If Pakistan ever disintegrates you know who to blame.
Winds blow Pakistan; U.S. shivers – chicagotribune.com
Winds blow Pakistan; U.S. shivers
Ally’s struggles cause dilemma for Washington
By Bay Fang | Washington Bureau
August 3, 2008
WASHINGTON — When Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani appeared before the Council on Foreign Relations last week on his maiden trip to Washington, he underlined Pakistan’s commitment to the war on terror by saying, “This is not Charlie Wilson’s war. This is Benazir Bhutto’s war.”
While that line referring to a movie and the assassinated Pakistani political leader drew applause, many in the audience reacted afterward with surprise to Gilani’s difficulty answering many of the questions that followed. His stumbles reinforced concerns in Washington that Pakistan, with its crucial role at the center of the fight against terrorism, has neither a stable government nor a unified strategy for dealing with militants within its borders.
President Pervez Musharraf has been sidelined, but no strong leader has emerged to replace him. The Pakistani military, the most powerful force in the country, is waiting in the wings. And the administration of President George W. Bush, which for many years focused its Pakistan strategy around Musharraf’s leadership, is struggling with how to react.
The dilemma for Washington has been heightened by U.S. officials’ reported suspicions that Pakistan’s powerful intelligence service, ISI, was involved in a July suicide bombing of the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan. Pakistan has denied a connection to the bombing, though a government spokeswoman conceded Friday that “individuals” within the spy agency might be sympathetic to the militants and that Pakistan needs to “weed them out.”
Wary about military
Administration officials worry that Pakistan’s government does not have enough control over the military or ISI to take action against the militant extremists who populate the country’s lawless regions near the Afghan border. “The problem seems to be growing faster than they can handle,” a senior administration official said on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.
The Bush administration has privately urged the Gilani government to try to convince its coalition partners, and Pakistan’s increasingly anti-American population, of the need to turn their focus from historic rival India toward the militancy on Pakistan’s western border.
Pakistani officials say they’re doing their best, and that the new government is still dealing with the fallout from Musharraf’s heavy-handed rule.
“It is very clear that the [Bush] administration wants to work with the democratic government, and Congress is very welcoming,” said Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. “At the same time, not everyone in Washington fully understands that there has been a major change in Pakistan, and the new government has inherited several issues from the previous regime.”
One of these residual problems is that the weak civilian government cannot dictate to the military. The military, under the new control of Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, has been keeping out of politics.
“The military is just waiting around, giving the civilian government enough rope to hang itself,” said Marvin Weinbaum, a Pakistan and Afghanistan scholar at the Middle East Institute. “The U.S. wants to strengthen the government, but knows full well that it’s going to be the military that will have to confront the militants.”
Because of this, the Bush administration not only completed delivery of 14 F-16 jet fighters to the Pakistan air force the day Gilani arrived in Washington, but also promised to shift more than $200 million in counter-terrorism funds to upgrade the country’s fleet of F-16s. Key Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee argued that the shift might help Pakistan counter India but would not help against the Taliban or Al Qaeda.
Seeking allies within ally
At the same time, the U.S. has been hedging its bets, warning that it might take unilateral military action against militants if the Pakistani military fails to come through. Hours before Gilani’s visit, a missile strike in the tribal region of South Waziristan, suspected to be the work of a U.S. Predator drone, was reported to have killed an Al Qaeda weapons expert.
But too many such strikes could further alienate an already suspicious Pakistani public and provoke a reaction from the military.
“It’s one thing to bomb a country that we don’t need,” said Christine Fair, a political scientist at RAND Corp. “But if we’re going to keep bombing Pakistan, we need a wider strategy.”
Analysts say it remains unclear whom the U.S. should work with. On the eve of Gilani’s visit, the government announced that the ISI would come under the control of the Ministry of Interior, an apparent gesture to the U.S. that Pakistan was tightening civilian oversight of the military. But that decision was quickly—and embarrassingly—reversed by military and intelligence officials.
“The ISI has always been somewhat of a problem, but now, without a powerful president, individuals already inclined to cause trouble now have freer rein to do it,” said Dan Markey, a South Asia specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Some Pakistan-watchers wonder whether the divided civilian government will survive through the end of the year. Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, head of one of the parties in the governing coalition, has threatened to pull his party out, mainly due to differences over restoring judges that Musharraf sacked last year.
Eyeing aid
The collapse of the government would make it significantly more difficult to pass an aid bill sponsored by Sens. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). That plan, co-sponsored by Sen. Barack Obama, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, seeks to triple non-military aid to Pakistan over the next five years, while conditioning military aid on certification of Pakistani counter-terrorism efforts.
The Bush administration, which has sent Pakistan more than $11 billion in military and humanitarian aid since 2001, has reacted to the bill with what one congressional staffer called “half-hearted acceptance.”
At Gilani’s Council on Foreign Relations appearance, one of the exchanges that provoked audience guffaws involved a question about how the government could better control the restive tribal area along the Afghanistan border.
Gilani replied that the area was already under the federal government, and that all the area’s senators actually support him.
Council president Richard Haass replied dryly, “Well, we wish you well with that.”