Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
They are not smiles, lol, they are rotfl. 
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
I have to go now seriously. I thorughly enjoyed the discussion, article and the knowledge transfer. Hope we discuss more topics in the future and have rotfl fun like we had today, isnt it?
See u later, KANK lol.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
Please do tell us what is “lost victories” and “tea party at Lahore Gymkhana” LOL…is it reverse of vijay or vajoos aar paar ki larai.. LMAO… I have more vijays for you whenever you ready. 
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
Now I know why Indians never lost to Pakis or Chini.s. 
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
Why you are getting unneccasry insults for the mistakes done by your marshall law dictators.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
facts are not insults and stop hiding behind muslim names for once and come out in the open..don’t be ashmed of your history…
Either way read on and enjoy..
What did you do in the war, daddy?
Dangers of military myths
The official history confirms another great failing of the 1965 war, the inability of the Indian Air Force to provide a decisive edge on the battlefield or even match up to the Pakistanis
In a society where even the writing of ancient history is so politically contentious, it is difficult to expect a realistic appreciation of fairly recent wars. Culturally, we also confuse military science with soldierly heroism. We can spend all our time extolling our troops for the courage they showed in Kargil but avoid talking about what got them in such a near-impossible war in the first place. Even with our bigger wars, propaganda myths created in the course of the engagements are then perpetuated for decades. In the 22-day war in 1965,** for example, as schoolchildren we were taught that the Pakistani pilots were so scared of the tiny Gnat that they fled the moment they spotted one. ** That it was because the then army chief, General J.N. Chowdhary, was such a world-famous hot-shot in tank warfare that the Pakistani armour came unstuck at Khem Karan and other graveyards of the Patton. That Lahore and Sialkot were almost sure to be in our bag if the war had gone on a few more days.
That is why it is refreshing that India’s own official history of the country’s first full-fledged modern war has been written with a degree of detachment. It confirms several widely held beliefs in the strategic community and described in the many books on that war. In India, the official history has followed close after the release of In the Line of Duty: A Soldier Remembers, the autobiography of ** Lt Gen Harbakhsh Singh, one of our tallest generals ever, professionally and physically, at 6-ft-2. As the western army commander during the 1965 war (there was no northern command then), he also led the operations in Kashmir and therefore controlled the entire war.
His revelations, read with his earlier War Despatches and now authenticated by the official history, are devastating. It is, for example, now confirmed that not only did Gen Chowdhury play a very small role in the entire campaign, he was so nervous as to be on the verge of losing half of Punjab to Pakistan, including the city of Amritsar. Harbakhsh describes, in clinical detail, how our own offensive in the Lahore sector had come unhinged. The general commanding the division on Ichchogil canal fled in panic, leaving his jeep, its wireless running and the briefcase containing sensitive documents that were then routinely read on Radio Pakistan during the war. Singh wanted to court martial him, Chowdhury let him get away with resignation.
But a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumour – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan. ** Singh describes the conversation with Chowdhury at Ambala where he refused to carry out the order, asking his chief to either put it down in writing or visit the front and take charge of the battle. Chowdhury waffled even on that panicky decision, Singh’s artillery and some rag-tag armour lured the Pattons into soggy ground on a moonlit night and the result was the greatest escape to victory in our post-Independence military history. What was to be a spectacular Pakistani breakthrough right up
to Panipat became a great rout of its armour.
** The official history confirms not just this but also another great failing of that war, the inability of the Indian Air Force to not only provide a decisive edge on the battlefield but to even match up to the Pakistanis. It did not participate in any of the big battles. Many of its attacks were casual, half-hearted, even suicidal, as the decision of opening the campaign with four Vampires, one of history’s first jets, made of plywood, to block the Pakistani advance in Chhamb. All four were shot, and IAF opened the campaign with a 0-4 deficit. Then followed a bizarre story of no communication between the army and the air force. The army apparently thought it could sort out the Pakistanis by itself. The air force thought it was fighting a war exclusively with the PAF. **
There was evidently too little communication between the army, air force and the political leadership. The IAF, for example, was told to stay back in the hangars in the eastern sector even when the PAF launched withering attacks on Kalaikunda and Bagdogra. Even after the disastrous Chhamb engagement, the IAF was so casual as to leave a whole bunch of frontline aircraft exposed at Pathankot, within minutes of flying time from PAF bases, and the result was another disaster in a raid at dusk. The Pakistanis seemed to have such a free run they even shot down the Dakota carrying the then chief minister of Gujarat, Balwant Rai Mehta, deep inside our territory, at night.
