Re: Out of Kargil
^
The Indian Hindu fanatics burned thousands of Muslims alive in Gujrat, so save us your symapathy over Kargil.
Re: Out of Kargil
One Indian failure after another.
http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/1673.asp
**Indian Army admits a series of blunders and critical failures in Kargil report **
Media Release
Feb. 21, 2005
Five years down the Kargil war, the Army has admitted a series of blunders and critical failures that cost with the lives of its 474 officers and men in an “internal assessment report”, documented from top secret operational notes with the military operations directorate. The 250-odd page secret report on the war fought on the icy heights of Kargil between May and July 1999 that has been scooped by the Indian English weekly Outlook in its latest edition is full of sensational revelations like:
*** Senior commanders reached late. There were lapses in command and control.
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There was total intelligence failure.
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It was presumed that an overt nuclear posture would guarantee peace.
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The army was in low intensity conflict mode and unprepared for a conventional war.
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There was a sense of complacency. It was assumed there would be no incursion across difficult and harsh terrain.
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Senior officers were physically unfit. And there was lack of initiative at the JCO-NCO level.
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Troops didn’t have any acclimatisation.
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Northern Command was stretched and troop levels were not adequate. **
While stressing that three defence chiefs were indecisive and so was then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the weekly magazine says the secret report not only chronicalises what went wrong but also puts on record what India’s defence establishment has done to ensure that such lapses don’t occur in the future. The secret report, according to the magazine, is a result of the decision to take a dispassionate look at the war and to record its history and disseminate it among top generals of the army was taken two years ago when Gen N.C. Vij took over as army chief. He had witnessed the war at close quarters as the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), a position that had given him the first knowledge of the secret operational notes. Gen. Vij got the documents compiled for the benefit of the army’s senior commanders to learn “valuable lessons of the art of war”-a war that was fought in recent times and won, albeit after paying a heavy price. The report is full of the critical failures that happened at various levels. Senior commanders failed to deliver, the intelligence set-up proved ineffective, battalions were led by people too old to climb razor-edge peaks in sub-zero climes, rifles that were introduced midway through the war created problems and the delay in deploying air power during the conflict prolonged the war.
INTELLIGENCE FAILURE: According to the army’s assessment in the report, one of the biggest lessons of the Kargil war was that there “was a sense of complacency among the officers and men”. It was believed at the command level and on the ground that the “terrain was so difficult that there would not be any incursions”. The army’s “winter posture” had led to vacating a few critical posts. This was coupled with the fact that nearly “a 130 km stretch between Turtuk and Zojila had no sensors”. The “winter air surveillance operations (WASO)” is described as “at best, not very effective.” The assessment also recognises another factor that caused much heartburn within the army’s higher echelons-the fact that there were no inputs from the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), whose prime task is to gather foreign intelligence. While RAW did manage an “intelligence scoop by intercepting a call between Gen Pervez Musharraf and his chief of staff”, there were no initial inputs on the extent of incursions into Kargil. The fact that there were “no ground sensors” on the 130 km stretch also adversely affected the army’s ability to preempt the incursions. It has also been put on record that Military Intelligence was unable to “analyse certain inputs”. For instance, there were reports of “large-scale animal transport movements on the Pakistani side of the LoC”. However, military intelligence summarised that these were undertaken to replenish ammunition for the Pakistani artillery regiments. Lessons: A range of new technology has been introduced, including regular flights by unmanned aerial vehicles.
UNFIT SENIORS AND LAX JUNIORS: The assessment points out that with an older profile of “commanders at the battalion and brigade level”, the army was literally gasping for breath. Two commanding officers of infantry battalions were moved out as they were physically unfit to deal with the demands made by the rugged terrain, high altitude and the rigours of war. The report also points out that equivalent Pakistani commanders were “younger by three to four years.” A sizeable proportion of the 474 killed during the war were young commissioned officers (lieutenants and captains) who had just passed out of the Indian Military Academy and had joined their respective units. The high casualty rate among them has been largely attributed in the assessment to the “severe lack of initiative in the junior leadership”, specifically among Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) who are platoon commanders. They were also found to be averse to taking risks. Finally, if the war was won, the report says, it was due to the “courage and leadership of the young (commissioned) officers” who “carried the bulk of the burden”.
Re: Out of Kargil
Firstly during kargil PAF was actively involved in protecting Pakistani airspace. PAF was not needed more than that. there were some political differences between the airforce and army at that time, but it was never taken to a point to jeopordise the security of the country. it has nothing to do with being coward. RMS Azam knows alot about airforce, but he has been wrong many many times. ANd i dont think he ever said PAF was coward. By the way did you ever get to see the hat tht PAF made during the recent tensions. Syed posted it once. It did not look like it was made by a coward airforce.
