Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Southie · December 1, 2014, 5:35am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Arleitter:

^

Thanks for admitting that you derailed the topic

@KKF @Southie @Med911

The high voters turn out happened amidst separatist’s calls for boy-cott.Tht means people braved guns and blatant threats from anti-social elements.

SRINAGAR/JAMMU/NEW DELHI: The Jammu & Kashmir electorate on Tuesday belied the ruling National Conference’s “fears” of a low turnout in the wake of recent floods, by clocking a massive 71.28% polling in the first phase of voting.

The turnout appears all the more impressive as the 15 J&K constituencies that went to polls are located in far-flung, mountainous districts of the state. While the corresponding turnout during the Lok Sabha poll this year was barely 52.63%, it was only a tad higher in the 2008 assembly poll at 64.97%. According to deputy election commissioner Vinod Zutshi, who chose to describe the polling in J&K as **“100% flawless with no incident to vitiate the poll”, voters remained queued up outside polling stations even after polling hours. **

The district-wise polling in J&K shows a major surge in poll percentage in Bandipora and Ganderbal, the latter being the chief minister’s traditional constituency. **While Bandipora registered a two-fold increase in turnout (from 35.24% to 70.3%) as compared to Lok Sabha poll held only six months back, the rise in Ganderbal was from 55% in 2008 state polls and 43.97% in Lok Sabha poll to 68% on Tuesday. Leh and Kargil too voted handsomely, while Kishtwar, Doda and Ramban recorded a 4-7% jump. **

Zutshi said as many as 43 sorties, by MI-17 and Chetak helicopters, were undertaken to airlift poll personnel and security forces to remote areas. The voter enthusiasm was best showcased when a 121-year-old lady voter, Noor Bin, voted in the Ramban assembly constituency.
Dealing a serious blow to separatist politics, thousands of voters had lined up before polling stations with nearly 10.52 lakh voters being eligible to vote.

Separatist groups like all the factions of Hurriyat Conference and JKLF have called for a boycott of the polls and a general strike as well.

A total of 123 candidates including seven ministers were in the fray with the ruling coalition partners National Conference and Congress and the opposition People’s Democratic Party(PDP) and BJP fighting for the spoils.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/photo/45273451.cms

Early morning chill and fog failed to dampen the spirits of the voters who had assembled at the polling stations an hour before the scheduled start of voting.

The voting time had to be extended in several polling stations to allow those voters, who were already inside the polling station premises, to cast their votes.

Serpentine queues of voters could be seen at most of the polling stations even in the five assembly constituencies of Kashmir valley, where the turn out used to be usually lower than in the segments in Jammu division owing the boycott call by the separatists.

“Reports of brisk polling in the valley are very encouraging. Glad to hear turnout in Chenab valley seats also picking up,” chief minister Omar Abdullah said, commenting on the early trends of voting.

He wished “good luck to all the voters braving the cold weather” and urged them to vote in large numbers and “vote with your hearts”.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/photo/45273456.cms

(Voters line up to cast their votes outside a polling station during the first phase of the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly elections.)

The lack of effect of the boycott call was evident from the fact that long queues could be seen even at polling stations where the separatists had posted their anti-election material.

Militants hurled grenades at two polling stations in Bandipora and Sonawari constituencies. The attacks failed to have any effect on the polling process as no one was hurt in the twin attacks while the voters stayed put to exercise their franchise.

A minor clash broke out between supporters of ruling National Conference and opposition PDP at a polling station in Baroosa area of Ganderbal constituency. One person sustained minor injuries but security personnel restored order and polling went on smoothly thereafter.

While most of the old timers turned up to vote based on their ideological affiliations, development and unemployment was the key issue for the first time voters.

“We want development in our constituency. We are not very far from either Srinagar (the summer capital of the state) or Bandipora district headquarter but we seem to be living in dark ages,” Farhat Jabeen, an 18-year-old voter from Sonawari constituency, said.

Abdul Majid, another first time voter, said unemployment was the biggest problem of the area. “We have not seen any one from our area get jobs in our area. We want change and we hope the new dispensation will grant us our wish,” he added.

**Abdul Gaffar, a 60 year-old, however maintained that the area had not lacked on development front. “We have seen the area change over the past six years and would want to continue it,” he said.
**

Re 1st sentence, I admitted that YOU derailed the thread by using the word manhoos. Our subsequent correspondence re that word derailed it further. Now please stick to the topic.

Arleitter · December 1, 2014, 5:57am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

^

Atlast you came to know the importance of sticking to topic.Good one Southie. :) Now please do not derail it anymore and be in the context of discussion. Thanks. :)

Southie · December 1, 2014, 6:28am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

You are the one doing the derailing. I am just responding to your false charges. Now could you please stick to the topic

Arleitter · December 1, 2014, 6:34am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

^

The topic is : Record turn out in J&K polls .

Thanks :)

Samir_Mirchandani · December 5, 2014, 4:41pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

I think turnout would have been even greater but for the recent slight uptick in cross border terrorism. But >71% is fantastic and clearly shows that people have seen through the selfish demagoguery of so called separatist "leaders".

I can remember the recent video of one of them (Geelani? forget the name) pushing flood victims off a rescue boat and commandeering it for himself and his cronies!

Med911 · December 5, 2014, 5:02pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

There is a reason we dont have a Kashmir section on this Forum. I think it would be wise if you not bring up Kashmir as at seems you are simply trying to provoke others on what is essentially a Pakistani forum. Although I have always been passionate about the issue, I choose not bring it up beacuse of the potential flame war it can start.

I mean really, this exchange hasnt made you look all that reasonable. It only diminishes your character. And in the end, it doesn't bring anything into the debate other then vitriol. Really, this was a pointless and needless thread, that you really didn't need to open.

But if this was an ego thing, trying to be condescending for the sake of it, then you have succeeded. I wonder if we would have such freedoms as you enjoy on an Indian forum?

Med911 · December 5, 2014, 5:06pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

More Indians seem to have found their way to the forum suddenly! Surprise surprise.

in 1984, the voter turn out was 68 percent. It was 78 percent in 1987. That was before the insurgency.

As we have mentioned before, Voting in Kashmir is not an acceptance of India.

Med911 · December 5, 2014, 5:16pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Arleiter saab, read the oppinions of people who are actualy informed on the subject instead off concocting your own conclusions…
*

By Dr. Fayaz Ahmad Bhat*
The history of all hitherto underway Assembly elections in the State of Jammu and Kashmir is history of push pooling, fraud, manipulation, rigging, controversy, coercion and misinterpretation. There have been widespread charges against New Delhi (Indian Government) for election rigging, installation of governments from 1951 to present. It was Congress Government at Delhi which is accused of controlling governments in the State from 1951 to 1965.
Prem Nath Bazaz (1978) maintains that “After independence, rulers of Jammu and Kashmir State were not the freely chosen representatives of the people as they should have been but were the nominees and the proteges of the Central Congress Government.” Similar views have been expressed by B. K. Nehru who was Governor of the state from 1981 to 1984. After nasty blow to autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir with 63rd amendment Act of Indian constitution Article 365 was applied to State of Jammu and Kashmir and posts of Sadar-e- Riysat and Prime Minister were abolished, election process in the State has been mere fun and fuss. The First Assembly Elections in Kashmir held in 1965 dumped Sheikh Abdullah and installed Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq as First Chief Minister of the State. The Sixth Assembly elections in 1984 were held to install the government of Ghulam Mohammad Shah commonly known as Gul Shah or Gul Curfew. The Seventh Assembly elections held in 1987 were programmed and planed, and elections rigged. According to Sudha Ramachandran “The 1987 election undermined the Kashmiris’ faith in the ballot box. It convinced the youth that with the ballot having failed them, they would have to turn to the bullet to deliver.”
B. K. Nehru (1997) asserts that Heads of Governments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir from 1953 to 1975 had been nominees of Delhi. “Their appointment to that post was legitimized by the holding of farcical and totally rigged elections in which the congress party led by Delhi’s nominee was elected by huge majorities.” The elections in the State from 1996 to 2008 were held with barrel of gun. It has been reported that “the people were literally dragged out physically from their homes at gunpoint, dumped into army trucks and brought to polling booths.” It was only since 2008 that the people cost their vote on their own but the elections in Kashmir since 1996 have been in vogue. The election boycott call by “separatists” on occasions has been quite effective especially in urban areas and in few rural pockets. There have been many occasions when people especially belonging to rural areas defied boycott call and have come out in large numbers to vote. This time in the first phase of the assembly elections the State witnessed a turnout of more than 71 percent, despite boycott call by “separatist”. This is the highest over the past 18 years. In the first phase of assembly elections (held on 25 of November 2014) the State witnessed more than 71 percent voter turnout. This is the highest voter turnout witnessed by the State over the past Eighteen years (assembly elections in the
state are held every six years).
Like past every party, “separatists”, main stream politicians of the State and New Delhi interpret high voter turnout in their own ways and put forth their own meanings and interpretations of voting in Kashmir. Both ‘separatists’ and mainstream politicians ascribe high voter turn out to collective issues and problems like “Sadak, Pani, aur Bijli!” (electricity, roads and drinking water!”). Indian Government uses high voter turnout (more than 71%) as propaganda to show to the world that the majority of Kashmiris respect and favour Indian Constitution and are with India forgetting the fact that voter turnout in 1987 was 78.65 percent and exploded into full fledged armed struggle against Indian rule in the State.
As noted earlier whether these are “separatist” or main stream politicians of the state both are attempting to conceal their failure and faults by misinterpreting or wrong labeling high voter turnout in Kashmir. The high voter turnout in Kashmir particularly in rural areas and in some urban outstrikes is ascribed to collective issues “Sadak, Pani, aur Bijli!” This is nothing but absurd and silly. The higher voter turnout in Kashmir is not for Sadak, Pani and Bijli which are collective issues but people have diverse meanings, interpretation and reasons for voting and elections. Those who cost their vote or boycott have their subjective, meaning, understanding and interpretation of elections in Kashmir. There are also sociological dimensions attached to higher voter turn outs in rural India. Rural areas in India especially in Kashmir or still dominated by tradition values, norms and belief systems with tradition having a profound impact on the interaction and daily lives of rural people. A contestant belonging to rural area is having wide network of kinship and relations which increases his number of voters and supporters significantly. This proportionately increases polling percentage in Kashmir especially in rural areas.
Observations and interaction reveal voting and boycott are not similar, simple and unique. The more people one interacts with, the more reasons he/she come across. Every one each individual vote or boycott with his/her own meaning and interpretation of elections and having their own interests and responses, emotions and feelings. Some individuals vote to get a Sarkari Naukari, (government job) most of those who are in Sarkari Naukri and vote, vote to stop posting at far flung areas or away from vicinity. A large chunk of populace not only vote but also support to get undue benefits and bucks (mostly contractors) and a good number of people vote to avenge personal feuds. So the notion that people vote for “Sadak, Pani, aur Bijli!” fell apart from syllogism. Moreover data and statistics reveal that the crises of Bijli in the state especially in the valley of Kashmir have worsened. Forty percent of rural populace is still without drinking water facility and despite various centrally sponsored schemes 20-25 percent habitations is yet to be connected with the roads. So where lays the truth?
Marx way back in 1844 said that the “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” After Marx it was Ivan Illich in 1970 who widened the scope and boundary of Marx thought and philosophy by employing his ideas and doctrine to other social institution to understand the reality. While analyzing realness of educational institutions and education process Ivan Illich maintained schools have become world religion for poor and makes false promises of salvation. This can equally be relevant and applicable to understand the political institutions and political process. The political institutions, elections and boycott in context of Kashmir can be termed as sigh of the oppressed creatures, the heart of heartless people and the soul of soulless acting as opium for the masses.
*Dr. Fayaz Ahmad Bhat is head of the department and teaches Sociology at Government Degree College Banihal Jammu and Kashmir. Dr.Fayaz is MPhil, PhD, NET in Sociology besides having Masters in Political Science also. He has completed his Doctorate degree from Jamia Millia Islamia a reputed Central University of India. He has also been awarded centrally administered Doctoral Fellowship by India Council of Social Science Research.
*

Med911 · December 5, 2014, 5:32pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Then you clearly have no knowledge of Kashmirs history under Indian occupation. You seem to have forgotten the high turn out in prior elections.

As I pointed out before, the voter trunout in past election have also been high (along with rigging). The turnout in 1987, JUST BEFORE the uprising started in 1989, was nearly 78 percent! So how does high voter turn out equate to acceptance of India when the insurgency started after high voter turn out?

Kashmiris generally have turned out to vote, but the mass rigging in 1987 resulted in low turnout which has only NOW risen to traditional levels.

Med911 · December 5, 2014, 5:44pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

LOL... Again, if you had any historical knowledge you would know that its only a record over the past 21 years.

The topic isnt worthy of remaining on its rails since the topic at hand isn't based on anything even remotely resembling fact. Its nothing more then Arleiter saab regurgitating Indian state propaganda. If I wanted to read propaganda, I would go to Times Of India.

Southie · December 5, 2014, 8:03pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Med911:

There is a reason we dont have a Kashmir section on this Forum. I think it would be wise if you not bring up Kashmir as at seems you are simply trying to provoke others on what is essentially a Pakistani forum. Although I have always been passionate about the issue, I choose not bring it up beacuse of the potential flame war it can start.

I mean really, this exchange hasnt made you look all that reasonable. It only diminishes your character. And in the end, it doesn't bring anything into the debate other then vitriol. Really, this was a pointless and needless thread, that you really didn't need to open.

But if this was an ego thing, trying to be condescending for the sake of it, then you have succeeded. I wonder if we would have such freedoms as you enjoy on an Indian forum?

Well said.

Med911 · December 6, 2014, 12:47am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Arleitter:

@Med911 @KKF @Southie

Kashmir Annexation to India | Kashmirforyou

Ranbir Singh’s grandson Hari Singh, who had ascended the throne of Kashmir in 1925, was the reigning monarch in 1947 at the conclusion of British rule of the subcontinent and the subsequent partition of the British Indian Empire into the newly independent Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. An internal revolt began in the Poonch region against oppressive taxation by the Maharaja. In August, Maharaja’s forces fired upon demonstrations in favour of Kashmir joining Pakistan, burned whole villages and massacred innocent people.The Poonch rebels declared an independent government of “Azad” Kashmir on 24 October. Rulers of Princely States were encouraged to accede their States to either Dominion – India or Pakistan, taking into account factors such as geographical contiguity and the wishes of their people. In 1947, Kashmir’s population was “77% Muslim and 20% Hindu”. To postpone making a hurried decision, the Maharaja signed a “standstill” agreement withPakistan, which ensured continuity of trade, travel, communication, and similar services between the two. Such an agreement was pending with India. In October 1947, Pashtuns from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Provincerecruited by the Poonch rebels, invaded Kashmir, along with the Poonch rebels, allegedly incensed by the atrocities against fellow Muslims in Poonch and Jammu. The tribesmen engaged in looting and killing along the way. The ostensible aim of the guerilla campaign was to frighten Hari Singh into submission. Instead the Maharaja appealed to Mountbatten for assistance, and the Governor-General agreed on the condition that the ruler accede to India. Once the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession, Indian soldiers entered Kashmir and drove the Pakistani-sponsored irregulars from all but a small section of the state. India accepted the accession, regarding it provisional until such time as the will of the people can be ascertained by a plebiscite, since Kashmir was recognized as a disputed territory. Kashmir leader Sheikh Abdullah endorsed the accession as ad-hoc which would be ultimately decided by a plebiscite and is appointed head of the emergency administration. The Pakistani government immediately contested the accession, suggesting that it was fraudulent, that the Maharaja acted under duress and that he had no right to sign an agreement with India when the standstill agreement with Pakistan was still in force. http://kashmir4you.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/shiekh_abdullah_pe_20070820.jpg?w=194&h=300The United Nations was then invited to mediate the quarrel. The UN mission insisted that the opinion of Kashmiris must be ascertained. The then Indian Prime Minister is reported to have himself urged U.N. to poll Kashmir and on the basis of results Kashmar’s accession will be decided. However, India insisted that no referendum could occur until all of the state had been cleared of irregulars. On 5 January 1949, UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan) resolution stated that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite. As per the 1948 and 1949 UNCIP Resolutions, both countries accepted the principle, that Pakistan secures the withdrawal of Pakistani intruders followed by withdrawal of Pakistani and Indian forces, as a basis for the formulation of a Truce agreement whose details are to be arrived in future, followed by a plebiscite; However, both countries failed to arrive at a Truce agreement due to differences in interpretation of the procedure for and extent of demilitarisation one of them being whether the Azad Kashmiri army is to be disbanded during the truce stage or the plebiscite stage.

The UN Security Council on 20 January 1948 passed Resolution 39 establishing a special commission to investigate the conflict. Subsequent to the commission’s recommendation the Security Council, ordered in its Resolution 47, passed on 21 April 1948 that the invading Pakistani army retreat from Jammu & Kashmir and that the accession ofKashmir to either India or Pakistan be determined in accordance with a plebiscite to be supervised by the UN. In a string of subsequent resolutions the Security Council took notice of the continuing failure by India to hold the plebiscite. However, no punitive action against India could be taken by the Security Council because its resolution, requiring India to hold a Plebiscite, was non-binding and the Pakistani army never left the part of the Kashmir, they managed to keep occupied at the end of the 1947 war, required by the Security Council resolution 47.
In the last days of 1948, a ceasefire was agreed under UN auspices; however, since the plebiscite demanded by the UN was never conducted, relations between India and Pakistan soured, and eventually led to three more wars over Kashmir in 1965, 1971 and 1999. India has control of about half the area of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir; Pakistan controls a third of the region, theNorthern Areas, or historically known as regions of Gilgit and Baltistan; and Pakistan Administered Kashmir. According to Encyclopædia Britannica, “Although there was a clear Muslim majority in Kashmirbefore the 1947 partition and its economic, cultural, and geographic contiguity with the Muslim-majority area of the Punjab (in Pakistan) could be convincingly demonstrated, the political developments during and after the partition resulted in a division of the region. Pakistan was left with territory that, although basically Muslim in character, was thinly populated, relatively inaccessible, and economically underdeveloped. The largest Muslim group, situated in the Vale of Kashmir and estimated to number more than half the population of the entire region, lay in Indian-administered territory, with its former outlets via the Jhelum valley route blocked.”

The eastern region of the erstwhile princely state of Kashmir has also been beset with a boundary dispute. In the late 19th- and early 20th centuries, although some boundary agreements were signed between Great Britain, Afghanistan and Russia over the northern borders of Kashmir, China never accepted these agreements, and the official Chinese position did not change with the communist takeover in 1949. By the mid-1950s the Chinese army had entered the north-east portion of Ladakh. : “By 1956–57 they had completed a military road through the Aksai Chin area to provide better communication between Xinjiang and western Tibet. India’s belated discovery of this road led to border clashes between the two countries that culminated in the Sino-Indian war of October 1962.”China has occupied Aksai Chin since 1962 and, in addition, an adjoining region, the Trans-Karakoram Tract was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1965.
In 1949, the Indian government obliged Hari Singh to leave Jammu and Kashmir and yield the government to Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of a popular political party, the National Conference Party. Since then, a bitter enmity has been developed between India and Pakistan and three wars have taken place between them over Kashmir. The growing dispute over Kashmir and the consistent failure of democracy also led to the rise of Kashmir nationalism and militancy in the state.
Following the disputed elections in 1987, young disaffected Kashmiris in the Valley such as the HAJY group – Abdul Hamid Shaikh, Ashfaq Majid Wani, Javed Ahmed Mir and Mohammed Yasin Malik – were recruited by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front(JKLF) and the popular insurgency in the Kashmir Valley increased in momentum from this point on. The year 1989 saw the intensification of conflict in Jammu andKashmir as Mujahadeens from Afghanistan slowly infiltrated the region following the end of the Soviet-Afghan War the same year. Pakistan provided arms and training to both indigenous and foreign militants in Kashmir, thus adding fuel to the smouldering fire of discontent in the valley.

So India was ready for a plebiscite but Pakistan failed to acknowledge it.

Taken from a link…
WHO HAS WHICH PART OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
[TABLE="class: datatable-default dataTable"]
[TH=“class: sorting_asc”]Regions[/TH]
[TH=“class: sorting”]Area in Sq Km[/TH]
[TH=“class: sorting”]% of current J&K controlled by India[/TH]
[TH=“class: sorting”]% of original J&K state in 1947[/TH]

[TR=“class: odd”]
Jammu region
26,293
26
12
[/TR]
[TR=“class: even”]
Kashmir Valley
15,948
16
7
[/TR]
[TR=“class: odd”]
Ladakh region
59,146
58
27
[/TR]
[TR=“class: even”]
State of Jammu and Kashmir
1,01,387
100
46
[/TR]

The rest of the areas are under the control of Pakistan and China.Now the matter is very simple.A plebiscite is ever to take place,it has to take place in the state as a whole.Moreover,Pakistan had struck a deal with China in 1963 and conceded parts of Kashmir’s land to China.

