TTP and the Haqqanis

Society Pakistan & World Affairs
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The Pakistani establishment views Haqqanis as an strategic asset that does not attack Pakistan and have protected them in N. Waziristan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan are however viewed as the enemy of the state and agents of India. Here is a video of a news conference of police showing off weapons confiscated in the Shabqadar area. Watch the video at 1:29, it shows a letter on TTP letter head written to some person named Noorwain(?) providing some sort of a guarantee to the letter holder named Ubaidullah. The letter is signed clearly by Shakeel Ahmed Haqqani and sealed.

This shows that TTP is nothing more than an extension of the Haqqanis who are also closely linked to the AlQaeda. Those who try to distinguish between these terrorist networks as friendly and enemy are mistaken in the their naivete. These terrorists are linked together.

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Pakistan is going to have to go into N Waziristan eventually.

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good try, keep it up... i didn't watch the video (cant) but i don't think youtube videos like this hold any weight specially when 2 such attempts proved to be fake earlier where army was shooting civilians...

and just think about it... haqqanis, the same haqqanis who openly declared many times in past (along with afghan talebans) that they have no links with TTP and they urged them to stop operating in Pakistan... and the same haqqanis who are organized and trained enough that they give us/nato very hard time... now they are stupid enough that their leader is signing a "letter head" of a group which they openly claim not being part of... no sane person with experience of fighting with americans specially in these times when propaganda war is much more in action than the real war in battle field, is gonna every do anything stupid of this level...

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Re: TTP and the Haqqanis

^^^ good job of passing the opinion without looking at the video. It is not a video made by your favorite villian "America". It is a Dawn news video clip of the press conference by KP police. The letter is shown only briefly is not the main focus of the report. Continue on with the denial mode.

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Its the army which has to deal with these people and if them themselves are in the denial mode then you cant blame the general populace. e.g. I have read in some news items that general kiyani told obama during the last meeting that the position pakistan is at the present is due to joining in american war on terror, and thats the exact reason why the pakistan military doesnt want to carry out operation in nwa because they believe that by this americans want to shift the afghan war into pakistan, so the statement "pakistan will not be part of american great game in the region".

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**this news is not related to this topic but gives an idea of Pak-US relations. During the previous meeting between Kayani and Obama the former handed over Pakistani strategic concerns regarding the issue especially when americans leave the region…and these strategic interests are defining when pakistan carries out the operation in nwa…besides at the end of the day you will have to negotiate with taleban as they wouldnt vanish in thin air, and if you have spoilt relations with all of them where will we be…the americans have no concern they will leave the region sooner or later but we have to live here…

http://www.dawn.com/2010/12/02/policy-paper-catches-obamas-attention.html

Policy paper catches Obama’s attention
From the Newspaper
December 2, 2010
By Syed Talat Hussain
ISLAMABAD: “General, rest assured. I will read every word of it,” said US President Barack Obama to the Pakistan chief of army staff who had just handed him a 13-page document.

On his way out of the room President Obama took the paper with him, not leaving it for his staff to place in the usual pipelines of official communication.

**The document, branded as a non-paper, is an attempt to give voice to Pakistan`s strategic interests in the policy review of the Afghanistan situation under way at the White House.
**
Diplomatic sources confirm that by taking the extraordinary step of placing the paper directly in the hands of President Obama, Gen Kayani has placed a strong “foot in the door of policy review”.

“I cannot say that the paper is going to be become President Obama`s favourite reading material, but for the first time he has a direct understanding of where the Pakistan military is coming from on issues that are vital for the US and for global security,” said a western diplomat.

“I know at least one person who is quite convinced of the paper`s arguments, and his name is Lt-Gen Douglas E. Lute,” said the diplomat, talking of the senior adviser and coordinator for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“The other person I have heard speak in great detail about the paper`s contents is the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Michael Mullen,” said the same source.

**The five-part paper details Pakistans assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, with regard to the ongoing conflict and efforts to negotiate with the Taliban. It focuses on the nature of Pakistans relations with the US and lists the possible ways out of the widening trust deficit between the two countries. It marks Pakistans concerns regarding India, besides reviewing counter-terrorism efforts in the Fata region. It closes on a rather harsh note where the Pakistani publics perceptions of the US are listed as a way of portraying the challenges ahead for both Washington and Islamabad.
**
Diplomatic sources in Islamabad claim that on the eve of the policy review the paper has become “a rather significant document used not just for reference but also to assess precisely where Pakistan stands on the matrix of South Asian security”.“This is the first time we have a written account of the Pakistani establishments core concerns,” said a western diplomat who has knowledge of the papers contents.

