Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

Why are Indians so “obsessed” with China? Can India with no maufacturing base compete with China. Only Service Sector jobs with no manufacturing jobs wont bring India’s economy to the level of China.

A Tale of a Rising Tiger Chasing a Soaring Dragon

http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/local/la-fg-obsess1may01,0,7381658.story?page=1&coll=sfla-business-headlines

As their nation booms, Indians can’t resist comparing stats with giant neighbor China.

By Henry Chu
Times Staff Writer
Posted May 1 2006

NEW DELHI — Politics and cricket may be the standbys of Indian small talk, but if you really want to get a conversation going here, turn the dial to China.

India’s northern neighbor is the hottest topic in town, the buzzword on everyone’s lips. Whether politicians or pundits, entrepreneurs or engineers, nobody here, it seems, can obsess enough over China.

Who has more people? China does, with 1.3 billion, though India ranks a close second, with just over a billion. Who has built more roads, bigger airports, taller skyscrapers? China again, by a convincing margin. But who boasts more billionaires? Chalk that one up for the home team, an edge that makes Indians puff with pride.

Such comparisons have become something of a national parlor game here as Indians increasingly look to China as the yardstick by which they measure their own progress and success. Excited by their country’s development boom, they are now eager to play catch-up with the economic big bang on the other side of the border.

" ‘Obsessive’ is a mild term for the kind of attention that China gets, and it’s always in terms of how many roads do we have, how many billionaires do we have," said Subarno Chattarji, a professor at the University of Delhi. “They are the role model.”

Newspapers brim with references to the Middle Kingdom, backed up by explanations, charts and graphs showing how India compares. Articles parse how India stacks up against China in foreign investment, literacy, Internet use, quality of higher education and even water distribution.

The fixation is fueled by a mixture of admiration, insecurity and rivalry. At root is the grudging recognition that China, for all its problems, remains the runaway leader on many fronts, in spite of India’s emergence as a high-tech colossus, the cascade of jobs created by Western outsourcing and the nudge into the middle class of millions of aspiring workers.

“China has been successful — let’s accept it. We want to emulate China no matter how we say we are different and want to be different,” said Chetan Ahya, an analyst with Morgan Stanley in Mumbai, formerly known as Bombay. “The fact of the matter is that they’re on top.”

Such a bluntly complimentary attitude isn’t without precedent. As long ago as the 7th century, a Chinese Buddhist monk returning from 17 years of travel and study in India asked, “Is there anyone in the five parts of India who does not admire China?”

In modern times, however, the relationship between the two countries has been marked more by mutual suspicion and, at times, outright hostility.

Although New Delhi and Beijing pledged lasting friendship in the 1950s — a popular slogan at the time, “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai,” proclaimed that “Indians and Chinese are brothers” — the two countries fought a border war in 1962. They gave each other the cold shoulder for decades afterward, each pointedly cozying up to the other’s enemies.

In 1991, India decided to dismantle some state controls to boost its economy. By then, China had more than a decade’s head start and was already embarked on its spectacular market-oriented growth.

Comparing the two Asian giants has since become a fashionable pastime among academics and Wall Street analysts who latch on to the obvious similarities: two ancient civilizations with billion-plus populations hauling themselves abreast of modernity, backed by talented entrepreneurs and cheap labor, with the added spice of atomic weapons thrown in.

China dwarfs India in most key respects. Its economy is more than twice as large, it receives 12 times as much foreign direct investment, and its exports are six times that of India’s. It boasts a larger infrastructure network, a more literate population and less abject poverty than India, where more than 350 million people eke out an existence on less than a dollar a day.

In terms of manufacturing, “made in China” still reverberates far more loudly across the globe than “made in India.” But India, even as it tries to whip its industrial sector into more competitive shape, is positioning itself as the yin to China’s yang.

Let Chinese workers churn out computers, refrigerators and cellphones, many Indians say, we’ll focus on the software — not just what goes into those computers but also the sectors such as the service industry, where a more skilled, better-English-speaking workforce gives India an edge. Foreign companies set up factories in China; in India, they invest in call centers and back-office service providers.

In 2005, industry accounted for 53% of China’s economic output and services 32%. The situation was flopped in India: 51% services and 28% industry.