We are open and ready for a plebiscite.Now where is Kashmir of 1948?

Thanks.

I dont understand how any of this is in any way supportive of India’s position. Everything India is currently doing (claiming Kashmir as its own) contradicts its position on partition. In principle there should be a referendum ( nuts and bolts aside), but the issue as far as India is concerned is resovled and there is no question of a referandum. Your side doesnt even acknowledge the basic premise that Kashmir is a disputed territory and that there should ever be a referendum. So where there should be a referendum or how it should be carried out is secondary. First you have to get the Indian side to revert to the original position.

The Indian state essentially realized that it has the military power to not compromise and so pushed its own solution onto all involved parties. If it were China or any other regional power instead of Pakistan, they would have been singing a different tune.

Arleitter · December 6, 2014, 5:06am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Med911:

There is a reason we dont have a Kashmir section on this Forum. I think it would be wise if you not bring up Kashmir as at seems you are simply trying to provoke others on what is essentially a Pakistani forum. Although I have always been passionate about the issue, I choose not bring it up beacuse of the potential flame war it can start.

I mean really, this exchange hasnt made you look all that reasonable. It only diminishes your character. And in the end, it doesn't bring anything into the debate other then vitriol. Really, this was a pointless and needless thread, that you really didn't need to open.

But if this was an ego thing, trying to be condescending for the sake of it, then you have succeeded. I wonder if we would have such freedoms as you enjoy on an Indian forum?

Med,G.S had a dedicated `Kashmir Forum' ,I think till the end of 2002. Your other remarks may not be adding anything to this topic.

Kashmir may be a sentiment or passion for a group for many but it does not mean that that it should not be discussed when positive changes are happening in that state after years of insurgency,under development and a total destruction of tours and tourism.

Thanks :)

Southie · December 6, 2014, 5:34am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

So whenever someone disagrees, they don't add anything to the topic. Nice.

Personally I find it distasteful to speak about Kashmir in a one sided manner. Bring some integrity to the table.

Arleitter · December 6, 2014, 5:35am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Unfortunately,Kashmiris have no interest in these separatists and people advocating plebiscite and and self-determiation and secession.

Once again 71% voting recorded in the second phase. :hehe:

71% voting recorded in 2nd phase of Jammu & Kashmir poll - The Times of India

*A soldier stands guard as voters wait in a long queue at a polling station to cast their votes for assembly election in Handwara district of Jammu & Kashmir, on December 2, 2014. *

According to EC, Reasi in recorded 80 per cent polling. Border areas of Poonch and Kupwara 78 and 68 per cent respectively.

READ ALSO: Kashmiris reject poll boycott calls with record 71% turnout in 1st phase

Voters wait in a queue at a polling station to cast their votes for assembly elections in Handwara district of Jammu & Kashmir, on December 2, 2014.

Arleitter · December 7, 2014, 8:10am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Wrong.It seems you lack knowledge about Kashmir and Kashmiris. The 2002 election had just 30%voter turn out and it was pretty much lower the 1996 election.

Again it shows that Kashmiris have started thinking differently and they want development not guns and violence.There are mnay factors attributed to this.The changing times,the realization that only Indioa can guarentee them safety,Only in Indian rule progress and development is assured for them and more importantly decades long insurgency has brought them nothing but death,blood shed and destruction.

It is not logic to assume that Kashmiris voted oin such a large numbers because they have no other option.If this is your arguement then you are discrediting APHC as a whole.APHC is instrumental in provoking youngsters in the valley and inciting them to take violent means and above all poll-boycotts. So this is a clear sign that people of Kashmir have realized who their friend and who their foe is. The second phase has also registered a high turn out of voters. No wonder terrorists who sneaked across the L.A.C wanted to unleash a carnage because they are shell-shocked to see the paradigm shift in the attitude of people of Kashmir.

Arleitter · December 7, 2014, 8:25am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir

Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir Rekha Chowdhary
Abstract | Index | Outline | Text | Bibliography | Notes | References | About the author
Abstract The paper analyses the 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu and Kashmir in the context of the conflict situation of the last two decades. The separatist sentiment, the paper argues, remains ascendant, even though mainstream politics (that had become totally irrelevant during the initial years of militancy and political upsurge) has been gradually gaining space. Rather than challenging separatist politics, mainstream politics is seeking to legitimise itself by acknowledging its own limitations and confining itself to the politics of ‘governance’ while leaving for separatist politics the issue of the ‘ultimate resolution of conflict’. However, in this process of legitimisation, mainstream politics has taken up many issues from the agenda of separatist politics. Consequently, despite the distinction between the two kinds of politics, there exists an overlap between them. The paper also focuses on the political divergence and the assertion of regional/religious identity politics. The Amarnath agitation, which took place a few months before the Parliamentary elections, became the basis of massive political mobilisation and reaffirmation of the popular separatist sentiment in Kashmir and religious cum regional identity politics in Jammu. As such, it forms an important reference point for the analysis. The paper also focuses on the 2008 Assembly election, which immediately preceded the Parliamentary elections.

Top of page
Index terms Keywords :conflict, democracy, elections, India, Jammu, Kashmir, political science
Top of page
Outline The context of electoral politics in Kashmir: Implications of conflict situation and separatist politics
The Amarnath agitation
The 2008 Assembly elections
The 2009 Parliamentary elections
The context of separatist politics
Implications of the Amarnath agitation
The impact of rethinking the Parliamentary elections
The Kashmir region
The Jammu region
Conclusion
Top of page
Full text PDF Send by e-mail

[ul]
[li]1 For a detailed understanding of the background and emergence of armed militancy and separatist poli (…)[/li][/ul]
1As in any other state of India, the 2009 Parliamentary election in the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be seen as an important moment reflecting the nature and direction of politics as it is evolving at the local level. One can gauge the changing nature of power politics; the context of popular participation; the nature of competition and the intensity and depth of democracy in the State. However, the context of the conflict situation which has engulfed this state for the past two decades provides additional meaning to the electoral exercise here. This paper will therefore seek to locate the Parliamentary elections in the context of separatism. Specifically, it will focus on the implications of parallel existence of the separatist and the mainstream politics on power politics of the State. Separatism, it may be mentioned here, emerged as the dominant political response in Kashmir during the post-1989 period. Manifested simultaneously through armed militancy as well as spontaneous popular upsurge, this political response has continued to have a hold over the politics of the Valley throughout the last two decades.1 Despite the restoration of mainstream politics after its complete erosion during the initial stages of separatism, the separatist politics continues to define the political responses of Kashmir. The two kinds of politics seem to be operating side by side, overlapping at a number of points and impacting each other in an interesting manner. It is in this context of overlap between the separatist and mainstream politics that the 2009 Parliamentary election will be analysed.

               2The  paper will also highlight the context of diversity and political  divergence within the state and its implications on electoral politics.  Focusing on the political divergence at the regional level, it will  analyse the process of political mobilisation around the regional  identity politics. 
               3The  immediate context of the elections is framed by two significant  political events that preceed these elections—first, the Amarnath  agitation which engulfed almost the whole state during the summer of  2008 and Assembly elections that were concluded in December 2008.
               [The context of electoral politics in Kashmir: Implications of conflict situation and separatist politics](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n1)                   4The  state of Jammu and Kashmir has been affected by the conflict situation  ever since 1947. The ruler of this erstwhile Princely state, after  remaining indecisive for quite some time, signed the instrument of  Accession with India under troubled conditions created by the tribal  invaders supported by Pakistan army, on 26[SUP]th[/SUP] October 1947.  The issue assumed international character with India taking the case to  the UN. With Pakistan holding on a part of J&K and contesting the  validity of Accession of the other part with India, this State continued  to remain a bone of contention between the two countries. 
               5However,  besides external dimension of the conflict which has afflicted this  state ever since 1947, there is also an internal dimension which is  defined by Kashmir’s relationship with India. This relation has  witnessed a protracted tension, especially since 1953. In 1953, Sheikh  Abdullah, the popular Kashmiri leader was removed from power and  detained for a long time. Before his detention, Sheikh had been  instrumental in negotiating a special constitutional status for the  state. However, with his dismissal not only this status was gradually  eroded, but Kashmiris were also denied democratic channels of political  expression. Excessive central intrusion in the politics of the state  distorted even the most developed indigenous political institutions like  the National Conference and distanced governance from the popular  responses (Bose 2003: 66-7) All this resulted in an accumulated  political discontent which was manifested throughout the post-1953  period. 
               6Though  Sheikh was brought back to power in 1975, political discontent  continued to manifest itself. One of the major reasons for this  discontent was the lack of any initiative in restoring the  constitutional autonomy of the state, the major pre-condition of Sheikh  for resuming power. However, due to the towering personality of the  Sheikh, particularly his capacity to assert autonomy of his government  vis-à-vis the intrusive politics of the Centre, the discontent was quite  subdued. But the incapacity of his successor and son, Dr. Farooq  Abdullah, to keep the Centre away from meddling into the politics of the  state, resulted in intensifying the already existing feeling of  discontent. The tension continued to grow after the dismissal,  engineered by the Congress—the ruling party in the Centre—, of Farooq  Abbdullah’s government, which had obtained a massive popular mandate  during the 1983 Assembly elections, (Abdullah 1985: 9). In addition, the  pressure built upon Farooq Abdullah and the National Conference to  enter into an electoral alliance with the Congress party increased the  dissatisfaction, since the Congress party was popularly held responsible  for distorting local politics since early fifties.

[ul]
[li]2 Along with MUF, the opposition to the NC-Congress combine was given by the People’s Conference led (…)[/li][li]3 For instance, the NC candidate in Bijbihera won the election with a margin of 100 votes only. In Wa (…)[/li][/ul]
7However, the real political outrage in the Valley was triggered by the 1987 Assembly election, generally perceived to be highly rigged, which led to the massive victory of NC-Congress combine and the defeat of most of the Muslim United Front (MUF) candidates. The MUF was formed in 1986 to give vent to the growing popular resentment against the alliance were seen to be manipulated. Despite polling 38.2% votes (compared to 45.2% votes of the NC-Congress combine), the opposition comprised of MUF and People’s Conference2 could register victory barely in four constituencies. The fact that the margin of victory of some of the candidates belonging to the ruling combine was very low, and the number of invalid votes in these constituencies was quite high, generated a feeling of scepticism regarding the validity of the results3 (Chowdhary & Rao 2003: 189-219).

               8It  was in the wake of disillusionment with the internal politics in  general that the present phase of conflict was started in the Valley.  What marked the beginning of this phase was the decision of some of the  Kashmiri youth who had participated in the elections as contestants,  election agents, campaigners and sympathisers of candidates to cross  over to Pakistan administered Kashmir to take training in armed  militancy. Moreover, apart from armed militancy, a spontaneous popular  upsurge grew against the Indian State that eroded the mainstream  politics in the Valley of Kashmir. The separatist politics manifested  both through the armed militancy as well as spontaneous political  response took a more organised form with the establishment of the All  Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in 1993. The establishment of APHC as  an umbrella organisation was necessitated by the proliferation of  militant groups which were at times operating at cross purposes. The  ideological differences between these organisations and their internal  strife, especially the war declared by Hizbul Mujahideen on the JKLF,  generated a need for a loose-knit organisation that could give a sense  of unity and common direction to those participating in the movement  (Schofield 2000: 143-88).

[ul]
[li]4 With common people openly identifying with separatist politics, the farcical nature of the electora (…)[/li][/ul]
9So much was the sway of the separatist politics in the Kashmir Valley, that it completely eroded the mainstream politics right from 1989. While Jammu and Ladakh regions remained more or less normal, there was no scope for the mainstream power politics in the Valley.4 As the legitimacy of the mainstream politics was openly questioned by the militants on the one hand, and the defiant masses on the streets of Kashmir on the other, the state was placed under the President’s rule for a prolonged period of time. In 1996, the electoral process was restored but the government that was formed after the Assembly election could not gain credence in the Valley of Kashmir. Since the elections were organised with the help of the security forces and the counter-insurgents, the government formed after the elections was not seen to be representing the popular will. Though NC had given the slogan of ‘autonomy’ to regain its hold in the local politics, there were not many takers of this slogan (Chowdhary 2000: 2600-1).

               10Despite  the restoration of political process, separatist sentiment continued to  hold sway. Though Kashmiris, by this time, had started reacting against  the ‘culture of violence’ and very subtly rejecting and de-legitimising  militancy, their sympathies with separatist politics continued to be  expressed through various demonstrations organised by the Hurriyat  Conference. Mainstream politics, therefore, continued to remain  challenged.
               11A  number of factors changed the popular response towards electoral and  mainstream politics. Firstly, the urge for normalcy after the prolonged  period of militant violence led to some kind of change of attitude  towards the process of governance. By the time the 2002 Assembly  election was concluded, the political processes related to governance  had already found some legitimate space in Kashmir’s politics. Without  any contradiction towards their separatist sentiments, people started  involving themselves in the ‘politics related to governance’. This  process was further boosted by a change in the nature of political  mobilisation. With the emergence of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as  another Kashmir-based party, not only the electoral competition became  quite intense, but the electoral discourse also became more grounded in  the local realities. PDP referred to the Human Rights violations taking  place in Kashmir and the need for providing ‘healing touch’ to people,  and also raised the issue of conflict and its resolution through the  process of dialogue both with both Pakistan and militants. Also  significant were the initiatives being taken by the Vajpayee-led  Government: declaring that India had made mistakes in Kashmir, Vajpayee  made a commitment to hold a ‘free and fair election’. This commitment  was an indirect acknowledgement of the intrusive role that the Centre  had been playing in the power politics of the State since 1950s.

[ul]
[li]5 It was exactly 29.64% voter turnout for the Valley of Kashmir. Interestingly in few districts like (…)[/li][/ul]
12The impact of all these factors was significantly visible through the voters’ response. Although the overall turnout during the 2002 Assembly elections was much lower than the 1996 Assembly elections, the participation was more voluntary rather than coerced by the presence of security forces in any manner, which made the 30% turnout in Kashmir Valley quite significant.5

[ul]
[li]6 That is the reason why the National Conference, which was ousted from power in 1984 due to the defe (…)[/li][/ul]
13The 2002 Assembly elections, generally acknowledged to be fair, helped build some kind of confidence in the electoral institutions and processes. Till now, the formation of government and its sustenance in power was more dependent on the support of the Centre rather than the mandate of people. The electoral politics therefore was quite distanced from the popular responses.6 Breaking the hegemony of the single dominant party also brought an alternative to the PDP-Congress coalition power. The possibility that a government could be changed through the participation of people in the electoral process, rather than through the manipulative politics of the Centre, strengthened the stake of the people in this process.

               14Moreover,  the response of people towards the electoral process was further  transformed through the intensity of competition after the creation of  the People’s Democratic Party. The emergence of another Kashmir-based  political party invigorated the mainstream political space.

[ul]
[li]7 Sheikh was arrested on the suspicion that he was not happy with the Accession of the State with Ind (…)[/li][/ul]
15Before the emergence of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), National Conference (NC) had hegemonised the politics of Kashmir region (Chowdhary & Rao 2004: 1521-7). It based its on playing a role in organising the resistance movement against the feudal Dogra rule before 1947 and the radical land reforms that it had initiated after it came into power in 1947. Its emphasis on economic and political reconstruction of the state, in pursuance of the New Kashmir Manifesto, the ideological blueprint of the party—particularly the redistribution of the land to the landless, debt relief to the peasants, free education till the Post Graduate stage—endeared this party to the Kashmiri masses and they formed the base of this party. The support was strengthened by Sheikh Abdullah’s charisma until his removal from power in 1953.7

               16With  the ouster of the Sheikh Abdullah from power and subsequent formation  of Plebiscite Front, the support base of NC shifted to this organisation  in the post-1953 period. However, NC continued to officially operate as  the ruling party of the state under the leadership of Bakshi Ghulam  Mohammed. But the ruling NC legitimacy remained contested throughout and  it survived more on the basis of the support from the Congress party  than on the basis of local support. So overwhelming was the influence of  the Congress that the NC ultimately merged with it in mid-sixties.  After 1975 when Sheikh Abdullah came back to power politics, the  Plebiscite Front was dissolved and the NC was revived. From 1975 to  1996, the NC was again the most influential party of Jammu and Kashmir,  particularly in the Valley.
               17Though  the NC continued to dominate the political scene of the State, its  support base gradually declined. In the background of the Kashmir’s  politics between 1953 and 1975 when people were mobilised around the  theme of contestation of the existing relationship of the state with  India, the return of Sheikh Abdullah to power without much change in the  status quo, there was a simmering discontent in the Valley. However,  due to the towering personality of Sheikh Abdullah, much of this  discontent did not take a concrete shape during his life time. But after  his death, the party now led by his son Farooq Abdullah started losing  space. Even when Congress as the ruling party in the Centre had  manoeuvred the ouster of his government in 1984, he had entered into an  alliance with this party in 1986 and contested the 1987 election leading  this alliance.

[ul]
[li]8 The disjuncture between the National Conference and the popular responses was also reflected earlie (…)[/li][/ul]
18As the party became dependent on the centre for its political survival rather than on mass support at the ground level, it distanced itself from popular concerns. That the party, despite obtaining massive mandate was disconnected from popular responses became clear in 1989 when the Valley came in the grip of militancy and witnessed a massive upsurge (Schofield 2003: 143-88).8 In the political crisis that ensued, not only NC was forced to withdraw from the political scene but had to face the maximum brunt of violence. Devoid of legitimacy, NC leadership went into hibernation. And even after coming back on the political scene by contesting the 1996 Assembly election and forming the government, it could not regain its previous legitimacy.

[ul]
[li]9 The competitive nature of regional politics of Kashmir ultimately resulted in deeper changes in the (…)[/li][/ul]
19With the emergence of PDP in late nineties, the context of the power politics changed drastically. As another Kashmir-based party, it not only challenged the dominance of the NC but changed the very logic of power politics. Adopting a political discourse that reflected the popular concerns of people in a situation of conflict, PDP sought to reduce the gap between popular aspirations and the power politics. It borrowed issues from the separatist camp and brought them to the centre of mainstream political space. Thus the party suggested ‘dialogue’ with the militants and separatists as a way towards solving the conflict; easing out pressure upon people from the excessive presence of the security forces; and reducing drastically the number of cases of Human Rights violations. It was this ‘people-oriented’ strategy of PDP that helped bring an end the hegemony of NC. During the 2002 Assembly elections, the PDP managed to capture as many as 16 seats from Kashmir Valley.9

               20The  mainstream political space was able to expand substantially during the  period between 2002 and 2008. From a situation in pre-2002 period when  political parties and leaders could not freely move in public space and  could not organise public meetings, 2007 saw frequent rallies being  organised by almost all the political parties in various parts of the  Valley—in the anticipation of the coming election, almost one year in  advance (Chowdhary 2008: 22).
               21Expansion  of the electoral space, however, has not taken place at the cost of the  separatist sentiment and politics. In fact, the separatist sentiment  remains intact in Kashmir. The legitimisation of the mainstream politics  has been possible only because there is no contradiction between the  separatist and mainstream politics and people are not forced to make a  choice between the two. The two are seen as reflecting two different  spheres of politics: one dealing with issues relating to governance; and  the other dealing with conflict situation and its resolution. Right  since the 2002 elections, the political parties have sought to restrict  the scope of electoral politics to the issues related to ‘governance’  only. Recognising the larger political realities of the state, these  parties acknowledge the widely prevalent separatist sentiment and the  need of addressing it. In no way do they claim that the extension of  electoral space amounts to shrinking the separatist space. 
               22The  parallel existence of the two kinds of politics reflects a complexity  that exists at the ground level, generated both by the change in the  dynamics of the separatist politics, and the nature of popular  responses. With the decline in armed militancy, the assertion of the  separatist sentiments is taking place through the mass politics. The  more the mainstream politics is expanding, the more it becomes rooted in  local responses, while generating a need to reaffirm the popular  separatist sentiments. In a situation where conflict resolution has not  taken a concrete shape, a danger is always felt that participation in  mainstream politics may be a sign of political normalcy which might put  the whole question of conflict resolution to the back burner. Thus has  emerged the very peculiar situation in Kashmir, where mainstream  political processes and assertion of separatist sentiments alternate. It  is interesting to note how abruptly the situation changes in the  Valley. While there was a tremendous electoral upsurge throughout the  year of 2007 and early 2008, it was suddenly halted by an equally strong  assertion of separatist politics during the Amarnath agitation. The  affirmation of the mainstream politics immediately followed when people  participated in large number during the 2008 Assembly elections. 
               [The Amarnath agitation](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n2)

[ul]
[li]10 Shri Amarnath Shrine Board was formed by the government of J&K in 2000 with the purpose of managing (…)[/li][li]11 General Sinha had earlier incensed many Kashmiris with a self-proclaimed agenda of changing the ‘mi (…)[/li][/ul]
23Amarnath land row engulfed the whole state throughout the summer of 2008. To begin with, there was a massive agitation in Kashmir, which was followed by a prolonged agitation in Jammu. This was once again followed by a renewed mass upsurge in Kashmir. The entire issue initially revolved around a government order diverting forest land to Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB), and subsequently around the revocation of the same order.10 The order gave the SASB the right to erect pre-fabricated temporary structures for housing pilgrims during the period of the Amarnath yatra. However, more than the order, it was the assertion of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the SASB—representing the ex-officio chairman, the Governor, General S.K. Sinha—, that land had been given permanently to the Board to build permanent structures that generated a massive response in Kashmir.11

               24The  separatists used the issue of diversion of land to SASB to create  suspicion of a grand design behind the order aimed at altering the  Muslim-majority character of the state. The fear of ‘demographic  change’, therefore, became the basis of mass mobilization in Kashmir. To  quell the agitation which had assumed dangerous proportions in Kashmir,  the order was revoked but this only generated another kind of polemics  in Jammu. The Bharatiya Janata Party and like-minded organizations  termed the revocation as an assault on ‘Hindu sentiments’ and demanded  restoration of the original order. The revocation of the order was  portrayed as anti-Jammu decision taken under the pressure of separatists  to appease the ‘Muslims of Kashmir’ without taking into consideration  the sentiments of the ‘Hindus of Jammu’.
               25In  both the regions, the agitation brought in focus the radical elements  who sought to mobilise people around emotive issues. In Kashmir, people  were mobilised by the Geelani-led Hurriyat Conference (as well as by the  PDP) around the fear of demographic change (the fear that by systematic  efforts the Muslim-majority character of the State will be changed) and  in Jammu, the mobilisation took place around the religious sentiments  of Hindus (supposedly hurt by the revocation of the Land Order). 
               26The  agitation had far reaching implications for the politics of the State.  In the Valley of Kashmir, there was aggressive affirmation of separatist  sentiments reminding one of the massive popular demonstrations of early  1990. However, unlike the separatism of the last few years which was  marked by the centrality of moderate leadership, it was now directed by  hardliners. 
               27The  public display of the separatist sentiments during this time gave an  indication that beyond the electoral vibrancy, the deep-rooted sense of  alienation continued to prevail. Throughout the period of agitation one  could feel that the mainstream politics had once more regressed to the  background and the separatist politics had become ascendant.

