Even though, one should not grieve over a death of a soldier, but this one was particulary sad considering his level of expertise and accomplishments. I found this article on one of the websites, written by Qadri himself.
Pakistan’s Afghan War:
Air Strategy and Operations
By Air Commodore A. Hameed Qadri (PAF)
Introduction
The Defence Forces of Pakistan are entrusted with the responsibility of providing ready and responsive capability to counter any challenge to national security. In order to succeed in such a mission, either by deterring or defeating the threat, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) shares the task equally with the other services. The core around which the entire edifice of the defence and military doctrines is structured remains the ‘Visualization of the Threat’. Threat and capabilities in a given environment are ever changing factors. Continual review of these makes an essential prerequisite in keeping the formulated military strategy current, relevant and applicable.
In December 1979, the massive influx of Russian forces into Afghanistan transformed the geo-political scenario of the region. The ulterior motives behind the events, for times to come, would remain a subject of discussion and analyses for the students of military history and international affairs. However, as perceived in Pakistan, the long-term principal objective of the erstwhile Soviet Union was access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. This change, with strong military overtones, brought forth certain stark realities and limitations of our military system. Till then, as the envisaged threat emanated from the East, so quite naturally the force structure, organization and plans of the PAF were orchestrated only towards that direction. The newly emerged volatile, dangerous and unpredictable situation in the West called for a re-evaluation of our land and air strategy.
At this important juncture in history, Pakistan’s political and military leadership rose to the occasion. The decision to resist Soviet military aggression at all costs was one of the boldest policy decision taken at the national forum - hopefully for its far-sightedness it would get its due recognition by posterity. The factor that eased the situation for Pakistan was the convergence of the national interests which forced the United States to offer military assistance. However, the revised land strategy in general and air strategy in particular, seemed to have been influenced by the compulsions of policies set by the political leadership. The aim of this article is to analyze the air strategy adopted by the PAF, and recap the salient aspects of the conduct of air operations on the Western front.
Formulation of Air Strategy
The pattern of the Soviet forces build-up in Afghanistan and their subsequent employment, along with their pre occupation with combating Afghan resistance, suggested that a full-scale ground offensive against Pakistan was probably neither a viable option nor was it likely. Hostile, rugged terrain along the Durand Line [Pak-Afghan border] being unfavourable for large-scale armour employment, reinforced this notion. Any manoeuvre across the Pak-Afghan border had to be infantry biased and supported with artillery. Under this scenario, it seems that a decision was taken by both the Pakistan Army and the PAF that concurrent deployment of forces on the east as well as the west was too costly in terms of the burden on our limited inventory. Therefore, resources to counter the new threat were deployed from the existing resources in various sectors of the western front. Simultaneously, plans were chalked out to redeploy these forces on the eastern theatre, if the situation so demanded. Incidentally, throughout the Afghan conflict our arch-rival India never let and opportunity go unexploited in exerting pressure on our eastern border. Throughout the 1980s, she continued to assess our vulnerability arising from divided military strength for the realisation of her aims at different times. To our great discomfort, her will to exploit situations for achieving her multiple aims, manifested openly time and again required a suitable response. The most serious ones that merit mention are: the threat of a possible surprise attack on Pakistani nuclear installations and the massive assembly of forces along our borders during exercise Brass Tacks. While dealing with the situation on the western border, the PAF along with the Pakistan Army, had to also remain prepared to meet the threat on its eastern border. During the same decade, the fervour of non-proliferation at international level was at its peak. Pakistan allegedly, as portrayed by the West, was at the threshold of acquiring nuclear capability. The threat of a possible Israeli attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations, with or without the support of regional and extra-regional players, was a real possibility. This threat required both a realistic assessment as well as suitable measures to address the contingency. Thus, the air strategy called for undertaking the following tasks simultaneously at the operational level:-
(a) Defend Pakistani airspace on the western front against air violations while remaining prepared to deal with further escalation of the Afghan conflict.
(b) Defend Pakistani nuclear facilities against a possible surprise attack from Indian and Israeli Air Forces, jointly or separately.
(c) Remain prepared to undertake full-range of operations, if called upon to do so, on the eastern border.
