United States Needs to Take a Stand With Pakistan, Report Says
By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS
WASHINGTON, July 23 - The 9/11 commission’s report lends unusual attention to Pakistan, saying that the governments in Islamabad and Washington need to make “hard choices” if they are to make progress in the fight against Islamist terrorism.
The commission recommended that the United States end a lengthy period of ambivalence and mistrust toward Pakistan and commit itself to a period of sustained aid, including military assistance and support for that country’s public education system as a counterweight to religious schools that foster extremism.
But that American support should come only if the government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf proves that he stands for “enlightened moderation” and confronts Islamic extremists in Pakistan, curbs nuclear proliferation and paves the way for a return to democracy, the commission said.
Pakistani officials praised the report as an endorsement of their policies. “Quite obviously there are things that are critical,” said a close aide to General Musharraf. But, he added, “when it comes to recommendations, it says that this is the one government that is the best hope.”
Still, the commission was hardly glowing in its descriptions of Pakistan.
**Pakistan is the first country listed by American and foreign government officials, the commission report said, when asked: “If you were a terrorist leader today, where would you locate your base?”
For the panel members, Pakistan is a problem and a solution. And at this moment, it is the site of the fiercest battles against international terrorists. **
“It is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist extremism,” the report said. “Within Pakistan’s borders are 150 million Muslims, scores of Al Qaeda terrorists, many Taliban fighters, and perhaps Osama bin Laden. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has come frighteningly close to war with nuclear-armed India over the disputed territory of Kashmir.”
The commission recommended that the United States overcome a legacy in which the two countries have been “allies of convenience” and decide definitively whether to back General Musharraf.
That American support would include sustaining current levels of humanitarian aid for years and developing a comprehensive approach to provide military aid and support for a better education system, to promote economic opportunity and counteract the religious schools that to produce militants.
Such backing cannot come too soon for General Musharraf, who finds himself increasingly boxed in on the domestic political front. On one side, Islamic militants with links to Al Qaeda are trying to kill him; he narrowly escaped two assassination attempts last December. On the other, the country’s liberal elite are expressing growing disappointment with the failure of the general, and his American backers, to build up the strong government institutions that they say will stabilize the country in the long term.
Pakistani political analysts accuse the general of sometimes enacting policies that work at cross-purposes. They say that on one hand, he is mounting aggressive efforts to pursue Qaeda members hiding along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. But on the other, they say, General Musharraf has held back on cracking down on former Taliban and Islamic militants waging an insurgency in the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir, the disputed territory Pakistan and India have fought two wars over. Analysts say Pakistan must crack down on all militancy in the country.
On terrorism, the report noted, Pakistan nurtured the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Pakistani army and intelligence services, in particular, revealed an ambivalence toward confronting Islamic extremists and struggled to maintain good relations with the Taliban until September 2001, the report said.
On proliferation, Pakistan’s record was equally problematic, the report said. The government, which claims not to trade in nuclear technology, insisted that it was unaware of the smuggling efforts of one of its most prominent citizens, A.Q. Khan, who is credited with making Pakistan a nuclear power.
Lastly, Pakistan has done little to resume democratic rule at the national level, the report said.
Such perceived shortcomings have been at the root of several difficult compromises the Bush administration has made, and which continue to this day. For example, despite strong indications that the Pakistani government knew of Mr. Khan’s activities, the administration took General Musharraf at his word.
Ambivalence has long been a characteristic of United States-Pakistani relations, and the report detailed how the nations’ alliance after Moscow’s 1980 invasion of Afghanistan unraveled after the Soviets withdrew and was replaced by numerous American sanctions in the 1990’s over Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons.
The report found that throughout much of the 90’s, when the bin Laden threat intensified, American policy planners were primarily focused on the prospect of a South Asian war, and they did not challenge Pakistan on Afghanistan and Al Qaeda.
The relationship was steeped in suspicion. In 1998, the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles on bin Laden camps in Afghanistan, in retaliation for the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. No terrorist leaders were killed. Officials in Washington speculated that one or more Pakistani officials might have tipped off the Taliban or al Qaeda, the report said.
Until Sept. 11, 2001, policy discussions in the Clinton and Bush administrations were largely about whether to impose new sanctions or to ease sanctions, the commission found.
Enlisting the cooperation of General Musharraf beyond lip service was a difficult task until the Qaeda attacks, according to the report.
But two days after the attacks, top Bush administration officials seeking an overarching antiterror strategy concluded that if Pakistan did not help the United States, it could fall in the sights of the American military. At the same time, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the Pakistani ambassador and urged several concrete steps - including stopping Qaeda operatives at its border, cooperating on intelligence and cutting off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban.
Pakistan made its decision swiftly. At a National Security Council meeting that afternoon, “Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that President Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terrorism,” the report said. Mr. Bush then ordered the Pentagon to draw up a military plan to strike the Taliban.
David Rhode contributed reporting from Pakistan to this article.