[ul]
[li]12 After the first phase of agitation which culminated with the revocation of the Government Order, th (…)[/li][/ul]
28A significant implication of the Amarnath agitation was the fractured relationship between Jammu and Kashmir. Though politically divergent, the two major regions had never been placed in such an antagonistic relationship.12 The political discord had reached beyond the usual issues of regional disparities and had started affecting the economic and trade relationship between the two regions. The most dangerous implication of the agitation was the communally divisive mobilisation and the resultant communal tension in the state.

               29Along  with the religious factor, it was the regional identity politics that  provided stimulus to the Amarnath agitation. In Jammu, a feeling of  political discontent has been persisting since early fifties. The  feeling emanates from the context of power politics of the State which  is perceived to be ‘Kashmir-centric’ having negligible or token presence  of Jammu’s political elite (Puri 1966: 77-81). It also has much to do  with the specificity of the conflict situation of Kashmir and the  response of the Central government. There is a feeling that in all  political negotiations undertaken to address the Kashmir problem, Jammu  is taken for granted and that the political arrangements are imposed on  this region. This feeling is accentuated by the context of political  divergence and the ideological divide between the two regions. The logic  of Kashmir’s dominant politics governed by the contestation of the  State’s relationship with India and manifested through the discourse of  ‘Autonomy’/‘Azadi’ does not extend itself to the Jammu region. The  politics of this region on the contrary, is governed by the regional  asymmetry in the power politics and resource distribution. 
               30The  dominant political discourse of Jammu revolves around the issues  related to regional ‘deprivation and neglect’. ‘Kashmir’ in this  discourse forms the ‘centre of power’ within the state and is perceived  to be dominating both the power structure of the state and the economic  and material resources. It is on this basis that popular perceptions  have been articulated around the notion of regional imbalances and a  number of agitations have been organised in Jammu. The context of  regional divergence and regional imbalances has come to overwhelm the  political logic of Jammu, not only in the Hindu-dominated areas where  organisations of Hindu-Right have been mobilising people around the  demand for abolition of Article 370 guaranteeing the special status of  the State, but also in the Muslim-dominated districts which are  relatively more backward. Leaders here blame the Kashmir-centric power  politics for the perpetual neglect of these districts. Ever since the  early fifties, there has been a perception throughout Jammu region that  the public policy and political decisions favour Kashmir while ignoring  Jammu. The political response of the region is therefore organised  around the issue of regional imbalances. The range of this response  however varies from the demand for regional autonomy (emanating from the  centrist politics), to the demand for a separate state of Jammu  (emanating from the Hindu Rightist politics). There is also a third  demand, coming from backward areas of Jammu region, for some kind of  sub-regional arrangement (the Hill Development Councils for instance).
               31Regional  divergence has been manifested in the politics of the state in a  variety of manners. However, despite this divergence the two regions of  the state never followed a confrontationist path. It was during the  period of militancy that the political divergence was reflected in a  sharp manner. However, even this did not result in collision between the  two regions. On the contrary, there evolved a feeling that despite the  specificity of conflict in the Kashmir region, there was a need to  evolve a consensus between the two regions. The conflict resolution  process, it was understood (both by the political elite in Kashmir as  well as in Jammu) needed to be inclusive so as to represent the  divergent political voices within the State. 
               32Amarnath  agitation became the first occasion in the history of politics of the  state when the two major regions of the state were placed in an  antagonistic situation. Both in Jammu as well as in Kashmir, the masses  were mobilised in a manner that enhanced regional chauvinism. Worse  still, the mobilisation ultimately took a communal route and resulted  not only in the tension between the two major communities of the state  but also in carving of new political constituencies based on religion.

[ul]
[li]13 Since 2002, when the era of coalition politics started, Jammu started having a substantial share in (…)[/li][/ul]
33In the absence of a regional party, the politics of regional discontent is often appropriated by the Hindu Rightist parties and organisations which combine regional issues with religious sentiments. Since the onset of militancy, the parties of Hindu Right have sought to sharpen the regional identity politics.13 Amarnath agitation was one such occasion when the Hindu Rightist organisations could mobilise masses in Hindu dominated areas of Jammu by arousing regional sentiment combined with religious one.

               34Regional  chauvinism not only dominated the Jammu region, but Kashmir as well.  After the onset of the coalition era which gave a visibility to Jammu in  the power politics, a politics has been generated in Kashmir around the  issue of its discrimination vis-à-vis Jammu. In radicalising the  regional politics of Kashmir, PDP has had a clear role to play. In its  competition with NC, this party has often sought to give an aggressive  edge to Kashmiri regional politics and also add religious dimensions to  it. One could clearly see the role of PDP in raising the regional  sentiments in Kashmir during the Amarnath agitation. Though responsible  for taking the decision on transfer of land to the SASB, this party  joined the side of agitators to demand its revocation, terming the Land  Order as an assault to Kashmiri identity and endangering the  Muslim-dominated character of the State. 
               [The 2008 Assembly elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n3)                   35The  2008 elections took place immediately after the Amarnath agitation. The  unprecedented regional and communal polarisation that afflicted the  state during this agitation, therefore, was bound to have repercussions  on this election.

[ul]
[li]14 Though much of the electoral discourse in Kashmir revolves around the ‘bigger issues’ like the idea (…)[/li][/ul]
36In the Valley, separatist politics was the highlight of the agitation. The separatist leadership had developed a renewed confidence that people who had participated in massive demonstrations against the Indian state during the agitation would not come forward to participate in elections, and the electoral exercise would once again be reduced to a farce. However, the boycott call was defied and there was massive participation of people in the Assembly election. Against 29.64% voter turnout in the 2002 Assembly election, the 2008 election recorded 51.64%. In almost all the districts and all the constituencies of the Valley, the percentage of the voter-turnout was much higher than the last Assembly elections. Throughout the Valley one could see the images of long queues outside the polling booth showing the eagerness to cast votes. The message was very clear: despite the centrality of the separatist politics, the mainstream politics has been extended and legitimised. The proximity of the people with the power politics, the location of power politics in local responses of people and their growing stake in the local politics—all had led to the deepening of democracy in this state, particularly in the Valley.14 This is why the usual sense of scepticism with regard to the democratic institutions was replaced by a greater involvement in the process of government making.

               Table 1. Comparative voter turnout in Kashmir – 2002 and 2008 Assembly elections*
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            Votes polled (in %)
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            **2002**
                   
                                            **2008**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **J&K**
                   
                                            43.70
                   
                                            60.92
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Kashmir**
                   
                                            29.64
                   
                                            51.64
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Jammu**
                   
                                            55.82
                   
                                            70.90
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Ladakh**
                   
                                            75.91
                   
                                            68.65
                   
                 
               
               ** Source: Election Commission of India. All the tables contain data from the Election Commission of India.*
               37Although  the voter turnout was not affected by the Amarnath agitation, same is  not the case with the electoral outcome. In an intensely contested  election which gave a fragmented verdict, PDP and BJP emerged as the  gainers. While PDP was able to increase its share of seats in Kashmir  region from 16 in 2002 to 19 and its vote percentage arose from 24.48%  to 27.42%, it could also gain entry in Jammu and register its victory in  2 seats with a voter turnout of 6.88% in its favour. BJP, however  emerged as the biggest gainer since it could increase its share of seats  from one to eleven. Its vote share in Jammu region increased from  17.80% to 22.94%. 
               38NC  was able to retain 28 seats that it had in 2002, but it suffered some  losses in Jammu region where it could win only 6 seats as compared to 9  seats in 2002. Congress also could not fare so well. As against 20 seats  in 2002, this time it could win only 17 seats. As against 21.38% votes  in 2002, only 18.17% votes were cast in its favour in 2008. It suffered  loss both in Jammu (from 26.40% to 23.98%) as well as in Kashmir (from  14.41% to 10%). 
               Table 2. Comparative percentage of votes polled by different parties – 2002 and 2008 Assembly elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            Votes Polled (in %)
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            J&K
                   
                                            Kashmir Region
                   
                                            Jammu Region
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            **2002**
                   
                                            **2008**
                   
                                            **2002**
                   
                                            **2008**
                   
                                            **2002**
                   
                                            **2008**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **NC**
                   
                                            28.23
                   
                                            23.59
                   
                                            35.62
                   
                                            27.50
                   
                                            23.95
                   
                                            20.16
                   
                 
                 
                                            **INC**
                   
                                            21.38
                   
                                            18.17
                   
                                            14.41
                   
                                            10.48
                   
                                            26.40
                   
                                            23.98
                   
                 
                 
                                            **PDP**
                   
                                            09.04
                   
                                            15.68
                   
                                            24.51
                   
                                            27,41
                   
                                            01.76
                   
                                            06.88
                   
                 
                 
                                            **BJP **
                   
                                            12.15
                   
                                            12.73
                   
                                            01.60
                   
                                            00.96
                   
                                            17.80
                   
                                            22.94
                   
                 
                 
                                            **JKNPP**
                   
                                            04.68
                   
                                            3.39
                   
                                            00.03
                   
                                            0.78
                   
                                            07.02
                   
                                            05.68
                   
                 
               
               Table 3. Comparative share of seats attained by political parties – 2002 and 2008 Assembly elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            Number of Seats
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            J&K
                   
                                            Kashmir Region
                   
                                            Jammu Region
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            **2002**
                   
                                            **2008**
                   
                                            **2002**
                   
                                            **2008**
                   
                                            **2002**
                   
                                            **2008**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **NC**
                   
                                            28
                   
                                            28
                   
                                            18
                   
                                            20
                   
                                            09
                   
                                            06
                   
                 
                 
                                            **INC**
                   
                                            20
                   
                                            17
                   
                                            05
                   
                                            03
                   
                                            15
                   
                                            13
                   
                 
                 
                                            **PDP**
                   
                                            16
                   
                                            21
                   
                                            16
                   
                                            19
                   
                                            00
                   
                                            02
                   
                 
                 
                                            **BJP **
                   
                                            01
                   
                                            11
                   
                                            00
                   
                                            00
                   
                                            01
                   
                                            11
                   
                 
                 
                                            **JKNPP**
                   
                                            04
                   
                                            03
                   
                                            00
                   
                                            00
                   
                                            04
                   
                                            03
                   
                 
               
               39The  results of Assembly elections clearly reflect the divide created during  the agitation. The increase in BJP’s and PDP’s share of votes and seats  follow the successful aggressive mobilisation of the regional and  religious identities by these two parties. Rather than the centrist  forces represented by Congress and National Conference, it was the  triumph for those parties which had stretched the politics of the state  to the extremely polarised responses.
               40Before  the Amarnath agitation, PDP was not in a very comfortable position in  Kashmir. After remaining in power for more than five years, it was  facing the anti-incumbency factor. In the context of its radical  pro-Kashmir politics, its association with Congress was becoming a  liability. In all likelihood therefore, NC was poised to win a  substantial number of seats in the Valley, had the agitation not taken  place. However, the Amarnath agitation changed the situation for the PDP  which severed its link with the Congress and joined the side of  agitators. Since the agitation honed the Kashmiri regional and  separatist sentiments, PDP’s gain was ensured. In the regionally  polarised politics where Jammu’s rightwing forces were provoking  anti-Kashmir sentiments, PDP was projecting itself as the redeemer of  the Kashmiri sentiment. Its leader Mehbooba Mufti was vociferously  campaigning against the ‘economic blockade’ of Kashmir by Jammu’s  agitators. In this context of regional and communal polarisation, the  PDP’s increase in popularity was clearly reflected during the Assembly  election.

[ul]
[li]15 The communal polarisation of the electoral politics of the State is not unprecedented. The 1983 Ass (…)[/li][/ul]
41The electoral polarisation on the communal basis was more clearly established in the Jammu region.15 Here BJP could register its victory in the record number of 11 seats. The highest number of seats that this party had ever attained was 8 during the 1996 Assembly election, as an immediate post-militancy reaction from the region. In the context of violence, BJP could succeed in extending its constituency. However, as the violence level came down, the influence of BJP also weakened. During the 2002 Assembly election, this party only managed to win one seat.

[ul]
[li]16 With Congress-PDP being the major partners of the coalition government, it represented a balance of (…)[/li][/ul]
42The constituency of BJP’s politics was in any case shrinking due to the changed nature of power politics of the State. The extreme politics of regional discontent on which the popularity of this party depends, was getting blunted in the context of coalitional power sharing. For the first time in the political history of the state, Jammu had a fair share of power in the state. The Congress having its base in Jammu and PDP in Kashmir created a regional balance.16

               43It  is important to note that since 2002, there was no major protest  organised in Jammu region around any regional issue. However, the  Amarnath agitation provided space and opportunity for BJP and other  like-minded organisations to mobilise the Hindu constituency. The  massive mandate in favour of BJP in Jammu’s Hindu-dominated districts  indicated that region was now getting communally polarised. 
               44The  fact that the PDP could register its victory in two Muslim dominated  constituencies of the Jammu region provided additional reason to believe  the growing impact of communal polarisation. Being a Kashmir-centric  party which has been seeking to legitimise its politics by emphasising  its ‘pro-Kashmir’ orientation with a pro-Muslim bias, PDP’s entry into  Jammu’s Muslim dominated areas and its success in two predominantly  Muslim constituencies was an indication of the communal polarisation  that was taking deeper roots in the State. In a way this reflected a  very dangerous signal of an extension of Kashmiri constituency to  Jammu’s Muslim pockets, thereby creating new alignments. So far, the  political divide in the state generally has been regional rather than  religious based. This is not to argue that communal factor did not  operate at all. On the contrary, the communal identity was invoked for  electoral purposes by almost all the political parties, including the  National Conference. However, the impact of such mobilisation remained  limited and did not succeed in carving a communal constituency. During  the Amarnath agitation, the aggressive Hindu religious mobilisation and  backlash against Muslims, in certain cases, resulted in communal wedge.  As a result, Kashmiri leaders both from the separatist camp as well as  from the mainstream parties sought to create a political constituency  among Jammu Muslims. The unprecedented victory of PDP in two Muslim  dominated constituencies signalled the success in this direction. 
               45The  impact of Amarnath agitation as reflected in the Assembly elections  raised major questions related to the future of the state. If the  divisive forces were to dominate the politics of the state, it would  threaten the integrity of the State. The state, despite its diversity  and political divergence, had continued to remain integrated due to the  endurance of the centrist forces. The centrist forces actually affirmed  the plural nature of society. With the radical forces occupying the  central space, the very plurality of the state has been endangered. 
               [The 2009 Parliamentary elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n4)                   46The  2009 Parliamentary elections took place barely few months after the  Assembly elections, thus dealing with the concerns and anxieties raised  due to the outcome of the Assembly elections. This election, being  relatively more distanced from the Amarnath agitation, provided  important clues about the depth of the impact of the divisive tendencies  sharpened during the agitation. It also provided interesting insights  into the relationship between the mainstream and separatist politics in  Kashmir. 
               [The context of separatist politics](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n1)

[ul]
[li]17 It cannot be argued that the positive response of the Kashmiris towards the electoral process has a (…)[/li][/ul]
47Defiance of the boycott call and enthusiastic participation of people in the Assembly elections resulted in a sense of demoralisation in the separatist camp. The growing space of the mainstream politics did not induce a simultaneous shrinking of the separatist space17, but it did lead to a change in orientation within the separatist camp. The impact of this shift could be seen during the Parliamentary elections, when Sajjad Gani Lone, a prominent separatist took the decision to contest the 2009 Parliamentary election from Baramula constituency of North Kashmir.

[ul]
[li]18 Though the present phase of Kashmir separatist politics was initiated in 1989, it was only in 1993 (…)[/li][/ul]
48Sajjad Lone led one of the leading separatist organisation, the People’s Conference (PC) which was a part of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) right from the time of its inception in 1993. As an amalgam of the separatist and militant organisations active in Kashmir, APHC represented the popular separatist sentiment in Kashmir.18 A G Lone, father of Sajjad Lone and the founder of the People’s Conference was one of the most prominent leaders of the APHC.

               49Though  many other separatists had earlier joined the electoral fray, the  Sajjad Lone’s decision to contest Parliamentary election had an  altogether different impact. Being a high profile separatist, at par  with the top separatist leaders like Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, Ali Shah  Geelani and Yasin Malik, one could see in his decision to contest  election a crack within the separatist politics. The crack was very  small, not seeming to affect the separatists overtly but in reality had  had a great psychological effect on them. More so since his decision to  contest election came in the wake of the massive participation of  Kashmiris in the Assembly elections. 
               50Separatists  had been very aggressive in their boycott call during the 2009  Parliamentary elections. Though the call was initially given by Syed Ali  Shah Geelani, the hardliner leader of the Hurriyat (G), soon the other  faction of Hurriyat led by Mirwaiz Omer Farooq and other organisations  joined the boycott campaign.
               51The  voter enthusiasm was quite low this time. Against 51% turnout during  the Assembly election, only 31.24% votes were registered during this  election. It was partially the impact of the aggressive campaigning by  the separatists that the voter participation during the Parliamentary  elections was relatively lower. 
               Table 4. Comparative voter turnout in Kashmir region – 2008 Assembly elections and 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            Voter turnout (%)
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            **2008 **
                     **Assembly elections**
                   
                                            **2009**
                     **Parliamentary elections**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **J&K**
                   
                                            60.92
                   
                                            39.66
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Kashmir**
                   
                                            51.64
                   
                                            31.24
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Jammu **
                   
                                            70.90
                   
                                            47.19
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Ladakh **
                   
                                            68.65
                   
                                            71.85

[ul]
[li]19 The high expectations that people have from the local politicians were demonstrated in 2007 when va (…)[/li][/ul]
52It is important to analyse as to why the same voters who showed enthusiasm in 2008 shied away from the same process in the Parliamentary election? Why did the separatists’ call for boycott succeeded this time? A number of reasons can be attributed to this. Firstly, the kind of proximity and involvement that the voters felt with the Assembly elections was missing during the Lok Sabha elections. Governance is becoming important to people and therefore they are keen to have a party in power with which they identify.19 This is why they defied the call for boycott during the Assembly elections. During the Parliamentary election, the boycott call could become effective because people did not have similar stakes. Not voting during these elections was a message that many Kashmiris would have wanted to give to the Central government—that their participation in the Assembly elections should not be construed as their complete rejection of the separatist politics. In the context of the complexity of relationship between the separatist and mainstream politics in Kashmir, it needs to be reiterated that the expansion of the mainstream politics does not necessarily take place at the cost of the separatist political space. Separatist sentiments continue to dominate the popular political responses despite their positive response to the mainstream politics. It is the assertion of the separatist sentiments that was reflected in the boycott politics. Lest the participation of the people during the Assembly elections should be seen as an endorsement of Indian position on Kashmir, the people sought to use the strategy of boycott politics to assert their continued contestation of this position.

