A very interesting article, on a bit of pak military history few people know about..
Ziaul Haq: personal reminiscences
18-08-08
Tayyab Siddiqui
It was a crisp October afternoon when the PIA plane on which I travelled touched down at Amman. I was embarking on my diplomatic career with first posting to Jordan in 1969. On arrival, I was received by an Embassy official and ushered into the VIP Lounge. The Ambassador along with three army officers greeted me warmly. I felt elated at this high level of protocol, but soon the ego balloon burst when I discovered that the Ambassador was leaving for Aligarh to be with his ailing octogenarian father, Nawab of Chatari, and the army brass was there not to greet me, but rather to see him off. I was introduced to the army officers. All three were brigadiers: Ziaul Haq, Iftikhar Rana and Yasin. This was my first meeting with Ziaul Haq, which soon blossomed into close friendship and mutual trust that lasted until Zia’s last moments.
Amman, built on seven hills like Rome, was a peaceful little town. The fateful June ‘67 Arab-Israeli war had deeply scarred the Arab psyche. Jordan had lost half of its territory. The feeling of shame at their comprehensive defeat was palpable.
Pakistan had sent a small contingent to train the Jordanian army. The training mission consisted of about 20 officers, drawn from both the army and air force, and was led by Major General Nawazish Ali. The air force team’s leader was Anwar Shamim, who later became Chief of Pakistan Air Force.
The June ‘67 war had resulted in a heavy exodus of Palestinians to Jordan. The refugee camps spread over the entire Jabal Hussain were seething with angry young Palestinians. The emergence of Qadafi in Libya in September 1969 and his revolutionary rhetoric against Israel revived the faith in Arab destiny. The battle of Karameh, a small border town, saw the first direct engagement between IDF and Palestinians on March 21, 1968, when a reprisal attack was resisted by PLO fighters. Israel lost 28 soldiers, 90 were wounded and they retreated, abandoning 18 tanks. Fatah’s losses amounted to 93 killed and “many” injured. The battle of Karameh changed the course of Middle Eastern history, with Palestinian fighters, the “fedayeen”, becoming the heroes of the Arab world. The Palestinian youth were brimming with confidence and bristling with resentment at the failure of Arab potentates. President Nasser had lost much of his glamour with the emergence of Gaddafi, who opened his coffers for the Palestinians and captured their imagination with wild denunciation of Arab monarchs and Israel. Totting guns on their shoulders, the young fedayeen showed total contempt for Jordanians. They provoked and humiliated army officers by setting road blocs and physical checks. They became a law unto themselves, totally oblivious of the consequences.
Resistance groups among Palestinians sprouted, each with a separate ideology and leadership. Yasser Arafat, lovingly called ‘Abu Ammar,’ headed the moderate Fatah, while radical splinter groups were led by George Habash, Naef Hawatmeh and Ahmad Jibrail. Palestinian youth were disenchanted with Arab leadership, in particular the monarchs, whom they regarded as corrupt, inefficient and lackeys of the West. Radical groups, such as the PFLP and PDFLP, were indoctrinated, supported and sustained by the Soviet Union. They believed that the Palestinian revolution wouldn’t realize until the corrupt monarchies in the region were done away with. The relationship between Arab rulers and Palestinians was thus one of mutual fear and hatred.
Arafat believed that for the liberation struggle to succeed, it had to work with frontline Arab states, even though they were ready to make peace with Israel. Habash favoured a revolutionary way and believed that the revolution had to begin in Jordan by provoking a confrontation to bring down King Hussain. Fatah’s policy was to confine the violence to the land of Palestine. The PFLP did not agree. It started a terror campaign against Jewish interests inside and outside the Middle East, beginning with an attack on an Israeli passenger plane at the Beirut Airport.
On 6 September 1970, the PFLP staged a spectacular hijack operation, involving four international airlines – PAN-AM, Swiss Air, BOAC and TWA. They landed at Dawson’s field, a strip of desert in Jordan. An attempt to hijack an El-AL plane was foiled by Israeli security and hijacker Leila Khalid was arrested in London. The PFLP demanded her release, and when their demand was refused, hijacked a BOAC airliner, which they also brought to Dawson’s field. Finally, she was released along with 600 passengers but the airplanes were blown up.
The hijacking intensified clashes between the fedayeen and King Hussain’s forces, who were losing patience with the arrogance and foolhardiness of the fedyaeen. The security situation deteriorated by the day. Fatal clashes between the Jordian army and fedayeen became routine. In June, Amman had been declared a non-family station and the families of the members of military mission were sent back home. I shifted to Zia’s house and lived there for nearly four months, until I was transferred to Beirut in June 1970. Soon, the military mission was also recalled to Pakistan in view of the developing Bangladesh crisis. Weary of the fedayeen’s contemptible behaviour, King Hussain’s generals mounted a ruthless onslaught to drive the fedayeen out of Jordan completely in September 1970. Thousands were massacred by Hussain’s troops in what came to be known as ‘Black September’.
Pakistan’s involvement in the killings of Palestinians and Brigadier Zia’s role in the events of Black September has been the staple of fanciful reports about how Zia personally led the campaign. These reports have been highly exaggerated. Pakistan’s army contingent in Amman comprised of not more than 20 officials of all ranks as mentioned earlier. In June 1970, an ACK regiment arrived in Amman at the request of King Hussain to protect Jordan’s air space against violations by Israeli and Syrian planes, but they simply had no combat role or capacity. It may also be mentioned that such military training missions were also assigned to Syria, Iraq and Libya, purely for training purposes. Jordan was not an exception.
The presence of the Pakistan training mission against this backdrop soon pulled it into the vortex of Arab intrigues and conspiracies. Its presence was magnified and exaggerated by vested groups. Our ambassador in Delhi had cautioned us against the surreptitious induction of Indian army officers belonging to RAW in PLO and PFLP ranks. Their assignment was to sow doubts and misgivings regarding Pakistan among Palestinians. The vicious propaganda regarding Zia’s role was certainly their handiwork.
It was September 2 when I received a call from Brigadier Zia informing me that the King had asked him to take over the command of the 3rd armoured division, stationed in Irbid. Syria has moved with an armoured brigade into Jordan. Major-General Qasim Motta, the Jordanian commander, had deserted and Zia was asked to take over.
It was a coincidence that Ambassador Chittari and Major General Nawazish both were out of Jordan at this time. I was the chargé d’affaires and Zia, the senior most army officer. Zia told the King that he would need political clearance from the embassy before he responded to the King’s command. I told Zia that the contingent’s mandate was not to fight and hence I would need permission from Islamabad. Telephone connections were dead. There were no cipher links either. The only communication link was telex based on Morse code. After a few hours’ effort, I established contact with Sultan M. Khan, the Foreign Secretary, who declined to give any instructions and advised me to contact the military brass. Finally I reached Mr Ghias Uddin, then Secretary General Defence. To my utter horror, without a moment’s hesitance, Ghias gave me the green signal. When I tried to explain the implications, I was cut short with a brief sentence: “We had Istikhara, Hashmite Kingdom’s star is ascendant. Go ahead. Follow the King’s commands.” That the foreign defence policy of Pakistan was formulated not on a dispassionate analysis of the situation but on the dubious religious invocation still amazes me.
Brigadier Zia accordingly took over the command in Irbid, but before any major military operation, the Syrians under intense pressure from the US and Israel, withdrew. This was the sum total of Pakistan’s involvement or Zia’s role in the alleged massacre of the Palestinians.
(to be continued)
