Re: Out of Kargil
I see a comprehension problem here… try again.
Re: Out of Kargil
You are the one with basic reading problems.
I asked for links from neutral sources that claimed that IA was unable to evict PA intruders from their entrenched positions.
You responded with nothing that claimed what I was asking for.
Either post relevant stuff or ask refund from your high school. 
Re: Out of Kargil
Pak logic is that the victors requested for a withdrawal in Kargil. Frankly this country has not traveled a single inch forward from 1965.
The scenario in 1965 was same….as per Pak theory the victor General Ayub requested the West to intervene for a ceasefire.
What compelled the Pak PM Sharif to run to Clinton and request him to find some minutes for a meeting on 4th of July?
Pak citizens must thank Clinton that he has taken the credit, otherwise I may like to know who supplied white flags to Pak soldiers at Kargil.
Re: Out of Kargil
Yes anjjan, funny isn't it? In every war, Pakistan is about to win but for some reason the whole world conspires to make them give up.
Nawaz Sharif went to Washington because Musharraf asked him to. Musharraf wanted a face saver because his men were losing posts day after day and he could not dare to send them replenishments in the face of IAF's bombardment and IA's artillery fire. Surely IA would have taken some more time to clear every post but they were clearing them rapidly and were willing to do whatever it took to get them back.
Face savers are needed only for the losing side. If India were losing, it would be Vajpayee in DC not Nawaz Sharif. When 2 kids are fighting, only the loser runs to daddy for help.
Re: Out of Kargil
haha…talwaar, It was india that made the most noise when the whole thing happened. So guess who was running to daddy the whole time. And dont tell me that India is such an idiot that when its brave soldiers were winning post by post every day, the government took the credit away from them and gave it to US. If India was winning that much and killing that many Pakistanis, do you think they would let them escape after (as per your logic) Pakistan did such a thing to them by attacking their home land. I guess India did the right thing by running to US, you guys just have hard time accepting it.
Re: Out of Kargil
You guys try and try but the facts destroy your lies.
Fact 1: It was Pakistan that sent its leader to Washington, not India. Do you think India had some brainwave powers to make Musharraf ask Nawaz to go to DC? India was perfectly fine with its army doing the job of clearing the intruders. India even refused to ask for outside help, period. Even Clinton’s own memoirs said so and so did every neutral reporting of the war.
Fact 2: Indian govt never “gave it to the US.” But no Indian leader is going to say no when a third party gets the enemy to surrender. No one is that blood thirsty.
Funny thing this logic, it always makes Pakistanis look silly.
Re: Out of Kargil
proudman,
Study of Kargil by RAND Corp.
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR.../MR1450.ch3.pdf
I can post other neutral studies as well. IA did win post after post.
Re: Out of Kargil
Guys,
The logic is simple.
Step 1: Remove the usual Pak nonsense of Jewish conspiracy etc.
Step 2: Ask yourself, if a side is winning, why would its army chief ask his PM to go to Washington for a neogtiated exit?
Step 3: Ask yourself, which country's leader went to Washington
Step 4: Ask yourself, which country agreed to surrender the posts it occupied and that too in a hurried manner
Now ask yourself, why would 2,3,4 happen if that country was actually winning? And remember Step 1 -> No conspiracy.
You guys should be paying me for this education. :)
Re: Out of Kargil
PP,
More education for you. This is from Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha in "The Friday Times" March 29 - April 04, 2002.
[quote]
During the conflict Pakistan Army had run out of manpower properly acclimatized to fight at such heights. Reports suggest that during the last week of the operation Pakistan had to pull out men deployed at Siachin, leaving positions there vulnerable to an Indian attack. Hence, it was in the Army’s interest to convince the prime minister to negotiate peace with the adversary.
[/quote]
PA ran out of soldiers to fight. That is why Musharraf beat the retreat and sent Nawaz to DC.