               53However,  despite the lower voter turnout in the Parliamentary elections as  compared to their turnout in the Assembly elections, participation of  Kashmiris showed an improvement as compared to their participation in  the earlier Parliamentary election. In all the three constituencies of  the Valley, the voter turnout this time was higher than in 2004  Parliamentary elections.
               Table 5. Comparative voter turnout in all the constituencies of the State – 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            Voter turnout (in %)
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            **2004**
                     **Parliamentary elections**
                   
                                            **2009**
                     **Parliamentary elections**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Baramulla**
                   
                                            35.65
                   
                                            41.84
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Srinagar**
                   
                                            18.57
                   
                                            25.55
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Anantnag**
                   
                                            15.04
                   
                                            27.09
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Ladakh**
                   
                                            73.52
                   
                                            71.86
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Udhampur**
                   
                                            45.09
                   
                                            44.88
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Jammu**
                   
                                            44.49
                   
                                            49.03
                   
                 
               
               54On  the basis of this data one can infer that although separatist politics  has affected the responses of people in the Valley to the extent that  many of them chose to remain away from the Parliamentary elections,  their response cannot be construed to mean a total rejection of the  electoral process. As the electoral data of 2004 elections shows, the  stake of people in the Parliamentary elections is not as high as in the  Assembly elections. Even when the faith of the people in the electoral  politics had increased due to a very credible electoral process during  the 2002 Assembly elections, their participation in the 2004  Parliamentary elections remained low. The overall expansion of the  electoral space that was taking place in the post-2002 period was not  reflected during the Parliamentary elections, even when at the ground  level one could see the difference. The political environment was  energised by intense political competition between the two regional  parties—the NC and the PDP which were not only mobilising people and  holding huge rallies but were also engaging people at the discursive  level through their different versions/models of peace process. One  could see the intensity of this politics throughout the year 2007 and  2008 (till the Amarnath agitation took place). The massive participation  of the people during the 2008 Assembly elections clearly established as  to how this politics had been legitimised.
               55However,  separatist politics remains the reality of Kashmir and despite the  extension of mainstream politics, and will remain intact mainly due to  the fact that there is a long-standing alienation among people which  needs to be addressed. Much of this alienation is the result of the  disjuncture between the power politics and the local responses. Politics  generally operated at a level where people were not involved—even in  the discursive sense. Not a single local debate took place about the  kind of political arrangements the state required, or the major  political changes implemented since 1953. The competitive nature of  power politics has changed this context. Rather than depending upon the  Centre for its legitimaty, the power politics now depends on popular  responses and is rooted in the local milieu. 
               [Implications of the Amarnath agitation](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n2)                   56To  what extent had the Amarnath agitation changed the nature and course of  politics of the state? Was the political response reflected during the  Assembly election symptomatic of the change in the nature of politics?  Or was it merely a passing phenomenon? An analysis of the 2009  Parliamentarly election is important for reflecting upon these  questions.
               57Though  not much time had passed between the Assembly and the Parliamentary  elections, the ground level situation in the state had witnessed  substantial changes which had implications on the Parliamentary  elections.
               58First  of all, the centrist forces came to acquire central space in the  politics of the State. In the face of the fragmented verdict during the  Assembly elections, the NC and Congress had joined together to form the  coalition government. 
               59The  Congress and the NC are the two parties of the State which have greater  stakes in the inclusive politics. The Congress has its stronghold in  Jammu region, distinguishing itself from the BJP by avoiding to present  itself as a party of Hindus. It has therefore acquired a solid base in  many Muslim pockets of the region. The Gujjars, the Muslim community of  the state, for instance, have been strong supporters of the Congress  party. Besides, to succeed in power politics, the party has to extend  its constituency beyond the Jammu region by increasing its presence and  stakes in Kashmir and Ladakh. Like the Congress, the NC has its presence  in all the three regions. Though Kashmir remains its primary  constituency, it has its existence and therefore a stake in all the  three regions of the state. The history of the party located in its  progressive ideology also defines it as a centrist party.

[ul]
[li]20 Interestingly, there has been a strong refutation of the communal charge on the part of the vocal m (…)[/li][/ul]
60Moreover, the political mobilisation that had taken place during the period of agitation lost its impact soon after the situation became normal, both in Jammu as well as in Kashmir. In Jammu, however, there was a rethinking about the agitation and the effect that it had on the region as a whole. Apart from the huge economic loss that people suffered due to the agitation, there was a feeling that Jammu did not gain much from the agitation. The massive regional sentiment that was generated during the agitation was not translated into any positive achievement for the region. On the contrary there was lot of negative baggage of the agitation. The traders, who form the economic backbone of the region, had to face the wrath of their Kashmiri counterparts who responded to the ‘economic blockade’ of the Valley during the agitation, by taking a decision to bypass Jammu in trade activities. However, it was the communal aftertaste of the agitation that made the people uneasy.20 The aggressive anti-Muslim posture of the fringe organisations activated during the agitation, the sporadic attacks on some Muslims and the outburst of communal violence in two towns of the region did not go very well with the local sensibilities.

               [The impact of rethinking the Parliamentary elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n3)                   61Being  partners in power, the NC and the Congress had reached a pre-electoral  arrangement for contesting the 2009 Parliamentary elections. Due to its  stronghold in the Valley, the NC contested the three seats of the  Valley, while the Congress having its base in Jammu, fielded its  candidates in both constituencies of the region. The third seat of  Ladakh was also contested by the Congress. As a consequence of this  alliance, the contest was regionally localised. There was a direct fight  between the NC and PDP in the Valley and between the Congress and BJP  in Jammu region.

[ul]
[li]21 Though the seat of was officially contested by the Congress candidate, the NC cadre of Ladakh rathe (…)[/li][/ul]
62The strategy of the coalition partners to contest in alliance helped them to gain both in the Valley as well as in Jammu region. The NC-Congress combine was able to sweep the Parliamentary elections winning five of the six seats. The sixth seat was also won by the rebel candidate of NC.21 In two of the three constituencies of the Valley, the margin of votes attained by the winning NC candidate over their PDP rivals was quite high. It was only in Anantnag constituency that there was a close contest between the two parties. In the case of Jammu region also, the Congress was able to win the Jammu seat with a very solid majority and it was only in Udhampur constituency that there was a neck-to-neck fight between the Congress and the BJP candidates.

               Table 6. Performance of NC, Congress, PDP and BJP – 2009 Parliamentary elections 
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            **Winner**
                   
                                            **Votes (in %)**
                   
                                            **Runner Up**
                   
                                            **Votes (in %)**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Baramulla**
                   
                                            NC
                   
                                            46.01
                   
                                            PDP
                   
                                            31.32
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Srinagar**
                   
                                            NC
                   
                                            51.99
                   
                                            PDP
                   
                                            41.30
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Anantnag**
                   
                                            NC
                   
                                            46.53
                   
                                            PDP
                   
                                            44.89
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Ladakh**
                   
                                            IND
                   
                                            29.84
                   
                                            INC
                   
                                            26.48
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Udhampur**
                   
                                            INC
                   
                                            37.90
                   
                                            BJP
                   
                                            35.71
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Jammu**
                   
                                            INC
                   
                                            45.33
                   
                                            BJP
                   
                                            30.94
                   
                 
               
               [The Kashmir region](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n4)

[ul]
[li]22 In Baramulla constituency, the NC candidate Sharif ud din Shariq won the election by polling 203022 (…)[/li][/ul]
63In Kashmir Valley, the NC not only registered its victory in all the three seats of the region, but also improved its share of votes compared to earlier election. With 38.42% votes cast in its favour during the 2004 Parliamentary election, it obtained 49.79% votes during the 2009 Parliamentary elections. This poll percentage was quite high as compared to the 38.12% votes polled by the PDP (slightly lower than its voter turnout of 39.29% in 2004). While the improvement of its share of votes was reflected in each individual constituency, however, it was in Anantnag constituency that the NC actually doubled its share of votes as compared to 200422 (from 23.63% in 2004 to 46.53% in 2009).

               Table 7. Votes polled (%) by NC and PDP in Kashmir Region – 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            **NC (in %)**
                   
                                            **PDP (in %)**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Kashmir region**
                   
                                            49.79 
                   
                                            38.12
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Baramulla**
                   
                                            46.01
                   
                                            31.32
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Srinagar**
                   
                                            51.99
                   
                                            41.30
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Anantnag**
                   
                                            46.53
                   
                                            44.89
                   
                 
               
               64The  loss of Anantnag seat was a huge setback for the PDP. Interestingly,  Anantnag is the stronghold of the PDP. The PDP has been dominating both  the Parliamentary as well as Assembly constituencies. In 2004  Parliamentary election, the seat was won by Mehbooba Mufti with 49.55%  votes. And during the 2008 Assembly elections, the party had swept the  four districts falling in this constituency, bagging 12 of the total 16  seats. What reflected the great decline of the party was its performance  in two Assembly segments of Anantnag and Wachi from where Muft Syed,  the patron of the party and Mehbooba Mufti, the party president, had  registered their victory with massive mandate during the Assembly  election. During the Parliamentary elections, the vote share of PDP in  both these segments had fallen drastically. 
               Table 8. Comparative performance of NC and PDP – 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                   
                                            Votes polled (in %)
                   
                 
                 
                   
                   
                                            **NC**
                   
                                            **PDP**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Kashmir region**
                   
                                            2004
                   
                                            38.42
                   
                                            39.29
                   
                 
                 
                                            2009
                   
                                            47.79
                   
                                            38.17
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Baramula constituency**
                   
                                            2004
                   
                                            38.13
                   
                                            35.18
                   
                 
                 
                                            2009
                   
                                            46.01
                   
                                            31.32
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Srinagar constituency**
                   
                                            2004
                   
                                            50.3
                   
                                            38.46
                   
                 
                 
                                            2009
                   
                                            51.99
                   
                                            41.30
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Anantnag constituency**
                   
                                            2004
                   
                                            23.63
                   
                                            49.55
                   
                 
                 
                                            2009
                   
                                            46.53
                   
                                            44.89
                   
                 
               
               65The  loss of the PDP in the Parliamentary elections reflected a change of  mood at the ground level since the Assembly elections. The lower level  of participation during the election also affected the election outcome.  The PDP’s was incapable to mobilise as it had during the Assembly  election, thus revealing its complacency during the Parliamentary  elections. Buoyant by its performance during the Assembly elections, the  party had taken its victory for granted during the Parliamentary  election. And may be due to this sense of complacency or may be to show  some kind of proximity with the separatist politics, neither Mehbooba  nor Mufti Syed cast their own votes.
               66The  PDP’s failure to retain its own ground in the Valley could be seen as a  rejection of the ‘soft-separatism’ of the party. In order to ground its  politics in the local sensibilities, the PDP borrows heavily from the  separatist agenda and often seeks to use emotive slogans to strengthen  its constituency. Even when it was a part of government, it continued to  use the populist rhetoric in order to claim its proximity with the  separatist sentiments of people. It was in the same vein that the party  had joined the Amarnath agitation and had sought to raise the emotive  pitch of Kashmir’s politics. Though the party could gain during the  Assembly elections which was conducted in the heat of the sentiments  raised during the Amarnath agitation, it could not take advantage during  the Parliamentary elections. As the situation was normalised, the party  lost support at the ground level. 
               67With  the rejection of PDP during the Parliamentary elections, the Kashmir  region also seems to have rejected the polarised regional politics of  the state. The PDP’s role in sharpening the regional divide equals to  that of the BJP. Both the parties gain mutually by stretching the  regional politics on opposite side. While BJP sharpens the pro-Jammu  sentiments, the PDP arouses pro-Kashmir sentiments. The mutual  exclusivity of both the sentiments aggravates the regional divide. The  fact that the communal elements automatically creeps in this kind of  aggressive regional mobilisation, makes this politics quite dangerous. 
               68Since  Kashmir remains the most important constituency, the NC also indulges  in the pro-Kashmir politics. However, what distinguishes the PDP’s  politics from the NC’s is that the former invokes ‘region’ as well as  ‘religion’ in a more aggressive manner. NC’s Kashmir-centric politics is  more oriented towards the Centre, making demands upon it on behalf of  the State (therefore, its emphasis on State Autonomy). The PDP’s  politics is more inward looking and therefore focuses on Kashmir region  defined in antagonistic terms vis-à-vis Jammu region. In the definition  of regional identity, the religious element of Kashmiri identity is also  invoked.
               [The Jammu region](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n5)

[ul]
[li]23 In Udhampur constituency, the Congress candidate, Ch. Lal Singh won the election by polling 2318153 (…)[/li][/ul]
69In Jammu region, the BJP was expecting to register its victory in both the seats. During the 2008 Assembly elections it could return 11 Assembly seats. The performance of the BJP in this election had raised the hopes of this party for the Parliamentary elections. However it lost both the seats to Congress. As against the 42.20% votes polled by the Congress, it could poll only 32.94% votes.23

               Table 9: Votes polled by BJP and Congress in Jammu region – 2009 Parliamentary elections (%)
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            **BJP**
                   
                                            **Congress**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Jammu region**
                   
                                            32.94
                   
                                            42.20
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Udhampur constituency **
                   
                                            35.71
                   
                                            37.90
                   
                 
                 
                                            **Jammu constituency **
                   
                                            30.94
                   
                                            45.33

[ul]
[li]24 However, the effect of the mobilization by the BJP does not seem to be lasting. Though it could get (…)[/li][/ul]
70Though both the seats of Jammu have remained the traditional strongholds of the Congress, the BJP could gain from the communal polarization during the peak of militancy and win both the seats during the 1998 and 1999 Parliamentary elections. However during the 2004 elections it lost both the seats. Its expectations in the post-Amarnath agitation were quite high and it had expected its victory this time as well – given the intensified mobilization by this party in the Hindu dominated areas of the region and the consequent polarization between the communities that was reflected during the period of agitation.24

               Table 10. Comparative performance of BJP and INC in Jammu region – 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            Votes polled (in %)
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            **2004**
                   
                                            **2009**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **BJP**
                   
                                            34.72
                   
                                            32.94
                   
                 
                 
                                            **INC**
                   
                                            39.22
                   
                                            42.20
                   
                 
               
               Table 11. Jammu constituency over the years: Results of the Parliamentary elections from 1989 to 2009
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            Votes polled (in %)
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            **BJP**
                   
                                            **Congress**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **1989**
                   
                                            6.16
                   
                                            41.82
                   
                 
                 
                                            **1996**
                   
                                            26.00
                   
                                            34.24
                   
                 
                 
                                            **1998**
                   
                                            43.26
                   
                                            18.11
                   
                 
                 
                                            **1999**
                   
                                            43.46
                   
                                            41.82
                   
                 
                 
                                            **2004**
                   
                                            36.81
                   
                                            38.94
                   
                 
                 
                                            **2009**
                   
                                            30.94
                   
                                            31.85
                   
                 
               
               Table 12. Udhampur constituency over the years: Results of the Parliamentary elections from 1989 to 2009
               [TABLE="class: texte"]
                 
                   
                                            Votes polled (in %)
                   
                 
                 
                   
                                            **BJP**
                   
                                            **Congress**
                   
                 
                 
                                            **1989**
                   
                                            12.63
                   
                                            40.66
                   
                 
                 
                                            **1996**
                   
                                            37.58
                   
                                            21.74
                   
                 
                 
                                            **1998**
                   
                                            48.67
                   
                                            7.13
                   
                 
                 
                                            **1999**
                   
                                            49.01
                   
                                            19.09
                   
                 
                 
                                            **2004**
                   
                                            31.85
                   
                                            39.61
                   
                 
                 
                                            **2009**
                   
                                            30.94
                   
                                            45.33

[ul]
[li]25 The opposition to Leelakaran’s candidature came from within the party on the ground that he was see (…)[/li][/ul]
71One definite message that is given by the voters during the Parliamentary elections in Jammu region is that politics here cannot be controlled by the rightist forces for a long time. In very certain terms people have shown their antipathy towards the forces that aim at mobilizing them on religious basis, polarizing them on communal grounds and generating tensions within the region. People might have been temporarily swayed by the emotions raised during the Amarnath agitation, but that is not the normal political mood of the region. In defeating Leela Karan Sharma from Jammu-Poonch Parliamentary constituency, the people have distanced themselves not only from the politics of Amarnath agitation but from the communal politics per se. The BJP, despite opposition from within the cadre, had taken the decision to give ticket to Leela Karan because as chairman of the Amarnath Sangharsh Samitie, he had become the most important face of the agitation25. Confident that the BJP could gain from the popularity of Leela Karan during the agitation, the party leadership had gone ahead with the Leela Karan’s candidature. Leela Karan, however, lost the election with a big margin.

               72The  natural direction of politics of Jammu is quite secular and is  manifested in secular manner in a variety of ways. The plurality of  Jammu as well as its multi-layered social and political dynamics compels  the regional politics to take a secular shape. However, in the absence  of a secular regional politics that takes into consideration not only  the sensitivities of the Hindu-heartland of Jammu region but also  carries within itself the political concerns of the backward sub-regions  at the periphery, the politics has all the possibilities of becoming  communally divisive. About Amarnath agitation, one can safely say that,  though it was manifested in religious terms, the major reason for the  mass mobilization was regional rather than religious. This leads us to  argue that communal elements which generally remain at the margins of  Jammu’s politics, seek to appropriate the regional discontent at any  time they can and change the very direction of popular responses. 
               [Conclusion](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n5)                   73This  paper has sought to analyse the intricacies of the electoral politics  of the state by locating it in the prevailing separatist context in the  Valley of Kashmir on the one hand and increasing political divergence on  regional basis on the other. The paper has sought to highlight the  reality of separatist politics in Kashmir, despite the fact that there  is increasing space for the mainstream politics. The electoral politics  which had become totally irrelevant in the Valley during the late  eighties, in the wake of militancy and political upsurge, has again  acquired legitimacy not only due to a shift in the nature of the  resistance politics but also due to the changed context of mainstream  politics. With the emergence of PDP as another regional party of  Kashmir, the hegemony of the National Conference has been fractured and  the intensity of electoral competition has increased. Consequently, the  possibilities of manipulation of the electoral politics by the ruling  party in the centre have become quite remote and the distance between  the electoral politics and the popular responses (that always used to  characterise the Kashmir’s electoral politics) has been significantly  reduced. 
               74The  legitimacy of the electoral politics, however, has been attained within  the overall context of separatism. Rather than challenging the  separatist politics, the political parties have sought to recognise the  reality of the conflict situation and limit the scope of their politics  to issues of ‘governance’ only. The divide between the ‘politics of  governance’ in which the political parties indulge and the ‘politics of  the ultimate resolution of conflict’ which is seen as the domain of the  separatist politics is generally recognised by the political parties,  separatist leaders as well as by the common masses. 
               75The  changed context of electoral politics can go a long way in dealing with  the separatism, which is actually a reflection of popular alienation.  But mere expansion of the mainstream space and its democratisation may  not be sufficient to deal with alienation and separatist sentiment. It  will have to be dealt with separately—through the conflict resolution  mechanism. Till that time, it will remain intact. 
               76The  paper has also focused on the political divergence within the state on  regional basis. The political divergence between the Kashmir and Jammu  regions reflects not only the specificity of the conflict situation in  Kashmir but also the context of power politics which has traditionally  been dominated by the political elite of Kashmir. This has resulted in a  politics of ‘regional deprivation’ that has often been appropriated by  the Hindu Rightist elements. The Hindu Rightist parties that seek to  exploit the generally prevalent feeling of regional discrimination by  communally polarising the political response of the region have not been  successful in electoral terms. However, the kind of regional cum  communal divide that was created in the wake of Amarnath agitation did  result in the substantial electoral gain for the BJP. Similar gain was  registered by PDP in Kashmir Valley
               77The  regional cum communal polarisation created during the Amarnath  agitation and reflected in the outcome of the 2008 Assembly elections  led to a concern about the implications of the divisive politics for the  future of the state. However, an altogether different voter response  during the 2009 Parliamentary elections has clearly established the  limitations of politics of regional and communal polarisation in the  plural and mixed society of Jammu and Kashmir. 
               78However,  the regional discontent remains a reality of Jammu’s politics and needs  to be addressed. There is also a need for a more secular response to  the regional discontent. In the absence such secular response, the  regional discontent is easily appropriated by the right-wing  organisations and gets communalised in the process. Communally divisive  politics, however, is not only dangerous for the Jammu region but for  the whole state.

