U.S= all talk about democracy but no action.

I recently read a report from Brookings that was mentioned in this article as well. This indeed is very sad and does prove my point that U.S policy is lopsided towards Arab /Muslim world. I am posting a total of three posts to make my point.
Point 1
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/05/politics/05powell.html?oref=login

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4 - When Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and other senior American officials arrive at a summit meeting in Morocco next week that is intended to promote democracy across the Arab world, they have no plans to introduce any political initiatives to encourage democratic change.

President Bush started speaking in 2002 about the need to bring democracy to the Arab nations. Since then, however, the popular view of the United States in the region has grown so dark, even hateful, that American officials are approaching the meeting with caution and with a package of financial and social initiatives that have only a scant relationship to the original goal of political change.

Administration officials and their allies defend the change in strategy, saying the United States should no longer try to take the lead.

“Others have gotten involved in the political side, and that is a good thing,” said Lorne W. Craner, who was assistant secretary of state for democracy and human rights until August and now is president of the International Republican Institute, a government-financed organization dedicated to advancing democracy worldwide. But administration officials said some senior officials in the State Department were frustrated by the unwillingness of their colleagues to raise political initiatives at the meeting.

A senior administration official involved in Middle East policy said that if the American program remained largely centered on business and financial initiatives, “that’s not good enough.” The United States needs “to hold people accountable,” he added.

Another official working in the same area added that Arab leaders were “willing to take the aid, but they’re not willing to carry out the reform.”

Mr. Powell, in a radio interview on Thursday, said he hoped the summit meeting participants would “come to an understanding of the need for reform and modernization in the broader Middle East and North Africa region.”

When the State Department set up a news media briefing last month on the Morocco meeting, it assigned Alan P. Larson, undersecretary of state for economic, business and agricultural affairs, to make the presentation. He said the meeting was intended “to create greater opportunities for the next generation in the broader Middle East” through grants and aid to small businesses, networking among regional financial institutions and exchanging “views about how to bring more capital in the region,” among other ideas. The United States is involved in most of those efforts through its Middle East Partnership Initiative.

In an interview, Mr. Larson contended that these and other financial proposals would contribute to democratic change, at least indirectly.

“When you help small entrepreneurs, that creates a middle-class part of the social underpinning of a democracy,” he said. “We see synergistic links between political and economic initiatives.”

He and other officials said more direct discussions of political change would come from the Democratic Assistance Dialogue, a new program administered by Italy, Turkey and Yemen intended to foster discussion of political change. But after an initial organizational meeting in Rome last month, future meetings have not yet been scheduled, said Burak Akcapar, counselor in the Turkish Embassy.

The Middle East Partnership Initiative, which has received $264 million from Congress since 1993, has a political component. But a study by two scholars at the Brookings Institution, published this week, found that it was “increasingly shifting its resources from democracy promotion and engagement with local volunteer organizations, to the far less provocative path of regime-led economic development.”

That “can have the effect of subsidizing an Arab government’s attempts to build a kinder, gentler autocracy,” it added.

“The whole thing rings hollow,” said Steven A. Cook, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan research group based in New York. “What is missing is not technical and financial know-how, it is the political will to reform,” said Mr. Cook, whose field of study is political change in the Arab world. “I don’t think these programs mesh with the president’s rhetoric.”

At the briefing, Mr. Larson emphasized repeatedly that the Morocco conference was not “an effort to impose anything from the outside as much as to facilitate efforts that are already being undertaken in the region” and “share experiences, share ideas” among Arab foreign ministers.

Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a public research organization, said, “If only the Arab leaders are involved, that will be a brief discussion.”

Anger about a perceived bias toward Israel in Washington and about the war in Iraq have made the United States quite unpopular among many in the Arab world. Then, in February, when an Arabic newspaper published a draft of a Bush administration plan urging the world’s wealthiest nations to press for political change in the Middle East, several Arab leaders erupted in anger. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, a close ally of Washington, called the plan “delusional.”

The administration quickly abandoned the plan.

The unspoken fact behind all of the discussions, said Leslie Campbell, director of the Middle East Program at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, a government-financed group that promotes democracy worldwide, “is that we are trying to work with a bunch of people who are going to be kicked out of office” if democratic change moves forward. For now, he added, “it’s easier to support free-trade agreements than political change.”

Now, not only do many Arab leaders oppose the plan for broad democratic change, so do some opposition leaders.

“The Bush plan is opposed by the ruling elites who fear losing their privileges and powers,” wrote Amir Taheri, a political commentator, in Gulf News, “and by a variety of oppositionists who use anti-Americanism as the key element of their political message.”

There is little question that Arab leaders prefer the new approach. A senior Arab diplomat said in an interview that when American officials spoke to his nation’s prime minister about political change recently, "the prime minister told them: ‘I have two trains - the political train and the economic train. And the political train cannot run ahead of the other.’

“So we started talking to them about economic development,” the diplomat said.