“I think India feels there’s room for both of us, that both countries have their respective areas of advantage and that both will do well,” said Prabhu Ghate, a commentator here.

Greater confidence and boldness have taken root among Indians, who until a few years ago balked at comparisons with China, finding them not only depressingly to their disadvantage but a little scary, Ahya said.

“There was a sense of self-doubt in India …. People were not exactly as confident as you see them now,” Ahya said. "A lot of them did get worried about Chinese competition, that, ‘They’re going to kill me, they’re going to wipe me out,’ whether it’s motorcycles or color televisions.

“But that doubt did not turn out to be true. Indians have come through unscathed, and they’re able to protect their turf…. So now there’s the sense that we want to learn from them.”

Despite row upon row of Chinese-made appliances in shops here, the balance of trade between the two countries actually tips in India’s favor, mainly because China is buying up natural resources such as iron ore from India at a feverish pace.

But clashes are inevitable. Both giants, in the race to develop, are desperate for oil and have slugged it out for access to petroleum reserves in Central Asia, Africa and South America. China, having more cash, has won virtually all of those battles, including a nasty one last summer over an oil producer in Kazakhstan, which Beijing agreed to acquire for $4.2 billion.

But realizing that their bidding wars were driving up prices, the nations agreed in January to cooperate in securing reserves abroad, creating what one pundit labeled an “axis of oil.”

“It is clear to me,” Mani Shankar Aiyar, India’s oil and gas minister, said at the time, “that any imitation of the ‘Great Game’ rivalry [between the British Empire and czarist Russia for control of Central Asia] … is a danger to peace. We cannot endanger each other’s security in our quest for energy security.”

That doesn’t mean there isn’t room for a little gloating whenever India comes out ahead in any comparison with China.

“Here is something to brag about,” the Hindustan Times crowed in March when the annual Forbes list showed more billionaires in India than in China. And when the World Bank issued a study last year giving India higher marks for good governance, the Economic Times declared: “It’s official: Tiger governs better than dragon.”

As is often the case with underdogs, the preoccupation with comparisons seems mostly one-sided. “India hardly exists on the Chinese media horizon. They couldn’t be bothered, really,” said Chattarji, the University of Delhi professor. He visited Beijing in August and saw nary a mention of his homeland in the newspapers.

When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao came to India a year ago, he was the subject of breathless magazine stories and front-page photo spreads. Trips by Indian officials to Beijing, by contrast, merit no more than the usual pro-forma coverage accorded foreign dignitaries.

That might change as India continues to grow and attract attention, and as its political profile rises.

“India figures less in Chinese discussion, but my sense is that it is rising and there is growing interest, especially as some leaders begin to see a U.S.-India axis emerging that might work to constrain China’s growth,” said Anthony Saich of the Asia Center at Harvard University.

“I do think the Chinese are fascinated by Bangalore” — India’s Silicon Valley — “and want to understand how this has been put together.”

Officially, Beijing welcomes warmer ties between Washington and New Delhi. But talk of their ganging up to keep China in check fans perennial fears of U.S. policies of containment.

At the same time, lingering resentment from the 1962 border war and distrust of China’s close relationship with Pakistan still color the rhetoric of some Indian politicians in discussions of their behemoth neighbor.

For now, China remains far more in India’s sights than vice versa.

“For a long time, the role models were Western countries, Europe and the U.S. And while Indians still think well of the U.S., it’s China and the Far East now that are the models,” Chattarji said. “This is the context for why the media and why even in normal conversation they’re constantly talking about this: How do we become like China?”

(INFOBOX BELOW)

Sizing up neighbors

Indians’ obsession with how their nation compares with China has become something of a contemporary parlor game. Here’s a quick measure (data for 2006 unless otherwise noted):

China India
Population 1.31 billion 1.09 billion
Median age 32.7 24.9
Population growth 0.59% 1.38%
Infant mortality 23.1/1,000 54.6/1,000
Life expectancy 72.6 64.7
Literacy rate 90.9% (2002) 59.5% (2003)
Total GDP (in trillions) $8.2 $3.7
GDP per capita $6,300 $3,400
GDP growth, 2005 9.3% 7.6%
Manufacturing (% of GDP, 2003) 39% 16%
Labor force, millions 706 406
Export goods and services
(% of world total, 2004) 6% 1%
Percentage living below $1/day 16.6% 34.7%
Electricity consumption
(kilowatt hours/person, 2003) 1,379 435
Internet users
(per 1,000 people, 2004) 75 32
Aircraft departures (2003) 946,000 264,000
Railways (miles) 44,675 (2002) 39,289 (2004)
Percentage of roadways paved 80% (2003) 63% (2002)

Sources: CIA World Factbook, International Monetary Fund, Foreign Policy, Deutsche Bank, World Bank

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

India appears to have an inferiority complex when it comes to China.

