General A. K. Niazi passes away.
General Niazi, who passed away on Monday, spoke to India Abroad -- the
largest circulated Indian-American newspaper, which is owned by
rediff.com -- in December 2001. A rare interview conducted by Amir
Mir.
Q. The release of the Hamoodur Commission report has generated a fresh
debate, with the public endorsing the recommendation for action
against those army officers responsible for the 1971 debacle. How do
you react?
A. I agree with the general public's demand that those responsible for
the East Pakistan crisis, especially the uniformed ones, should have
been punished. Having returned to Pakistan after the debacle, I
volunteered to face court-martial proceedings. But my offer was denied
by the then army chief, Tikka Khan. He did not want the Pandora's Box
to be reopened. Any such action could have exposed the general
headquarters' inept conduct of war and Tikka's role as army reserve
commander. As a matter of fact, we were denied the right to
self-defense before the Hamoodur Rehman Commission, which would not
have been denied in a court-martial.
Under the Pakistan Army Act, you can cross-examine and call a witness
in your support, especially when your character and reputation are at
stake. Since such an opportunity would have exposed the GHQ's own
weaknesses, we were never court-martialed. Even otherwise, had there
been a court-martial, I would have been exonerated quite easily. The
commission had agreed with my contention that the orders for surrender
were given to me by President Agha Yahya Khan.
Q. You say the commission had agreed with your contention that the
surrender orders were given by President Yahya Khan. But the report
released by the Musharraf regime holds you and a few other generals
responsible for the debacle.
A. If I was responsible for such a big tragedy, why was I not
court-martialed, although Tikka was out to damage me? Being the army
chief, Tikka cancelled two squares of borderland allotted to me in
Kasur. In his January 1991 statement published in an English daily,
Tikka had stated: 'We even did not find any potential material against
Lt Gen A A K Niazi, who surrendered to the Indian Commander, Lt Gen
Jagjit Singh Aurora, because he had permission to surrender from Yahya
Khan. But we did not take him back in the army and through an
administrative action, retired him with normal benefits.'
Q. You mean to say then President Yahya Khan was solely responsible
for the fall of Dhaka and you were just following his orders?
A. No. Besides Yahya Khan, there were a few more personalities equally
responsible for the East Pakistan crisis who have not been blamed in
the report. The commission did not unravel the whole truth about
various personalities and factors, which fuelled the separatist
movement in East Pakistan and caused the final break-up of Jinnah's
united Pakistan.
The report concludes there was no order to surrender. However, 'in
view of the desperate picture' painted by you [being the commander of
the Eastern Command], the higher authorities only gave you a consent
to surrender, and that too, only if necessary. The report says that
you could have disobeyed such an order if you thought you could defend
Dhaka.
I swear on oath that I was given clear-cut orders from Yahya to
surrender, but still I was determined to fight till the end. I even
sent a message that my decision to fight till the end stands. However,
General Abdul Hamid Khan and Air Chief Marshal Rahim rang me up,
ordering me to act on the GHQ signal of December 14, 1971 because West
Pakistan was in danger. It was at this stage that I was asked to agree
on a cease-fire so that the safety of the troops could be ensured.
However, I still believe that had a counter-offensive been launched by
the Pakistan Army Reserves, composed of two armored and three infantry
divisions, Pakistan would have remained united and the war results
would have been much different.
Q. What do you say about the commission's findings that your troops in
East Pakistan indulged in loot, arson, rape and killings?
A. Immediately after taking command in East Pakistan, I heard numerous
reports of troops indulging in loot and arson, killing people at
random and without reason in areas cleared of anti-state elements.
Realizing the gravity of the situation, I approached my bosses through
a letter dated April 15, 1971, informing them of the mess being
created. I clearly wrote in my letter that there have been reports of
rapes and even the West Pakistanis are not being spared. I informed my
seniors that even officers have been suspected of indulging in this
shameful activity.
However, despite repeated warnings and instructions, the respective
commanders failed to curb this alarming state of indiscipline. And
this trend definitely undermined our troops' battle efficiency.
Q. How do you justify your failure as a military commander and do you
accept responsibility for the Pakistan army's humiliating surrender in
East Pakistan?
A. Our 45,000 troops were fighting against half a million Indian
troops, lakhs of Mukti Bahinis (Bengali freedom fighters supported by
India) and a hostile Bengali population. I actually needed around
300,000 troops to simply combat insurgency. By that time, we were
already cut from the base but still fighting without any respite.
If Hamood thought we were on a picnic, he should have joined us. Let
me make it clear that the army fought bravely under my command in East
Pakistan. However, it was an unabated power struggle, which finally
led to the 1971 debacle, especially when the barrel of the gun blocked
the transfer of power.
The 1971 imbroglio was the outcome of an unabated struggle for power
between Yahya, Mujib (founder of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur
Rehman) and Bhutto (former Pakistan prime minister, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto). Yahya wanted to retain power while Bhutto wanted to attain
it. This was despite the fact that Sheikh Mujib's Awami League had
emerged victorious and he should have been handed over the government.
Bhutto's fiery speeches were not mere rhetoric, but the actions of a
desperate man vying for power at any cost. Had power been transferred
to Mujib, Pakistan would have remained united. However, it is pity
that the commission absolved Bhutto of any blame.