Usaf: Indian Exercises Showed Need For F-a-22, Changes In Training

The following article is from “Inside the Air Force” magazine, USA. This is from the June 4, 2004 issue - Vol. 15, No. 23

IAF pilots beat USAF 90% of the time!

Direct link to article (subscriber only)

[http://www.insidedefense.com/](Link to magazine)

USAF: Indian Exercises Showed Need For F/A-22, Changes In Training

Inside The Air Force
June 4, 2004
Pg. 1

– Hampton Stephens

A recent exercise with the Indian Air Force is causing U.S. Air Force officials to re-evaluate the way the service trains its fighter pilots while bolstering the case for buying the F/A-22 as a way to ensure continued air dominance for the United States, according to service officials.

The surprising sophistication of Indian fighter aircraft and skill of Indian pilots demonstrated at the Cope India air combat exercise Feb. 15 through 27 at Gwalior Air Force Station, India, should provide a reality check for those who had assumed unquestioned U.S. air superiority, service officials who participated in the exercise said this week. The event was the first-ever air combat exercise involving the U.S. and India and the most active bilateral military exchange in over 40 years, according to these officials.

“The major takeaway for the Air Force is that our prediction of needing to replace the F-15 with the F/A-22 is proving out as we get smarter and smarter about other [countries’] capabilities around the world and what technology is limited to in the F-15 airframe,” said Col. Mike Snodgrass, commander of the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK. “We’ve taken [the F-15] about as far as we can and it’s now time to move to the next generation.” Snodgrass, who has been selected to receive his first star, and two other wing officials spoke with Inside the Air Force June 2.

The Air Force has been arguing the absolute necessity of the F/A-22 since the program began. But the performance of the Indians in direct competition against the Air Force’s best fighter, the F-15C, was particularly striking evidence of an endangered U.S. lead in air combat capability, the statements of service officials indicate.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper told the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee in March that the results of Cope India were “very revealing,” although he declined to elaborate in a public forum. Privately, other senior service officials have pointed to Cope India as evidence that continued U.S. air superiority is dependent on the F/A-22.

Although service officials have been reluctant to detail how the Indians performed against the six F-15Cs from the 3rd Wing that participated in Cope India, Rep. Duke Cunningham (R-CA) said in a Feb. 26 House Appropriations defense subcommittee hearing that U.S. F-15Cs were defeated more than 90 percent of the time in direct combat exercises against the IAF.

Officials from the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf did not provide specifics about how their aircraft fared, but said the experience is causing the service to reevaluate the way it trains its pilots for air-to-air operations.

“What happened to us was it looks like our red air training might not be as good because the adversaries are better than we thought,” Snodgrass said. “And in the case of the Indian Air Force both their training and some of their equipment was better than we anticipated.”

“Red air” refers to the way the Air Force simulates enemy capability in air combat training. Because the service has assumed for years that its fighters are more capable than enemy aircraft, the U.S. pilots that simulate the enemy, known as “red” forces, in air combat training are required to operate under rules that constrain their combat capability.

“We have always believed that our technology was superior to everyone else’s technology, that we would fight a somewhat inferior adversary, so we have had to supply a simulated adversary from our own resources; we call that ‘red air,’” Snodgrass said.

As a result, Air Force pilots are used to flying against an enemy whose combat capability is deliberately limited.

“There are maneuvering limits as well as weapons employment limits, what we believe enemy aircraft may be able to do with their weapons systems, so we try to simulate that in our own airplane with our own weapons,” Snodgrass explained. “It becomes very complex because instead of using the airplane the way it was designed, you now have to come up with rules of thumb that limit what you do and cause you to not perform . . . the way we really would want to in combat.”

The Cope India exercises consisted of air combat maneuvers in which pilots would practice their fighter tactics and fly against each other one-on-one, as well as simulated combat scenarios. It was during this simulated combat, which included both “offensive counterair” and “defensive counterair” scenarios, that the Indians proved the most formidable, according to the 3rd Wing officials. In the offensive counterair scenarios, a small number of F-15Cs would attempt to intercept an enemy strike aircraft en route to a target that was guarded by a larger number of Indian fighters. In the defensive counterair missions, the F-15s would attempt to defend a target against Indian fighters.