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

^^ Let alone China, Bharatis have that complex with everyone except (may be) Bhutan and Nepal.

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

Also, in order to feel superior, every indian tries to speak english when they can perfectly communicate with each other in their native tounges...

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

no doubt, china is way ahead of india...it is this very reason why india 'looks upto china' as a model for our own growth, but also with some fear for its own security, because a too powerfull china could be a threat to india. Even india created SEZ's (Special economic zones), which are based on chinese model.

Besides, some indians do try to speak in english when they can perfectly communicate in their native languages. I do support this. Because it is this very language which has helped india integrate and even come up to a substantial extent with the world economy. Our entire BPO, ITES services run on english language. If anyone knows english, he definitely has competitive advantage. If someone tries to speak in english in order to feel superior, then i dont support this. There is nothing to feel superior about this.

Re: Why are Indians so “obsessed” with China?

Indians are far more obsessed with Pak, please read on

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EC26Df02.html

One-eyed policy poses danger to India
By Ramtanu Maitra

During the past months of intense diplomatic maneuvering concerning Iraq, it was distressing to note that while all major nations were involved in the effort to resolve the crisis, India could do no more than issue occasional statements by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee expressing the nation’s desire to have a peaceful resolution. Despite the fact that a potentially dangerous situation was developing in India’s own back yard, New Delhi had no ability to participate, and other nations had no interest in what India had to say.

The present paralytic state of India’s foreign-policy making, and the nation’s inability to contribute in a meaningful way on the major issues that concern the security and peace of the world, is the result of a deliberate process that began with the advent of the V P Singh government in late 1980s. Since then, India has increasingly abandoned looking at the world independently, slowly but surely narrowing its foreign-policy sights.

The explosion of nuclear devices in 1998 presented a way out of this hole. At that point, like it or not, New Delhi showed up on the radar screen of all major countries. There was a growing expectation that the government’s bold step was a mark of mature self-confidence, and that the declared nuclear-weapons state would broaden its foreign-policy outlook and seek a place among the major nations.

What followed, however, was the spectacle of groveling at Washington’s feet. At the end of the 10 rounds of talks, projected in New Delhi as diplomacy, and after a loud endorsement of the war on terrorism, India’s entire foreign policy appears to be more tightly wrapped around Pakistan than ever. At the same time, the country’s domestic policy has strayed far from the path of removing abject poverty and building up the nation, hurtling down the path of least resistance into the abyss of exploitation of caste and Hindu-Muslim conflicts. Ayodhya, Babri Masjid, Ram Janambhoomi, Gujarat killings, Jammu and Kashmir … the list goes on.

Beginning of marginalization
In theory, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s took the straitjacket off Indian foreign policy. But instead of refashioning an independent direction to meet the nation’s needs, the Indian foreign-policy establishment fell apart. Under the US-backed V P Singh government in1989, India abandoned its leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement. But there has been no hint of a positive step or direction in India’s own neighborhood or beyond.

The South Asian Association of Regional Countries forum, conceived by India in the early 1980s, has not been advanced by even an inch. Nor has a finger been lifted to convince the major nations that India, with a billion-plus people, has a right to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

India remains merely a place on the world map. The success of Indian professionals in the area of information technology was a bright blip noticed by some. The mandarins of New Delhi’s South Block have tried to milk the IT success, but it did not fill many buckets.

It is not as if nothing of significance has been happening in the subcontinent since 1989. Sri Lanka was ravaged by terrorism unleashed by the Tamil Tigers who were once nurtured by India. Nepal moved away from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy to absolute chaos. Myanmar underwent a sea-change. Five new Central Asian nations emerged on the world map and immediately drew the attention of all major powers. And the Southeast Asian nations, bolstered by the growth of a powerful and stable China in the neighborhood, reached out to integrate further with the subcontinent.

