Re: US govt expects Musharraf to quit army post
Further report’s on the tide turning against Mush, clock is ticking…
Closer to the endgame?
Full article: http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/24/op.htm
Consequently, there was little debate in western capitals on how and when the regime should be encouraged to transfer power to genuinely elected representatives. Now for the first time, there appears to be evidence of re-thinking, though still tentative, that the western powers and, in particular, the US, may be beginning to understand the risk in standing by the current political dispensation.
In fact, since early this year, the sentiments being expressed by senior US officials, as well as influential legislators, have been exceedingly critical of the government. The refrain has been that Islamabad should “do more” on the war on terror as well as improve its performance on issues such as democracy, human rights, etc. In both Houses of Congress, bills have been passed that call upon the administration to reduce the aid package to Pakistan, or make it contingent on the fulfilment of certain conditions.
These misgivings in Congress notwithstanding, Islamabad insisted that President Bush and senior members of his team remained committed to Musharraf as the only option available to Pakistan. It was argued that the US felt very comfortable working with the current leadership. After all, it had proven itself both efficient and willing to do Washington’s bidding.
It was also the view that the US intelligence and security agencies appreciated that Musharraf had “the virtue of being a known quantity” and that “with Iraq spiralling out of control and an emboldened Iran flexing its muscles throughout the region, are not things complicated enough without taking a chance on a nuclear armed Muslim nation of 165 million people?”
It was therefore expected that Washington would say or do nothing to weaken Musharraf, though it would, of course, maintain pressure on Islamabad, to extract the maximum from it on issues close to its heart. Nevertheless, recent pronouncements from Washington indicate a perceptible shift in US thinking.
This is borne out by the latest observations of senior CIA officials who have dismissed the possibility of extremists coming to power any time soon, Robert Richer, who was associate director of operations for the CIA, told The New York Times recently, that there was recognition now that “this fear within Washington that Islamic extremism has been a dominant force in Pakistan, has been started in part by Musharraf himself”. More significantly, he indicated that “the succession plan has the seal of approval from the agency”. Does this mean that “other options” are already under consideration?
The media in the West is also slowly coming to grips with the fact that Pakistan’s strong man may be faltering and that he may be facing his severest crisis since seizing power from an elected civilian government some seven years ago. Britain’s prestigious daily The Times was the first to come out with the advice that as “a good general always knows when to retreat”, Musharraf should prove himself a good general “as Pakistan is literally without the rule of law”, after the Chief Justice’s removal.
The advice was particularly sombre as the newspaper had been a vocal supporter of the president. It also accused Musharraf “of showing little enthusiasm for returning Pakistan, as promised, to democratically elected government”. The paper went on to charge that the government stood “accused on all sides of tampering with the independence of the judiciary, a particularly sensitive issue in Pakistan, where judges have been held in high esteem as they are perceived to be the only bulwark against dictatorship and civilian misrule alike”.
It may have been a mere coincidence, but US Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher’s short visit to Islamabad at this time became the occasion for considerable speculation. He denied that it had anything to do with the judicial crisis, but did point out that the US understood “the sensitivity of accusations and this needs to be handled very carefully”.
Boucher’s attempt to be “diplomatic” in his remarks, was, however, noted by The Washington Post, which severely criticised the administration for its support for the “military ruler”. At the same time, it chided Boucher for having said in Islamabad that Musharraf was leading Pakistan towards being “a moderate, stable, democratic Muslim state”.
The Post claimed that far from leading Pakistan towards democracy, Musharraf was dismantling liberal and secular institutions in the country already threatened by Islamic extremism. Finally, it asked why Bush believed that its support for Musharraf would change him. A couple of days later, The Los Angeles Times too charged that it was “short-sighted in the extreme” of the Bush administration not “to distance itself from Musharraf, or to at least express disapproval of his behaviour”.
It was no less significant that the EU Troika Heads of Mission in Islamabad decided to make an official demarche at the foreign office on March 19 to express their concern with developments relating to the Chief Justice. The demarche caught the government off-guard, for it expected the EU to stay away from the fray. Later, the EU issued a statement that said that “the Troika had stressed the importance the EU attaches to the respect and independence of the judiciary, especially in view of the upcoming election process”.
The foreign office may take umbrage at this but it knows well that when we were pleading for the EU parliament’s ratification of the Third Generation Agreement, we committed ourselves to being a functioning democracy.
The prestigious Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also decided to come out with a special commentary on Pakistan. It claimed that recent developments had “shaken the aura of invincibility that Musharraf has enjoyed until now” and warned that “when the political trends shift in Pakistan, they generally go down by sharp and unexpected steps…”
Stratfor, a private intelligence firm with close ties to US security agencies, too stepped in with the warning that “Musharraf might not be the only casualty of this crisis; the military’s hold on power could be weakened once the dust settles”.
Whatever doubts there may have been on this score were removed when a US State Department spokesman hinted that the US expected Musharraf to give up the army chief post by the end of the year. Indicating a shift in policy, the spokesman emphasised that the US expected the current judicial crisis “to be resolved within the confines of Pakistani law” and in a “transparent” manner.
Since this represented a change from current US policy, the spokesman had to engage in a skilful balancing act, calling the president a “solid friend” and insisting that the US was “not going to dictate to him or to anybody else on how we should follow through on his commitment to democracy.” He added that the US was prepared “to offer guidance and counsel and encouragement to continue along the pathway of democracy”.
Given the blanket support that the Bush administration has always provided to the regime and its willingness to disregard its transgressions, the spokesman’s remarks caused an understandable stir in Pakistani political circles.
The question now being asked is whether the US has taken a fundamental decision to gently nudge Musharraf to give up his position as army chief, which is his real source of power. If so, it would not be the first time that the US would be abandoning a “friend”, when no longer required. But if it were to encourage the return to Pakistan of a genuinely elected democratic government, it would do itself a favour and earn the goodwill of the people of this country.
***The writer is a former ambassador. ***