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Bibliography Abdullah, Farooq (1985) My Dismissal: As Told to Satti Sahni, New Delhi: Vikas.
Akbar, M. J. (1991) Kashmir: Behind the Vale, Delhi: Viking.
Bose, Sumantra (1997) The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace, New Delhi: Sage.
Bose, Sumantra (2003) Kashmir: Roots of Conflicts, Paths to Peace, Delhi: Vistaar Publisher.
Chowdhary Rekha (2000) ‘Autonomy Demand: Kashmir at Crossroads’, Economic and Political Weekly, 22 July.
Chowdhary Rekha & Nagendra Rao (2003) ‘Jammu and Kashmir: Political Alienation, Regional Divergence and Communal Polarisation’, in Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, 15(1-2), January-June.
Chowdhary Rekha & Nagendra Rao (2004) ‘National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir: From Hegemonic to Competitive Politics’, Economic and Political Weekly, 3-10 April.
Chowdhary Rekha (2008) ‘Electioneering in Kashmir: Overlap between Separatist and Mainstream Political Space’, Economic and Political Weekly, 12 July.
Ganguly, Sumit (1997) The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hewitt, Vernon (1995) Reclaiming the Past: The Search for Political and Cultural Unity in Contemporary Jammu and Kashmir, London: Portland.
Puri, Balraj (1966) Jammu: A Clue to Kashmir Tangle, Delhi: B. Puri.
Puri, Balraj (1983) Simmering Volcano: Jammu’s Relation with Kashmir, Delhi: Sterling.
Puri, Balraj (1993) Towards Insurgency, New Delhi: Orient Longman.
Schofield, Victoria (2000) *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending *War, London: I B Tauris.

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Notes 1 For a detailed understanding of the background and emergence of armed militancy and separatist politics of Kashmir, see M J Akbar (1991), Sumit Ganguly (1997), Victoria Schofield (2000), Sumantra Bose (1997, 2003),* *Vernon Hewitt (1995)
2 Along with MUF, the opposition to the NC-Congress combine was given by the People’s Conference led by Abdul Gani Lone. While MUF could poll 31.8% votes, the People’s Conference could get 6.4% votes.
3 For instance, the NC candidate in Bijbihera won the election with a margin of 100 votes only. In Wachi the margin of victory of the winning candidate was of 122 votes and in Shopian it was of 336 votes. Moreover, there was a huge number of votes which were declared invalid. Thus 6.7% votes polled in Doru, 5.6% in Chrar-e-Sharief, 4.9% in Homshilbug, 4.8% in Wachi and Sangrama each, 4.5% in Amirakadal and 4.2% votes in Handwara were rejected. In most of the constituencies of narrow victories, the number of invalid votes was quite high. In fact in the three above stated constituencies of Bijbihera, Wachi and Shopian with very narrow margins of victory, the number of invalid votes was much higher than the margin with which the winning candidates had been declared victorious. Thus 1177 votes were declared invalid in Bijbihera, 1806 in Wachi and 1122 in Shopian.
4 With common people openly identifying with separatist politics, the farcical nature of the electoral politics became very clear during the 1989 Parliamentary elections. Not only were there not many keen contestants ready to fight this election, but there were also not many voters ready to vote. For the two of three constituencies which went to poll (the third was returned uncontested), only 5% voters cast their votes.
5 It was exactly 29.64% voter turnout for the Valley of Kashmir. Interestingly in few districts like Kupwara, Budgam and Baramulla, the voter turnout was as high as 53.15%, 46% and 40.09% respectively. The voter turnout in Ananntnag and Pulwama was moderate—24.05% and 23.68% respectively. It was in the Srinagar district that the lowest turnout—11.17%.
6 That is the reason why the National Conference, which was ousted from power in 1984 due to the defections engineered by the Congress, not only risked its popularity by going in for an alliance with the same party, but also took the open position of remaining on the right side of the ruling party of the Centre in order to stay in power. Going against its own ideology, it even chose to side with the BJP-led NDA during the late nineties.
7 Sheikh was arrested on the suspicion that he was not happy with the Accession of the State with India and was hobnobbing with the Americans around the idea of independence of Kashmir. However, as Mir Qasim has revealed in his book, he was also a victim of a local conspiracy led by his own cabinet colleagues led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohd.
8 The disjuncture between the National Conference and the popular responses was also reflected earlier, especially after the Party opted for entering into alliance with the Congress party. The support that the Muslim United Front enjoyed before the 1987 Assembly election was mainly due to the disillusionment with the politics that this party was pursuing.
9 The competitive nature of regional politics of Kashmir ultimately resulted in deeper changes in the power politics of the State. The fragmented verdict at the regional level and the failure of any party to obtain a majority of seats led to the formation of a coalition government. The important aspect of this post-2002 coalition politics is that is it representative of both regions. Fragmented verdict during the 2002 Assembly election led to the alliance between the PDP and the Congress and formation of their government along with few other smaller parties. The NC emerged as the largest party with presence in all the three regions of the state and chose to sit in opposition. This arrangement reflected greater democratisation of the politics of the state from a number of angles. Apart from the fact that the politics of Kashmir had become intensely competitive and rooted in local concerns, it had, for the first time, space for genuine opposition. The NC due to its numerical strength could operate as an effective opposition party and could put sufficient pressure on the ruling coalition. Meanwhile, there was a wider base for the government with one of the coalition partners having its support base in Kashmir region, the other in Jammu.
10 Shri Amarnath Shrine Board was formed by the government of J&K in 2000 with the purpose of managing the pilgrimage to Amarnath shrine in South of Kashmir. During the peak of summer, the shrine attracts thousands of pilgrims from all over India.
11 General Sinha had earlier incensed many Kashmiris with a self-proclaimed agenda of changing the ‘mindset’ in Kashmir which he set about doing by redefining ‘Kashmiri-yat’ based essentially on its Hindu past. As chancellor of the University of Kashmir, he patronised the Centre for Kashmir Studies which was frequently used to propagate his views.
12 After the first phase of agitation which culminated with the revocation of the Government Order, the agitation acquired a form in which the two regions were placed in a completely antagonistic form. The revocation of the Order after the mass response in Kashmir was projected as anti-Hindu and anti-Jammu act of the state government and therefore led to a prolonged agitation in Jammu which lasted for more than two months. To quell the sharpened regional response in Jammu, the State government took the decision to restore 800 canal of land in Baltal to Shri Amarnath Shrin Board. This government decision led to a fresh phase of agitation in Kashmir during which sharp regional sentiments were expressed. Specifically, there were reactions against the ‘economic blockade’ of Kashmir during the Jammu agitation. So strong was the anti-Jammu response in Kashmir at that time that the traders took a decision to severe their links with their Jammu counterparts.
13 Since 2002, when the era of coalition politics started, Jammu started having a substantial share in power politics. That is the reason why the voices raising the demand for a separate Jammu state were not raised and the forces of Right were quite marginalised (this was reflected in just one seat in favour of BJP and one for Jammu State Morcha). However during the Amarnath agitation, the forces of Right were able to mobilise the people from urban centres of Jammu by combining religious sentiment with regional factor.
14 Though much of the electoral discourse in Kashmir revolves around the ‘bigger issues’ like the ideas of ‘self-government’, ‘autonomy’, there are also issues which confront the people on routine basis. The idea of de-militarisation of PDP, for instance, is very much located in the problems faced by people due to the continued presence of security forces. The ‘healing touch’ policy advocated by PDP similarly involves the rehabilitation of people adversely affected by violence.
15 The communal polarisation of the electoral politics of the State is not unprecedented. The 1983 Assembly elections are known to be one of the most communally polarised elections of the State. In an intensely contested election between the National Conference and Congress, the Congress was able to mobilise the Hindu voters of Jammu and register its massive victory in this region.
16 With Congress-PDP being the major partners of the coalition government, it represented a balance of forces between Jammu and Kashmir. Congress was having its strong base in Jammu and the PDP in Kashmir. Besides a very effective representation of Jammu based leaders in the Ministry, there was a system of rotation for the position of CM and Deputy CM between the two parties and regions. For the first three years of the coalition, the position of Chief Minister was held by Kashmir based PDP leader Mufti Mohd Sayeed (with Mangat Ram Sharma of Congress, a leader of Jammu holding the position of Deputy CM) and after that the position of CM was held by Ghulam Nabi Azad, a Jammu-based Congress leader with Muzzafar Hussain Beg of PDP holding the position of Deputy CM. Due to the changed context of power structure, the scope of politics based on regional discontent was somewhat restricted.
17 It cannot be argued that the positive response of the Kashmiris towards the electoral process has amounted to the decline in their separatist sentiments. On the contrary, the assertion of the separatist sentiments, especially since the Amarnath agitation, has become more intense. One can see the intensity of such sentiments through the mass demonstrations against cases of Human Rights violations. Ever since 2007, such demonstrations have been frequently organised all over the Valley. A glimpse of the deep-rooted separatist sentiment is also given by the massive funeral processions of the militants killed by the security forces.
18 Though the present phase of Kashmir separatist politics was initiated in 1989, it was only in 1993 that the APHC was formed to give a political face to the separatist sentiment. This sentiment was represented till that time, by the armed militancy on the one hand and the spontaneous popular upsurge on the other. Throughout the period of 1990, there were massive demonstrations in Kashmir Valley. Thousands of people would march on the streets raising the slogan of Azadi. The repressive measures adopted by the state soon restrained the public expression of the mass response, the intensity of the armed militancy, however continued. The beginning of the decade of 1990s saw a mushroom growth of militant organizations. Apart from Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the initiator of armed militancy in Kashmir, the Hizbul Mujahideen, had emerged as the major militant organization having a local support base. The Hizb, supported by Pakistan, launched soon after its emergence a major offensive on JKLF and succeeded in eliminating its cadres to a large extent. It was in this context of the mutual rivalry that a need was felt to organise all the militant and separatist groups under the banner of a single umbrella organization. The All Party Hurriyat Conference was therefore organised in 1993.
19 The high expectations that people have from the local politicians were demonstrated in 2007 when various agitations were launched around the issue of opening of colleges and restructuring of the districts and Tehsils.
20 Interestingly, there has been a strong refutation of the communal charge on the part of the vocal middle class, media, traders and the politicians of Jammu. Soon after the agitation, the regional dimensions of the agitation were highlighted and the religious sentiments expressed during the agitation were underplayed.
21 Though the seat of was officially contested by the Congress candidate, the NC cadre of Ladakh rather than supporting him, worked for the victory of the NC rebel candidate who was able to wrest the seat defeating the official candidate of the alliance partners.
22 In Baramulla constituency, the NC candidate Sharif ud din Shariq won the election by polling 203022 votes as against 138208 votes of PDP candidate Mohammad Dilawar Mir. Sajad Gani Lone of People’s Conference polled 65403 votes. Please elaborate on the defeat of S.G. Lone. In Srinagar constituency, NC candidate Farooq Abdullah won the election by polling 147075 votes as against 116793 of Moulvi Iftikhar Ansari of PDP. In Anantnag constituency, Mirza Mehboob Beg won the election by polling 148317 votes as against 143093 votes polled by PDP candidate, Peer Mohd. Hussain.
23 In Udhampur constituency, the Congress candidate, Ch. Lal Singh won the election by polling 2318153 won the seat by defeating BJP candidate Dr. Nirmal Singh who polled 218459 votes. In Jammu constituency, the Congress candidate, Madan Lal Sharma won the election by polling 382305 votes as against 260932 votes polled by his nearest rival, Leela Karan Sharma of BJP.
24 However, the effect of the mobilization by the BJP does not seem to be lasting. Though it could get a large number of votes from Hindus (exceeding its hold from 11 Assembly segments to 13), it failed to get the advantage of winning the seats as it had in 1998 and 1999. It could not get all the Hindu votes of the region. The Congress could get a substantial number of Hindu votes. (The NC-Congress combine also gained in the region—with lead in 21 Assembly segments as compared to victory in 19 seats during 2008 Assembly elections).
25 The opposition to Leelakaran’s candidature came from within the party on the ground that he was seen as an outsider who had not been associated with the politics of BJP in any form.
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References Electronic reference Rekha Chowdhary, « Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir », South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal [Online], 3 | 2009, Online since 24 November 2009, connection on 07 December 2014. URL : Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir
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About the author Rekha Chowdhary University of Jammu, Department of Political Science
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Arleitter · December 7, 2014, 8:26am

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir

Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir

            **Rekha Chowdhary**
                                     [Abstract](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#abstract) | [Index](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#entries) | [Outline](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#toc) | [Text](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#text) | [Bibliography](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bibliography) | [Notes](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#notes) | [References](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#quotation) | [About the author](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#authors)
                            **Abstract**

                                The  paper analyses the 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu and Kashmir in  the context of the conflict situation of the last two decades. The  separatist sentiment, the paper argues, remains ascendant, even though  mainstream politics (that had become totally irrelevant during the  initial years of militancy and political upsurge) has been gradually  gaining space. Rather than challenging separatist politics, mainstream  politics is seeking to legitimise itself by acknowledging its own  limitations and confining itself to the politics of ‘governance’ while  leaving for separatist politics the issue of the ‘ultimate resolution of  conflict’. However, in this process of legitimisation, mainstream  politics has taken up many issues from the agenda of separatist  politics. Consequently, despite the distinction between the two kinds of  politics, there exists an overlap between them. The paper also focuses  on the political divergence and the assertion of regional/religious  identity politics. The Amarnath agitation, which took place a few months  before the Parliamentary elections, became the basis of massive  political mobilisation and reaffirmation of the popular separatist  sentiment in Kashmir and religious cum regional identity politics in  Jammu. As such, it forms an important reference point for the analysis.  The paper also focuses on the 2008 Assembly election, which immediately  preceded the Parliamentary elections.

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Index terms

                                **Keywords :**

conflict, democracy, elections, India, Jammu, Kashmir, political science
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Outline

             [The context of electoral politics in Kashmir: Implications of conflict situation and separatist politics](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto1n1)
             [The Amarnath agitation](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto1n2)
             [The 2008 Assembly elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto1n3)
             [The 2009 Parliamentary elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto1n4)
             [The context of separatist politics](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto2n1)
             [Implications of the Amarnath agitation](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto2n2)
             [The impact of rethinking the Parliamentary elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto2n3)
             [The Kashmir region](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto2n4)
             [The Jammu region](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto2n5)
             [Conclusion](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocto1n5)

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Full text

             [PDF](http://samaj.revues.org/pdf/2785) [Send by e-mail](http://samaj.revues.org/signaler2785)

[ul]
[li]1 For a detailed understanding of the background and emergence of armed militancy and separatist poli (…) [/li][/ul]
1As in any other state of India, the 2009 Parliamentary election in the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be seen as an important moment reflecting the nature and direction of politics as it is evolving at the local level. One can gauge the changing nature of power politics; the context of popular participation; the nature of competition and the intensity and depth of democracy in the State. However, the context of the conflict situation which has engulfed this state for the past two decades provides additional meaning to the electoral exercise here. This paper will therefore seek to locate the Parliamentary elections in the context of separatism. Specifically, it will focus on the implications of parallel existence of the separatist and the mainstream politics on power politics of the State. Separatism, it may be mentioned here, emerged as the dominant political response in Kashmir during the post-1989 period. Manifested simultaneously through armed militancy as well as spontaneous popular upsurge, this political response has continued to have a hold over the politics of the Valley throughout the last two decades.1 Despite the restoration of mainstream politics after its complete erosion during the initial stages of separatism, the separatist politics continues to define the political responses of Kashmir. The two kinds of politics seem to be operating side by side, overlapping at a number of points and impacting each other in an interesting manner. It is in this context of overlap between the separatist and mainstream politics that the 2009 Parliamentary election will be analysed.

               2The  paper will also highlight the context of diversity and political  divergence within the state and its implications on electoral politics.  Focusing on the political divergence at the regional level, it will  analyse the process of political mobilisation around the regional  identity politics. 
               3The  immediate context of the elections is framed by two significant  political events that preceed these elections—first, the Amarnath  agitation which engulfed almost the whole state during the summer of  2008 and Assembly elections that were concluded in December 2008.
               **[The context of electoral politics in Kashmir: Implications of conflict situation and separatist politics](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n1)**

               4The  state of Jammu and Kashmir has been affected by the conflict situation  ever since 1947. The ruler of this erstwhile Princely state, after  remaining indecisive for quite some time, signed the instrument of  Accession with India under troubled conditions created by the tribal  invaders supported by Pakistan army, on 26[SUP]th[/SUP] October 1947.  The issue assumed international character with India taking the case to  the UN. With Pakistan holding on a part of J&K and contesting the  validity of Accession of the other part with India, this State continued  to remain a bone of contention between the two countries. 
               5However,  besides external dimension of the conflict which has afflicted this  state ever since 1947, there is also an internal dimension which is  defined by Kashmir’s relationship with India. This relation has  witnessed a protracted tension, especially since 1953. In 1953, Sheikh  Abdullah, the popular Kashmiri leader was removed from power and  detained for a long time. Before his detention, Sheikh had been  instrumental in negotiating a special constitutional status for the  state. However, with his dismissal not only this status was gradually  eroded, but Kashmiris were also denied democratic channels of political  expression. Excessive central intrusion in the politics of the state  distorted even the most developed indigenous political institutions like  the National Conference and distanced governance from the popular  responses (Bose 2003: 66-7) All this resulted in an accumulated  political discontent which was manifested throughout the post-1953  period. 
               6Though  Sheikh was brought back to power in 1975, political discontent  continued to manifest itself. One of the major reasons for this  discontent was the lack of any initiative in restoring the  constitutional autonomy of the state, the major pre-condition of Sheikh  for resuming power. However, due to the towering personality of the  Sheikh, particularly his capacity to assert autonomy of his government  vis-à-vis the intrusive politics of the Centre, the discontent was quite  subdued. But the incapacity of his successor and son, Dr. Farooq  Abdullah, to keep the Centre away from meddling into the politics of the  state, resulted in intensifying the already existing feeling of  discontent. The tension continued to grow after the dismissal,  engineered by the Congress—the ruling party in the Centre—, of Farooq  Abbdullah’s government, which had obtained a massive popular mandate  during the 1983 Assembly elections, (Abdullah 1985: 9). In addition, the  pressure built upon Farooq Abdullah and the National Conference to  enter into an electoral alliance with the Congress party increased the  dissatisfaction, since the Congress party was popularly held responsible  for distorting local politics since early fifties.

[ul]
[li]2 Along with MUF, the opposition to the NC-Congress combine was given by the People’s Conference led (…) [/li][li]3 For instance, the NC candidate in Bijbihera won the election with a margin of 100 votes only. In Wa (…) [/li][/ul]
7However, the real political outrage in the Valley was triggered by the 1987 Assembly election, generally perceived to be highly rigged, which led to the massive victory of NC-Congress combine and the defeat of most of the Muslim United Front (MUF) candidates. The MUF was formed in 1986 to give vent to the growing popular resentment against the alliance were seen to be manipulated. Despite polling 38.2% votes (compared to 45.2% votes of the NC-Congress combine), the opposition comprised of MUF and People’s Conference2 could register victory barely in four constituencies. The fact that the margin of victory of some of the candidates belonging to the ruling combine was very low, and the number of invalid votes in these constituencies was quite high, generated a feeling of scepticism regarding the validity of the results3 (Chowdhary & Rao 2003: 189-219).

               8It  was in the wake of disillusionment with the internal politics in  general that the present phase of conflict was started in the Valley.  What marked the beginning of this phase was the decision of some of the  Kashmiri youth who had participated in the elections as contestants,  election agents, campaigners and sympathisers of candidates to cross  over to Pakistan administered Kashmir to take training in armed  militancy. Moreover, apart from armed militancy, a spontaneous popular  upsurge grew against the Indian State that eroded the mainstream  politics in the Valley of Kashmir. The separatist politics manifested  both through the armed militancy as well as spontaneous political  response took a more organised form with the establishment of the All  Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in 1993. The establishment of APHC as  an umbrella organisation was necessitated by the proliferation of  militant groups which were at times operating at cross purposes. The  ideological differences between these organisations and their internal  strife, especially the war declared by Hizbul Mujahideen on the JKLF,  generated a need for a loose-knit organisation that could give a sense  of unity and common direction to those participating in the movement  (Schofield 2000: 143-88).

[ul]
[li]4 With common people openly identifying with separatist politics, the farcical nature of the electora (…) [/li][/ul]
9So much was the sway of the separatist politics in the Kashmir Valley, that it completely eroded the mainstream politics right from 1989. While Jammu and Ladakh regions remained more or less normal, there was no scope for the mainstream power politics in the Valley.4 As the legitimacy of the mainstream politics was openly questioned by the militants on the one hand, and the defiant masses on the streets of Kashmir on the other, the state was placed under the President’s rule for a prolonged period of time. In 1996, the electoral process was restored but the government that was formed after the Assembly election could not gain credence in the Valley of Kashmir. Since the elections were organised with the help of the security forces and the counter-insurgents, the government formed after the elections was not seen to be representing the popular will. Though NC had given the slogan of ‘autonomy’ to regain its hold in the local politics, there were not many takers of this slogan (Chowdhary 2000: 2600-1).

