The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Few comments about the contentions by Stephen Cohen:
1. Stephen P. Cohen, a Jew, is considered very pro-Pakistani-Establishment. What he wrote above is an effort to maintian an image of scholarly fairness. He therefore reveals only a tip of the ice-berg.

  1. Note that the "core of Pakistan", as specified in the geopoltics course taught in the Staff College Queta, is confined only to one province i.e. Punjab and doesn't include even a single district from any other province. Obviously, the rest of the provinces are peripheries. This shows the degree of emphasis on Punjab in Pakistan.

  2. Compare the geopolitical view propounded in the geopolitics course of Staff College Queta to the view of Aziz Hindi mentioned in a preceding post when he calls Punjab as the Prussia of Pakistan. This amply demonstrates that "Punjab being the core of Pakistan" is not just a limited view but something broadly shared by influential classes of one province.

  3. "East Pakistan will be defended from West Pakistan" was a typical stunt of the military leaders to ward off the Bangalis demand for adequate representation in armed forces. This in effect meant that almost all of the military establishment, installations, and power will be concentrated in West Pakistan and in the hands of West Pakistanis and that the undereepresentation of Bangalis in armed forces is strategically justified. One other argument, the military leaders of that time put forward to justify this was, Bangalis are not a martial race and are physically not fit to enlist.

  4. The geoplolitics course says that Punjab is the core and the other three provinces are invasion routes. A material manifestation of this thinking is that almost all the military industrial complexes, military installations, defence and strategic assets, headquarters of armed forces, military command and control, etc. are concentrated only in one province. This shows the imbalance.

  5. The geopolitics course says that "fall of the core would mean end of ...national resistence". This is but a ...categorical declaration of the "core's equivalence to Pakistan" and the "peripheral status" of the rest of the provinces.

  6. One wonders on what grounds are other three provinces called invasion routes? If the locus of threat to Pakistan lays in the north-west, then how do you include Sindh among the invasion routes? On the other hand if the locus of threat lays in the East accross Wahga, then how come call the Punjab "the core" but Sindh the "invasion route" whereas Sindh seems to be strategically more secure.

  7. The last excerpt in which the loyalties of Baluchis and Sindhis to Pakistan and their martial qualities are doubted is rather more inflamatory and is indicative of a parochial view of patriotism.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

To answer your questions

1: It is supposed to by law..in fact payments ..have been rarely consistent..and often NWFP has not been paid at all, also the amount has been capped at 6 billion rupees when in fact post 1996 it should have been increased to 10 billion. and subsequently 18 billion as Diurrani stated

2: No it has not agreed to the payment..the issue is on arbitration..something which WAPDA and the federal government had been refusing to do over the last 20 odd years. In fact one porposal going around by the federal government was to reduce payments

3: Yes, there are several arguments about this issue:

  1. By the Federal government: NWFP should give up claim to the money owned..and accept payment capped at 6 billion rupees.with no upward adjustments in royalty or any influence over control off the hydel stations be allowed (private control is acceptable but NWFP control is not)

  2. At a maximum NWFP should be compensated from a time period of 1990 onwards.

  3. NWFP should not claim any interest or inflation adjustments for the money owned, however the Federal government can offer loans to cover the budget deficit at double digit rates

What NWFP has asked for:

  1. A system evolved whereby the money is paid directly to the Provincial government..depriving the Federal government off the power to abuse its power as it has done since 1973.

  2. Backdated payments be made in full and adjusted for inflation,or on interest equivalent to the amount that has been charged to the province on loans.

  3. Greater Control of the stations be transferred to Provincial control or guaranteed representation of the province in boards controlling the stations.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

  1. Silly, go on inventing ethnicities for the elite to hide the truth. Your style of argumentation is as if Punjab doesn't exist at all. Common culture, common language, common history, common geography, and common interests are what characterize an ethnicity and not some vague concept as blood lineage.

  2. Stephen P. Cohen is a friend of Pakistan's powerful establishment. That is why he has earned the ire of Indians. As one of the most senior South Asian experts, he has a great impact on American policy for South Asia and has almost always pleaded the case of Pakistan. Moreover, what he quoted is from the course on geopolitics taught in Staff College Queta and not his own concoction.