Pakistan foreign office sources confirm that penning strategic concerns in totality is unusual. “This reduces diplomatic manoeuvrability,” said an official. “But this paper had to be sent because we were not sure whether Pakistan`s point of view is properly understood in the White House.** President Obama needs to understand the full context of our arguments on Afghanistan, on strategic ties with the US and India, and counter-terrorism.”**

He admitted, however, that the paper did not have “a whole lot of input” from the Pakistan foreign office. “When it was prepared it was a highly classified document. I don`t think more than a handful of people knew what was going to be in it and how it was going to be presented,” said the official.

These people included Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. Official sources confirm that both the prime minister and the foreign minister read the paper before it was handed over. The paper had decisive input from military commanders and the ISI. Military sources say that it took three days to chisel out the final version.

Cross-questioning

Pakistani delegates who attended the strategic dialogue`s formal round in Washington the day after the paper was handed over to President Obama said that all the US participants were carrying copies of it.

“The first round of the talks was more like senate committee cross-questioning,” said a Pakistani member of the delegation. “Gen Kayani and the foreign minister were bombarded with queries by US members.”

The way forward in Afghanistan attracted the most attention.

“The US administration is caught in a difficult situation. They are preconditioning dialogue with the Taliban. They want the Taliban to first renounce violence, publicly disown Al Qaeda, and swear to abide by the constitution of Afghanistan,” said a Pakistani member of the delegation requesting anonymity. “What we are saying is that these preconditions should become end-conditions: negotiations should be a way to reach these goals.”

Those who have seen the paper say that it highlights the urgency of the situation in Afghanistan, saying that time is “short” and resources “limited”. It warns Washington that “idealism will have to operate within the confines of hard ground realities”.

**Talking about the perquisite for an “all-embracing solution” to Afghanistan`s problem the paper says that sharp focus has to be kept on the “history, geography and culture of Afghanistan”. **It suggests that a “new strategic framework” has to be defined, including an “operating strategy”.

Long-term interests**

**The paper calls Afghanistan`s war a matter of life and death for Pakistan. Gen Kayani articulated a similar argument in front of the US president while handing over the paper.

“Afghanistan is not just another war for us,” the general told the president, according to a delegate present. “We have to look after our long-term interests and cannot do anything in the short-term that would compromise those.”

In the paper, Pakistan`s long-term interests are defined as “achieving enduring peace based on a stable environment”. **The usual terminology of “friendly Afghanistan” does not find mention in the final outcome suggested in the paper, said a military source familiar with its contents.

Pakistans desire to see “an all inclusive approach, open to all Afghans irrespective of their opposing viewpoints” permeates the papers portion on Afghanistan. But even then it says that peace in Afghanistan might never be “complete, permanently stable, or uncontested” and should always be judged in “relative terms and in the Afghan environment”.

It advises Washington to have a “minimal agenda” and push for “broader public support” to achieve stability in Afghanistan.

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http://news.yahoo.com/s/time/20101222/wl_time/08599203932100

Pakistan Sees An Alternative Endgame in Afghanistan

By OMAR WARAICH / ISLAMABAD – Wed Dec 22, 6:25 pm ET

For Pakistanis, the phrasing may have been delicate but the message of the Obama Administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan review was clear: Washington is not satisfied with Pakistan’s efforts against al-Qaeda militants hiding in the Tribal Areas, or its failure to deny the Afghan insurgency sanctuaries on its side of the border. The five-page summary of the Administration’s assessment that was released publicly even included concerns about the stability of nuclear weapons in the region. Nine years after Pakistan became Washington’s key frontline ally in its war on terrorism, the two sides have yet to align their priorities - but Pakistan’s military leaders may be trying to interest Washington in a workable endgame.
A senior government official speaking on condition of anonymity says President Obama’s suggestion that Pakistan’s progress has been slow underscores lingering mistrust. “We would have preferred if the U.S. government had spoken of joint failures and problems on the Afghan side of the border as well,” says the official. In fact, Pakistan sees the review as having sanitized U.S. failures in Afghanistan, while casting blame on Pakistan.

The strategy review does acknowledge some progress, pointing out that Pakistan has taken action in six of the seven tribal areas along the border. “That’s a very diplomatic way of saying they have failed to go into North Waziristan,” says a senior Western diplomat. Sometimes described as the world’s most dangerous place, North Waziristan is home to the most lethal militant elements operating not just in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan. The Haqqani militant network uses it as a launching pad for attacks on U.S. and NATO troops across the border, while an assortment of groups active in Pakistan are either headquartered or sheltered there. And the U.S. has for months been trying to get Pakistan to send troops into the area.