               10Despite  the restoration of political process, separatist sentiment continued to  hold sway. Though Kashmiris, by this time, had started reacting against  the ‘culture of violence’ and very subtly rejecting and de-legitimising  militancy, their sympathies with separatist politics continued to be  expressed through various demonstrations organised by the Hurriyat  Conference. Mainstream politics, therefore, continued to remain  challenged.
               11A  number of factors changed the popular response towards electoral and  mainstream politics. Firstly, the urge for normalcy after the prolonged  period of militant violence led to some kind of change of attitude  towards the process of governance. By the time the 2002 Assembly  election was concluded, the political processes related to governance  had already found some legitimate space in Kashmir’s politics. Without  any contradiction towards their separatist sentiments, people started  involving themselves in the ‘politics related to governance’. This  process was further boosted by a change in the nature of political  mobilisation. With the emergence of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as  another Kashmir-based party, not only the electoral competition became  quite intense, but the electoral discourse also became more grounded in  the local realities. PDP referred to the Human Rights violations taking  place in Kashmir and the need for providing ‘healing touch’ to people,  and also raised the issue of conflict and its resolution through the  process of dialogue both with both Pakistan and militants. Also  significant were the initiatives being taken by the Vajpayee-led  Government: declaring that India had made mistakes in Kashmir, Vajpayee  made a commitment to hold a ‘free and fair election’. This commitment  was an indirect acknowledgement of the intrusive role that the Centre  had been playing in the power politics of the State since 1950s.

[ul]
[li]5 It was exactly 29.64% voter turnout for the Valley of Kashmir. Interestingly in few districts like (…) [/li][/ul]
12The impact of all these factors was significantly visible through the voters’ response. Although the overall turnout during the 2002 Assembly elections was much lower than the 1996 Assembly elections, the participation was more voluntary rather than coerced by the presence of security forces in any manner, which made the 30% turnout in Kashmir Valley quite significant.5

[ul]
[li]6 That is the reason why the National Conference, which was ousted from power in 1984 due to the defe (…) [/li][/ul]
13The 2002 Assembly elections, generally acknowledged to be fair, helped build some kind of confidence in the electoral institutions and processes. Till now, the formation of government and its sustenance in power was more dependent on the support of the Centre rather than the mandate of people. The electoral politics therefore was quite distanced from the popular responses.6 Breaking the hegemony of the single dominant party also brought an alternative to the PDP-Congress coalition power. The possibility that a government could be changed through the participation of people in the electoral process, rather than through the manipulative politics of the Centre, strengthened the stake of the people in this process.

               14Moreover,  the response of people towards the electoral process was further  transformed through the intensity of competition after the creation of  the People’s Democratic Party. The emergence of another Kashmir-based  political party invigorated the mainstream political space.

[ul]
[li]7 Sheikh was arrested on the suspicion that he was not happy with the Accession of the State with Ind (…) [/li][/ul]
15Before the emergence of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), National Conference (NC) had hegemonised the politics of Kashmir region (Chowdhary & Rao 2004: 1521-7). It based its on playing a role in organising the resistance movement against the feudal Dogra rule before 1947 and the radical land reforms that it had initiated after it came into power in 1947. Its emphasis on economic and political reconstruction of the state, in pursuance of the New Kashmir Manifesto, the ideological blueprint of the party—particularly the redistribution of the land to the landless, debt relief to the peasants, free education till the Post Graduate stage—endeared this party to the Kashmiri masses and they formed the base of this party. The support was strengthened by Sheikh Abdullah’s charisma until his removal from power in 1953.7

               16With  the ouster of the Sheikh Abdullah from power and subsequent formation  of Plebiscite Front, the support base of NC shifted to this organisation  in the post-1953 period. However, NC continued to officially operate as  the ruling party of the state under the leadership of Bakshi Ghulam  Mohammed. But the ruling NC legitimacy remained contested throughout and  it survived more on the basis of the support from the Congress party  than on the basis of local support. So overwhelming was the influence of  the Congress that the NC ultimately merged with it in mid-sixties.  After 1975 when Sheikh Abdullah came back to power politics, the  Plebiscite Front was dissolved and the NC was revived. From 1975 to  1996, the NC was again the most influential party of Jammu and Kashmir,  particularly in the Valley.
               17Though  the NC continued to dominate the political scene of the State, its  support base gradually declined. In the background of the Kashmir’s  politics between 1953 and 1975 when people were mobilised around the  theme of contestation of the existing relationship of the state with  India, the return of Sheikh Abdullah to power without much change in the  status quo, there was a simmering discontent in the Valley. However,  due to the towering personality of Sheikh Abdullah, much of this  discontent did not take a concrete shape during his life time. But after  his death, the party now led by his son Farooq Abdullah started losing  space. Even when Congress as the ruling party in the Centre had  manoeuvred the ouster of his government in 1984, he had entered into an  alliance with this party in 1986 and contested the 1987 election leading  this alliance.

[ul]
[li]8 The disjuncture between the National Conference and the popular responses was also reflected earlie (…) [/li][/ul]
18As the party became dependent on the centre for its political survival rather than on mass support at the ground level, it distanced itself from popular concerns. That the party, despite obtaining massive mandate was disconnected from popular responses became clear in 1989 when the Valley came in the grip of militancy and witnessed a massive upsurge (Schofield 2003: 143-88).8 In the political crisis that ensued, not only NC was forced to withdraw from the political scene but had to face the maximum brunt of violence. Devoid of legitimacy, NC leadership went into hibernation. And even after coming back on the political scene by contesting the 1996 Assembly election and forming the government, it could not regain its previous legitimacy.

[ul]
[li]9 The competitive nature of regional politics of Kashmir ultimately resulted in deeper changes in the (…) [/li][/ul]
19With the emergence of PDP in late nineties, the context of the power politics changed drastically. As another Kashmir-based party, it not only challenged the dominance of the NC but changed the very logic of power politics. Adopting a political discourse that reflected the popular concerns of people in a situation of conflict, PDP sought to reduce the gap between popular aspirations and the power politics. It borrowed issues from the separatist camp and brought them to the centre of mainstream political space. Thus the party suggested ‘dialogue’ with the militants and separatists as a way towards solving the conflict; easing out pressure upon people from the excessive presence of the security forces; and reducing drastically the number of cases of Human Rights violations. It was this ‘people-oriented’ strategy of PDP that helped bring an end the hegemony of NC. During the 2002 Assembly elections, the PDP managed to capture as many as 16 seats from Kashmir Valley.9

               20The  mainstream political space was able to expand substantially during the  period between 2002 and 2008. From a situation in pre-2002 period when  political parties and leaders could not freely move in public space and  could not organise public meetings, 2007 saw frequent rallies being  organised by almost all the political parties in various parts of the  Valley—in the anticipation of the coming election, almost one year in  advance (Chowdhary 2008: 22).
               21Expansion  of the electoral space, however, has not taken place at the cost of the  separatist sentiment and politics. In fact, the separatist sentiment  remains intact in Kashmir. The legitimisation of the mainstream politics  has been possible only because there is no contradiction between the  separatist and mainstream politics and people are not forced to make a  choice between the two. The two are seen as reflecting two different  spheres of politics: one dealing with issues relating to governance; and  the other dealing with conflict situation and its resolution. Right  since the 2002 elections, the political parties have sought to restrict  the scope of electoral politics to the issues related to ‘governance’  only. Recognising the larger political realities of the state, these  parties acknowledge the widely prevalent separatist sentiment and the  need of addressing it. In no way do they claim that the extension of  electoral space amounts to shrinking the separatist space. 
               22The  parallel existence of the two kinds of politics reflects a complexity  that exists at the ground level, generated both by the change in the  dynamics of the separatist politics, and the nature of popular  responses. With the decline in armed militancy, the assertion of the  separatist sentiments is taking place through the mass politics. The  more the mainstream politics is expanding, the more it becomes rooted in  local responses, while generating a need to reaffirm the popular  separatist sentiments. In a situation where conflict resolution has not  taken a concrete shape, a danger is always felt that participation in  mainstream politics may be a sign of political normalcy which might put  the whole question of conflict resolution to the back burner. Thus has  emerged the very peculiar situation in Kashmir, where mainstream  political processes and assertion of separatist sentiments alternate. It  is interesting to note how abruptly the situation changes in the  Valley. While there was a tremendous electoral upsurge throughout the  year of 2007 and early 2008, it was suddenly halted by an equally strong  assertion of separatist politics during the Amarnath agitation. The  affirmation of the mainstream politics immediately followed when people  participated in large number during the 2008 Assembly elections. 
               **[The Amarnath agitation](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n2)**

[ul]
[li]10 Shri Amarnath Shrine Board was formed by the government of J&K in 2000 with the purpose of managing (…) [/li][li]11 General Sinha had earlier incensed many Kashmiris with a self-proclaimed agenda of changing the ‘mi (…) [/li][/ul]
23Amarnath land row engulfed the whole state throughout the summer of 2008. To begin with, there was a massive agitation in Kashmir, which was followed by a prolonged agitation in Jammu. This was once again followed by a renewed mass upsurge in Kashmir. The entire issue initially revolved around a government order diverting forest land to Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB), and subsequently around the revocation of the same order.10 The order gave the SASB the right to erect pre-fabricated temporary structures for housing pilgrims during the period of the Amarnath yatra. However, more than the order, it was the assertion of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the SASB—representing the ex-officio chairman, the Governor, General S.K. Sinha—, that land had been given permanently to the Board to build permanent structures that generated a massive response in Kashmir.11

               24The  separatists used the issue of diversion of land to SASB to create  suspicion of a grand design behind the order aimed at altering the  Muslim-majority character of the state. The fear of ‘demographic  change’, therefore, became the basis of mass mobilization in Kashmir. To  quell the agitation which had assumed dangerous proportions in Kashmir,  the order was revoked but this only generated another kind of polemics  in Jammu. The Bharatiya Janata Party and like-minded organizations  termed the revocation as an assault on ‘Hindu sentiments’ and demanded  restoration of the original order. The revocation of the order was  portrayed as anti-Jammu decision taken under the pressure of separatists  to appease the ‘Muslims of Kashmir’ without taking into consideration  the sentiments of the ‘Hindus of Jammu’.
               25In  both the regions, the agitation brought in focus the radical elements  who sought to mobilise people around emotive issues. In Kashmir, people  were mobilised by the Geelani-led Hurriyat Conference (as well as by the  PDP) around the fear of demographic change (the fear that by systematic  efforts the Muslim-majority character of the State will be changed) and  in Jammu, the mobilisation took place around the religious sentiments  of Hindus (supposedly hurt by the revocation of the Land Order). 
               26The  agitation had far reaching implications for the politics of the State.  In the Valley of Kashmir, there was aggressive affirmation of separatist  sentiments reminding one of the massive popular demonstrations of early  1990. However, unlike the separatism of the last few years which was  marked by the centrality of moderate leadership, it was now directed by  hardliners. 
               27The  public display of the separatist sentiments during this time gave an  indication that beyond the electoral vibrancy, the deep-rooted sense of  alienation continued to prevail. Throughout the period of agitation one  could feel that the mainstream politics had once more regressed to the  background and the separatist politics had become ascendant.

[ul]
[li]12 After the first phase of agitation which culminated with the revocation of the Government Order, th (…) [/li][/ul]
28A significant implication of the Amarnath agitation was the fractured relationship between Jammu and Kashmir. Though politically divergent, the two major regions had never been placed in such an antagonistic relationship.12 The political discord had reached beyond the usual issues of regional disparities and had started affecting the economic and trade relationship between the two regions. The most dangerous implication of the agitation was the communally divisive mobilisation and the resultant communal tension in the state.

               29Along  with the religious factor, it was the regional identity politics that  provided stimulus to the Amarnath agitation. In Jammu, a feeling of  political discontent has been persisting since early fifties. The  feeling emanates from the context of power politics of the State which  is perceived to be ‘Kashmir-centric’ having negligible or token presence  of Jammu’s political elite (Puri 1966: 77-81). It also has much to do  with the specificity of the conflict situation of Kashmir and the  response of the Central government. There is a feeling that in all  political negotiations undertaken to address the Kashmir problem, Jammu  is taken for granted and that the political arrangements are imposed on  this region. This feeling is accentuated by the context of political  divergence and the ideological divide between the two regions. The logic  of Kashmir’s dominant politics governed by the contestation of the  State’s relationship with India and manifested through the discourse of  ‘Autonomy’/‘Azadi’ does not extend itself to the Jammu region. The  politics of this region on the contrary, is governed by the regional  asymmetry in the power politics and resource distribution. 
               30The  dominant political discourse of Jammu revolves around the issues  related to regional ‘deprivation and neglect’. ‘Kashmir’ in this  discourse forms the ‘centre of power’ within the state and is perceived  to be dominating both the power structure of the state and the economic  and material resources. It is on this basis that popular perceptions  have been articulated around the notion of regional imbalances and a  number of agitations have been organised in Jammu. The context of  regional divergence and regional imbalances has come to overwhelm the  political logic of Jammu, not only in the Hindu-dominated areas where  organisations of Hindu-Right have been mobilising people around the  demand for abolition of Article 370 guaranteeing the special status of  the State, but also in the Muslim-dominated districts which are  relatively more backward. Leaders here blame the Kashmir-centric power  politics for the perpetual neglect of these districts. Ever since the  early fifties, there has been a perception throughout Jammu region that  the public policy and political decisions favour Kashmir while ignoring  Jammu. The political response of the region is therefore organised  around the issue of regional imbalances. The range of this response  however varies from the demand for regional autonomy (emanating from the  centrist politics), to the demand for a separate state of Jammu  (emanating from the Hindu Rightist politics). There is also a third  demand, coming from backward areas of Jammu region, for some kind of  sub-regional arrangement (the Hill Development Councils for instance).
               31Regional  divergence has been manifested in the politics of the state in a  variety of manners. However, despite this divergence the two regions of  the state never followed a confrontationist path. It was during the  period of militancy that the political divergence was reflected in a  sharp manner. However, even this did not result in collision between the  two regions. On the contrary, there evolved a feeling that despite the  specificity of conflict in the Kashmir region, there was a need to  evolve a consensus between the two regions. The conflict resolution  process, it was understood (both by the political elite in Kashmir as  well as in Jammu) needed to be inclusive so as to represent the  divergent political voices within the State. 
               32Amarnath  agitation became the first occasion in the history of politics of the  state when the two major regions of the state were placed in an  antagonistic situation. Both in Jammu as well as in Kashmir, the masses  were mobilised in a manner that enhanced regional chauvinism. Worse  still, the mobilisation ultimately took a communal route and resulted  not only in the tension between the two major communities of the state  but also in carving of new political constituencies based on religion.

[ul]
[li]13 Since 2002, when the era of coalition politics started, Jammu started having a substantial share in (…) [/li][/ul]
33In the absence of a regional party, the politics of regional discontent is often appropriated by the Hindu Rightist parties and organisations which combine regional issues with religious sentiments. Since the onset of militancy, the parties of Hindu Right have sought to sharpen the regional identity politics.13 Amarnath agitation was one such occasion when the Hindu Rightist organisations could mobilise masses in Hindu dominated areas of Jammu by arousing regional sentiment combined with religious one.

               34Regional  chauvinism not only dominated the Jammu region, but Kashmir as well.  After the onset of the coalition era which gave a visibility to Jammu in  the power politics, a politics has been generated in Kashmir around the  issue of its discrimination vis-à-vis Jammu. In radicalising the  regional politics of Kashmir, PDP has had a clear role to play. In its  competition with NC, this party has often sought to give an aggressive  edge to Kashmiri regional politics and also add religious dimensions to  it. One could clearly see the role of PDP in raising the regional  sentiments in Kashmir during the Amarnath agitation. Though responsible  for taking the decision on transfer of land to the SASB, this party  joined the side of agitators to demand its revocation, terming the Land  Order as an assault to Kashmiri identity and endangering the  Muslim-dominated character of the State. 
               **[The 2008 Assembly elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n3)**

               35The  2008 elections took place immediately after the Amarnath agitation. The  unprecedented regional and communal polarisation that afflicted the  state during this agitation, therefore, was bound to have repercussions  on this election.

[ul]
[li]14 Though much of the electoral discourse in Kashmir revolves around the ‘bigger issues’ like the idea (…) [/li][/ul]
36In the Valley, separatist politics was the highlight of the agitation. The separatist leadership had developed a renewed confidence that people who had participated in massive demonstrations against the Indian state during the agitation would not come forward to participate in elections, and the electoral exercise would once again be reduced to a farce. However, the boycott call was defied and there was massive participation of people in the Assembly election. Against 29.64% voter turnout in the 2002 Assembly election, the 2008 election recorded 51.64%. In almost all the districts and all the constituencies of the Valley, the percentage of the voter-turnout was much higher than the last Assembly elections. Throughout the Valley one could see the images of long queues outside the polling booth showing the eagerness to cast votes. The message was very clear: despite the centrality of the separatist politics, the mainstream politics has been extended and legitimised. The proximity of the people with the power politics, the location of power politics in local responses of people and their growing stake in the local politics—all had led to the deepening of democracy in this state, particularly in the Valley.14 This is why the usual sense of scepticism with regard to the democratic institutions was replaced by a greater involvement in the process of government making.

               Table 1. Comparative voter turnout in Kashmir – 2002 and 2008 Assembly elections*
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     Votes polled (in %)



                     **2002**
                     **2008**


                     **J&K**
                     43.70
                     60.92


                     **Kashmir**
                     29.64
                     51.64


                     **Jammu**
                     55.82
                     70.90


                     **Ladakh**
                     75.91
                     68.65


               ** Source: Election Commission of India. All the tables contain data from the Election Commission of India.*
               37Although  the voter turnout was not affected by the Amarnath agitation, same is  not the case with the electoral outcome. In an intensely contested  election which gave a fragmented verdict, PDP and BJP emerged as the  gainers. While PDP was able to increase its share of seats in Kashmir  region from 16 in 2002 to 19 and its vote percentage arose from 24.48%  to 27.42%, it could also gain entry in Jammu and register its victory in  2 seats with a voter turnout of 6.88% in its favour. BJP, however  emerged as the biggest gainer since it could increase its share of seats  from one to eleven. Its vote share in Jammu region increased from  17.80% to 22.94%. 
               38NC  was able to retain 28 seats that it had in 2002, but it suffered some  losses in Jammu region where it could win only 6 seats as compared to 9  seats in 2002. Congress also could not fare so well. As against 20 seats  in 2002, this time it could win only 17 seats. As against 21.38% votes  in 2002, only 18.17% votes were cast in its favour in 2008. It suffered  loss both in Jammu (from 26.40% to 23.98%) as well as in Kashmir (from  14.41% to 10%). 
               Table 2. Comparative percentage of votes polled by different parties – 2002 and 2008 Assembly elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     Votes Polled (in %)



                     J&K
                     Kashmir Region
                     Jammu Region



                     **2002**
                     **2008**
                     **2002**
                     **2008**
                     **2002**
                     **2008**


                     **NC**
                     28.23
                     23.59
                     35.62
                     27.50
                     23.95
                     20.16


                     **INC**
                     21.38
                     18.17
                     14.41
                     10.48
                     26.40
                     23.98


                     **PDP**
                     09.04
                     15.68
                     24.51
                     27,41
                     01.76
                     06.88


                     **BJP **
                     12.15
                     12.73
                     01.60
                     00.96
                     17.80
                     22.94


                     **JKNPP**
                     04.68
                     3.39
                     00.03
                     0.78
                     07.02
                     05.68


               Table 3. Comparative share of seats attained by political parties – 2002 and 2008 Assembly elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     Number of Seats



                     J&K
                     Kashmir Region
                     Jammu Region



                     **2002**
                     **2008**
                     **2002**
                     **2008**
                     **2002**
                     **2008**


                     **NC**
                     28
                     28
                     18
                     20
                     09
                     06


                     **INC**
                     20
                     17
                     05
                     03
                     15
                     13


                     **PDP**
                     16
                     21
                     16
                     19
                     00
                     02


                     **BJP **
                     01
                     11
                     00
                     00
                     01
                     11


                     **JKNPP**
                     04
                     03
                     00
                     00
                     04
                     03


               39The  results of Assembly elections clearly reflect the divide created during  the agitation. The increase in BJP’s and PDP’s share of votes and seats  follow the successful aggressive mobilisation of the regional and  religious identities by these two parties. Rather than the centrist  forces represented by Congress and National Conference, it was the  triumph for those parties which had stretched the politics of the state  to the extremely polarised responses.
               40Before  the Amarnath agitation, PDP was not in a very comfortable position in  Kashmir. After remaining in power for more than five years, it was  facing the anti-incumbency factor. In the context of its radical  pro-Kashmir politics, its association with Congress was becoming a  liability. In all likelihood therefore, NC was poised to win a  substantial number of seats in the Valley, had the agitation not taken  place. However, the Amarnath agitation changed the situation for the PDP  which severed its link with the Congress and joined the side of  agitators. Since the agitation honed the Kashmiri regional and  separatist sentiments, PDP’s gain was ensured. In the regionally  polarised politics where Jammu’s rightwing forces were provoking  anti-Kashmir sentiments, PDP was projecting itself as the redeemer of  the Kashmiri sentiment. Its leader Mehbooba Mufti was vociferously  campaigning against the ‘economic blockade’ of Kashmir by Jammu’s  agitators. In this context of regional and communal polarisation, the  PDP’s increase in popularity was clearly reflected during the Assembly  election.