In these offensive and defensive missions, four F-15Cs were usually flying against 10 or 12 of the same model Indian fighter, according to Col. Greg Neubeck, deputy commander of operations for the wing’s 3rd Operations Group and exercise director for Cope India. The 3rd Operations Group is responsible for the 3rd Wing’s flying mission.

The Indians flew a number of different fighters, including the French-made Mirage 2000 and the Russian-made MIG-27 and MIG-29, but the two most formidable IAF aircraft proved to be the MIG-21 Bison, an upgraded version of the Russian-made baseline MIG-21, and the SU-30K Flanker, also made in Russia, Neubeck said. He emphasized the fact that U.S. forces were always outnumbered in these scenarios, but said the missions proved more difficult than expected.

**“What we faced were superior numbers, and an IAF pilot who was very proficient in his aircraft and smart on tactics. That combination was tough for us to overcome,” Neubeck said.

One reason the Indian pilots proved so formidable is that their training regimen does not include a concept of “red air.” Instead, “they fly pretty much blue-on-blue . . . [a] full-up airplane with no restrictions against somebody else’s airplane with no restrictions, and that leads to more proficiency with your aircraft,” Neubeck said.**

In addition to reinforcing the need for the F/A-22, therefore, Cope India demonstrated that the service might be able to immediately improve its air combat capability by changing the way Air Force pilots train.

“The Air Force is re-examining, from what I can understand, our concept of red air and how we might be able to provide red air to our fighter forces so that we get [the best] training we can afford,” Snodgrass said.

Neubeck said the service probably needs to “take off the handcuffs that we put on our red air training aids and allow them to be more aggressive and make the red air tougher than we have in the past.”

Although India is a friendly nation, the lesson of Cope India is that almost any nation could surpass the United States’ air combat capability if the Pentagon does not continue to invest in better training and technology, the Elmendorf officials said. At last count, for example, there were over 5,000 MIG-21s active in air forces around the world, Snodgrass said. Even American fighters, such as Boeing’s F-15, are being sold in upgraded versions to countries around the world.

“I believe what this demonstrates is that the capacity exists out there for any nation with the appropriate resources and the will to acquire technology and to train their aircrews to be very, very capable,” said Col. Russ Handy, commander of the 3rd Operations Group. “In the long term this could occur in nations outside of the Indian Air Force.”

The Air Force will get another chance to test its capabilities against the Indians in July, when the IAF will bring its Jaguar fighter-bomber aircraft to Eielson AFB, AK, for the Cooperative Cope Thunder exercise. The 3rd Wing officers said their pilots had not yet flown against an Indian-piloted Jaguar.

Interesting.

It seems to be a trait that US military exercises involve simulations under which US superiority is taken as given - they seem to underestimate what they could be up against. This "red air" problem they encountered against the IAF is a good example. Having trainined with the assumption that their enemies would be less capable than they are, they've underestimated the capabilities of other forces and this in turn has led to inferior training. The result is what this article has shown.

The main example that I can think of, however, is a pre-Iraq war training exercise where a US simulation of an Iraqi invasion was carried out.

The US general commanding the "Iraqi Army" realised that his force, vastly outgunned, could only survive through guerrilla tactics rather than direct confrontation. However, when he tried to do this (with much success), he was instead reprimanded by his superiors for acting "unrealistically".

This variation on "red air", where his forces were supposed to underperform, turned out much as the air training exerices in this article did - the US assumed an easy win, but this assumption was wrong.

Of course, when they invaded Iraq in the end - they ended up encountering guerilla style resistance.

Another report, from Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine two weeks ago.

http://www.aviationnow.com

Note that USAF reveals that IAF pilots fly more hours than them.

F/A-22 Secrets Revealed

By David A. Fulghum

May 23, 2004

Aviation Week & Space Technology

RAPTOR UNWRAPPED

With long-term military budget cuts looming once again, the U.S. Air Force and Lockheed Martin are finally talking about some of the F/A-22 Raptor’s closely held secrets that they hope will keep Congress paying for the $132-million stealth aircraft.