A senior State Department official said discussions with several Arab states brought similar results.

In a speech to open a session of Parliament on Wednesday, King Abdullah II of Jordan emphasized that his country must continue “reform, modernization and development,” which would enable “the Jordanian individual to actively take part in formulating the present and the future.” He went on to emphasize that change should be focused on fighting “poverty and unemployment.”

Mr. Craner, the former State Department official, said: “I would watch for the prominence of political versus economic and social reforms discussed at the meeting. If it is mostly economic and social, it is not a good sign.”

The senior Arab diplomat offered a broader warning.

“Something must happen as a result of this meeting,” he said. “If nothing happens, it will be very difficult to keep this alive because there are lots of people who want to kill it.”

Steven R. Weisman contributed reporting from Washington for this article.

Point 2
My point in bold

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/05/international/asia/05pakistan.html

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4 - Despite the recent pullback of Pakistani troops from tribal areas where some believe Osama bin Laden may be hiding, President Bush told Pakistan’s president, Pervez Musharraf, on Saturday that the troops have “been incredibly active and very brave” in routing out Al Qaeda terrorists.
The comments came during a stopover by Mr. Musharraf on his way to Britain, in a rare visit to the White House on a Saturday by a foreign leader.
“The president has been a determined leader to bring to justice not only people like Osama bin Laden,” Mr. Bush said, "but to bring to justice those who would inflict harm and pain on his own people.
“Remember, this is a man whose life had been threatened by, and still is threatened by, Al Qaeda leadership,” he said, a reference to the two assassination attempts on Mr. Musharraf last year.
Mr. Bush’s comments were a continuation of the White House’s strategy of using visits like this to bolster Mr. Musharraf’s leadership and to play down the tensions between the United States and Pakistan.
Those tensions have grown more acute, despite public pronouncements. White House and intelligence agency officials have complained that the flow of information from Pakistan about the nuclear smuggling network built by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear program, has slowed to a trickle. Mr. Musharraf has refused to allow the United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations’ nuclear monitoring body to interview Dr. Khan directly, insisting that the questions be passed through Pakistani officials.
Many American officials believe that is a way of filtering both the questions and the answers, perhaps to make sure that no current government or military officials are implicated in an investigation into the network’s role in arming Iran, North Korea and Libya.
“Everyone knows that this reaches well into the Pakistani leadership,” a European diplomat involved in the investigation said this week, “and the Pakistanis are being very careful.”
But a senior administration official said Saturday that Mr. Bush had raised the issue only obliquely, asking Mr. Musharraf to assure that there is continued cooperation. The official said Mr. Musharraf “didn’t seem aware that there was any problem,” and promised to look into it.
There was apparently no direct discussion of Mr. Musharraf’s decision not to give up his role as leader of the Pakistani military, as he had promised more than a year ago. Mr. Bush used the visit, in fact, to praise the expansion of democracy in the country.
“There are some in the world who do not believe that a Muslim society can self-govern,” Mr. Bush said. “Some believe that the only solution for government in parts of the world is for there to be tyranny or despotism. I don’t believe that. The Pakistan people have proven that those cynics are wrong.”

Mr. Musharraf, according to a senior administration official who sat in on the meeting in the Oval Office, brought his commerce minister, and Mr. Bush made plain that the Pakistanis had complaints about the relationship with the United States, mostly involving trade restrictions.
Mr. Bush also made no announcement of any impending American agreement to sell surveillance airplanes, antitank missiles and other weapons to Pakistan.
The senior official declined to answer any questions about the American position on those sales, which include F-16 fighter jets, saying, “It came up, as it has in past meetings, and probably will in future meetings.”

A comment on underlined: A big detour to come across atlantic for a stopover. My my

Point 3
See the brookings report.
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/wittes20041129.htm

If President Bush’s rhetoric on promoting democracy in the Middle East has been bold and ambitious, the implementation of his “forward strategy of freedom” has been rather more tortuous. Diplomatic fights with European allies and harsh critiques from friendly Arab regimes watered down the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative, announced at the G-8 summit in June. Bush’s proposal to double funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, the United States’ main tool for democracy promotion abroad, was rejected by the House of Representatives. But while most of the administration’s democracy promotion policy remains at the conceptual level, there is one exception: the Middle East Partnership Initiative, or MEPI. Nearly two years old, MEPI has already spent over $103 million on behalf of educational, economic, and political reform and women’s empowerment in the Middle East.

MEPI was meant as an antidote to America’s traditional focus on government-to-government, large-scale aid programs, and a recognition by the U.S. government that effective reform in economies and society had to be accompanied by increased political freedoms.1 Instead of large projects, MEPI was designed to provide smaller grants to build partnerships with non-governmental Arab groups and local citizens, and to build links across Middle Eastern countries. Inherent in this approach was a judgment that Arab governments had not sufficiently recognized their looming demographic and economic challenges, and had not fully embraced the need for political, economic, and social reform. Instead, the thinking went, they would need to be goaded toward change by a combination of independent American assistance and grassroots activism.