[ul]
[li]15 The communal polarisation of the electoral politics of the State is not unprecedented. The 1983 Ass (…) [/li][/ul]
41The electoral polarisation on the communal basis was more clearly established in the Jammu region.15 Here BJP could register its victory in the record number of 11 seats. The highest number of seats that this party had ever attained was 8 during the 1996 Assembly election, as an immediate post-militancy reaction from the region. In the context of violence, BJP could succeed in extending its constituency. However, as the violence level came down, the influence of BJP also weakened. During the 2002 Assembly election, this party only managed to win one seat.

[ul]
[li]16 With Congress-PDP being the major partners of the coalition government, it represented a balance of (…) [/li][/ul]
42The constituency of BJP’s politics was in any case shrinking due to the changed nature of power politics of the State. The extreme politics of regional discontent on which the popularity of this party depends, was getting blunted in the context of coalitional power sharing. For the first time in the political history of the state, Jammu had a fair share of power in the state. The Congress having its base in Jammu and PDP in Kashmir created a regional balance.16

               43It  is important to note that since 2002, there was no major protest  organised in Jammu region around any regional issue. However, the  Amarnath agitation provided space and opportunity for BJP and other  like-minded organisations to mobilise the Hindu constituency. The  massive mandate in favour of BJP in Jammu’s Hindu-dominated districts  indicated that region was now getting communally polarised. 
               44The  fact that the PDP could register its victory in two Muslim dominated  constituencies of the Jammu region provided additional reason to believe  the growing impact of communal polarisation. Being a Kashmir-centric  party which has been seeking to legitimise its politics by emphasising  its ‘pro-Kashmir’ orientation with a pro-Muslim bias, PDP’s entry into  Jammu’s Muslim dominated areas and its success in two predominantly  Muslim constituencies was an indication of the communal polarisation  that was taking deeper roots in the State. In a way this reflected a  very dangerous signal of an extension of Kashmiri constituency to  Jammu’s Muslim pockets, thereby creating new alignments. So far, the  political divide in the state generally has been regional rather than  religious based. This is not to argue that communal factor did not  operate at all. On the contrary, the communal identity was invoked for  electoral purposes by almost all the political parties, including the  National Conference. However, the impact of such mobilisation remained  limited and did not succeed in carving a communal constituency. During  the Amarnath agitation, the aggressive Hindu religious mobilisation and  backlash against Muslims, in certain cases, resulted in communal wedge.  As a result, Kashmiri leaders both from the separatist camp as well as  from the mainstream parties sought to create a political constituency  among Jammu Muslims. The unprecedented victory of PDP in two Muslim  dominated constituencies signalled the success in this direction. 
               45The  impact of Amarnath agitation as reflected in the Assembly elections  raised major questions related to the future of the state. If the  divisive forces were to dominate the politics of the state, it would  threaten the integrity of the State. The state, despite its diversity  and political divergence, had continued to remain integrated due to the  endurance of the centrist forces. The centrist forces actually affirmed  the plural nature of society. With the radical forces occupying the  central space, the very plurality of the state has been endangered. 
               **[The 2009 Parliamentary elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n4)**

               46The  2009 Parliamentary elections took place barely few months after the  Assembly elections, thus dealing with the concerns and anxieties raised  due to the outcome of the Assembly elections. This election, being  relatively more distanced from the Amarnath agitation, provided  important clues about the depth of the impact of the divisive tendencies  sharpened during the agitation. It also provided interesting insights  into the relationship between the mainstream and separatist politics in  Kashmir. 
               **[The context of separatist politics](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n1)**

[ul]
[li]17 It cannot be argued that the positive response of the Kashmiris towards the electoral process has a (…) [/li][/ul]
47Defiance of the boycott call and enthusiastic participation of people in the Assembly elections resulted in a sense of demoralisation in the separatist camp. The growing space of the mainstream politics did not induce a simultaneous shrinking of the separatist space17, but it did lead to a change in orientation within the separatist camp. The impact of this shift could be seen during the Parliamentary elections, when Sajjad Gani Lone, a prominent separatist took the decision to contest the 2009 Parliamentary election from Baramula constituency of North Kashmir.

[ul]
[li]18 Though the present phase of Kashmir separatist politics was initiated in 1989, it was only in 1993 (…) [/li][/ul]
48Sajjad Lone led one of the leading separatist organisation, the People’s Conference (PC) which was a part of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) right from the time of its inception in 1993. As an amalgam of the separatist and militant organisations active in Kashmir, APHC represented the popular separatist sentiment in Kashmir.18 A G Lone, father of Sajjad Lone and the founder of the People’s Conference was one of the most prominent leaders of the APHC.

               49Though  many other separatists had earlier joined the electoral fray, the  Sajjad Lone’s decision to contest Parliamentary election had an  altogether different impact. Being a high profile separatist, at par  with the top separatist leaders like Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, Ali Shah  Geelani and Yasin Malik, one could see in his decision to contest  election a crack within the separatist politics. The crack was very  small, not seeming to affect the separatists overtly but in reality had  had a great psychological effect on them. More so since his decision to  contest election came in the wake of the massive participation of  Kashmiris in the Assembly elections. 
               50Separatists  had been very aggressive in their boycott call during the 2009  Parliamentary elections. Though the call was initially given by Syed Ali  Shah Geelani, the hardliner leader of the Hurriyat (G), soon the other  faction of Hurriyat led by Mirwaiz Omer Farooq and other organisations  joined the boycott campaign.
               51The  voter enthusiasm was quite low this time. Against 51% turnout during  the Assembly election, only 31.24% votes were registered during this  election. It was partially the impact of the aggressive campaigning by  the separatists that the voter participation during the Parliamentary  elections was relatively lower. 
               Table 4. Comparative voter turnout in Kashmir region – 2008 Assembly elections and 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     Voter turnout (%)



                     **2008 **
                     **Assembly elections**
                     **2009**
                     **Parliamentary elections**


                     **J&K**
                     60.92
                     39.66


                     **Kashmir**
                     51.64
                     31.24


                     **Jammu **
                     70.90
                     47.19


                     **Ladakh **
                     68.65
                     71.85

[ul]
[li]19 The high expectations that people have from the local politicians were demonstrated in 2007 when va (…) [/li][/ul]
52It is important to analyse as to why the same voters who showed enthusiasm in 2008 shied away from the same process in the Parliamentary election? Why did the separatists’ call for boycott succeeded this time? A number of reasons can be attributed to this. Firstly, the kind of proximity and involvement that the voters felt with the Assembly elections was missing during the Lok Sabha elections. Governance is becoming important to people and therefore they are keen to have a party in power with which they identify.19 This is why they defied the call for boycott during the Assembly elections. During the Parliamentary election, the boycott call could become effective because people did not have similar stakes. Not voting during these elections was a message that many Kashmiris would have wanted to give to the Central government—that their participation in the Assembly elections should not be construed as their complete rejection of the separatist politics. In the context of the complexity of relationship between the separatist and mainstream politics in Kashmir, it needs to be reiterated that the expansion of the mainstream politics does not necessarily take place at the cost of the separatist political space. Separatist sentiments continue to dominate the popular political responses despite their positive response to the mainstream politics. It is the assertion of the separatist sentiments that was reflected in the boycott politics. Lest the participation of the people during the Assembly elections should be seen as an endorsement of Indian position on Kashmir, the people sought to use the strategy of boycott politics to assert their continued contestation of this position.

               53However,  despite the lower voter turnout in the Parliamentary elections as  compared to their turnout in the Assembly elections, participation of  Kashmiris showed an improvement as compared to their participation in  the earlier Parliamentary election. In all the three constituencies of  the Valley, the voter turnout this time was higher than in 2004  Parliamentary elections.
               Table 5. Comparative voter turnout in all the constituencies of the State – 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     Voter turnout (in %)



                     **2004**
                     **Parliamentary elections**
                     **2009**
                     **Parliamentary elections**


                     **Baramulla**
                     35.65
                     41.84


                     **Srinagar**
                     18.57
                     25.55


                     **Anantnag**
                     15.04
                     27.09


                     **Ladakh**
                     73.52
                     71.86


                     **Udhampur**
                     45.09
                     44.88


                     **Jammu**
                     44.49
                     49.03


               54On  the basis of this data one can infer that although separatist politics  has affected the responses of people in the Valley to the extent that  many of them chose to remain away from the Parliamentary elections,  their response cannot be construed to mean a total rejection of the  electoral process. As the electoral data of 2004 elections shows, the  stake of people in the Parliamentary elections is not as high as in the  Assembly elections. Even when the faith of the people in the electoral  politics had increased due to a very credible electoral process during  the 2002 Assembly elections, their participation in the 2004  Parliamentary elections remained low. The overall expansion of the  electoral space that was taking place in the post-2002 period was not  reflected during the Parliamentary elections, even when at the ground  level one could see the difference. The political environment was  energised by intense political competition between the two regional  parties—the NC and the PDP which were not only mobilising people and  holding huge rallies but were also engaging people at the discursive  level through their different versions/models of peace process. One  could see the intensity of this politics throughout the year 2007 and  2008 (till the Amarnath agitation took place). The massive participation  of the people during the 2008 Assembly elections clearly established as  to how this politics had been legitimised.
               55However,  separatist politics remains the reality of Kashmir and despite the  extension of mainstream politics, and will remain intact mainly due to  the fact that there is a long-standing alienation among people which  needs to be addressed. Much of this alienation is the result of the  disjuncture between the power politics and the local responses. Politics  generally operated at a level where people were not involved—even in  the discursive sense. Not a single local debate took place about the  kind of political arrangements the state required, or the major  political changes implemented since 1953. The competitive nature of  power politics has changed this context. Rather than depending upon the  Centre for its legitimaty, the power politics now depends on popular  responses and is rooted in the local milieu. 
               **[Implications of the Amarnath agitation](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n2)**

               56To  what extent had the Amarnath agitation changed the nature and course of  politics of the state? Was the political response reflected during the  Assembly election symptomatic of the change in the nature of politics?  Or was it merely a passing phenomenon? An analysis of the 2009  Parliamentarly election is important for reflecting upon these  questions.
               57Though  not much time had passed between the Assembly and the Parliamentary  elections, the ground level situation in the state had witnessed  substantial changes which had implications on the Parliamentary  elections.
               58First  of all, the centrist forces came to acquire central space in the  politics of the State. In the face of the fragmented verdict during the  Assembly elections, the NC and Congress had joined together to form the  coalition government. 
               59The  Congress and the NC are the two parties of the State which have greater  stakes in the inclusive politics. The Congress has its stronghold in  Jammu region, distinguishing itself from the BJP by avoiding to present  itself as a party of Hindus. It has therefore acquired a solid base in  many Muslim pockets of the region. The Gujjars, the Muslim community of  the state, for instance, have been strong supporters of the Congress  party. Besides, to succeed in power politics, the party has to extend  its constituency beyond the Jammu region by increasing its presence and  stakes in Kashmir and Ladakh. Like the Congress, the NC has its presence  in all the three regions. Though Kashmir remains its primary  constituency, it has its existence and therefore a stake in all the  three regions of the state. The history of the party located in its  progressive ideology also defines it as a centrist party.

[ul]
[li]20 Interestingly, there has been a strong refutation of the communal charge on the part of the vocal m (…) [/li][/ul]
60Moreover, the political mobilisation that had taken place during the period of agitation lost its impact soon after the situation became normal, both in Jammu as well as in Kashmir. In Jammu, however, there was a rethinking about the agitation and the effect that it had on the region as a whole. Apart from the huge economic loss that people suffered due to the agitation, there was a feeling that Jammu did not gain much from the agitation. The massive regional sentiment that was generated during the agitation was not translated into any positive achievement for the region. On the contrary there was lot of negative baggage of the agitation. The traders, who form the economic backbone of the region, had to face the wrath of their Kashmiri counterparts who responded to the ‘economic blockade’ of the Valley during the agitation, by taking a decision to bypass Jammu in trade activities. However, it was the communal aftertaste of the agitation that made the people uneasy.20 The aggressive anti-Muslim posture of the fringe organisations activated during the agitation, the sporadic attacks on some Muslims and the outburst of communal violence in two towns of the region did not go very well with the local sensibilities.

               **[The impact of rethinking the Parliamentary elections](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n3)**

               61Being  partners in power, the NC and the Congress had reached a pre-electoral  arrangement for contesting the 2009 Parliamentary elections. Due to its  stronghold in the Valley, the NC contested the three seats of the  Valley, while the Congress having its base in Jammu, fielded its  candidates in both constituencies of the region. The third seat of  Ladakh was also contested by the Congress. As a consequence of this  alliance, the contest was regionally localised. There was a direct fight  between the NC and PDP in the Valley and between the Congress and BJP  in Jammu region.

[ul]
[li]21 Though the seat of was officially contested by the Congress candidate, the NC cadre of Ladakh rathe (…) [/li][/ul]
62The strategy of the coalition partners to contest in alliance helped them to gain both in the Valley as well as in Jammu region. The NC-Congress combine was able to sweep the Parliamentary elections winning five of the six seats. The sixth seat was also won by the rebel candidate of NC.21 In two of the three constituencies of the Valley, the margin of votes attained by the winning NC candidate over their PDP rivals was quite high. It was only in Anantnag constituency that there was a close contest between the two parties. In the case of Jammu region also, the Congress was able to win the Jammu seat with a very solid majority and it was only in Udhampur constituency that there was a neck-to-neck fight between the Congress and the BJP candidates.

               Table 6. Performance of NC, Congress, PDP and BJP – 2009 Parliamentary elections 
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     **Winner**
                     **Votes (in %)**
                     **Runner Up**
                     **Votes (in %)**


                     **Baramulla**
                     NC
                     46.01
                     PDP
                     31.32


                     **Srinagar**
                     NC
                     51.99
                     PDP
                     41.30


                     **Anantnag**
                     NC
                     46.53
                     PDP
                     44.89


                     **Ladakh**
                     IND
                     29.84
                     INC
                     26.48


                     **Udhampur**
                     INC
                     37.90
                     BJP
                     35.71


                     **Jammu**
                     INC
                     45.33
                     BJP
                     30.94


               **[The Kashmir region](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n4)**

[ul]
[li]22 In Baramulla constituency, the NC candidate Sharif ud din Shariq won the election by polling 203022 (…) [/li][/ul]
63In Kashmir Valley, the NC not only registered its victory in all the three seats of the region, but also improved its share of votes compared to earlier election. With 38.42% votes cast in its favour during the 2004 Parliamentary election, it obtained 49.79% votes during the 2009 Parliamentary elections. This poll percentage was quite high as compared to the 38.12% votes polled by the PDP (slightly lower than its voter turnout of 39.29% in 2004). While the improvement of its share of votes was reflected in each individual constituency, however, it was in Anantnag constituency that the NC actually doubled its share of votes as compared to 200422 (from 23.63% in 2004 to 46.53% in 2009).

               Table 7. Votes polled (%) by NC and PDP in Kashmir Region – 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     **NC (in %)**
                     **PDP (in %)**


                     **Kashmir region**
                     49.79 
                     38.12


                     **Baramulla**
                     46.01
                     31.32


                     **Srinagar**
                     51.99
                     41.30


                     **Anantnag**
                     46.53
                     44.89


               64The  loss of Anantnag seat was a huge setback for the PDP. Interestingly,  Anantnag is the stronghold of the PDP. The PDP has been dominating both  the Parliamentary as well as Assembly constituencies. In 2004  Parliamentary election, the seat was won by Mehbooba Mufti with 49.55%  votes. And during the 2008 Assembly elections, the party had swept the  four districts falling in this constituency, bagging 12 of the total 16  seats. What reflected the great decline of the party was its performance  in two Assembly segments of Anantnag and Wachi from where Muft Syed,  the patron of the party and Mehbooba Mufti, the party president, had  registered their victory with massive mandate during the Assembly  election. During the Parliamentary elections, the vote share of PDP in  both these segments had fallen drastically. 
               Table 8. Comparative performance of NC and PDP – 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]



                     Votes polled (in %)




                     **NC**
                     **PDP**


                     **Kashmir region**
                     2004
                     38.42
                     39.29


                     2009
                     47.79
                     38.17


                     **Baramula constituency**
                     2004
                     38.13
                     35.18


                     2009
                     46.01
                     31.32


                     **Srinagar constituency**
                     2004
                     50.3
                     38.46


                     2009
                     51.99
                     41.30


                     **Anantnag constituency**
                     2004
                     23.63
                     49.55


                     2009
                     46.53
                     44.89


               65The  loss of the PDP in the Parliamentary elections reflected a change of  mood at the ground level since the Assembly elections. The lower level  of participation during the election also affected the election outcome.  The PDP’s was incapable to mobilise as it had during the Assembly  election, thus revealing its complacency during the Parliamentary  elections. Buoyant by its performance during the Assembly elections, the  party had taken its victory for granted during the Parliamentary  election. And may be due to this sense of complacency or may be to show  some kind of proximity with the separatist politics, neither Mehbooba  nor Mufti Syed cast their own votes.
               66The  PDP’s failure to retain its own ground in the Valley could be seen as a  rejection of the ‘soft-separatism’ of the party. In order to ground its  politics in the local sensibilities, the PDP borrows heavily from the  separatist agenda and often seeks to use emotive slogans to strengthen  its constituency. Even when it was a part of government, it continued to  use the populist rhetoric in order to claim its proximity with the  separatist sentiments of people. It was in the same vein that the party  had joined the Amarnath agitation and had sought to raise the emotive  pitch of Kashmir’s politics. Though the party could gain during the  Assembly elections which was conducted in the heat of the sentiments  raised during the Amarnath agitation, it could not take advantage during  the Parliamentary elections. As the situation was normalised, the party  lost support at the ground level. 
               67With  the rejection of PDP during the Parliamentary elections, the Kashmir  region also seems to have rejected the polarised regional politics of  the state. The PDP’s role in sharpening the regional divide equals to  that of the BJP. Both the parties gain mutually by stretching the  regional politics on opposite side. While BJP sharpens the pro-Jammu  sentiments, the PDP arouses pro-Kashmir sentiments. The mutual  exclusivity of both the sentiments aggravates the regional divide. The  fact that the communal elements automatically creeps in this kind of  aggressive regional mobilisation, makes this politics quite dangerous. 
               68Since  Kashmir remains the most important constituency, the NC also indulges  in the pro-Kashmir politics. However, what distinguishes the PDP’s  politics from the NC’s is that the former invokes ‘region’ as well as  ‘religion’ in a more aggressive manner. NC’s Kashmir-centric politics is  more oriented towards the Centre, making demands upon it on behalf of  the State (therefore, its emphasis on State Autonomy). The PDP’s  politics is more inward looking and therefore focuses on Kashmir region  defined in antagonistic terms vis-à-vis Jammu region. In the definition  of regional identity, the religious element of Kashmiri identity is also  invoked.
               **[The Jammu region](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom2n5)**

[ul]
[li]23 In Udhampur constituency, the Congress candidate, Ch. Lal Singh won the election by polling 2318153 (…) [/li][/ul]
69In Jammu region, the BJP was expecting to register its victory in both the seats. During the 2008 Assembly elections it could return 11 Assembly seats. The performance of the BJP in this election had raised the hopes of this party for the Parliamentary elections. However it lost both the seats to Congress. As against the 42.20% votes polled by the Congress, it could poll only 32.94% votes.23

               Table 9: Votes polled by BJP and Congress in Jammu region – 2009 Parliamentary elections (%)
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     **BJP**
                     **Congress**


                     **Jammu region**
                     32.94
                     42.20


                     **Udhampur constituency **
                     35.71
                     37.90


                     **Jammu constituency **
                     30.94
                     45.33

[ul]
[li]24 However, the effect of the mobilization by the BJP does not seem to be lasting. Though it could get (…) [/li][/ul]
70Though both the seats of Jammu have remained the traditional strongholds of the Congress, the BJP could gain from the communal polarization during the peak of militancy and win both the seats during the 1998 and 1999 Parliamentary elections. However during the 2004 elections it lost both the seats. Its expectations in the post-Amarnath agitation were quite high and it had expected its victory this time as well – given the intensified mobilization by this party in the Hindu dominated areas of the region and the consequent polarization between the communities that was reflected during the period of agitation.24

               Table 10. Comparative performance of BJP and INC in Jammu region – 2004 and 2009 Parliamentary elections
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     Votes polled (in %)



                     **2004**
                     **2009**


                     **BJP**
                     34.72
                     32.94


                     **INC**
                     39.22
                     42.20


               Table 11. Jammu constituency over the years: Results of the Parliamentary elections from 1989 to 2009
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     Votes polled (in %)



                     **BJP**
                     **Congress**


                     **1989**
                     6.16
                     41.82


                     **1996**
                     26.00
                     34.24


                     **1998**
                     43.26
                     18.11


                     **1999**
                     43.46
                     41.82


                     **2004**
                     36.81
                     38.94


                     **2009**
                     30.94
                     31.85


               Table 12. Udhampur constituency over the years: Results of the Parliamentary elections from 1989 to 2009
               [TABLE="class: texte"]


                     Votes polled (in %)



                     **BJP**
                     **Congress**


                     **1989**
                     12.63
                     40.66


                     **1996**
                     37.58
                     21.74


                     **1998**
                     48.67
                     7.13


                     **1999**
                     49.01
                     19.09


                     **2004**
                     31.85
                     39.61


                     **2009**
                     30.94
                     45.33

[ul]
[li]25 The opposition to Leelakaran’s candidature came from within the party on the ground that he was see (…) [/li][/ul]
71One definite message that is given by the voters during the Parliamentary elections in Jammu region is that politics here cannot be controlled by the rightist forces for a long time. In very certain terms people have shown their antipathy towards the forces that aim at mobilizing them on religious basis, polarizing them on communal grounds and generating tensions within the region. People might have been temporarily swayed by the emotions raised during the Amarnath agitation, but that is not the normal political mood of the region. In defeating Leela Karan Sharma from Jammu-Poonch Parliamentary constituency, the people have distanced themselves not only from the politics of Amarnath agitation but from the communal politics per se. The BJP, despite opposition from within the cadre, had taken the decision to give ticket to Leela Karan because as chairman of the Amarnath Sangharsh Samitie, he had become the most important face of the agitation25. Confident that the BJP could gain from the popularity of Leela Karan during the agitation, the party leadership had gone ahead with the Leela Karan’s candidature. Leela Karan, however, lost the election with a big margin.