In the 1980s, it would have been inconceivable that any solution of the Sri Lankan conundrum, or Nepal’s chaos, could emerge without India’s full involvement in the process. Today, the United States and even Japan, whose foreign policy is drafted in Washington, are more involved than India in finding solutions to the problems in India’s immediate neighborhood.

False moves
Despite overt invitations from the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states, India could not put a firm foot forward in either the economic area or security matters to announce a presence commensurate with its size. External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, in a fit of sanity, went to Indochina in 2001 to inaugurate the Mekong-Ganga development plan, but the initiative remains stillborn. There are reasons to believe that it was meant more to counter China’s initiatives in the area than to develop effective infrastructure linkages between India and Southeast Asia.

BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation), established in 1998, is another such stillborn project. It could have been the first step toward cooperation with India’s neighbors in the east, but the Indian External Affairs Ministry showed no ability, or interest, to make it work. In Myanmar, India’s foreign-policy thrust is directed principally at thwarting the development of a stronger Sino-Myanmar relationship - a negative approach that is doomed to fail.

New Delhi has abrogated its responsibility in most of the nations contiguous to India, while its relationship with Southeast and East Asia remains frozen in hesitancy and uncertainty. In the Middle East, where Islam rules the roost, India - with its 130-plus million Muslim citizens and separated from Arabia by just a short stretch of the Arabian Sea - is becoming increasingly insignificant, even though oil-producing Arabia will inevitably become vitally important to oil-short India in the not-too-distant future.

Only in the region encompassing Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan has Indian foreign-policy making shown a spark of ingenuity. That, too, began only after the transfer of Jaswant Singh to the Ministry of Finance late last year after holding the foreign-affairs portfolio.

Why the lethargy, or worse?

The babus of the South Block
The answer can be found in looking at India’s foreign-policymaking apparatus - the babus of the South Block who hijacked India’s foreign policy after the departure from the scene of the last of the Nehru-Gandhi family members in the late1980s. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi created a vacuum in foreign-policy making. The minions of the South Block grabbed it with both hands and have since squandered it.

A present-day Indian Foreign Office bureaucrat must possess two basic requirements to reach the top of the heap. First and foremost he or she must be categorically anti-Pakistan - the more virulent the better - and simultaneously an anti-China ideologue. The entirety of the foreign policy of a nation of a billion-plus flows from there.

Under the circumstances, one might expect politicians within the government or sitting on the opposition benches to act as guides and balancing factors. But, sadly, most of today’s active politicians in India are too ignorant to have any understanding of an increasingly complex world. Others are simply not interested.

The marginalization of India is showing up in every area, despite the denial of that reality by India’s External Affairs Ministry, and the uninterest of others. India will soon face a crisis in the form of paying a very high indirect cost for such policy limitations.

Gross failures
The Jaswant Singh-led groveling began to flower after the US declaration of war on terrorism in September 2001. At the time, India threw its full support into the US campaign - a not unreasonable move except that it was motivated exclusively by the hope that the United States would help India curb Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri militants.

Obsessed with Pakistan and clutching on to the US promise, India’s policy toward Pakistan became enmeshed with the United States’ policy toward Pakistan. When the Indian parliament was attacked on December 13, 2001, India could not move against Pakistan because Washington prevented it. Subsequently, India assembled some 700,000 troops with armaments along the Pakistan border, threatening to invade. After six months and billions of rupees, the troops were brought back. That, too, was done under pressure from Washington.

It became evident at that point that having made the Pakistan problem the center of its foreign policy and latched on to the US to deal with it, India had lost everything.

New Delhi’s failure to extract any concession from Pakistan in the war on terrorism has made it more anti-Pakistan than ever. Having come to realize that Washington will do little to help on cross-border terrorism, New Delhi feels the need to prove to the Indian people that it has not given up its hostile posture to Pakistan. The political decision to remain obsessed with Pakistan has further distorted India’s ability to play any role in world affairs.