Re: Out of Kargil
Study of Kargil by RAND Corp.
Re: Out of Kargil
They even sacked people like Brigadier Surinder Singh, who dared to tell the truth of India’s humiliation in Kargil.
Re: Out of Kargil
Proudpakistani,
Here is an analysis of Kargil by Brig. Shaukat Qadir
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/JA00199.pdf
What kind of an air chief says to his country’s C in C that he will not be able to fight if an enemy attacks?
Is there a cap for this?
Re: Out of Kargil
HZ,
IA screwed up in Kargil by not detecting the incursion. The Indian Army itself accepts that. It punished people upto the General level for that. Civilian intelligence officers were punished too. All lost their jobs and pensions.
But PA to this day refuses to own up ot its mistakes. That is what I was pointing out. BTW, Gen. Zinni is a close personal friend of Musharraf to this day. He has no reason to lie as to who agreed to a withdrawal. Every other independent report corroborates the claim that it was Musharraf who ordered withdrawal after the conflict enlarged. Only later did he conveniently place the blame on Nawaz.
Re: Out of Kargil
I cannot open your document for some reason. Also what you have quoted, i dont see anywhere he said that he will not fight if enemy attacks. You are reading too much into it. When military goes to war, everything is discussed and looked at from every angle. waisay…dil ko khush rakhnay ko ghalib, yeh khayal acha hay. Khush rahoo yaar.
Re: Out of Kargil
So please enlighten us as to how running up a sheer cliff is the prefered method of assault in this case? At most, NATO admired your air and ground support, artillary and such. But who in their right mind would send their men to attack. headfirst a position that clearly advantageous to the enemy. It is well understood that even air support for these ground forces was didfficult at the time. So please do post the NATO’s evaluation of IA tactics… I really would like to know how this can be a good tactic..
Re: Out of Kargil
I can email/upload it if you like.
anyway if what you are saying makes sense why didn’t Musharraf think of such things before he set thousands of men upon Kargil? Shouldn’t such topics be discussed before sending people to die? What sort of General just impulsively sends his men to attack?
Re: Out of Kargil
I read through this and there doesnt seem to be anything wrong. The air chief was only making a point that in sight of our lack of proper readiness taking into account the sudden nature of the inccursion into Kargil, the Air force was simply not prepared to fight a war. Thats a probelm we have had as far back as the early 90’s when US put those sanctions in place? He didnt say he wouldnt fight, he says they couldnt provide the air support they need.
Re: Out of Kargil
According to the document, Musharaf and the other generals did not think that this would escalate into an all out war. The assumption was that they (the Indians) would deploy ground forces to Kargil, and get the selves cut off from supply lines. They (the generals) didnt think they would need air support, atleast not the kind needed for an all out war, since no full scale war was on the table…
And what kind of generals send thier men to die? UMMM, I think all generals do, including the ones that sent helicopters and ground forces to try and take out guys occupying high ground.
Re: Out of Kargil
Dude, who said it was running up that they admired. Yes, initiall IA Generals thought it was a few men and sent troops on a foolish death mission.
But IA adapted quickly, by late May/early June 1999 and these are the tactics that were discussed. Let me post one of them.
Here is the full text of the Tololing chapter
Re: Out of Kargil
The difference is that the IA Generals quickly adapted after they realized their mistakes. PA leadership tried to cover up its mistakes and let its men die without supplies or air support. They had no Plan B and once the crap hit the fan they washed their hands off.
BTW, contrary to your views, most of IA’s causalties were in the initial stages not due to vertical assaults, but due to artillery attacks by PA on Indian supply lines. Most of IA’s casualties till June were in the logistics side. Once the forwards positions were cleared, PA lost its “spotters” and IA’s casualties dropped down significantly.
Re: Out of Kargil
mis communication here.. I was talking about your initial response, which is still foolish. .Atleast they learn from their mistakes.
Re: Out of Kargil
there was nothing wrong with the plan Pakistani generals made. But politically Pakistan was not ready to do such a mission. And if your philosophy applies then why are there fire exchanges between soldiers, why are you guys sitting on siachin. it was known that some of Pakistani soldiers will die.
Re: Out of Kargil
Well, yeah, but that was part of their strategy. They didnt have a plan B, the whole thing was gamble. Sometimes when your faced with such odds, you have to gamble. Read some history, many generals have gambles, without a plan B EVEN!!! Many were succesful, many werent.. Its called war.
Regardless, you asked what kind of general.. Well, thats the definition of war isnt it, to send your men on a mission to die if they have to…
Re: Out of Kargil
PLEASE Talwar DO TELL!
Seems you conveniently overlook your own invasions...