Re: Consensus & The Dam
Here is a good discussion about the topic. Dams are part of the infrastructure of any society or country. They have to be built even when there is opposition. The same thing is true with roads, bridges, electric line towers etc. Every country goes through the tough negotiations and some time long litigations, and Pakistan is no exception. However a project like this cannot be blocked forever. I say build the darned thing called KBD and then move on to build the Bhasha dam.
EDITORIAL: KBD: now or never
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2005\12\13\story_13-12-2005_pg3_1
Talking to journalists in Karachi on Sunday, General Pervez Musharraf indicated that the government will go ahead with the construction of Kalabagh Dam whether or not it can get a national consensus on it. This is the first indication that General Musharraf has tired of efforts of the past three years to get the smaller provinces, especially Sindh and NWFP, to fall in line and accept the logic of technical parameters for the feasibility of the project rather than putting it into a political straitjacket.
To be fair to General Musharraf, he still wants a consensus. “Consensus is very important. But sometimes you don’t get a complete consensus because of a variety of reasons.” This is why he was speaking to Sindhi intellectuals and newspaper editors and reporters. However, as he has said repeatedly, building large and small dams, as well as canals, is a necessity that can no longer afford the luxury of procrastination. The country has not built a large dam in the past 30 years and is currently facing a shortage of nine million acre feet of water. “This shortage,” as General Musharraf said, “will enormously compound in the coming years and only the construction of big dams like Kalabagh can help us cope with the situation.”
The KBD issue has been hanging fire for more than three decades. Successive governments have tried to pick it up only to drop it when it got hot. General Musharraf, too, has been testing its temperature for the last three years. But it appears that he is now prepared to take the heat and go right ahead with what needs to be done. As we have previously noted, this is the best option available. If the government is convinced that it can’t do without KBD, it should not let the opportunity slip by. And if it can’t take the heat, it should drop the issue once and for all.
However, having settled for the difficult option in the short-term for the larger benefit of the country in the longer-term, General Musharraf should realise that KBD cannot be treated in a vacuum. He may go ahead with the project — and he should — but equally he must appreciate the imperative of creating an atmosphere of trust. The polarisation in Islamabad, which consequently cuts vertically through the entire country, is not conducive to undertaking highly controversial projects. General Musharraf is in Quetta even as one Baloch sardar, Nawab Akbar Bugti, has declared that the federal government has started a mini-military operation in the province. Mr Bugti’s statement comes on the heels of the indictment of his grandson for alleged involvement in the bombing of the PIDC building in Karachi. The two Baloch suspects have reportedly told the police that they were assigned the job by Mr Bugti’s grandson. Mr Bugti has, of course, rejected the claim and said that his grandson is being framed by the federal government for political reasons. We mention this for two reasons: in a country where even a criminal case can take a political colouring, constructing KBD won’t be an easy task; secondly, the incident evinces the distrust that exists at all levels of governance.
Even the ruling League is not a united house. There is now a forward bloc in that party. It may not become an immediate problem for the system, but come 2007 it could begin to hurt. The ruling League’s allies are unhappy with it and they too are unlikely to resist the temptation of drawing blood when they get the opportunity. General Musharraf has so far thrived on the disunity among the political classes, mediating and balancing to retain his and the army’s primary position in the polity. But this tactical necessity runs contrary to General Musharraf’s own, stated strategic objectives which require a movement towards building bridges rather than widening the interstices that crisscross the political terrain of Pakistan.
He needs therefore to revisit his larger policy even as he goes ahead with KBD.