Getting Prepared
Without going into details of the various policy options which must have been considered by the then political and military leadership to protect Pakistan’s long-term interests in the region, the approach adopted by the PAF to tackle the above-mentioned tasks could now be discussed. The PAF, at this juncture, had to modernize its force to achieve a meaningful qualitative edge, if a credible deterrence had to be offered to its adversary, equipped with state-of-the-art equipment. Making a tough decision, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) and his Air Staff wisely, in the first two years of the war, turned down US offers of providing low technology F-5E and A-10 aircraft. The argument, put forth by the United States government that only these aircraft could efficiently be absorbed and effectively employed by the PAF, was rejected. The PAF leadership insisted that it could not recommend the purchase of such outdated and less capable aircraft to its Government; and felt fully confident of assimilating advanced technology, and mastering the latest American weapon systems. Standing on its ground firmly, the PAF was able to persuade the Government of Pakistan and of the United States to allow purchase of F-16 aircraft, which were inducted in operational service in 1983. The F-16’s air intercept radar, and its potent weapons, provided the much-needed cutting edge to the PAF and helped in overcoming the terrain-imposed limitation of ground based radar to some extent. In the hands of well-trained PAF fighter pilots, F-16 aircraft were a force to reckon with. Except for the initial batch of six pilots, all F-16 aircrew were trained by the PAF itself without any foreign assistance. The PAF devised a strategy aimed at deterring the enemy from intruding into our airspace, and hot pursuit operations, through Defensive Counter Air Operations (DCAO) only. It also continued to demonstrate its resolve to deal with large-scale aggressions on our western and eastern fronts. Initially, air violations on the Afghan front were countered by ordering air defence scrambles from Forward Operational Bases (FOBs).
Subsequently in 1986, when the intensity of our airspace violations increased, a heavier response in the shape of Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) along the western border was put up with reasonable success. The dictates of defence policy required the adaptation of a defensive posture, and the exercise of restraint, to keep the conflict from over-spilling the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan.
PAF on War Footing
At the operational level, the strategy devised had much different implications for the PAF than for the Pakistan Army. It was often not understood or appreciated by those not involved in it. The Pakistan Army deployed necessary force along the western border while the bulk of its forces still remained in cantonments or in exercise areas. Similarly, on the eastern front, reasonable warning was available to occupy battle locations. It was not so in case of the PAF particularly on western front as it operated from a limited number of air bases. As the PAF was forced to undertake only Defensive Counter Air Operations, which in simple words required maintenance of pilots and aircraft on ground alert round the clock and mounting continuous Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions, its air bases were kept at the highest level of operational readiness. In the achievement of the first task described earlier, air bases of the PAF’s Northern Air Command (NAC) were kept ready. Few PAF air bases, along the western border, from where aircraft took off to intercept or patrol our airspace were at war with the enemy. On the eastern front, the threat of a surprise attack on Pakistan’s nuclear installations by India or Israel required the PAF’s response from almost all flying units. The period during which Pakistan was engaged in dealing with the Afghan problem, was also one of growing tensions between Pakistan and India. Indeed, the PAF remained on war footing and prepared to contain any aggressor with all its might during this crucial period. Its aircrew and personnel remained available to react on short notice and continuously rehearsed their well-formulated plans. The spirit with which the above mentioned task was performed by the dedicated personnel of PAF, about which not much was made known to the public, deserves the highest praise. It should now be made available to public to enable them to acknowledge and appreciate the PAF’s role and achievements during those nine fateful years.
For the PAF, therefore, the situation was not much different from a full-fledged war which it undertook throughout the 1979-1988 conflict in general and during the 1986-88 period in particular. It entailed operating air defence sensors and command and control centres at their peak efficiency, while the men and officers remained operationally deployed in the field and on their respective air bases. Such was the level of readiness of the PAF that it could have gone to war almost without any warning. With such a state of preparedness why thousands of air violations, including incidents of attack on targets just inside our borders took place during the Afghan war, is a question which requires a deep understanding of air operations. Unless a no-fly zone was declared and established such intrusions could not have been prevented. It called for the aggressive employment of air power. A small air force like the PAF, however efficient it may be, cannot establish a no-fly zone over a 1,000 km long frontier. Moreover, the crossing of international borders to establish such a zone would have meant open confrontation amounting to war. The situation not only required a Herculean effort in terms of continuous CAPs but an early warning (EW) system to detect violations. Clearly such an objective was both untenable and unrealistic under the prevalent environment. This subject will be dealt with in greater details later.
Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE)
The defence of ones own airspace against hostile enemy aircraft is achieved by creating an Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE) through the setting up of a radar network to guide your own aircraft for interception. Before the 1979 Soviet invasion, the surveillance of our western border was carried out by high level radar only. Therefore, a new plan had to be made to create low as well as high level ADGE, especially covering the areas of interest. However, difficult and rugged mountainous terrain on the western border did not favour the setting up of an elaborate low-level network. Nevertheless, a quick re-deployment of the available resources was made in two distinct sectors. The first area, called the Northern Belt for ease of understanding, consisted of the land mass between Laram to Miranshah. This area witnessed maximum ground as well as air activity by the enemy during the war. The Southern Belt stretched from Quetta to Pishin in Balochistan. However, the intensity of activity in this area was not as much as in the north.
The deployment of Mobile Low-Level Radars (MPDRs) and Mobile Observers Units (MOUs) at the chosen sites was an uphill task. The tribal belt, insulated terrain and inaccessibility of the selected sites proved a limiting factor in providing contiguous coverage. The first to be deployed were the radars of No. 4084 and 4102 Squadrons at Landikotal and Aravali. Another coverage was provided by No. 410 Squadron, whereas low-level ADGE comprised a belt of MPDRs and MOUs. The radars located between Swat in the north to Miranshah to the south were manned round the clock by the officers and men of No. 483 Unit. These radars had to be provided with rations, water, spares and other day-to-day needs. Similarly, conditions in the south were as hostile and difficult as in the north.
Some of the air defence sites were completely cut off from the bases. During the winter season the personnel had to melt ice for washing and cooking. However, at no stage were the men and officers found lacking in morale and courage needed to sustain the operations. Air Defence Command (ADC) rightly deserves credit for the deployment of radar at Machlak and Khojal which were to play an important and meaningful role during the operations. Overall, many radar remained extremely under-manned as weapon controllers had to maintain the sites around the clock. The men and officers of the Air Defence Branch (ADB) are the unsung heroes of the PAF who withstood the rigours and pressures of real operations, weather and terrain for many years without respite.
Initially, F-6s from PAF Peshawar and PAF Samungli provided CAPs in their respective areas. Their primary role was to show PAF’s presence. The CAP pilots were specifically instructed to avoid engagements. More frequent CAPs were mounted as the number or air violations increased. Such was the caution exercised by the higher command that almost everyone who mattered monitored the progress of interceptions from Sector Operation Centre (SOC) and Northern Air Command Headquarters (NAC HQ). It almost amounted to breathing down the necks of our controllers by the senior staff, which restricted the freedom of combat controllers. Given the situation and strategy imperatives, as explained earlier, such caution and close monitoring is understandable in retrospect. The Afghan violations initially remained restricted to occasional 1-2 nm incursions. As the CAPs were maintained in depth with strict instructions to avoid engagement, the whole exercise was one of extreme frustration for the PAF’s controllers and pilots.
PAF’s Air Operations
A review of the operations reveals that squadrons other than the F-16s, were not afforded a fair chance to exploit the intercept opportunities to shoot intruders. Stringent rules of engagement, the cautious approach of the higher command and preference to use F-16s for western CAPs, appear to have been the causes behind such missed interceptions. Operational activities of various squadrons engaged on western front are described in following paragraphs:-
(a) No. 15 AS Squadron. This Squadron was the first one to be tasked with ADA duties in 1979, from PAF Peshawar. Their involvement on western border continued till the end of the war which required eight to ten pilots on ADA at one time. Periodically, a squadron detachment was also sent to another base to share duties for the defence of Kahuta. While thousands of hours were spent by the pilots on ADA, 2,142 hours were flown on the western border. Twice its pilots intercepted the enemy aircraft: first a Russian IL-26 on 1 March 1980, and second two MiG-21s in February 1986. The Squadron was not authorized to shoot, much to the frustration of its pilots.
(b) No. 26 TA Squadron. This squadron remained deployed on ADA from October 1984 at PAF Peshawar till the end of the conflict. Its pilots flew 1,564 western CAP missions whereas they were ordered 355 times to scramble for ‘hot’ interceptions. They repeatedly flew parallel to Afghan formations within our territory. Large enemy formations would cross back into Afghan airspace on sensing their presence. Demonstrating a high level of discipline and self-control, the pilots of No. 26 Squadron played their part in forcing the enemy to abandon their pursuit of Mujahideen across the border, and thus minimized damage to our own troops and population.