While these conversations, many of them informal, didn’t touch on “even one-third of its classified capabilities,” according to one pilot, they included the ability to hunt down and destroy cruise missiles well behind enemy lines, the introduction of a new missile that allows the head-on attack and destruction of stealthy enemy missiles, a tailless bomber derivative design, a planned electronic attack capability so powerful that it actually damages enemy electronics, and modifications that would allow the aircraft’s electronic package to invade enemy computer networks.

The tone of the conversations was sharpened by a still-unreleased report about the series of air combat training engagements earlier this year between Indian air force Su-30MKs and F-15Cs from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska; the latter were equipped with the U.S.’ newest long-range, high-definition radars.

Those who have read draft copies of the report say the Su-30MKs and F-15 pilots were seeing each other at the same time with their radars, but the Indian pilots were getting off the simulated first shot with their AA-10 Alamo missiles and often winning the long-range engagements. The Indian pilots also had more flight time in the previous year than the U.S. pilots, roughly 300 hr. compared with 250 hr., the pilot said. :biggthumb

Those factors are causing the U.S. to rethink the formula that they always will be facing less well-trained pilots and inferior weaponry. They also reinforce the argument that the U.S. needs a fighter with greater radar range (the F/A-22’s is more than 100 naut. mi.), stealth (the F-15 has a huge radar cross section) and fused sensors so that pilots can easily grasp what’s going on around them.

Key to the F/A-22’s capabilities is a complex of passive sensors, basically for electronic surveillance, that line the outside edges of the fighter’s wings and tail surfaces. They gather electronic emissions at frequencies up to 18 GHz., sort them by time and angle of arrival for location, and analyze the signature automatically for rapid identification. Electronic data are fused with detailed RCS signatures gathered by the radar for additional identification.

HOW MANY F/A-22S the Air Force eventually gets is still a crap shoot. Estimates range from a service requirement for more than 400 to pessimistic predictions of only 100-150 if the congressional budgeters, soured by the growing cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, are unsympathetic.

A primary mission for the F/A-22 is slated to be cruise missile interception well behind enemy lines. “A cruise missile has stealth in only one direction–straight ahead,” says Lt. Col. Mike Stapleton, operations officer for the 43rd Fighter Sqdn. The F-22s would operate in an extended picket line so they can look at cruise missiles to either side of their patrol area from a beam aspect where the missile is not low-observable. In addition, the new, 200-naut.-mi. AESA radar, in development for the E-10 surveillance aircraft, is to provide key cueing of cruise missile locations.

Tactics used by cruise missile operators are instructive. One option is to send waves of 10 missiles that would pull defenses to one side while a following wave slips through. Another is to disperse a large launch into many directions so that some actually approach the targets from behind. Those tactics have led the U.S. to plan a multi-layered defense that begins with F-22s deep in enemy territory.

While F-22s would normally operate at the 45,000-50,000-ft. level, for cruise missile defense they would drop into the middle altitudes around 25,000-30,000 ft. That would allow them the flexibility to combat both AS-4 “Kitchen” or CAS-1 “Kraken”-type, high-speed, air-launched missiles (predictable course, but little time to react) or to pick “Silkworm”-type missiles (low speed, but unpredictable course) out of ground clutter. Detailed information on missiles that leaked through the F/A-22 line would be sent by data link to second and third defensive layers comprising AESA-radar-equipped F-15s and F/A-18Es operating in less well-defended areas.

Four of the initial seven cadre pilots in the 43nd Fighter Sqdn., the Air Force’s first F/A-22 squadron, came from the AESA-equipped F-15 squadrons in Alaska, where they developed concepts for airborne cruise missile defense, Stapleton says. While F/A-22 crews will train to attack cruise missiles with AIM-9s and 20-mm. cannon, the primary weapon will be the AIM-120C Amraam. A variant, the AIM-120C-6 (available by 2006), has been specialized with an improved seeker to optimize the explosive cone of destruction for small, slow targets in a head-on engagement with the F/A-22. The upgraded Amraam incorporates improved fuzing through a new quadrant target-detection device. One tactic for the F-22s will be to approach a wave of cruise missiles head-on, get in a first shot and then turn at Mach 1.7 supercruise speed for a second and third shot from behind.