The biggest failure of the Indian policymakers was in not realizing that Pakistan is the cornerstone of Washington’s global “war on terrorism”. It was well known that the Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had nurtured and strengthened the two elements that the US was keen to eliminate - the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists. Without Pakistan’s help, which came in fits and starts, Washington had no ability to achieve even a nominal level of success in this venture.

The US agenda never included elimination of Kashmiri militants, notwithstanding what Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage promised or didn’t promise. What Washington had in mind was to prevent an all-out war between India and Pakistan, fearing a nuclear exchange. The US policy to bring India over to its side in the “war on terrorism” was to prevent such a war. This simple fact was ignored by New Delhi.

One of the reasons that India walked into that foolish trap is the in-built anti-China mindset of most of the External Affairs Ministry babus. China considers Pakistan its strong ally and has helped it develop its nuclear capabilities. China did that for a number of reasons, and it cannot be the basis for Sino-Indian relations.

In New Delhi, however, the Sino-Pakistani entente is projected as definitive proof that China considers India an enemy and is working through Pakistan to undermine its stability. India’s External Affairs Ministry has found the Vajpayee government an easy listener to this atrocious analysis. The corollary of the anti-China mindset of the South Block babus is the “soft sell” of the India-US axis to counter the emerging China. This is sold by a strong anti-China lobby in the United States and has been lapped up by a section within the Indian army and foreign-policy makers.

Dangers ahead
The Pakistan-centered foreign-policymaking process has created other distortions. For instance, a number of members in the present Indian government, driven by their anti-Muslim obsession, have found a new ally in Israel. Major-General Uzi Dayan, head of Israel’s National Security Council, visited India last year for a “joint security strategic dialogue”. Former foreign minister Shimon Peres, during his visit to India last year, dubbed India “Israel’s best friend” in the region.

For years now, policymakers aided by oodles of arms deals signed between India and Israel with the blessing of the United States have muted India’s voice in support of the Palestine nation. In total, more than $2 billion in arms contracts have been signed between Israel Aircraft Industries and the Indian Defense Ministry, with Israel selling surface-to-surface Barak missiles, pilotless planes and radar systems, and renovating hundreds of MiG-21 and MiG-29 planes and Russian-made T-72 tanks. India is also in the process of acquiring Israel’s Arrow Theater Missile Defense System. Significantly, Israel is also providing consultancy to India on how to deal with the cross-border terrorist influx from Pakistan.

Washington’s interest in consolidating India-Israel military relations became apparent when India sought to purchase three Phalcon early-warning aircraft from Israel, systems that the US has prohibited Israel from selling to China. The Indo-Israeli missile defense system also serves the Pentagon’s goal of advancing an international missile defense architecture.

The killing of Muslims in Gujarat last year and the emergence of a powerful anti-Muslim bloc within the ruling government in India poses an additional serious threat to India’s ability to play a meaningful role in world events. The longer-term danger for India is the Muslim issue. There is no question that the Pakistan situation will not improve in the foreseeable future. The Pakistani army will continue to have a firm grip on the nation’s foreign policies.

That means that the Kashmir issue will be kept alive, and the Pakistani policy of bleeding India in revenge for India’s role in breaking up Pakistan in 1972 to create Bangladesh will continue. The BJP’s polarization and the Israeli influence in the country’s policymaking vis-a-vis Pakistan and the Muslim population will further endanger India’s security. Disgruntled poor Muslims have already become vulnerable to the machinations of the Pakistani ISI. A further polarization would bring to the fore the criminal elements among the Muslims in India.

Israel wears a very definite anti-Pakistan mask, which helps Indian Interior Minister L K Advani exercise authority over the anti-Muslim hawks within the present government.

A delegation from the Jewish Institute of National Security Agency (JINSA), a US-based pro-Israel think-tank that has become increasingly powerful in light of the war against Iraq, was in Delhi this year. It included a number of high-level military Israeli officers. From the United States came General Wayne Downing and former Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelligence chief Steve Pomerantz, who is known to partner with Islam-bashers.

By directing India’s foreign policy to align with the anti-Islam, anti-Muslim cabal, New Delhi has set on a dangerous path. India, with a billion-plus people and a well-developed technological base, may soon be identified as an anti-Muslim nation - a prospect India cannot afford. India’s future success, and the nation’s stability, will depend on how it interacts within the region and beyond it. Should India get bogged down as an anti-Muslim nation, with two Muslim nations - Pakistan and Bangladesh - to its west and east, the country will be truly, permanently straitjacketed.

