Should Pakistan be worried about the cosy relationship between Iran and India. Iranian newspapers and websites including the official IRNA website has given prominent coverage to Khatami’s visit to India. Pakistan is also worried about good relationship between Kabul and New Delhi.
India-Iran pact: new dangers for Pakistan
According to unconfirmed Indian reports, an accord signed between India and Iran on January 19 will allow New Delhi to use Iranian military bases in the event of a war with Pakistan. The agreement will also boost Indian armament exports to Iran and base Indian intelligence, security and military experts in Iran to train their Iranian counterparts. Appropriately, the “strategic alliance” came just days ahead of the January 26 visit to India of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. What should Pakistan make of this?
One thing is clear: If Iran were to actually allow India use of its (Iran’s) military bases in the event of an India-Pakistan war, it would be considered a hostile act on the part of Tehran. That is perhaps why Pakistan’s Foreign Office has rubbished such reports, pointing out it is inconceivable that Iran would do anything of the sort. Apparently, when President Khatami visited Pakistan recently, he was at pains to establish good neighbourly relations with Pakistan and gave many assurances in this regard.
But one needs to go beyond the “if there is a war” scenario to discuss the implications of the budding new military cooperation agreement between India and Iran. The fact is that to all intents and purposes, India and Pakistan are already at “war”. Given the changing dynamics of conflict, as well as the nuclear capabilities on both sides, “war” (or more appropriately covert operations) is now being conducted at multiple levels, including at the sub-conventional level. This means that any Indian presence on Iranian military bases, even if it is for training the Iranians, would theoretically allow New Delhi a more subtle “operational” use of such facilities: early warning, intelligence gathering, and even, conceivably planning and monitoring terrorist attacks on Pakistan. That India has already set up such bases in Afghanistan is now an open secret. Therefore it would make sense for it to link its presence in Iran with similar “training bases” in Afghanistan to “encircle” Pakistan. An Indian military presence in Iran with or without strike capability would enable India in the event of war with Pakistan to create a “holding threat” along its western borders.
India has been making overtures to Iran for a few years now. Indeed, Indian leverage with Iran has steadily grown with the souring of ties between Pakistan and Iran. How have Pakistan and Iran come to this pass – Iran, from basing Pakistani aircraft in 1965 and 1971 to allowing India access to its bases with potentially hostile intent towards Pakistan? Ironically, this situation is the product of Pakistan’s policy to avoid a two-front situation. That policy, woven around Afghanistan, set Pakistan on the path of conflict with Iran. The situation was exacerbated not only by events inside Pakistan – sectarian conflict – but also because of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
Fortunately, though, Iran is unlikely to signal overt hostility towards Islamabad. There is a complex array of domestic factors that makes it very difficult to define Iran at this stage. The real Iran is still unfolding. This is why the US is having such difficulty in formulating a viable Iran policy. Also, Iranian support for the Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah militia and the PLO makes it the number one threat for Israel in the “outer circle”. But over the last three years, Israel has become the second largest exporter of weapons to India and India-Israel co-operation continues to grow. India is also eager to be a “strategic partner” of the United States. But the US does not look kindly at Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear-weapons capability. Similarly, Iran cannot resolve Afghanistan with India: whenever that happens, geographic constraints dictate that it will have to resolve it with Pakistan.
In the event, both India and Iran will have to juggle quite a few balls to be able to make this so-called “strategic alliance” work. But there may be openings here for both. India seems embarked on a policy that keeps its regional security requirements separate from its aspirations beyond the region, though there is a dialectic between the two strands at least as far as India’s relations with the US and its hostility towards Pakistan are concerned. Also, to say that it is absolutely impossible for India to court Iran while trying to woo the US is not right. During the Cold War, Pakistan managed to keep strategic partnerships with both China and the United States. In the end, it was in a position to actually serve as a bridge between the two. India could conceivably play the same role between Iran and the US, especially if internal struggles in Iran begin to shape up in favour of the reformists.
Therefore the situation certainly poses a danger to Pakistan. A clear Indian military presence in Iran would require Islamabad to seriously review its regional policy not just with Afghanistan but also with Iran and India. Unfortunately, however, we see no signs of this taking place in Islamabad. In fact, no one is even asking questions of those who supported the way our intelligence agencies conducted the Afghan policy for over a decade or shrugged off the need to have a friendly Iran on our western borders
India-Iran pact: new dangers for Pakistan
Iranian media
http://www.tehrantimes.com/Description.asp?Da=1/28/03&Cat=2&Num=019
indian, Iranian Defense Ministers Meet in New Delhi
http://www.tehrantimes.com/Detailview.asp?Keyword=india&Da=1/28/03&Cat=2&Num=2