After close to two years of operation, how well is this new democracy-promotion tool meeting its aims? A review of MEPI’s spending, programs, and priorities reveals three troubling flaws: a scatter-shot approach to promoting reform; an overemphasis on government-directed assistance that repeats instead of repairs the errors of our past assistance in the region; and, most worrying, a lack of support at higher policy levels for its goals and projects. MEPI’s problems in fact reveal the deep ambivalence with which the president’s forward strategy of freedom is being implemented. As such, its record raises troubling prospects for democracy promotion as an aim of American policy in the Middle East.

BACKGROUND

MEPI was headed at its inception by then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (and vice-presidential daughter) Elizabeth Cheney, giving it high-level political clout within the Administration to back up its muscular focus on a new approach to American democracy assistance. Despite two leadership changes since then (the program is now headed by Scott Carpenter, a political appointee with previous experience in democracy promotion), MEPI has steadily increased its staff and funding, and even opened field offices in two Arab countries (United Arab Emirates and Tunisia) to help advance its agenda of Middle Eastern reform.

Although MEPI was initially allocated only $29 million in reprogrammed FY02 State Department funds, the emergency war-related supplemental appropriation bill, passed in March 2003, increased MEPI’s funding by $100 million. The Bush Administration requested an additional $145 million for the program in FY04, but the House Appropriations Committee reduced the funding to $45 million, citing concerns about duplication of existing aid programs and noting that MEPI was “defined only in the most general terms.” In the FY05 Foreign Operations bill passed by the House this summer, MEPI was granted another $90 million, again less than the administration request (of $150 million), but without the negative committee language. Thus, MEPI has received a total of $264 million, of which it has spent, according to public records, just over $103 million.2

In the 22 months since its founding, MEPI has sought both impact and legitimacy by addressing the reform priorities identified by Arab scholars in the 2002 UN Arab Human Development Report. That report identified four deficits hindering developmental progress in the Arab world: deficits in political freedom, economic freedom, knowledge, and women’s empowerment. MEPI is thus divided into four pillars: economic reform, political reform, educational reform, and women’s empowerment. Each pillar’s goals are outlined in the chart below…

MISPLACED PRIORITIES

MEPI’s first main flaw is the evident lack of a coherent strategy, which hampers the program’s ability to have a noticeable impact on deeply entrenched social problems and reluctant target governments. In its first nineteen months of operation, MEPI spent its largest share of funds on political reform projects (33 percent or $34,015,000), and the smallest share on women’s empowerment projects (16 percent or $16,981,904). Education reform and economic reform received 25 and 24 percent of MEPI’s funding (or $25,900,000 and $24,626,280), respectively. In principle, this allocation, with political reform most prominent, reflects the president’s stated priorities for Middle Eastern reform. But in practice, the programs funded by MEPI present a scatter-shot approach to reform that does not take account of the political hurdles to economic and social reform and that splits an already-small funding pie into miniscule fragments.

MEPI’s first-year programs run the gamut from the mundane to the visionary. Economic reform grants include funds to translate Algeria’s documentary submissions to the World Trade Organization ($963,000), link Tunisian and American companies for investment ($100,000), train entrepreneurs ($786,575), and boost intraregional trade ($600,000). Education programs include “English in a Box” teaching resources for Jordanian and Moroccan teachers ($400,000), internet links between Yemeni and American high schools ($1.5 million) and a “child centered education program” for selected states in North Africa and the Gulf ($1.1 million). Women’s empowerment programs include projects to teach women to read and advocacy programs to combat honor killings. While these projects individually present worthy opportunities to improve the lives of Arab men, women, and children, the sheer diversity of audiences and issues addressed by these programs means that their impact is likely to be limited in both scope and longevity.

MEPI’s lack of focus seems to result from two distinct forces: first, the pressure on MEPI’s staff to “spend out” their authorized budget in order to justify requests for more funding meant that, especially in the first year, projects did not receive much scrutiny for their fit within an overall strategic plan. Moreover, the desire to demonstrate short-term accomplishments to congressional committees led MEPI to favor small, quick-impact programs, such as one-time training seminars, over those with more potential to produce long-term payoffs. Second, MEPI’s implementation has so far relied heavily on local embassy staff and host governments to recommend programs for potential funding—and that has meant that MEPI’s intent to further policy reforms in Arab states has been blunted by the direction of MEPI funds to “benign” programs favored by host governments, such as girls’ literacy and technical assistance to regime agencies or regime-approved organizations. While MEPI is beginning now to use its field offices and increased staff to build strategic plans, its first two years of funding are not likely to produce significant payoffs in educational, economic or political reform for Arab citizens.
The article is too big for copying and pasting so read on at the site above.

Yeah democrohypocrisy

you mean the type like when they select hand picked puppets and say here you go another democracy puppet for yah!

Stuff democracy its for suckers anyway!

We want islam not kuffar systems and laws!