F/A-22S ASSIGNED the cruise missile defense mission would carry at least six Amraams and possibly more when a compressed-carriage AIM-120 design is fielded, says J.R. McDonald, director of Lockheed Martin’s F/A-22 program. The range of the F/A-22 can be extended with two 600-gal., low-observable fuel tanks carried on two inboard hard points that are plumbed to transfer fuel. However, there are a number of concepts for a larger, longer range FB-22 that could also carry a larger weapons payload. McDonald says the weapons bay on either the F/A-22 or FB-22 concepts could be enlarged to carry more missiles. Moreover, because of the improvements in stealth coatings, shaping and RCS predictability, the changes could be made while actually improving the signature of the aircraft, he says.

Some of the FB-22 derivative concepts being proposed by Lockheed Martin include both one- and two-seat options, with and without a vertical tail, McDonald said. The tailless version would be possible because the wing would be expanded and made large enough to carry sufficient flight control surfaces to provide adequate aerodynamic authority.

“We have a smorgasbord of options,” McDonald said. The objective is to preserve all the attributes of the F/A-22–stealth, speed, integrated avionics–while giving up a bit of agility in order to field a stable bombing platform. The aircraft would also be designed to control a wide range of unmanned reconnaissance and strike aircraft.

Most intriguing about the F/A-22’s future were hints from various sources that the fighter would have drastically improved electronic attack capability and would introduce computer network attack to its arsenal. Critics say some of the planning borders on the fanciful. Officials have acknowledged that the F/A-22’s AESA radar has a projected capability to concentrate its transmission power onto a narrow spot–most likely the electronic radars and communication links associated with air defenses–with enough focus to jam them. The Thor jamming system is to be active in 2008. Those working on improvements say that with the addition of radar cheek arrays to the aircraft in 2010, it would be able to focus enough energy in a beam to actually damage electronic components in enemy sensors.

An associated capability is airborne computer network attack that, under project Suter, currently resides with the EC-130 Compass Call. However, the aircraft is large, slow and can’t penetrate defended airspace. Futurists say a further modified F/A-22 will be able to operate over key targets and carry out computer attack or surveillance with much less power. “If you’re 5 mi. from the threat, you don’t need the power of Compass Call” to penetrate an enemy computer network, says one official

Oh horrors!

Our planes are in danger, and we are losing!

Let's spend billions on a new weapons system!

Can you imagine the USAF actually having an article that says that they can easily defeat any known threat using what is essentially 1980's technology? Not likely, when they have a new weapons program they want to buy.

The same kinds or articles appear in the '80's when confronting the theory that the USSR would launch huge waves of cheap small maneuverable jets, while ours were big and bulky and technologically superior, but very out numbered. That is how we got the F-16.

Large grain of salt on this one....

Welldone IAF.

I see OG endorses a conspiracy theory where it suits his purpose :)

although i have to agree.. that was the first thought that crossed my mind.. USAF just wants new toys that's all.

Oh sure, I can hear the American general now, "OK, let's let four of our planes attack twelve of theirs. And lets poke each of our pilots in the eye. And let's pretend that there is no Awacs plane around, and let's make our pilots fly the entire flight upside down." I think it is clear to say that we would lose badly under those simulated combat conditions!

We need a new plane!

Yes Yes.

I mean how can those Indoos come anywhere near this level :rolleyes:

Those who could read would notice that the excercises involved both air forces playing both roiles - aggressor and defender and in 1 to 1 and 1 to many type settings.

Then again… :rolleyes:

Re: Usaf: Indian Exercises Showed Need For F-a-22, Changes In Training

Maybe the Yanks should try their hand against the boys from the PAF. They wouldn’t stand a chance. That’s probably the reason why they withheld those F16’s for so long. If the Indians can beat them, what is the quality of these Yanks.

I can imagine the pakis lining up to have a go. The pilots from Karachi will probably be saying " bohoth dino se kisi ke dhulai nahin ke hai. :smash: