Although its a painful part of our history, but in order to avoid these events in the future we need to analyse the reasons that brought unified Pakistan to an end, in a period less than 25 years…these events that brought about Pakistan’s division should be avoided in the future…in the demise of combined Pakistan, most of the role was played by the politicians of West Pakistan…there was a sense of deprivation in the minds of the East Pakistanis, which made them feel as if they were being subjugated, or colonized…right now, some smaller provinces have their grudges, which should be removed so that we might avoid our past bitter experiences…
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_14-12-2002_pg3_2
**Op-ed: Lessons of 1971
**
Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi
A diversified state and society cannot function smoothly in the absence of participatory political institutions and processes. The operational norms have to be socio-cultural tolerance and adjustment of competing claims through dialogue and accommodation
Thirty-one years ago, in December, the Pakistan military surrendered to its Indian counterpart in what was then East Pakistan. The state of Pakistan, as established in August 1947, disintegrated. This was the first disintegration of an ex-colonial state after the Second World War.
The remainder Pakistan, or the present-day Pakistan, recovered from the trauma of 1971, and made reasonable strides in the political, diplomatic and economic fields over the last three decades. However, there is a need to revisit 1971 time and again in order to draw lessons and to adopt realistic policies and perspectives on pressing political, economic and social issues.
The break-up of Pakistan was a domestic failure. It was caused primarily by the failure to create a sense of political participation and economic justice among the Bengalis, who, one generation ago, were in the forefront of the movement for the establishment of Pakistan. It was ironic that the political institutions and processes functioned in Pakistan in such a manner that the Bengalis, who constituted a numerical majority, were reduced to minority status as far as sharing and management of power was concerned.
The articles, commentaries and books that appeared in Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of the events of 1971 overplayed the role of the external actors. No doubt, India exploited the situation to its advantage. Its military intervention helped Bangladesh to win independence.
However, the major development was caused by a host of factors, belonging mainly, not exclusively, to domestic Pakistani context. Other writings focused on fixing the responsibility of the 1971 episode on General Yahya Khan and top military commanders or Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or Mujibur Rahman or all of them.
Only a small number of studies of 1971 published in Pakistan during this period adopted a dispassionate and analytical approach to examine the whole issue by focusing on domestic and external factors, particularly the political process and pattern of economic development in Pakistan. This trend became more pronounced as time went by. The eighties and the nineties saw books and articles by Pakistani writers that avoided emotionalism and adopted a more comprehensive approach to deal with the events of 1971. A thorough study of these publications enables us to draw conclusions that are helpful for coping with the present day problems in Pakistan.
Former civil servants, retired military officers, scholars and journalists produced material that helps us understand why the Pakistan of 1947 could not stay united. Some of these studies focus on the military side — the insurgency and the 1971 Indo-Pak war. A recently published study entitled “The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War: A Soldier’s Narrative” by Major General Hakeem Arshad Qureshi focuses on insurgency, counter-insurgency and the 1971 war, offering insightful perspectives for avoiding the mistakes of 1971.
The publication of the Hoomudur Rahman Commission (HRC) Report by the Government of Pakistan after unnecessarily long delay exposed the deficiencies in leadership provided by the military commanders and senior bureaucrats during that period. The review of the HRC Report makes it easy to understand why the Pakistan Army delayed its publication. Had its parts not been published in India, the Pakistan Army might not have brought it out. The official circles had created the impression in Pakistan that all copies of this report were destroyed by the Zia regime. Interestingly enough, in October 1988, an Indian journalist published an article in Illustrated Weekly of India on the HRC Report, claiming that he had seen parts of it with the US Government in Washington, DC.
The domestic sources of the break-up of Pakistan are now easy to identify. The weakening and fragmentation of the political forces and especially the absence of participatory institutions and processes caused much alienation in the then East Pakistan. Given the fact that the Bengalis were under-represented in the senior ranks of the bureaucracy and the Army, the elective channels were the only option available to them to access power. These channels were blocked or manipulated as the bureaucratic-military elite overwhelmed the political process in the mid-fifties. The military take over in October 1958 blocked their chances of political advancement except through cooperation by the military rulers. The 1962 Constitution created an authoritarian and centralized political system which could not process the growing pressures for political participation and economic justice, especially from East Pakistan.
The overwhelming role of the federal government, going back to the pre-1958 period, scuttled the chances of development of autonomous political processes at the provincial level. Had there been some autonomous political space available at provincial level, provincial interests and demands could be accommodated. However, no provincial government could function without the blessing of the federal government. In the pre-1958 period, the federal government manipulated and divided provincial politics and installed governments of its choice. The 1962 Constitution hardly left any scope for autonomous provincial politics. This was bound to cause alienation and frustration in East Pakistan.
The overall disposition of the federal government towards East Pakistan was condescending. The senior federal (mainly West Pakistani) bureaucrats invariably behaved like the administrators of a colonized territory. What bothered the Ayub Khan government was the “ungratefulness” of the Bengali intellectuals and counter elite, who refused to acknowledge its contribution towards industrialization and economic development of East Pakistan. What the rulers did not realize was that in post-colonial era, non-participatory economic development does not promote positive feelings. Furthermore, the fast growing disparity between the two wings of Pakistan was neutralizing the impact of Ayubian strategy of economic development.
Political experience of a community holds key to its disposition towards political institutions and processes in a diversified polity like Pakistan. If a particular community or a region learns over time that the political process restricts their opportunities and undermines their interests, they are not expected to identify with its institutions and processes. In the pre-1947 period, Muslim Bengalis felt alienated from non-Muslims, although they spoke the same language and shared some aspects of culture. The Muslim Bengalis established partnership with the Muslims living in northwestern India and were in the forefront of the movement for establishment of Pakistan. They identified with Islam based Pakistan nationalism because they were convinced that their future would be secure in Pakistan.
They learned over the years in Pakistan that their socio-cultural identity and politico-economic rights and interests were being overwhelmed by an overbearing central government dominated by West Pakistan that often lacked representative character. They also found out that the dominant elite and the pro-establishment religious elements were using Islam to perpetuate their hold over power and resist change. The Bengalis began to redefine their identity and interests with reference to language, culture and ethnicity as a counterpoise to the domineering Pakistani nationalism. Islam was pushed to the periphery as the symbol of political mobilization because its use in the political domain was monopolized by the Pakistani government that was perceived to be hostile to Bengali interests. The Bengalis were once again faced with insecurity. But, this time its source was Pakistani state and government.
The Bengali struggle started with demands for political rights and participation within the Pakistani framework which they had opted for in 1947. What happened later is well known.
A diversified state and society cannot function smoothly in the absence of participatory political institutions and processes. The operational norms have to be socio-cultural tolerance and adjustment of competing claims through dialogue and accommodation. These efforts must be accompanied by policies for promoting socio-economic justice. The political system can move in the direction of these goals provided the dominant elite and especially the non-representative bureaucratic civilian and military structures do not pursue their power ambition in a blatant manner and do not manipulate the political forces. This compromises the democratic credentials of the political process and changes it into a management rather than participatory system. Such a system cannot command voluntary loyalty.
Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