Zahid Choudri, a Punjabi from Lahore, writes in his Political History of Pakistan:

"No other factor has had such a great impact on the political history of our country as Punjabi chauvinism. The long spans of martial laws were the result of this chauvinism. The clash between Punjabi chauvinists and Muhajirs intensified when any one of them became the sole power-holder. Muhajirs got this opportunity in the rule of Liaqat Ali Khan whereas Punjabis had it in the form of Ghulam Mohammad, Choudri Mohammad Ali, Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan, and Gen. Ziaul Haq. But Punjabis and Muhajirs become allies whenever a third ethnicity emerged and tried to reach power or any member of it actually grabbed power. Sometimes, a puppet from a another ethnicitiy was put on the throne to shut its mouth. Such puppets sometimes included weak personalities like Khwaja Nazimuddin, Mualvi Tamizuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Hussain Shaheed Suharwardi, Noorul Amin, and Mohammad Khan Junejo and sometimes strong people like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Shiekh Mujibur Rahman. Those who were ousted easily but those who were strong met an unfortunate fate (reference is here to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Shiekh Mujib, and Liaqat Ali Khan)."

About the situation in East Pakistan at that time, this author writes:

"Bangalis were in majority in Pakistan but they not only had no representation in the central administration but were also subjects of the Punjabi bureaucracy with imperialist mind-set. Aziz Ahmad, a Punjabi, was the Punjabi chief secretary of East Pakistan. This person was a "pakkaa sahib". His was so stiff-necked that it seemed his neck was made of plywood. He showed contempt for provincial ministers apart from common Bangalis and sent secret reports about them to the central government. The military commander of East Pakistan was Major General Mohammad Ayub Khan a Punjabi from District Hazara of Pakistan. This person had such a cheap mentality that he not only considered Bangalis inferior but also expressed his contempt for them openly. He was not in favor of Bangalis recruitment in army and in this regard he held the imperialist view of racial and martial classification. He insulted provincial ministers and members of assembly. Although he himself was stupid and nominally educated but considered himself super human in military uniform."

  1. As for Gawadar, strategic and economic motives/interests of the ruling elite, and other powers in the region, are at the basis of this project and not the wefare of Baluchi people. This point has already been explained by Zakk and doesn't need further comment. By the way, why doesn't the center grant provincial autonomy and control of resources to Baluchistan if the well-being of Baluchis is a motive?

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

I have a question i.e. what is the history of military operations in Pakistan? Which areas have seen military actions and which not? Hope someone helps!

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Shahid Kardar, is a respected writer on economic issues and a former Punjab Provincial Finance Minister. This article is one of many by him and other writes pointing out the unjust system that the people in Isloo seem to perpetuate.

The bitterness of the Baloch

By Shahid Kardar

The Baloch feel acutely deprived and are very angry. The causes of their distress are deep-rooted and some suggestions from official quarters that Akbar Bugti wants to extract a heavier pound of flesh than that which he is already getting from the system and that an external hand is exploiting the odious incident at the Sui facility, is a poor attempt to trivialize the significance of the long-standing complaints of the Baloch.

This article focuses on the raw economic hand that has been dealt to Balochistan under different dispensations over the years, by reviewing the present arrangements.

Of Balochistan’s total budgeted revenue receipts of Rs. 26.4 billion for this year, close to 94 per cent are expected to flow from the federal government, either as its share from the divisible pool of taxes (Rs. 10.3 billion, a share of 38.9 per cent), as straight transfers (Rs. 7.4 billion, 27.9 percent), or as subvention grants for its backwardness (Rs. 5.8 billion, 22 per cent).

The province only contributes around six per cent of revenues, which also highlights both the heavy dependence on federal transfers and the huge mismatch between the assigned responsibilities of the province and the wherewithal available to it to discharge such obligations.

The high fiscal dependence on federal transfers is on account of the centralized tax structure (especially after the introduction of GST), the almost exclusive powers granted by the Constitution to the federal government to make use of the revenue potential provided by all major, broad-based and buoyant taxes and the skewed distribution of tax revenues brought about by the NFC Award of 1997, which has resulted in a revenue sharing formula that favoured the federal government at the expense of the provincial governments.