               72The  natural direction of politics of Jammu is quite secular and is  manifested in secular manner in a variety of ways. The plurality of  Jammu as well as its multi-layered social and political dynamics compels  the regional politics to take a secular shape. However, in the absence  of a secular regional politics that takes into consideration not only  the sensitivities of the Hindu-heartland of Jammu region but also  carries within itself the political concerns of the backward sub-regions  at the periphery, the politics has all the possibilities of becoming  communally divisive. About Amarnath agitation, one can safely say that,  though it was manifested in religious terms, the major reason for the  mass mobilization was regional rather than religious. This leads us to  argue that communal elements which generally remain at the margins of  Jammu’s politics, seek to appropriate the regional discontent at any  time they can and change the very direction of popular responses. 
               **[Conclusion](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#tocfrom1n5)**

               73This  paper has sought to analyse the intricacies of the electoral politics  of the state by locating it in the prevailing separatist context in the  Valley of Kashmir on the one hand and increasing political divergence on  regional basis on the other. The paper has sought to highlight the  reality of separatist politics in Kashmir, despite the fact that there  is increasing space for the mainstream politics. The electoral politics  which had become totally irrelevant in the Valley during the late  eighties, in the wake of militancy and political upsurge, has again  acquired legitimacy not only due to a shift in the nature of the  resistance politics but also due to the changed context of mainstream  politics. With the emergence of PDP as another regional party of  Kashmir, the hegemony of the National Conference has been fractured and  the intensity of electoral competition has increased. Consequently, the  possibilities of manipulation of the electoral politics by the ruling  party in the centre have become quite remote and the distance between  the electoral politics and the popular responses (that always used to  characterise the Kashmir’s electoral politics) has been significantly  reduced. 
               74The  legitimacy of the electoral politics, however, has been attained within  the overall context of separatism. Rather than challenging the  separatist politics, the political parties have sought to recognise the  reality of the conflict situation and limit the scope of their politics  to issues of ‘governance’ only. The divide between the ‘politics of  governance’ in which the political parties indulge and the ‘politics of  the ultimate resolution of conflict’ which is seen as the domain of the  separatist politics is generally recognised by the political parties,  separatist leaders as well as by the common masses. 
               75The  changed context of electoral politics can go a long way in dealing with  the separatism, which is actually a reflection of popular alienation.  But mere expansion of the mainstream space and its democratisation may  not be sufficient to deal with alienation and separatist sentiment. It  will have to be dealt with separately—through the conflict resolution  mechanism. Till that time, it will remain intact. 
               76The  paper has also focused on the political divergence within the state on  regional basis. The political divergence between the Kashmir and Jammu  regions reflects not only the specificity of the conflict situation in  Kashmir but also the context of power politics which has traditionally  been dominated by the political elite of Kashmir. This has resulted in a  politics of ‘regional deprivation’ that has often been appropriated by  the Hindu Rightist elements. The Hindu Rightist parties that seek to  exploit the generally prevalent feeling of regional discrimination by  communally polarising the political response of the region have not been  successful in electoral terms. However, the kind of regional cum  communal divide that was created in the wake of Amarnath agitation did  result in the substantial electoral gain for the BJP. Similar gain was  registered by PDP in Kashmir Valley
               77The  regional cum communal polarisation created during the Amarnath  agitation and reflected in the outcome of the 2008 Assembly elections  led to a concern about the implications of the divisive politics for the  future of the state. However, an altogether different voter response  during the 2009 Parliamentary elections has clearly established the  limitations of politics of regional and communal polarisation in the  plural and mixed society of Jammu and Kashmir. 
               78However,  the regional discontent remains a reality of Jammu’s politics and needs  to be addressed. There is also a need for a more secular response to  the regional discontent. In the absence such secular response, the  regional discontent is easily appropriated by the right-wing  organisations and gets communalised in the process. Communally divisive  politics, however, is not only dangerous for the Jammu region but for  the whole state.

Top of page
Bibliography

                                                                                            Abdullah, Farooq (1985) *My Dismissal: As Told to Satti Sahni*, New Delhi: Vikas.

Akbar, M. J. (1991) Kashmir: Behind the Vale, Delhi: Viking.
Bose, Sumantra (1997) The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace, New Delhi: Sage.
Bose, Sumantra (2003) Kashmir: Roots of Conflicts, Paths to Peace, Delhi: Vistaar Publisher.
Chowdhary Rekha (2000) ‘Autonomy Demand: Kashmir at Crossroads’, Economic and Political Weekly, 22 July.
Chowdhary Rekha & Nagendra Rao (2003) ‘Jammu and Kashmir: Political Alienation, Regional Divergence and Communal Polarisation’, in Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, 15(1-2), January-June.
Chowdhary Rekha & Nagendra Rao (2004) ‘National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir: From Hegemonic to Competitive Politics’, Economic and Political Weekly, 3-10 April.
Chowdhary Rekha (2008) ‘Electioneering in Kashmir: Overlap between Separatist and Mainstream Political Space’, Economic and Political Weekly, 12 July.
Ganguly, Sumit (1997) The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hewitt, Vernon (1995) Reclaiming the Past: The Search for Political and Cultural Unity in Contemporary Jammu and Kashmir, London: Portland.
Puri, Balraj (1966) Jammu: A Clue to Kashmir Tangle, Delhi: B. Puri.
Puri, Balraj (1983) Simmering Volcano: Jammu’s Relation with Kashmir, Delhi: Sterling.
Puri, Balraj (1993) Towards Insurgency, New Delhi: Orient Longman.
Schofield, Victoria (2000) *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending *War, London: I B Tauris.

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Notes

             [1](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn1) For  a detailed understanding of the background and emergence of armed  militancy and separatist politics of Kashmir, see M J Akbar (1991),  Sumit Ganguly (1997), Victoria Schofield (2000), Sumantra Bose (1997,  2003),Vernon Hewitt (1995) 
             [2](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn2) Along  with MUF, the opposition to the NC-Congress combine was given by the  People’s Conference led by Abdul Gani Lone. While MUF could poll 31.8%  votes, the People’s Conference could get 6.4% votes. 
             [3](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn3) For  instance, the NC candidate in Bijbihera won the election with a margin  of 100 votes only. In Wachi the margin of victory of the winning  candidate was of 122 votes and in Shopian it was of 336 votes. Moreover,  there was a huge number of votes which were declared invalid. Thus 6.7%  votes polled in Doru, 5.6% in Chrar-e-Sharief, 4.9% in Homshilbug, 4.8%  in Wachi and Sangrama each, 4.5% in Amirakadal and 4.2% votes in  Handwara were rejected. In most of the constituencies of narrow  victories, the number of invalid votes was quite high. In fact in the  three above stated constituencies of Bijbihera, Wachi and Shopian with  very narrow margins of victory, the number of invalid votes was much  higher than the margin with which the winning candidates had been  declared victorious. Thus 1177 votes were declared invalid in Bijbihera,  1806 in Wachi and 1122 in Shopian.
             [4](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn4) With  common people openly identifying with separatist politics, the farcical  nature of the electoral politics became very clear during the 1989  Parliamentary elections. Not only were there not many keen contestants  ready to fight this election, but there were also not many voters ready  to vote. For the two of three constituencies which went to poll (the  third was returned uncontested), only 5% voters cast their votes.
             [5](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn5) It  was exactly 29.64% voter turnout for the Valley of Kashmir.  Interestingly in few districts like Kupwara, Budgam and Baramulla, the  voter turnout was as high as 53.15%, 46% and 40.09% respectively. The  voter turnout in Ananntnag and Pulwama was moderate—24.05% and 23.68%  respectively. It was in the Srinagar district that the lowest  turnout—11.17%. 
             [6](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn6) That  is the reason why the National Conference, which was ousted from power  in 1984 due to the defections engineered by the Congress, not only  risked its popularity by going in for an alliance with the same party,  but also took the open position of remaining on the right side of the  ruling party of the Centre in order to stay in power. Going against its  own ideology, it even chose to side with the BJP-led NDA during the late  nineties.
             [7](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn7) Sheikh  was arrested on the suspicion that he was not happy with the Accession  of the State with India and was hobnobbing with the Americans around the  idea of independence of Kashmir. However, as Mir Qasim has revealed in  his book, he was also a victim of a local conspiracy led by his own  cabinet colleagues led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. 
             [8](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn8) The  disjuncture between the National Conference and the popular responses  was also reflected earlier, especially after the Party opted for  entering into alliance with the Congress party. The support that the  Muslim United Front enjoyed before the 1987 Assembly election was mainly  due to the disillusionment with the politics that this party was  pursuing. 
             [9](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn9) The  competitive nature of regional politics of Kashmir ultimately resulted  in deeper changes in the power politics of the State. The fragmented  verdict at the regional level and the failure of any party to obtain a  majority of seats led to the formation of a coalition government. The  important aspect of this post-2002 coalition politics is that is it  representative of both regions. Fragmented verdict during the 2002  Assembly election led to the alliance between the PDP and the Congress  and formation of their government along with few other smaller parties.  The NC emerged as the largest party with presence in all the three  regions of the state and chose to sit in opposition. This arrangement  reflected greater democratisation of the politics of the state from a  number of angles. Apart from the fact that the politics of Kashmir had  become intensely competitive and rooted in local concerns, it had, for  the first time, space for genuine opposition. The NC due to its  numerical strength could operate as an effective opposition party and  could put sufficient pressure on the ruling coalition. Meanwhile, there  was a wider base for the government with one of the coalition partners  having its support base in Kashmir region, the other in Jammu. 
             [10](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn10) Shri  Amarnath Shrine Board was formed by the government of J&K in 2000  with the purpose of managing the pilgrimage to Amarnath shrine in South  of Kashmir. During the peak of summer, the shrine attracts thousands of  pilgrims from all over India.
             [11](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn11) General  Sinha had earlier incensed many Kashmiris with a self-proclaimed agenda  of changing the ‘mindset’ in Kashmir which he set about doing by  redefining ‘Kashmiri-yat’ based essentially on its Hindu past. As  chancellor of the University of Kashmir, he patronised the Centre for  Kashmir Studies which was frequently used to propagate his views. 
             [12](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn12) After  the first phase of agitation which culminated with the revocation of  the Government Order, the agitation acquired a form in which the two  regions were placed in a completely antagonistic form. The revocation of  the Order after the mass response in Kashmir was projected as  anti-Hindu and anti-Jammu act of the state government and therefore led  to a prolonged agitation in Jammu which lasted for more than two months.  To quell the sharpened regional response in Jammu, the State government  took the decision to restore 800 *canal*  of land in Baltal to Shri Amarnath Shrin Board. This government  decision led to a fresh phase of agitation in Kashmir during which sharp  regional sentiments were expressed. Specifically, there were reactions  against the ‘economic blockade’ of Kashmir during the Jammu agitation.  So strong was the anti-Jammu response in Kashmir at that time that the  traders took a decision to severe their links with their Jammu  counterparts. 
             [13](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn13) Since  2002, when the era of coalition politics started, Jammu started having a  substantial share in power politics. That is the reason why the voices  raising the demand for a separate Jammu state were not raised and the  forces of Right were quite marginalised (this was reflected in just one  seat in favour of BJP and one for Jammu State Morcha). However during  the Amarnath agitation, the forces of Right were able to mobilise the  people from urban centres of Jammu by combining religious sentiment with  regional factor.
             [14](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn14) Though  much of the electoral discourse in Kashmir revolves around the ‘bigger  issues’ like the ideas of ‘self-government’, ‘autonomy’, there are also  issues which confront the people on routine basis. The idea of  de-militarisation of PDP, for instance, is very much located in the  problems faced by people due to the continued presence of security  forces. The ‘healing touch’ policy advocated by PDP similarly involves  the rehabilitation of people adversely affected by violence. 
             [15](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn15) The  communal polarisation of the electoral politics of the State is not  unprecedented. The 1983 Assembly elections are known to be one of the  most communally polarised elections of the State. In an intensely  contested election between the National Conference and Congress, the  Congress was able to mobilise the Hindu voters of Jammu and register its  massive victory in this region. 
             [16](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn16) With  Congress-PDP being the major partners of the coalition government, it  represented a balance of forces between Jammu and Kashmir. Congress was  having its strong base in Jammu and the PDP in Kashmir. Besides a very  effective representation of Jammu based leaders in the Ministry, there  was a system of rotation for the position of CM and Deputy CM between  the two parties and regions. For the first three years of the coalition,  the position of Chief Minister was held by Kashmir based PDP leader  Mufti Mohd Sayeed (with Mangat Ram Sharma of Congress, a leader of Jammu  holding the position of Deputy CM) and after that the position of CM  was held by Ghulam Nabi Azad, a Jammu-based Congress leader with  Muzzafar Hussain Beg of PDP holding the position of Deputy CM. Due to  the changed context of power structure, the scope of politics based on  regional discontent was somewhat restricted.
             [17](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn17) It  cannot be argued that the positive response of the Kashmiris towards  the electoral process has amounted to the decline in their separatist  sentiments. On the contrary, the assertion of the separatist sentiments,  especially since the Amarnath agitation, has become more intense. One  can see the intensity of such sentiments through the mass demonstrations  against cases of Human Rights violations. Ever since 2007, such  demonstrations have been frequently organised all over the Valley. A  glimpse of the deep-rooted separatist sentiment is also given by the  massive funeral processions of the militants killed by the security  forces. 
             [18](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn18) Though  the present phase of Kashmir separatist politics was initiated in 1989,  it was only in 1993 that the APHC was formed to give a political face  to the separatist sentiment. This sentiment was represented till that  time, by the armed militancy on the one hand and the spontaneous popular  upsurge on the other. Throughout the period of 1990, there were massive  demonstrations in Kashmir Valley. Thousands of people would march on  the streets raising the slogan of *Azadi*.  The repressive measures adopted by the state soon restrained the public  expression of the mass response, the intensity of the armed militancy,  however continued. The beginning of the decade of 1990s saw a mushroom  growth of militant organizations. Apart from Jammu Kashmir Liberation  Front (JKLF), the initiator of armed militancy in Kashmir, the Hizbul  Mujahideen, had emerged as the major militant organization having a  local support base. The Hizb, supported by Pakistan, launched soon after  its emergence a major offensive on JKLF and succeeded in eliminating  its cadres to a large extent. It was in this context of the mutual  rivalry that a need was felt to organise all the militant and separatist  groups under the banner of a single umbrella organization. The All  Party Hurriyat Conference was therefore organised in 1993. 
             [19](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn19) The  high expectations that people have from the local politicians were  demonstrated in 2007 when various agitations were launched around the  issue of opening of colleges and restructuring of the districts and  Tehsils. 
             [20](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn20) Interestingly,  there has been a strong refutation of the communal charge on the part  of the vocal middle class, media, traders and the politicians of Jammu.  Soon after the agitation, the regional dimensions of the agitation were  highlighted and the religious sentiments expressed during the agitation  were underplayed. 
             [21](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn21) Though  the seat of was officially contested by the Congress candidate, the NC  cadre of Ladakh rather than supporting him, worked for the victory of  the NC rebel candidate who was able to wrest the seat defeating the  official candidate of the alliance partners. 
             [22](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn22) In  Baramulla constituency, the NC candidate Sharif ud din Shariq won the  election by polling 203022 votes as against 138208 votes of PDP  candidate Mohammad Dilawar Mir. Sajad Gani Lone of People’s Conference  polled 65403 votes. Please elaborate on the defeat of S.G. Lone. In  Srinagar constituency, NC candidate Farooq Abdullah won the election by  polling 147075 votes as against 116793 of Moulvi Iftikhar Ansari of PDP.  In Anantnag constituency, Mirza Mehboob Beg won the election by polling  148317 votes as against 143093 votes polled by PDP candidate, Peer  Mohd. Hussain. 
             [23](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn23) In  Udhampur constituency, the Congress candidate, Ch. Lal Singh won the  election by polling 2318153 won the seat by defeating BJP candidate Dr.  Nirmal Singh who polled 218459 votes. In Jammu constituency, the  Congress candidate, Madan Lal Sharma won the election by polling 382305  votes as against 260932 votes polled by his nearest rival, Leela Karan  Sharma of BJP. 
             [24](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn24) However,  the effect of the mobilization by the BJP does not seem to be lasting.  Though it could get a large number of votes from Hindus (exceeding its  hold from 11 Assembly segments to 13), it failed to get the advantage of  winning the seats as it had in 1998 and 1999. It could not get all the  Hindu votes of the region. The Congress could get a substantial number  of Hindu votes. (The NC-Congress combine also gained in the region—with  lead in 21 Assembly segments as compared to victory in 19 seats during  2008 Assembly elections).
             [25](http://samaj.revues.org/2785#bodyftn25) The  opposition to Leelakaran’s candidature came from within the party on  the ground that he was seen as an outsider who had not been associated  with the politics of BJP in any form.

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References

             **Electronic reference**

              **Rekha Chowdhary**, « Electoral  Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An  Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir », *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal* [Online], 3 | 2009, Online since 24 November 2009, connection on 07 December 2014. URL : [Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir](http://samaj.revues.org/2785)

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About the author

             **[Rekha Chowdhary](http://samaj.revues.org/2786)**

             University of Jammu, Department of Political Science

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Copyright

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
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                  Electronic ISSN 1

nikhil25 · December 7, 2014, 5:04pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

thinking about the possible outcomes of a plebiscite is an interesting exercise. only 10-12% of the undivided state's territory is populated by people that prefer a change to the status quo. that territory is something like 2/3rds of the valley. the twist is that it's the most densely populated part of the entire state which means they could reasonably approach 51% of the entire state's population in a plebiscite.

unfortunately for them there is a 0.00% chance that a handful of tehsils in the valley are going to determine the fate of the remaining 90% of the state's territory populated by people prefer the status quo. as a result the only conceivable scenario resulting in independence is the secession of only this tiny isolated sliver of the state. i wonder how many of those voters would prefer that outcome if they knew in advance that the new nation would be limited to their tehsils, creating one of the tiniest self-insufficient nations on earth.

with that said i think it should still be up to them to decide - just pointing out that many people have an unrealistic view of what the possible outcomes could be.

Samir_Mirchandani · December 7, 2014, 5:24pm

Re: Recod turn-our in J&K polls..

why is voting in numbers not acceptance? It is a globally accepted fact that exercise of ones rights is just that - acceptance of the franchise. If you think about the psychological aspects - if someone is rejecting something they will have nothing to do with it voluntarily. Here we have them voting in great numbers. And as you point out, not just this election but in prior ones as well.

The only non-acceptance is of these facts from people who do not want to admit that Pakistan's decades of proxy war and claims on Kashmir have been utterly defeated and rejected in Kashmir.