One can clearly see US double standards sanctions and no sanctions only on Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons but US is the main poliferator to countries of its choice.
First sanctions were imposed in 65 for going to war with India, in 71 they send their aircraft carrier loaded with weapons it still has not arrived yet.
We have come a long way with these sanctions thanks to China and France we have our own state of the art tank (AL-Khalid) and sub (Agosta 90B). For fighter jets we should explore other posibilities eg.. French Mirage or Rafael or Chinese J10/J11/J12. I think US should shove those F16s coz the sanctions will return when it serves them better.
** The Finanical Express of India **
New Delhi, Aug 6: Recent reports from Washington suggest that the US administration has initiated the process of re-arming Pakistan once again, reminiscent of the mid-80s when the US supplied it billions of dollars worth of arms. After a long gap of more than four years during which no proposals for transfer of defence items to Pakistan was made ¡ª from early 1998 to mid 2002 ¡ª the US State Department has of late been approving licences for transfer of such items to Pakistan in unprecedented numbers.
In the week of July 15, 2002, the last week for which data is available, 23 license approvals were forwarded to the US Congress, many of them for items relating to F-16, transfers of which had been prohibited by various acts of the Congress from early 90s onwards. In the subsequent weeks, for which public data has not yet been released, indications are that additional approvals for such transfers have been continuing at a similar rate. The F-16s in the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) inventory, for example, are the frontline aircraft of the PAF modified for delivery of nuclear weapons.
In addition there are a number of other factors that are likely to intensify the US supply of military hardware to Pakistan. The US-Pakistan Defence Consultative Group (DCG) suspended in 1998 has been revived and significantly the US administration has made the first-ever budgetary request for FMF (Foreign Military Financing) assistance to Pakistan, the first-ever such request since 1990.
The situation will become even more critical in the coming months when the current restrictions on military transfers to Pakistan will all be lifted, after which there will be no bar on any type of military transfers or assistance to Pakistan. The security implications of such unbridled military transfers for Indian security need hardly be emphasised. That being the case it is not difficult to envisage the serious effects of such transfers on the ongoing efforts at improving the bilateral Indo-US relations.
This evolution of US-Pakistan Military relations ¡ª from one where any type of assistance under any scheme was barred to Pakistan in 1990 to one where all types of military assistance are allowed ¡ª evolved in two stages, both of which were unfortunately not fully appreciated by Indian security analysts. The US sanctions on military supplies to Pakistan was first invoked in April 1979 by President Carter as a result of Pakistan¡¯s violation of Sec 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), the so-called Symington amendment. It was followed by sanctions under Glenn amendment as well. As a result, all military supplies to Pakistan had come to a halt in 1979. However, the developments in Afghanistan in 1981 forced the US administration to review its military relations with Pakistan and as a result a new legislation ¡ª Sec 620E of FAA ¡ª was passed in December 1981 to resume such supplies, giving the President authority to waive the existing sanctions. An assistance program worth $4 billion followed it.
By 1985 it became apparent that Pakistan was embarking on a major clandestine nuclear weapon program, involving among other things, illegal exports from the US of items meant to support its nuclear weapon program. Accordingly in order to discourage Pakistan¡¯s nuclear weapon program, the US Congress enacted far stricter restrictions on the conditions under which the President could offer assistance, including military, to Pakistan. This amendment to FAA, popularly known as the Pressler amendment, required the President to certify that ¡°during the fiscal year in which the US aid was to be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that proposed the United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will posses a nuclear explosive device.¡±
During the following years the US presidents issued five such certificates covering the fiscal years 1986-90. Thereafter, the US presidents felt unable to issue such certificates and as a result all aid to Pakistan ceased in 1990.
By mid-1990s, the US administration was feeling the far-reaching effects of the Pressler amendment. Because the Amendment banned aid and arms transfers to Pakistan under FAA or any other Act, it had effectively brought to a stop all official bilateral aid or assistance from the US to Pakistan in all spheres of activities.
Efforts were made, therefore, by the US Congress and the US administration to find a way out. Accordingly amendments were made to Sec 670E of FAA in 1996. Known as Brownback Amendment it restricted prohibitions on the US assistance to Pakistan to only military assistance (Brown Amendment); and allowed for transfer to Pakistan of military equipment, technology or other services other than F-16 aircraft, pursuant to contracts or cases entered into before October 1990. Subsequent to this, transfers of military supplies to Pakistan resumed in 1996. Such transfers were once again stopped as a result of the sanction that was imposed on Pakistan in May 1998 as a result of its nuclear test.
The US Congress gave the President the authority to waive the sanctions on India and Pakistan in October 1999. However, while the only India-related sanctions were in respect of the May 1998 nuclear tests, the then existing sanction on Pakistan were not only in respect of the May 1998 tests but many which were in force because of the pre-May 1998 violations of the US laws by Pakistan. The Congressional waiver authority did not differentiate between India and Pakistan and as a result gave the President authority to waive all sanctions on Pakistan i.e., the Symington, Glenn and Pressler sanctions.
While President Clinton exercised partially his waiver authority on October 27, 1999, allowing for civil bilateral and multilateral aid, he did not waive the sanctions relating to military transfers. Meanwhile, Pakistan came under additional sanctions, first for democracy-related sanctions in 1999 as a result of the military coup and then again in November 2000 for MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) violations. Thus in early pre-Sept 11, 2001, the following military supply related sanctions were in place against Pakistan: i) The Symington sanctions of April 1979; ii) the Pressler sanctions, as amended in 1996; iii) the Glenn sanctions of May 1998 and iv) the MTCR-related sanctions of November 2000.
Once again as a result of events in Afghanistan, the US President waived all these sanctions operating on Pakistan based on the waiver authority of October 1999 and the Brownback Bill of October 2001 (P.L. 107-57). As a result, limited one-time supplies of military items were allowed till November 2002 and thereafter, the complete range of military supplies and assistance, unencumbered by any legislative restriction. ** In short after November 21, 2002 there will be no restriction whatsoever on any type of military assistance or supply from the US to Pakistan. **
[This message has been edited by Abdali (edited August 08, 2002).]