For Balochistan, not only have total federal transfers (including straight transfers in the form of the Gas Development Surcharge (GDS) and royalty on gas, subvention grants and the 2.5 per cent provincial share of GST) grown at a modest rate of 1.8 per cent per annum since 2001/02, but they have also tended to be volatile and unpredictable, at least until recently, often rendering the provincial revenue and expenditure estimates unrealistic.

The high degree of dependence on federal transfers has left Balochistan little leeway in absorbing the cost of shortfalls in such transfers, since the potential for mobilization of revenues from its own taxes and user charges for provincially provided services has tended to be limited.

As of now the NFC divisible pool is distributed on the basis of population. This formula uses population as the sole criterion, meaning that all development is about, and for, people.

However, this suggests that all citizens of Pakistan should be treated equally, regardless of the fact that population density is not the same across provinces and all provinces are not starting from similar initial positions of service provision.

There is a minimum overhead and administrative cost of providing a service based on an acceptable standard of service delivery. Balochistan with its scattered and sparsely populated settlements has to bear a higher unit cost for providing services.

Since Balochistan has a low population density, a high level of poverty and backwardness (in terms of provision of infrastructure like roads and electricity and health and education services) A large land-mass, a purely population-based division of the divisible pool puts Balochistan at a distinct disadvantage.

Under the 1997 NFC Award Balochistan has been receiving subvention grants to cater for the special development needs of the province. The problem with this approach is that there are no agreed criteria for setting the level of subvention. Resultantly, the Balochistan government has little leverage in negotiating a specific amount in the form of subvention.

There has been some indexation of the basic amount with inflation, but the criteria for determining the basic amount as well as negotiating raises is not clearly defined, affecting the predictability and certainty of resource flows under this head from the federal government.

As mentioned above, Balochistan also receives direct transfers from the federal government on account of its ownership of gas. These transfers relate to the excise duty and royalty on gas, and its share of the Gas Development Surcharge (GDS).

The excise duty on gas is based on production volumes. The excise duty is set at a low rate (of Rs. 5.30 per BTU), which was established several years ago. The federal government sets the rate and collects the tax, and then transfers the respective shares to the provinces.

Since Balochistan has no role in the entire process, it cannot influence the federal government’s policy on this count. The royalty on gas is paid in recognition of the ownership right of the province.

It is fixed at the rate of 12.5 per cent of the gas sold and valued at the well-head price. However, the well-head price has been pitched at a low level for the gas fields in Balochistan, compared with the royalty being paid on gas fields elsewhere, those discovered recently whose well-head prices are much higher.

The well-head prices of the gas fields in Balochistan have been fixed on a cost-plus formula, well below the well-head prices of new gas fields, requiring an adjustment in favour of Balochistan by transferring to it the difference between royalty at a market price and the well-head price for fields which are on the cost-plus formula.

At present, the GDS is determined on the basis of the cost of exploration and is distributed between the provinces according to the proportion of volume contributed by different gas fields to total national gas supply.

This sharing arrangement has been put in place despite the fact that the GDS collected is a function of the difference between the weighted prescribed price (determined on the basis of the well-head price, O&M cost, excise duty, etc.) and the price paid by the consumer.

GoB’s gas fields are mature and are fast depleting, which has resulted in the reduction of the share of Balochistan in the GDS. Since the well-head price for Balochistan fields is low, its contribution margin, per unit of gas, to the total GDS is more than the contribution of gas fields in other provinces.

By allocating GDS receipts on the basis of volumes rather than total value of gas sold (being the product of volume and average weighted price paid by the final consumers), Balochistan’s share is being artificially depressed.

Whereas it contributes 53 per cent to 65 per cent under different formulas, it is now getting a share of roughly 35 per cent in the GDS distributed between the provinces.

If the formula is changed to give Balochistan a fair share, it would get a GDS of approximately Rs. 9.8 billion instead of the present Rs. 4.8 billion. Also, Rs. three to four billion rupees is due to Balochistan for the difference in GDS payable by gas producers on the basis of collections and the GDS liability paid by them to-date.

In the light of the discussion above this writer strongly believes that to be able to address the kind of grievances being articulated by the Baloch (and for that matter also by the Pashtuns and the Sindhis), a new federal structure has to be devised in the interest of stability in Pakistan.

