Re: Out of Kargil
In the early days of the war, Army chief General Ved Prakash Malik reportedly told a senior commander that his (the officer was also the colonel commandant of one of the regiments fighting in Kargil) boys were not fighting bravely.
Three batallions ignored as nation honours martyrs of Kargil
Josy Joseph in New Delhi
It took courage, grit and many hundred lives to keep the Indian flag flying over the icy heights of Kargil. A year after the end of the 45-day Kargil war, on Wednesday, the government will pay homage to the martyrs of the conflict. However, three army units posted at Kargil when the intrusion was first detected – the 121 Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Surinder Singh, consisted of the 4 Jat, 3 Punjab and 16 Grenadiers – have not been honoured with a single medal for their involvement in the operations. Not a single soldier from these three batallions featured in the list of gallantry award winners in 1999.
The list was otherwise reflective of the government and army headquarters’s desire to commemorate the Kargil victory. There were four Param Vir Chakra winners, several other soldiers who won other gallantry medals, but none from the 121 Infantry Brigade. Lieutenant General H B Kala, Colonel Commandant of the Jat Regiment, wrote to Army Headquarters protesting this. He pointed out that the 4 Jat Battalion lost two officers and 19 soldiers and took part in several gallant operations during Operation Vijay. Army HQ responded to Lt Gen Kala on expected lines. Vice-Chief of the Army Staff Lt Gen Chandrasekhar wrote back, saying the three battalions needed to be pulled up for their failure in detecting the Pakistani intrusion.
This was not the first disagreement among the Army’s top brass. **In the early days of the war, Army chief General Ved Prakash Malik reportedly told a senior commander that his (the officer was also the colonel commandant of one of the regiments fighting in Kargil) boys were not fighting bravely. The comments were made when there were high casualties and few battlefield successes. The question about who should be blamed for the high, initial casualties remain. The soldiers went into battle without proper reconnaissance and intelligence inputs. Many commanding officers of battalions pleaded with senior commanders not to send their boys up the hills to be murdered. According to reliable sources, at least one CO posted at Kargil during the initial days of the operation, was transferred for refusing to obey his commander’s orders. The officer was later demoted – stripped of a star – to Lt Colonel rank. His present posting is not known. **
The 8 Sikh Battalion deserves special mention. The battalion, which was moved to the Kargil theatre, participated in several key operations. In early June when Tiger Hill caught the nation’s imagination, 8 Sikh was asked to capture the peak. Despite repeated attempts by its troops and several score casualties, the regiment could not succeed. It was only after a brigadier was deputed to plan the Tiger Hill operation, with detailed intelligence inputs, that Tiger Hill was finally captured on July 4, 5, 1999. It came after twenty soldiers and an officer were given special training in high altitude warfare by trainers from the High Altitude Warfare School in Sonmarg.