Pakistan has agreed in principle to mount an offensive there, but insists that it will do so at a time of its own choosing. “There is little prospect of an offensive at least before February,” says Talat Masood, a retired general and analyst. “Indeed, in the winter, it won’t be able to hold the ground at night, they would need two and a half divisions. And they have to consolidate the areas they’ve already cleared [of Pakistani Taliban] in Swat and South Waziristan. There is a worry that they may lose ground there.” And while Washington complains of a porous border, the Pakistanis would like to see U.S. troops do more to fortify its Afghan side. (Read “Is Pakistan Losing Patience in the War on Terror?”)

Skepticism of the U.S. review isn’t confined to its assessment of Pakistan’s progress. “The strategy review boasts about gains made in Afghanistan, but says that they are ‘fragile and reversible’,” says Mushahid Hussain, a prominent Pakistani politician. “What does that mean? We saw what happened in Marjah and Kandahar. The Americans are looking for a scapegoat in Pakistan for a strategy that has failed in Afghanistan.”
On a visit to Washington shortly before the strategy review was released, Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani gave President Obama a 14-page document detailing Pakistan’s concerns in the region. “It was the clearest enunciation in writing of Pakistan’s core national security interests,” says politician Hussain, who has seen the classified document. “It laid out Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan,” he adds, “saying that we seek a stable and peaceful Afghanistan - not necessarily a friendly Afghanistan.” The suggestion is that Islamabad will settle for less than the restoration of a Taliban-dominated proxy government in Kabul. (Watch TIME’s video of the battle for Marjah.)

The document also acknowledges India’s regional role and interests, but argues that it should not pursue these at Pakistan’s expense. Pakistan, if the logic of the document is pursued, appears to be preparing for a settlement in Afghanistan that would accommodate competing regional interests. Until now, it has angrily denounced what it sees as a Northern Alliance-dominated regime in Kabul under Indian sway, and accused New Delhi of using its consulates in Afghanistan to back armed Baloch separatist groups attacking Pakistan.

General Kayani is said to have repeated familiar arguments for delaying an offensive in North Waziristan, but the unspoken reason for hesitation is the fact that the militant group there that Washington most wants the Pakistanis to tackle is the potent Haqqani network - a longstanding ally of Pakistani intelligence. (Watch TIME’s video on the dilemma facing Pakistan’s army.)

The Pakistanis also believe Washington is adjusting its own position: Whereas it has previously set the preconditions for talking to the Taliban - renunciation of al-Qaeda, laying down arms, and accepting the Afghan constitution - Pakistan’s generals today believe these are now end goals rather than preconditions for talks. Indeed, they believe the endgame has begun, and are encouraged by the reaffirmation of next summer as the starting date for a drawdown of U.S. troops - although they oppose General David Petraeus’ emphasis on escalating military action. (Comment on this story.)
Pakistan’s security establishment seeks to be the principal interlocutor with militant groups in any deal.** “The Pakistani military leadership,” says retired general Masood, “would prefer some sort of an understanding with Haqqani, so he can share some power in a post-withdrawal government. But Washington doesn’t want to speak to the Haqqanis, deeming them irreconcilables.” Yet U.S. officials have told their Pakistani counterparts that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar isn’t interested in talking to the Americans. “Mullah Mohammad Omar is believed to be supremely confident of his chances,” says Masood. “If he is willing to talk, it would be to the Pakistanis.” And that’s where Pakistan senses an opportunity to help the U.S. end the war**

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Re: TTP and the Haqqanis

^^^Thank you for posting the articles. They enforce the presumption that I stated that the establishment in Pakistan view the Haqqanis (and Taliban) as a strategic asset useful for future and long term interests of Pakistan. However, all evidence past and present points out that Haqqanis (and Taliban) are not the assets that would or could safeguard Pakistan's long term interests in Afghanistan. On the contrary it seems that they are the biggest long term threat to Pakistan. They have formed and supported this TTP organization exclusively to target the Pakistani state and people. They don't recognize the Durand line just like Daud. Their drugs, guns , smuggling and violence threatens Pakistan.

They don't follow Pakistan's directives while drawing more and more from the Pakistani state. The establishment appears to betting on the wrong horse here. I will be happy if someone can point to any evidence that show that these people have actually been proven to be a reliable asset.