** Many of us have read with great resentment and scepticism claims of writers like former PAF chief Air Marshall Asghar Khan (India-Pakistan War: The First Round) and British writer John Fricker who give Pakistan a TKO victory in the 1965 air war. :k: Fricker, in particular, gave these claims international currency with his controversial article, ‘30 Seconds over Sargodha’, which described ‘‘how’’ a PAF pilot shot down four Indian Hunters in 30 seconds over the Sargodha airbase. These claims are highly inflated. But the fact remains that in 1965 the IAF failed to tilt the balance in any theatre of the war. ** Singh says the IAF was simply not prepared for war, physically or mentally. The IAF commanders from that period, including the then chief Arjan Singh, say the army never kept them in the loop. But the fact is that all of them, even the eastern and western command chiefs, were decorated after the war. There were no questions asked.
** There weren’t any asked elsewhere either. Every single army general even remotely connected with the war effort was decorated, including the Strike Corps commander in the Sialkot sector who did not cover five miles in 15 days. Chowdhury himself was cast as some kind of a swadeshi Rommel, though he never got within shouting distance of the war. And even the then naval chief was decorated though his fleet remained firmly in harbour, failing to stir out even after the Pakistanis cockily pounded Dwarka. **
The dangers in perpetuating mythologies built during a war into a kind of instant military history are obvious. It is impossible to first generously lionise and decorate people and to then hold them accountable for what they did wrong during a war. We obviously learnt some lessons from these in 1965 and the result was a decisive, premeditated campaign and victory in 1971. The key to that lightning campaign was total understanding between the army and the IAF. But if you look back on the way we once again rushed to hand out decorations post-Kargil and how closed we still are to the idea of finding out how on earth we let so many Pakistanis get so well entrenched on so much territory for so long, you wonder if the lessons of 1965 are so thoroughly forgotten that we are willing to make the same mistakes again.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
Thats the only thing you can do at the end. ( of course after lot of cut & paste)
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Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
First remove your burqa then stick to the topic instead of beat around the bush..
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
You will never ever able to prove that Piakistan is more stronger than India and it was not beaten and thrashed in all four wars it started.
You can keep calling me kafir, you are responsible for this, nobody else.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
My my my oh my, what else they teach in Indian schools, you kicked Shri Baburs ass all the way to Ferghana and ended up ruling Uzbik ass for 350 years…
P.S: Your rangeen burqa speaks volumes..
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
tahir bhai ..actually these people cannot see an indian muslim praising indian army.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
No, we are taught Shimla agreement, Niazi signing some docs, Nawaz in NY on 4th July, Pak giving some kind of support to Kashmiris behind burqa.
Your ps was right guess, now you know the world of diff between you & me.
P.S: Your rangeen burqa speaks volumes..
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
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Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
I am sure they also teach you about Chai party at Lahore GymKhana, Sand Dunes of Run of Kutch and Hindi-Chini Bahen-Bhai of Zhou Enlai..NO?
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
yess.. I remember that
ahh man.. that was a classic
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
This is how Indians achieve vijay after vijay, this excerpt is straight from their own official report.
Every single army general even remotely connected with the war effort was decorated, including the Strike Corps commander in the Sialkot sector who did not cover five miles in 15 days. Chowdhury himself was cast as some kind of a swadeshi Rommel, though he never got within shouting distance of the war. And even the then naval chief was decorated though his fleet remained firmly in harbour, failing to stir out even after the Pakistanis cockily pounded Dwarka.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
Well well well, see what is our lil cute friend Abdali is saying here :) .
Duniya jale to jale, tum na jalo....
haar bhi jao agar, par haath na malo...
Gymkhana: I agree the ceasefire did not let us organize the tea party at Gymkhana, it became a joke just like the 4:1 superior pakistani soldiers :) .
But tujhe to shukraguzaar hona chahiye khuda ka, agar tea party hoti gymkhana me to abdali naam ka koi banda kisi ghar me safai ka kaam kar raha hota India mein.
I do not know about the sand dunes of kutch, please provide details with reference (not like the last article, where you did not provide references :) )
India China war: We lost the war. Period. But what puzzles me is that do pakistanis have any chinese blood in their veins which make them claim the chinese victory as theirs. Oh I know now, thats the only war they know where India lost.