Re: Out of Kargil
PP,
Tell me when you have had enough. Remember, there is a test at the end:)
This is from Brigadier Shaukat Qadir's report that I had linked before:
[quote]
Under cover of fire, elements of 2 Rajputana Rifles captured what the Indians called ‘Tololing top ’,(Point 45907),the most dominating height directly overlooking Dras,on 12 June. An adjacent post was captured on 13 June, and Tiger Hills (Point 5140), another dominating height, fell on 20 June. The army had continued to assert that no posts had fallen to the Indians,which reaffirms the contention that no effort was made to explain such a loss, or why it could not recur. However, in this case, it appears that Sharif found the Indian claims more credible than the Pakistan army’s denials.
[/quote]
PA kept losing posts but tried to lie that it did not happen. I wonder why :)
Re: Out of Kargil
PP, Let me soothe your pain by saying that the whole world is lying and only you are correct. 
NOT… 
Re: Out of Kargil
lol the thread still going on...looks like indians have not stopped whining yet....they are even coming up with algorithms justifying that they won... i can understand their frustration :D ....
good luck guys keep trying or crying over kargil
Re: Out of Kargil
Talwar all you do is show me reports that show the view point of some people. Just like i can have a view point and you can also. It does not show what the ground realities are.
here is my question to you.
If India was winning a war, why did it let US mediate? I mean India was winning a war, killing Pakistanis every day, and it still let US come in between them and shooting the people responsible for attacking their country. Even if ( for example that we accept) Pakistan went to the US first, why did India let the people who were responsible for an Indian colonel to say "they are killing us like dogs" go? Whether Nawaz sharif went there himself or under pressure from Musharraf, (your quotes contradict on that matter as well, which shows how authentic they are) it was US pressure that made pakistan leave the peaks. I am not saying that India did not take any peaks, but still the critical time of winter was comming near and India had not progressed as much as it claims it had.
Re: Out of Kargil
here is a report from interview by Brig Surender Singh from Times of India.
Key peak still in Pakistan's control.
CHANDIGARH: A former Indian Army officer has claimed a few strategic peaks in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir, including the crucial Point 5353, were still under occupation by Pakistani forces.
** Brig. Surinder Singh, who was dismissed from service in June 2001, also claimed the Indian defence establishment had misled the country by claiming it had gained control on the peaks in Kargil, where India and Pakistan fought a brief border conflict in 1999. **
Singh was sacked after being embroiled in a controversy with his superiors about alleged lapses and intelligence failures that led to Pakistan-backed intruders occupying strategic features along a 140-km stretch of the Line of Control.
He asserted he had proof that Point 5353, a hill in the Drass sector of north Kashmir, was still under Pakistani occupation.
"I have evidence of this claim including satellite images," he told reporters.
Singh said the alleged inaction of the defence and political leadership during the Kargil conflict was only the tip of the iceberg.
"The defence establishment had misled the nation about getting every intruder out of the Kargil sector. I can give proof of this to whatever committee the new government at the centre sets up," Singh said, noting he had written about the matter to Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee.
Singh said he had asked Mukherjee to order a thorough probe into the Kargil conflict and issues that were deliberately hidden by the previous coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party.
Re: Out of Kargil
Pakistan will NEVER run out of soldiers to fight for its mother land. YOu can claim you won 65, 71 or 99. I dont care, you can claim you won 48 also. what ever makes you happy. Allah aap ko sukh ki neend day.
Re: Out of Kargil
nahin naa he will not sleep until u agree mate
Re: Out of Kargil
haha…challo phir tawar bhai kay sukh ki khattar main aggree karta hoon. waisay bhi, he wont have to deal with me after a few more days.
Re: Out of Kargil
The Indian’s love sleeping, because it allows them to dream of victories they never achieved in reality.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1618/16180330.htm
**An Army caught napping **
The minutes of a crucial meeting of the Unified Headquarters, the apex body of organisations managing security in Jammu and Kashmir, show why the initial stages of India’s response to events in Kargil were confused and directionless.
