Iraq is more feeble than the last time despite all the BS about WMD, so it looks like a fairly good outlook if things got to plan:
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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,174-504308,00.html
December 06, 2002
Swift work in Iraq would boost the US economy
Foreign Briefing by Richard Lambert
THE conflict with Iraq and the war against terrorism have cast a shadow of uncertainty over the US economy that is unlikely to be cleared up any time soon.
The outcome of any campaign is not in doubt, given America’s astonishing military superiority over the rest of the world. And the enormous size of the US economy means that it can comfortably finance military spending on a scale that would bankrupt other nations.
But there are very different economic scenarios for the consequences of war, depending on the scale and duration of the struggle. At one extreme, it is possible that a quick victory over Iraq would actually leave the US economy growing rather more rapidly than it would if there were no war at all, thanks in good measure to the boost in business and consumer confidence that could be expected once this uncertainty was resolved.
At the other extreme, a prolonged campaign that led to general disarray in the Middle East and a much higher oil price would bring a sharp recession along with higher inflation and unemployment. Another terrorist attack on American soil could have similar consequences.
There are a fair number of clues to the direct costs of a war in Iraq. A starting point is the first Gulf War, which cost roughly $80 billion (£51 billion) in today’s money. A study by the Democratic staff of the House Budget Committee in September suggested that the figure might be rather lower this time.
For its part, the Congressional Budget Office has said that it could cost up to $13 billion to get troops into position, another $6 billion to $9 billion a month to run the war, and up to $7 billion to return US forces to their bases.
Depending on the length of the campaign, that could imply a broadly similar figure.
A rather higher estimate came in what appears to have been an unguarded comment by Larry Lindsey, head of the White House’s National Economic Council, who in September projected what he called the upper bound of war costs at between 1 and 2 per cent of US gross domestic product, or very roughly $100 billion and $200 billion.
All this fits in with a recent remark by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, who said: “I would be very doubtful if the impact on the economy is more than modest, largely because this is not Vietnam or Korea. Korea . . . had a really monumental effect, because the economy was so much smaller.”
At this point the complications start. The numbers could be much higher if the campaign is longer and rougher than is now expected.
Other enormous variables include the amount that will be spent on reconstruction and nation building, and the extent to which the costs will be shared between America and its allies.
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington has produced three possible scenarios to help to address these questions.
In the benign case, to which it attaches a 40 to 60 per cent probability, Saddam Hussein is removed with little collateral damage and Saudi Arabia increases oil production to offset any temporary shortfall in Iraqi output. The result would be a slightly faster rate of growth in the US economy than if there were no war at all.
The worst-case outcome, which has a 5 to 10 per cent probability, is very different. There is protracted military resistance in Iraq and significant damage to oilfields in the region. Iraq uses terrible weapons against Israel and the allies and there is widespread hostility throughout the region.
In this case, the price of oil could shoot up to $80 a barrel and stay up at about $40 for several years. The growth rate in the US would slow by 4.5 percentage points compared to a no-war case, and the economy would slip into a recession.
Splitting the difference, the centre outlines what it calls an intermediate war scenario, with a 30 to 40 per cent probability. This would lead to a decline in business and consumer confidence that would slow US growth by just under 2 percentage points.
A pessimistic analysis by the Yale economist William D. Nordhaus produces numbers that are quite close to this worst-case outcome. In his figures, the direct cost of military spending is multiplied several times over by the much greater follow-on costs of occupation and peacekeeping, reconstruction and nation building, and by the macroeconomic impact of higher oil prices and falling business and consumer confidence. A protracted conflict, he suggests, would bring output losses equivalent to between 2 to 5 per cent of GDP, and tip the US into a recession on the scale of that which followed the first Gulf war.
If the economic consequences of a war against Iraq are unpredictable, those of the war against terrorism are even more so.
This is because they will be largely determined by something that is absolutely unknowable — the shape and timing of any future terrorist attacks on America and its allies.
It is not so much the direct costs of any such attack that are a concern, grave though they may be. Rather, it is the possible impact on confidence in the West and, potentially even more serious, the likely reaction of the US to any further terrorist outrage.
For example, America’s ports are widely seen to be vulnerable to attack. If a weapon of mass destruction were concealed in a container and exploded in a port, the US might feel obliged to close down its sea transport system for a period.
A stoppage that lasted for more than a week or two could result in gridlock for much of the world’s commerce. How likely is such an attack? In a document that it declassified in October, the CIA suggested that if Saddam had his back to the wall there was a distinct likelihood that he would try to attack America with chemical or biological weapons.
Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, believes that the most urgent unaddressed national security threat to both America and Russia is a nuclear terrorist attack (although not from Iraq).
The US is a resilient and powerful nation, which is well capable of sustaining a protracted struggle against terrorism, and which can treat shocks that might cripple weaker countries as little more than a bump in the road.
Some of these worries are already being discounted by the financial markets and reflected in business conditions today: share prices would be higher than they are without these concerns and the oil price would be lower.
But uncertainty is going to be a burden for the US economy, and so for the world, for some while to come.