Grow up, mard ban and stop denying the facts, learn from me.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
Well in my opinion the 1965 war was a stalemate. However, be it liberating Bangladesh in '71, capturing Siachen glacier in 1984 and finally in Kargil, Indian Army achieved all its goals.
From Mr. Ayaz Amir’s column :
Despite its huge army, Pakistan has shown itself incapable of fighting a war for longer than 15 days. Barely halfway through the 1965 war Pakistan’s straw field marshal, Ayub Khan, had had enough. He was desperate for a ceasefire. In 1971 Gen Yahya and his generals fought a 17-day war and managed to lose half the country.
In 1999 the architects of Kargil – as choice a bunch of military geniuses as any produced by the Pakistan army – thought they were walking in the footsteps of Rommel and Manstein. They soon realized they had bitten off more than they could chew. Desperate for a way out, they urged then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to rush to Washington to seek a face-saving withdrawal.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
Facts like these
** Every single army general even remotely connected with the war effort was decorated, including the Strike Corps commander in the Sialkot sector who did not cover five miles in 15 days. Chowdhury himself was cast as some kind of a swadeshi Rommel, though he never got within shouting distance of the war. And even the then naval chief was decorated though his fleet remained firmly in harbour, failing to stir out even after the Pakistanis cockily pounded Dwarka **
Or facts like these, This is what you are taught in your schools..
** for example, as schoolchildren we were taught that the Pakistani pilots were so scared of the tiny Gnat that they fled the moment they spotted one. That it was because the then army chief, General J.N. Chowdhary, was such a world-famous hot-shot in tank warfare **
You never lost to Chini Bhai, how is that possible when these was only 9 chini for one hindi, isn’t that cheating? Should have been the other way round..
Here is another Vijay the Rann of Kutch Vijay, don’t be surprised they don’t teach such Vijays in Indian schools…
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1965.stm
** In April 1965, a clash between border patrols erupted into fighting in the Rann of Kutch, a sparsely inhabited region along the south-western Indo-Pakistani border. When the Indians withdrew, Pakistan claimed victory. **
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iftikhar_Janjua
In April 1965 using the excuse of a tri-service exercise (Arrow Head), the Indians brought in 31 and 67 Infantry Brigades in area Karim Shahi - Kavda. The IAF and the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant, supported by other navel vessels, also moved into the gulf. On 8/9 April, the Indians attacked the Pakistan post at Ding (Rann of Kutch) without any provocation. Pakistan Rangers acted to repel the aggression.
The Pakistani Government then decided to use force to evict the Indian para-military troops from Sardar Post and Biarbet. General Musa in reported to have stated “the Indians cannot challenge the Pakistan army and get away with it”.
On 23 April Brigadier Iftikhar Janjua, known for his boldness and one who inspired confidence among his men by being well up in front during the heat of the battle, ordered 4 Punjab to capture point 84 by first activity around Chad bet. Since the progress of 6 Punjab was slow 2 frontier force was directed to join them. By first light the battalion reached it’s objective without suffering too many casualties. 2 Frontier Force later attacked Biar Bet along with a squadron of 12 Cavalry. Biar Bet was captured by 0600 hours 26 April.
** The task of evicting the enemy from Pakistan territory was achieved. Speaking at the United Nations on 28 April the then foreign minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, informed the members that on 18 April, when it became clear that India planned to occupy the entire Rann of Kutch, Pakistan’s forces acted in self defence and restored the situation.
The outcome of the Runn Kutch test of strength was very positive for the Pakistan Army. As described by Gul Hassan Khan, then Director of Military Operations, in his later memoirs - "“the set back in Kutch proved immeasurably disconcerting to the Indian army. As a result the Government of India was in a quandary. On the other hand, ours was in a state of euphoria. The high command of our army was intoxicated by our showing and our morale could not possibly have been higher. We were ready for any task that may be assigned to us without any question.”[1] **
Iftikhar Khan Janjua Road in Rawalpindi, the location of the Pakistan Army Museum[2], is named in his honour.
General Iftikhar Janjua belonged to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.
Re: Musharraf threatens Hindustan (days after building more bases near LOC)
The endless list of Indian vijays, here is another :D
But a bigger disaster struck a bit to the south where the other division cracked up in assault, just as it encountered a bit of resistance. Several infantry battalions, short on battle inoculation, deserted and Singh gives a hair-raising account – and confirmation of a long-debated rumour – that Chowdhury panicked so badly he ordered him to withdraw to a new defensive line behind the Beas, thereby conceding half of Punjab to Pakistan