PRAVEEN SWAMI
THE truth, like murder, will out, goes the maxim. Through the three months since the Kargil war began, military officials have insisted that they were prepared for Pakistan’s aggression and that the campaign was conducted to a well-thought-through plan f rom its early stages. 15 Corps Commander Lieutenant-General Krishan Pal had, in an interview, even described the campaign as an example of “generalship unparalleled in the history of warfare”. Now documents obtained by Frontline have disproved such claims. The Army knew next to nothing about the scale and character of the intrusion, even less about the structure of the war that was to follow, and it was entirely unprepared for a full-scale conflagration involving the Pakistan Army in Kargil. The minutes of the crucial first meeting on the Kargil war of the Unified Headquarters (UHQ), the apex body of organisations managing security in Jammu and Kashmir, cast light on events in the weeks that followed the detection on May 3 of Pakistan’s aggr ession. Disturbed by the blase reaction of the Army at that meeting to the occupation of some 1,500 sq km of Indian territory by Pakistani regulars, Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah flew to New Delhi on May 24, accompanied by Chief Secretary Ashok Jaitley and Director-General of Police Gurbachan Jagat. There he discovered that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and top government officials were unaware of the events unfolding on the Kargil heights. It was a day of desperate pleading before the Cabinet Co mmittee on Security met on May 25. (This sequence of events was reported in Frontline’s July 2 issue.)
On May 19, a fortnight after Pakistan’s intrusion was detected on the Batalik heights, the UHQ met in Srinagar. The emergency meeting was called to discuss the intrusion and, its minutes record, the “emerging security scenario”. The UHQ is chaired by the Chief Minister. His Security Adviser, the 15 Corps Commander, could by custom chair UHQ meetings in the Chief Minister’s absence, and thus he played a special role in its deliberations. That this meeting was an unusual one is evident from the fact that almost the entire security establishment in Srinagar attended it. Farooq Abdullah was accompanied by Minister of State for Home Mushtaq Ahmed Lone, Chief Secretary Jaitley, Principal Secretary B.R. Singh, Principal Secretary (Home) C. Phunsog, Information Director S. Pandey, Divisional Commissioner Khurshid Ahmed Ganie and Srinagar Deputy Commissioner Tanveer Jahan. The Border Security Force sent two Inspectors-General, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police two Deputy Inspectors-General and the Central Reserve Police Force a Deputy Inspector-General and an Additional Deputy Inspector-General. The Director-General of Police led a team consisting of Additional Director-General R. Tikoo, three Inspectors-General and a Senior Superintendent of Police. The Intelligence Bureau (I.B.) Joint Director was present, as were a Commissi oner and a Deputy Commissioner from the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). A.K. Chopra, Brigadier-General (Staff) of the 15 Corps, initiated the proceedings with a general briefing on the events in Kargil. The contents of the briefing are not recorded in the minutes, but officials who attended the meeting say that it was a sket chy account lasting only a few minutes, of the presence of infiltrators in the sector. Pal then took over from his subordinate. Paragraph 4 of the minutes record that he made six observations. The first two were routine. “The areas of infiltration were unheld ones,” Pal said, “by both India and Pakistan and dominated by patrols and aerial surveillance by both sides, due to the rugged and extremely difficult high altitude terrain conditions.” He then proceeded to outline the “sequence of infiltration in various sub-sectors and actions taken by the Army.”
SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY
Brigadier-General A.K. Chopra of the 15 Corps displays weapons seized from Pakistani infiltrators in June. The term “dominated by patrols and aerial surveillance” passed unchallenged: no one at the UHQ apparently saw it fit to ask how thousands of infiltrators could thus enter and hold such an area. Pal proceeded to make four assertions that proved even more damning. First, he insisted that “no voids were created in the CI (counter-insurgency) grid due to the movement of troops in Kargil Sector and deployment in the valley was fully balanced.” The remark was intended to reassure security officials in the Sta te who were disturbed by the gaps created in counter-insurgency deployments by the movements of troops to the borders. The Army, Pal’s remarks make it clear, did not expect that events in Kargil would suck in larger numbers of troops from security duties in the State. This was a massive error of judgment, for by the end of the Kargil war, 58 battalions had been moved to guard the borders vacated by troops headed for Kargil. But this error was the outcome of even larger errors of judgment. Paragraph 4(iv) of the minutes record Pal asserting that there was “no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes.” The language used make at least two things clear. For one, the Army did not realise that there was already a concentration of Pakistani troops, from the Northern Light Infantry and Gilgit Scouts, pushing soldiers into Indian territory. Several additional brigades were to be used in the weeks to come. Pal himself is on record as claiming that Pakistan used upwards of 10 battalions, including units of its elite Special Services Group, in the Kargil War. Clearly, at this stage the Army had no idea of these deployments. Even more serious, Paragraph 4(iv) leaves little room for doubt that the Kargil intrusion was not seen as a conventional military engagement at all. Pal’s remark that there were “no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes” now seems absurd. T he massive artillery exchanges that were under way through the Kargil sector, from the Mushkoh Valley in the west to Turtok in the east, were evidently misinterpreted as routine duels. By this time, Pakistan was funnelling entire brigades into Kargil, anticipating a massive Indian retaliation across the Line of Control. India, too, was to prepare for such a possibility, but at this stage its Army clearly had little idea of where the Kargil engagement was headed. The UHQ reports explain just why the ini tial stages of India’s response to events in Kargil were confused and directionless.
NISSAR AHMED
Lt.- Gen. Krishan Pal, Commander of the 15 Corps. Pal proceeded to underline his thesis that the intrusion would be contained with ease. Paragraph 4(v) notes his claim that the “situation was local and would be defeated locally”. At least five brigades of the Indian Army, made up largely of troops from outside Jammu and Kashmir, had to be shipped in before containment was achieved. As such, Pal’s assertion at the UHQ meeting illustrates a complete failure of comprehension. The 15 Corps Commander even seemed unaware of the threat to troop movements from Pakistan artillery fire on the Srinagar-Leh highway, directed by observation posts set up by infiltrators above Drass, notably on Tiger Hill and Tololing. “The Army convoys were moving unhindered,” he noted, “and soon the civil convoy would also commenc e.” It only started after the Pakistani withdrawal was near-complete. HOW does one account for a spectacular misjudgment of the military character of the Kargil intrusion? It is important to note that these judgments were not just made by Pal, but the Army as a whole. Chief of the Army Staff General V.P. Malik, for one, saw no reason to cut short his week-long visit to Poland in May when he received news of the intrusion. One obvious possibility is that the Army did not have, as on May 19, a cogent picture of what was going on. But Pal himself has, in a tape-recorded inte rview to Frontline, ruled out that possibility. “Our final assessments were made when our frontline contacts and photo surveillance provided detailed inputs that tallied,” he said. Those assessments were presumably made by May 17, when Pal claimed to have “a good degree of clarity about just what was going on.” He added: “I distinctly remember making it clear when I first briefed the press in Srinagar on May 19 that the depth, extent, logistic support, fire support and magnitude left no doubt in my mind that it was a Pakistan Army-backed operation” (Frontline, August 27). “Pakistan Army-backed operation” is the crucial phrase here. Army officials, the UHQ minutes make clear, may have understood that their Pakistani adversaries were supporting the intrusion, as they do through the Line of Control and the western internatio nal border. But the Kargil intrusion was clearly not understood as an Army-led conventional engagement. Others at the UHQ meeting disagreed, notably Farooq Abdullah. Paragraph 8(i) records his strong intervention. The Chief Minister argued that the “recent infiltration was not a short-term plan but a sinister design of Pakistan aimed to isolate certain areas and cut off Kargil-Leh from the valley as (was) being done in Rajouri-Poonch areas…He opined that these were not mere militants but supported by some Pakistani regulars too.”
Farooq Abdullah’s sources of information were presumably from his police force, whose warnings from mid-May about the presence of Gilgit Scouts and the Northern Light Infantry had generally been dismissed. Certainly, neither the Intelligence Bureau nor R AW did anything to dispel Pal’s notions at the UHQ meeting. Paragraph 6 of the minutes record thus: “On being asked by the Chief Secretary about the intelligence input, Joint Director IB stated that since January this year it was reported that approximat e(ly) 200 Al-Badr militants waiting in Kotli and Kel could not infiltrate due to effective counter-infiltration posture by the Army…'Accordingly, frustration had built up and thus possibly infiltration was effected in Kargil sector.” Paragraph 7 notes that the RAW focussed, somewhat mystifyingly given the context of the meeting, on “activation of infiltration routes through Nepal and other areas”. Just why the I.B., in particular, chose to remain silent at the meeting is unclear. Its Joint Director must have been aware of reports coming from his Leh station since last October, reports which were made available to Frontline, warning that gro ups of Pakistani irregulars were being trained in Olthingthang with the express purpose of launching a thrust into Kargil this April. One possibility is that the I.B. chose to remain silent, leaving the job of engaging the 15 Corps Commander in argument to the Chief Minister. A second possibility is that his position, and for that matter Pal’s stance, were not fully reflected in the minutes. But neither officer appears to have written to the UHQ Secretariat asking for the minutes to be modified, for no corrections were circulated to its members. As such, the minutes appear to be a plausible narration of the meeting.
Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah.
Interestingly, Pal’s assessment of Pakistan’s objectives in Kargil was remarkably coherent. “On being asked the main objective behind this infiltration,” Paragraph 5 of the UHQ minutes records, “the Advisor Security remarked that the possible aim of Paki stan at the macro-level could be to internationalise the situation, create war-like hysteria and attempt to strengthen their case for third party intervention.” But he appeared unable to comprehend that Pakistan could act not only by creating a war-like hysteria but actually going to war. The infiltrators’ tactics were interpreted firmly in the light of the experience of insurgent tactics in Jammu and Kashmir. “At the operational level, these infiltrators would possibly aim at disrupting the vital lines of communication in this sector to Khalsi and Leh, as also create disturbances in the depth areas.” This position reflected institutional myopia born of the belief that nuclear weaponisation in South Asia precludes the possibility of conventional engagement. As Pal recently argued, the Army continues to believe, along with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s defence establishment, that after “nuclear status was acquired, it stood to reason, both military and strategic reason, that any possibility of a conventional conflict will decline.” From this premise, he proceeded to argue that the Kargil conflict had " nothing to do with the nuclear scenario". “Perhaps,” Pal concluded, “the linkages are more with the proxy war it is waging in Kashmir… That seems to me to be more plausible. What has happened seems similar to what Pakistan did in 1947 and 1965 when it used the facade of Mujahideens and Kabailis. The tactics are identical, too, with what was done in Afghanistan.” This politically driven sundering of events in Jammu and Kashmir from those events set off by Pokhran-II and the entirely ahistorical comprehension of how the Kargil war came about may well force India to pay for the mistakes with the lives of its soldiers. Interestingly, Farooq Abdullah seems more perceptive than the party he supports in Parliament. Paragraph 8(ii) of the minutes outlines his belief that “as soon as the Kosavo (sic) problem would be over, Pakistan would attempt to bring Kashmir into th e international limelight…He added that the additional aim could also be to keep the Army committed in such inhospitable terrain conditions and extend the areas of their employment by opening up new fronts.” The use of the plural form “fronts” is obvio usly relevant. **The UHQ minutes expose the dishonesty of the Army leadership on its conduct of the Kargil war, and that of the political establishment which has sought to shield the Army leadership from public scrutiny. Even more disturbing, it makes evident the poverty of the Indian defence establishment’s conceptual and doctrinal thought. **
Re: Out of Kargil
ProudPak……For your information Pakistan could officially recognized the presence of its soldiers at Kargil only after three years of war that is in 2003, when some of the martyrs were officially given honors.
(So, what the hell, Shariff was begging dt 4th of July 1999 in Washington DC?)
Re: Out of Kargil
Now a days, daily we got to know something new.
And when this all party roundtable meeting took place under the leadership of US mediators? Date, time etc.? And what decisions were taken?