This will require a recasting of the Constitution and the establishment of a more viable structure that gives meaningful autonomy to the provinces. This realignment will involve a slashing of the Concurrent List and the handing over of full control of all key resources (especially those found below the ground like oil, gas and other major minerals) to the provinces where these resources are located.

**In defence of this proposal one can argue that if Pakistan’s political and economic structure were to be implanted in the US, Texas (and for that matter in other federations in the world, like Canada and Australia) with all its oil, would not be rich; instead entrepreneurs in New York and Washington would be living it up.

Contrast the situation in the US in which the wealth of Texas belongs to the citizens of that state with that in Pakistan where the gas rich Balochistan, the owner of this country’s lifeline and the richest resource, is the least developed province in both physical and social terms and which continues to beg for funds from the federal government to stay afloat. **

More importantly, Islamabad has to be persuaded to give up many of the activities that it has taken upon itself to perform, largely because of the massive share of national revenues and resources that it appropriates.

This is why the federal development programme includes not only Gwadar, the Coastal Highway and the Sandak projects but also the construction of provincial roads (like those connecting Chaman and Quetta and Quetta and Kila Saifullah), which should be implemented by the provincial government, essentially because some of them, even under this flawed Constitution, fall entirely within the purview of the provincial and local governments.

Other than problems being encountered on account of poor coordination between different tiers of government and some duplication of effort and expenditures, the projects also suffer from poor design and lack of prioritization, activities that the provincial government is much better placed to carry out.

It is just that the federal government will simply not let go of functions and resources that rightfully belong to lower formations of government. The answer to the injustice felt by the Baloch lies in solutions outlined above and a genuine federal system and not in conjuring at a political system around some misconceived notion of ‘supreme national interest’ nor by simply increasing the size of the federal government’s development programme in Balochistan and enhancing the job quotas for the Baloch in federally managed public services and projects.

The writer is a former finance minister of Punjab.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

And another article by Dr Faisal Bari..this article also explodes the myth that donor and investment groups would be put of because off the MMA…(not that I ama fan of the MMA) but in fact that NWFP does have all the right circumstances for investment if the federal government empower the province and assists in its development

Development and differences

by Dr Faisal Bari
The Punjab and to an extent the NWFP seem to be doing better, economically, than most of Sindh and Balochistan. Some evidence of this is available from the last Labour Force Survey as well. ** Unemployment went down in the Punjab, and marginally in the NWFP, and it rose a little in Sindh and significantly in Balochistan. There are differences in North and South of Punjab and in rural and urban Balochistan too, but the provincial story is important as well. **

Apart from any real differences, perceptions about the differences in the provinces are certainly widening. There is lots of talk about Punjab getting a significant amount of investment, both domestic and foreign, and Lahore becoming a thriving hub of activity. Sialkot and Faisalabad doing well too, and in addition the belt between Gujranwala and Gujrat also picking up. Granted that most of these are relatively in the North of the province, but they do constitute a fairly large area. People are talking of how donors love the Punjab and the NWFP, but are reluctant to go into Sindh and Balochistan. There is a buzz about the ‘parha-likha Punjab’ and the girl-school initiatives in NWFP, but seldom do we hear of similar initiatives or claims of success from the other provinces.

All of the above, whether based on real differences or differences in perceptions, do not bode well for national integration, inter-provincial harmony and balanced development. Our provinces, unlike say the various States in the US, represent different ethnic and linguistic groupings. Large differences between them, or even perceived differences, can be devastating for national unity. History has, if it has shown us anything, shown this in as graphic a way as possible in the form of the independence movement in East Bengal.