(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact [email protected] for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

lol

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

A free press can be fodder to lots of discussions........ L0L

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

lol

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

That is good point. But your analysis is faulty. Indians speak English, because it is a common language. India is land rich in culture and language, and tertiary language, such as English, is a good way to communicate.
Perhaps it makes more sense to you to give you the paradigm of Arabic. Mullahs in Pakistan are running around calling for Arabic to be the national language. This takes away the "regional" identity, an added bonus is being able to communicate with the Arabs coming to Pakistan for "training".

Complex..good term. However, what you term complex, the rest of the world calls competition. It's a good thing. It's a drive to make yourself better. Something that has escaped the Pakistani mentality. Maybe if Pakistanis had a bit more of it, Pakistan would be known for more than simply a constant "frontline state".

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?


hahah! Competition with Nepal?

Oh Baboo! What hath you smokin'?

It is Bharati complex with Pakistan that drove the whole region down to the present level.

Bharatis may have won Kashmir, and East Pakistan, but they lost the biggest prize: Peace and Harmony in the region.

Even now the biggest drain (in economic terms) are the freeloaders of the North who are like leaches for the Bharati south. While Banglore and Hyderabad bring in High-T money, northren Baboos of Bihar and UP are wasting it in Dilli and burning it in Kashmir.

P.S. Bharati south will be much better off economically if they rid themselves of these Northy leaches.

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

Janab, Pakistani unifocal foreign and domestic policy is what drove the region into terrorism. Indians are not sending Arabs into the Norther Areas. The Indian "complex" requires that they try to better themselves. Pakistani complex dictates that they counter India, even it it harms the pakistani nation...that is why Pakistan has become a den for terrorism.

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

India is learning from China (and other countries too that are developing), but is competing with itself, everyday trying to make it better than it was.

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

Someone tell the Indians to get a basic sewerage system up and running first and then talk about "competition".

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?


O ji, tis the other way round.

[quote]
Bharatis may have won Kashmir, and East Pakistan, but they lost the biggest prize: Peace and Harmony in the region.
[/quote]
...only with Pakistan. Not with anyother country.

Hah, even China-India trade is $19 billion annually.....far more than Pakistan's TOTAL exports to the world.
And to say that just last month a Chinese foreign secretary was in India demanding 90,000 sq. kms of Indian territory in return for Aksai Chin in Kashmir.

Nepalis dont require visas to enter India and can invest freely in India and vise-versa.
Nepali gorkhas blasted the Pakistani army in Kargil.

Now Sri Lanka and India are Free-Trade partners. Indian companies are see Lanka as an investment haven.
Not to mention that 1,200 Indian Forces were lost to completely break the LTTE bastion in Jaffna and pushed them further east.

Our former PM paid with his life for this decision.

Upon India's request, Bhutan destroyed ALL ULFA camps in its territory. Bhutan's Prince took leave from his studies in London to take part in the military operations.

Now look at Pakistan. Forget India, it got slapped by Afghanistan for naming its ballistic missiles after Afghan warlords. Karzai's government routinely accuses Pakistan of terrorism and harbouring millitants.
I can go on with its development vis-a-vis India (even though both gained independence at the same time), Pakistan's insurgencies, relations with neighbours etc.

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

and 90% of that is from China to Bharat. And that my friend scares the $hite out of the Bharati planners.

Re: Why are Indians so “obsessed” with China?

Put it in perspective, per capita Pak exports are higher then India and growing rapidly…

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

Yes the trade favours China in cash flow (although 90% is an exageration). And by the way same is true for US China trade.
In any case we pay china in cash - not by aid money.

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

China-US comaprison is not applicable to Bharat-China. The dynamics are totally different.

Payment is payment wheter through cash, card, or aid.

Re: Why are Indians so "obsessed" with China?

Bhaiji read the context of my answer - It is in response to your saying 90% flows from china to India.
And there is a difference on how you pay - when you pay cash it means your feet are in chadar, when by credit it means your feet are out of the chadar and when it is aid it means you cannot support yourself - means you do not have a chadar, probably just a Roomaal.