Washington’s ultimate success in creating a stable Iraq completely hinges on its ability to create viable Iraqi security forces capable of handling all of the security tasks currently being undertaken by US-led forces. While the United States is presently taking the majority role in attempts to bring security to Iraq, ** it will be able to fulfill this role at its present intensity for only so long. Washington does not have the funds, troop reserves, or domestic support to sustain a permanent occupation with troops numbering in the tens of thousands and coming under consistent guerrilla attack. ** Washington will have to replace the bulk of its troops with indigenous Iraqi security forces, or else risk the chance of having to end the occupation of Iraq on terms not in synch with US regional interests.
Added latter… now why would every body bring in korea and vietnam…
This is not the first time in the history of US foreign policy that it has faced the difficult task of creating indigenous security forces in the midst of an ongoing guerrilla struggle. Back during Washington’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict, spanning from the 1950s to the 1970s, subsequent presidential administrations realized that their ultimate success in creating a stable South Vietnam generally in line with US interests depended on their ability to create indigenous Vietnamese security forces capable of quelling the Vietnamese nationalist and communist insurgency.
Washington never managed to achieve its aims in Vietnam, and was finally forced out of the country when Vietnamese guerrillas and North Vietnamese regulars overran the South and established military and political control over Saigon two years after the departure of US troops. There were a multitude of reasons why Washington failed in its objectives in Vietnam, but a central one was the fact that the US was never able to create viable Vietnamese security forces that were not corrupt or ineffective. Instead, US policymakers consistently had to deal with a Vietnamese security apparatus that often stole from Vietnamese peasants, or performed poorly in combat against nationalist and communist insurgents in addition to the North Vietnamese Army.
The problem with this is that they let Ahmad Chalabi run the deBaathification panel. He used it as a way to eliminate his competition.. uni professors were sacked just because they carried the card even though they never participated in criminal acts or even sympathized with the Baath. And since the US were acting like dumbf---s back then we jumped to defend Chalabi's actions and the whole deBaathification process, which was corrupt.
What just happened wasn't an attempt to re-hire Baathist torture-masters.. it was simply righting a wrong. Giving those innocent members of higher society who had to join the party in order to survive a chance at survival in a legitimate setting. The problem comes in our inability to properly describe what we're doing. The CPA seems reluctant to do that, and people wouldn't exactly trust them now if they did, so they give a half-assed explanation and it looks bad all around.
Now Chalabi, the fallen stooge is comparing the rehiring of Baathists "... like allowing Nazis into the German government immediately after World War II".
But one thing for sure is, this will not go down well with the Shia-majority and Kurds at all and most Sunni's who suffered at the hands of the Baathists as well.
Please don't tell me you're congratulating Chalabi's position, Malik. For one thing that'd be awfully hypocritical. But also it's just plain wrong. But it does bring up a good opportunity to explain the current situation.. In Germany after the war we did in fact re-hire Nazi party members. Nazi card-holders were allowed to enter politics, etc. What happened is that the ones who committed crimes as Nazis were jailed or otherwise excluded. Same case in Iraq for the most part. Same thing happened in post-war Japan, France, really just about everywhere where people were on the wrong side of a fight not by choice.
But you're right that this won't sit well with the Kurds and Shia. Is that a moral problem or a political one? I'd think it's a political one. Those professors who joined the Baath because it was the only way to pursue their legitimate career have a right to do so again. Of course, most of the people being reinstated now are Sunni, a good chunk of the most highly skilled people in Iraq are Sunni.. so they can argue for some sort of affirmative action plan to balance out the ranks, but to argue that these people cannot work simply because they worked for the Baath is wrong. So, sure the competition will grumble, but they'll have to get used to it.
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*Originally posted by spoon: *
Please don't tell me you're congratulating Chalabi's position, Malik.
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Hardly, it was just an observation. The man has always been and will remain a detestable little stooge, who will never command any support in Iraq.
Frankly, I don't buy the argument that they are only wanting to bring back skilled people who were forced to become members of the Baath party. Why were they even sacked in the first place a year ago? Read up on Iraqi history, and you will see this is exactly the sort of thing the British did in the 1920's and 1930's when faced with Shia and Kurdish political demands. Then this is what the British-installed imported Hejazi King did as well. Mark my words, the American's finally 'lost' Iraq in April 2004 i.e. in Fallujah and the Shia rebellion in the south. Everything they do from now on will be looked on suspiciously by all groups in Iraq, and there is not much the American's can do to regain the initiative.