Perceptions can alter in a matter of years. A few years ago Sindh seemed to be doing well and was perceived as a front-runner in terms of attempting reforms successfully and starting to manage issues in health, education and delivery of social services. And now, in just a few years, it is perceived as a very difficult province to work in. This also brings out the importance of the political process as well. Sindh has a very difficult political situation. The party that won the most seats in the provincial elections has been kept out of government. This has been achieved by cobbling together a coalition that does not have much in common between its members except for the desire to be in power and to keep the majority party out. But it has led to too many political impasses. The coalition in power has major problems of division of power between themselves. In most cases this has led to mismanagement of programmes, delays and abandonment of programmes that had a lot of promise. The fact that the provincial government, with the Chief Minister from interior Sindh, sits in Karachi, but has a MMA-backed person controlling the district government, and MQM dominated approach to management of provincial affairs creates problems that have not been resolved so far. In fact, with time they have become more entrenched. Some international donors, though none have pulled out of Sindh, have become much more wary of investing there or starting new programmes there. In fact in some instances I have even heard donors saying that they are under pressure from the government to ‘do something for and in Sindh’ but they do not know what.
The issues in Balochistan, though different, are having similar results. Balochistan government has major issues of capacity at the district and even the provincial levels. A lot of DMG and other federal service posts lie vacant in Balochistan. Even where some departments have capable and trained officers, there are too few of them. Turnovers are high, and especially at the Provincial Secretary level most officers who are from outside of the province seem to be almost ready to catch the next plane out of Quetta. A Quetta posting is treated as almost a ‘punishment posting’ in the civil service. If posts remain vacant longer, officers are more interested in getting a transfer than in getting work done, junior staff is not as trained, and motivation levels are low, it is hard to see how things can improve or projects be implemented well.

In addition, coalition politics has not helped here too. The distinct priorities of the coalition partners have more often stalled or slowed down implementation of projects than have helped. Perceptions, again based on reality or not, have not helped either. A lot of development-community members think that the Balochistan government has more rent-seeking activity going on than in other provinces. This does not encourage people to go and work there, or invest in the province.

It is true that the NWFP has been hurt a little by the fact that it has an MMA government when the federal government has a coalition that does not include MMA. The provincial government has, over the last few years, alleged that it has had delays in getting funds, its issues and concerns have not been heard in a timely and prompt manner, and it has been given Governors who have made life more difficult for the provincial government. But current government has survived these things and has developed a bit of a reputation for getting things done in certain areas. The emphasis that the provincial government has placed on education, especially on education of girls, has stood them in good stead with the donors. Most donors were pleasantly surprised by the fact that an MMA government was(and is) giving female-education such a priority, and this alone, more than anything else, has meant that donors have been quite willing to invest in the province.

A few years ago when the international and local interest rates went down and the Federal government also wanted to control its fiscal position better, it decided to give the provinces the right to negotiate programme and project loans directly with multilateral and bilateral donors and lenders. All of these loans still carry a sovereign guarantee of the country, are signed on by the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) in Islamabad, and are contracted with the knowledge of the federal government, but they are negotiated by the provinces, and conditionalities are set by the provinces themselves in direct negotiations with the lenders. ** The federal government has successfully passed on the burden of negotiation for the provinces to them, and it has also released itself of the duty to finance most of provincial development. **

The decentralization of loan negotiation is good for the provinces too as they can not only determine the levels of assistance they require themselves, they can also negotiate directly and set provincial priorities themselves. But it has a downside too. Provincial capacity, prowess and ability, as well as perceptions of its competence matter more now than before. It is in this context that the above discussion should be understood. If a province is taken to have a competent and effective bureaucracy and a fairly functional political setup, as in the Punjab and the NWFP, they are likely to become the darling for the lenders and they will have access to as much money as they want and even more. But if a province is perceived to have major capacity or system issues (Balochistan) or major political problems (Sindh and to an extent Balochistan), these provinces could be avoided by lenders. One could argue that this is how it should be. In a way the market forces seem to be working here so that better risk for lenders are paying off in better terms and conditions for borrowers. This is true, but if we are thinking of issues of national integration, harmony and cohesion, we cannot let the market take provinces too far apart from each other. This can create major issues for us later.

** The federal government has a role here. It has to ensure that all provinces remain fairly close to each other. This does not mean that it has to slow down the fast movers, it means it has to come to the aid of the slower ones. If differences are based on perceptions alone and not reality, the federal government can remove the perceptual differences by providing requisite guarantees. But if the differences are real, the federal government has to help the province get over its limitations. How it is achieved will be tricky, but the importance of doing it cannot be underestimated. **
E-mail queries and comments to: [email protected]

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

About two years back, the Govt of NWFP launched a project to expand the hydro-electric power generation capacity of Malakand(Jaban) Hydroelectric Power Station by installing more turbines. The extra turbines were to generate 85 Mega Watts of electricty which was to be supplied to local industries to boost industrial development in the province. Loans were taken by the province from international banks for this purpose.

Now the central government has decided to distribute the 85 MW electricity from this facility through "national grid" in "Lahore". Meanwhile, Govt of Punjab has declared the supply of electricity to its farmers on subsidized rates to boost agriculture.

Another event is that of the discovery of oil and gas in Shakardara, Kohat. The supply line from this oil facility has been linked with the national grid and the gas from Shakardara has been linked to industries in Mianwali, Punjab.

Here it is worth-mentioning that wheat produced in Punjab has subsidized rates in Punjab. A standard bag of wheat-flour comes for Rs. 740 in Punjab but Rs. 850 in NWFP. A flour miller from NWFP, or for that matter any other province, doesn't have the permission to buy wheat from open market in Punjab. Moreover, a flour miller, from Baluchistan for example, is not supplied wheat until supplied to flour millers of Punjab. Ironically, the uninterrupted supply of natural gas from Baluchistan runs industries in many areas of the country including Punjab. Contrary to the price of wheat, a unit of gas has the same price in Lahore as in Baluchistan.

It must be mentioned that natural resources are federally-owned in Pakistan but agriculture provincially-owned.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

The Nation-Nawai-Waqt is a Punjab-based newspaper, a mouth-piece for Punjab's interest. Moreover, never ever believe in the fabricated figures by Pakistani sources. No industrial development is in sight in NWFP. And unemployment is also rising in NWFP.

These are all lies. Otherwise point me a single big foreign or domestic investment in NWFP. This inclusion of NWFP of NWFP in the list of well-off provinces is an attempt to conceal the imperial position of the Punjab.

These are plain lies.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Inventing ethnicity? The following people are not Punjabi by any stretch of the imagination - go check any sources you want, and prove the contrary if you want?

General Mirza Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff, 1988 - 1991. - Mohajir.
[thumb=H]ASLAM27192_3237348.JPG[/thumb]

General Wahid Kakar, Chief of Army Staff, 1993 - 1996. - Pashtun.
[thumb=H]WAHEED27192_5313265.JPG[/thumb]

General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, 1998 - present. - Mohajir.
[thumb=H]General_Musharaf27192_9061564.JPG[/thumb]

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Wrong - he was a Pashtun from Hazara, NWFP.

Khan was born in the village of Rehana near Haripur Hazara to an ethnic Pashtun family, the first child of the second wife of Mir Dad Khan, who was a Risaldar Major in Hodson’s Horse.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayub_Khan)

[thumb=H]Ayubkhan27192_5112974.JPG[/thumb]

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Sir, you stated that Jang /News/Geo group are Punjabi-owned, and I proved you were incorrect. They are the second richest industrial group in Pakistan, have always been based in Karachi, Sindh and and are owned by Mohajirs of Hyderabad-Deccani origin. Unless you can prove otherwise from any sources you have?

Look above - even people defending the rights of NWFP and Balochistan are quoting from The Nation-Nawai-Waqt Punjab-based newspaper as you claim. Are you saying we should dismiss these sources because you hate anything Punjabi-owned? I will seriously read what Zak and others have posted from these sources and others even if you will not.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Punjab get’s less per head from the federal government, and the other three provinces get more, especially Balochistan.

Total per capital federal transfers to Punjab are significantly lower as compared to other federating units. Punjab received only Rs 1,600 per head from the federal divisible pool as compared to Rs 2,000 of NWFP, Rs 2,400 of Sindh and Rs 3,500 of Balochistan during the year 2003-2004.

http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2004-daily/02-02-2004/main/main8.htm

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

“Why is Punjab ready for peace?” is an interesting article by Dr. Munis Ahmad published in News, Marh 22, 2005. The article can be read at

http://www.apnaorg.com/articles/moonis-1/

Here is an excerpt from the article.

“But if Punjab has become ready for peace with India by allowing greater interaction with the Indian part of Punjab, then it should also allow the people of Sindh to interact with their brothers and sisters in Rajasthan, the Pushtuns in the North-Western Frontier Province to have soft borders with their counterparts living in Afghanistan and the Baloch to meet with their fellows in Iranian Balochistan. Most important, the Punjab-dominated military and bureaucratic establishment should stop suspecting the loyalty of migrants from India and refrain from creating hurdles in issuing visas for Urdu-speaking Indians interested in visiting Pakistan. The teachers of Sindh’s universities, particularly those in Karachi, should not be discouraged from visiting India and the condition of seeking clearance from security agencies for their visit to India should be withdrawn immediately

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

^
Have you been able to prove the following Chiefs of Army are/were Punjabi's or even from Punjab?

Field Marshal Ayub Khan - Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, 1958 - 1969 - Pashtun.
[thumb=H]Ayubkhan27192_5112974.JPG[/thumb]

General Musa Khan, Chief of Army Staff, 1958 - 1969. - Pashtun.
[thumb=H]MUSA27192_8907073.JPG[/thumb]

General Yahya Khan, Chief of Army Staff, 1969 - 1971. - Persian
[thumb=H]Yahyakhan27192_3182233.JPG[/thumb]

General Mirza Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff, 1988 - 1991. - Mohajir.
[thumb=H]ASLAM27192_3237348.JPG[/thumb]

General Wahid Kakar, Chief of Army Staff, 1993 - 1996. - Pashtun.
[thumb=H]WAHEED27192_5313265.JPG[/thumb]

General Ehsanul Haq - Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Committee, 2004 - present. - Pashtun.
[thumb=H]ehsan27192_7186827.JPG[/thumb]
[/QUOTE]

General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff, 1998 - present. - Mohajir.
[thumb=H]General_Musharaf27192_9061564.JPG[/thumb]

Do you even know the ethnicities of the present 9 Corp Commnders of the Pakistan Army?

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

SB: Ayub was an Ethnic pashtun as you said, like Leghari was an ethnic Baloch..but the Legharis were for all intents and purposes Seriaki now..similarly Ayub was a Hindko speaking Pathan..he had no constituency in the Pashtun belt..in fact opposition to AYub Khan from 1968 started from the Pashtun belt.

Musa Khan was not ethnic Pashtun he was Hazara from Baluchistan.

Quoting the federal transfers per head is an anoamaly..Punjab and Sindh are far less dependant on Federal government transfers.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Millions of ethnic Pashtuns speak Hindko, just as millions of Hindko-speakers also speak Pashto. Is that not correct? Does that necessarily define their ethnic groupings? Musa Khan was from Balochistan - so Pakistan has had a non-Punjabi Balochistani as military chief. That is very good to here. :slight_smile:

Much larger federal transfers per head to the smaller provinces, as copmpared to Punjab is very relevant, and at least goes some way to disprove some of the one-sided arguments against Punjab domination. Not that I am doubting other factual examples of the inequalities of the present federal dispensation in Pakistan, which I believe are being slowly corrected. I hope for instance that this government pursues the recent proposal to slash the concurrent legislative list in the constitution.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

come join India and we can live togther :smiley:

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

SB: Again circular arguments , many Southern Punjabi Seriaki speakers
speak Punjabi..but you include them as Baloch..should we add them into the Punjab grouping ..that would shift the balance dramatically in many of the stats. Hindko speakers are not ethnically defined as Pashtun..anymore than most Ethnic Baloch in Sindh classify themselves as Baluchi. They maybe perceived as "ethnically foreign" by locals..but their futures and interests are all in their respective provinces.

WHy is it that Nawaz Sharif becomes a Kashmiri when someone mentions him as an example of a leader from Punjab but Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan are mentioned as examples of Pashtuns? playing with semantics about ethnicity and domicile is an easy way to get around the argument of ethno-regional imbalances.

Federal Transfers: Again.. Federal transfers in %age represents the NFCs transfers from the divisble pool...the remaining 60+% of the NFC which is with the federal government..the bulk is spent on the Military budget, civil service, debt servicing and the PDSP ..traditionally all of these favour in terms of balance people from Punjab (Northern Punjab), Sindh (Karachi), NWFP ( Peshawar.contrary to what people assume is not a pashtun city, and mardan, kohat and the hazara belt)

Concurrent list: It was supposed to be abolished in 1978, any devolution now would have to do far more than just remove the concurrent list..

LOTD: You are confusing Baris comments about provicnial labour rates and ethnic ones...if you include FATA ...pashtuns are pushed to near the bottom..barely above Baloch of the barrel as far as Human development indicators are concerned.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Almost all the serious and research-oriented writings on the political or military history of Pakistan, I studied, called General Mohammad Ayub Khan a Punjabi. The reason for this is obvious. First Ayub Khan was a Hindku-speaker. And Hindku is a dialect of Punjabi, so considered by almost all the linguists.

Second, ethnicity doesn't neccessarily imply race. It may imply any thing, from religion to race and language to culture, that may define the group allegiances of a person in a given context. That is why we hear such terms as ethnic Muslim (here religion being the basis for ethnicity) or ethnic Asian (here geography and physiogymy are the determinents). In Pakistani context, we would take the territorial, linguistic, and cultural affiliations together with one's thrust of interests to define one's ethnicity. I'll rather say that political loyalties should also be taken into account. A Baluchi who has been subservient to the center against the interests of Baluchis would not be a proper Baluchi.

Those people of Peshawar, Sawabi, Nowshera, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, etc. who spoke hindku few generations back are now either bilingual or Pashto-speakers and as such are part and parcel of Pashtun body-sociale by culture and language, type of social institutions, norms and values, and commanlity of interests. They are not distinguishable from Pashtuns.

The situation of Haripur ( birth place of Ayub Khan ) unlike upper Hazara, where Pashtun-Kashmiri cultural influences pre-dominate, is different. Due to its geographical proximity with Punjab, its inhabitants have preferred linguistic and cultural affinities with Punjabis rather than Pashtuns.

Anyhow, I wonder, why don't you accept Nawaz Sharif to be a Punjabi? Where was the center of his political loyalties?

Here is something for you.

Ayub Khan...an ethnic Punjabi (if you are not willing to accept him Punjabi then accept him as an ethnic Hindku-speaker)
General Musa Khan...an etnic Hazara, Shia, and Persian
General Yahya Khan...an ethnic Qazlabash Persian that also spoke Hindku
General Gul Hassan...ethnic Pashtun
General Tikka Khan....ethnic Punjabi (the general who massacred Bangalis)
General Ziaul Haq......ethnic Punjabi (migrated from Punjab to whom a house was alloted from the Hindu-evacue property in Peshawar)
General Mirza Aslam Baig...a Muhajir
General Asif Nawaz Janjua...an ethnic Punjabi
General Kakar...ethnic Pashtun
General Gehangir Karamat...ethnic Punjabi
General Musharaf....ethnic Muhajir

But all this statistic on ethincities of various chiefs is very misleading. It is not the question of one invidual. An individual is nothing. It is the question of the whole hierarchy that extends down from him. It is the question of the whole institutional structure, set-up, and composition. It is the question of the set-up of the entire politico-adminstrative and economic system. Even the ostensibly powerful Musharaf has to toe Punjab's line and has to rely on the military and political power of Punjab to survive. The day he ignored Punjab he will be sent back home. The guy is so cautious about this point that he has settled in Gujranwala and is reluctant to strike a deal with Benazir.

Anyhow, we should look to things in totality. (What about other forces? What about core commanders formation? what about the whole military-and-civil bureaucratic hierarchy? what about the industrial and finacial elite? what about the fuedals power? what about share in industrail-economic development? what about constitution? what about power of senate and national assembly? what about share in media...etc.).

Moreover, I will find about this Jang group soon. However, I am sure it is Punjab-based.

Re: The Ultimate Losers in Pakistan!

Zak Sir, it is quite simple.

  1. If you want to look people’s ethnic groups, rather the area/province they reside in, then ethnic Punjabi’s still have not dominated the military-politcal structure i.e. actual executive power, not window dressing.

  2. But, if you want to look at the province they reside in, rather than their ethnicity then again you will see that Punjab has not been dominant.

The choice is yours to make, not semantics.

Ethnic Balochi’s in Sindh do define themselves as Balochi - just check the census figures, and the cross-provincial tribal linkages. Farooq Leghari is the Sardar of a Balochi Leghari tribe](http://uk.msnusers.com/BalochCircle/photoalbum1.msnw) whose people live in the “Seraiki” belt that crosses the boundaries of all four provinces, and who has known to favour them before others. Nawaz Sharif is a Kashmiri not just because of his parentage or for the purposes of semantics, but by his governance of the country, whereby his administration was loaded with his Kashmiri brethern to the detriment of not just the smaller provinces, but also the wider Punjab. Where did I define Yahya Khan as a Pashtun?