(c) No. 17 and 23 AS Squadrons. Both these squadrons operated from PAF Base Samungli in the southern part of the western border. No. 23 Squadron was put on air defence alert right from the beginning in 1979 whereas No. 17 Squadron took over the duty in May 1983. No. 23 Squadron flew a total of 376 CAP missions and 361 hot scrambles. On the other hand, No. 17 Squadron flew 682 CAP missions and was ordered to scramble 238 times. Resources of both the squadrons were stretched to the limit when their pilots had to share the defence of Kahuta from another base in the area of Northern Air Command. Unfortunately, a record of near engagements was not maintained. The same story of sighting the enemy and keeping an eye on him was also repeated here.
(d) No. 5 TA&R and No. 18 AS Squadrons. These squadrons operated from PAF Base Minhas (Kamra) in the relatively active period of 1986. Their participation was restricted to patrolling the border areas and manning the CAP stations with other squadrons. The enemy always respected their presence and did not dare to pursue attacks beyond the border. No. 5 Squadron flew 108 sorties, including 54 CAPs whereas No. 18 Squadron was scrambled 12 times.
(e) No. 11 AS Squadron. This squadron, established as an Operational Conversion Unit (OCU), played a significant role in training pilots for Afghan air operations. At the same time, the Squadron shared the operational duties with its sister units namely No. 9 and No. 14 AS Squadrons. The instructor pilots of No. 11 Squadron shared the burden of ADA duties and western CAP missions. Its pilots flew a total of 346 sorties on western CAP, out of which 256 CAPs were flown between the active period of February to May 1986 alone. Unfortunately the first-ever engagement, led by a senior commander was not successful because lack of proficiency on the newly acquired AIM-9L.
(f) No. 9 AS Squadron. This squadron, with its 16 pilots at any given time, participated actively for over four years and took the burden of operations especially during the period of increased activity on the western border. Its level of involvement can be judged from the fact that despite operational and training commitments, it generated more effort than any other squadron in support of western operations. It flew 2,221 sorties on the western border, including countless scrambles from PAF Sargodha. The Squadron was rewarded by three enemy kills: two SU-22 and an Elint aircraft during the conflict.
The Squadron comprised six section leaders, ably led by its squadron commander Wg. Cdr. Abdul Razzak. The other five section leaders included Sqn. Ldr. A. Hameed Qadri [author], Sqn. Ldr. Ikram Bhatti, Sqn. Ldr. Yousuf Chaudhry and Sqn. Ldr. (Late) Rahat Mujeeb Siddique. Pair Leader duties were shared by Sqn. Ldr. Kaiser Tufail, Sqn. Ldr. Faaiz Amir, Sqn. Ldr. Suhaib Afzal, Sqn. Ldr. Najam Saeed and Sqn. Ldr. Waseem-ud-Din. Those who flew as No. 2 in formations included Sqn. Ldr. Sikander Hayat, Sqn. Ldr. Altaf Saleem, Sqn. Ldr. Azhar Hussain, Sqn. Ldr. Imran Amin and Sqn. Ldr. Farooq Sikander. The CAP activity on the western border started in February 1986, when the Afghans bombed Mujahideen camps on the Pakistan border near Parachinar. These squadron pilots continuously manned CAP points in two ship formations from dawn to dusk on the western front, and also repeatedly came up in the air to provide air cover to nuclear installations. The defence of Kahuta was ensured at night as well. On any given day, all squadron pilots were detailed on ADA duties and long western CAPs while normal flying was squeezed in between this routine. The Squadron virtually operated from ADA location, round the clock. Frequent configuration changes and effort requirements put maximum strain on the Squadron and Base maintenance personnel. Operations at such a pace under combat conditions continued for a long time till No. 14 Squadron was re-equipped in September 1986 at PAF Base Minhas (Kamra). Suffice it to say that No. 9 MR Squadron successfully accomplished the task of guarding the western skies along with the other PAF squadrons.
(g) No. 14 MR Squadron. Immediately after its establishment at PAF Base Minhas (Kamra) in September 1986, No. 14 MR Squadron was put on air defence alert and started patrolling our western border. It remained involved in these operations till April 1989. The squadron flew a total of 1,825 sorties, including innumerable hot scrambles on the western border. The squadron comprised 16 pilots during the period of relatively increased hostility in 1986-87. Led by Wg. Cdr. Amjad Javed, its section leaders included Wg. Cdr. Shahzad Chaudhry, Wg. Cdr. Muzzafar, Wg. Cdr. Sami Toor, Sqn. Ldr. Ghazanfar, Sqn. Ldr. Khalid Cheema and Sqn. Ldr. Nauman. Six pair leaders namely Sqn. Ldr. Khalid Pervaiz, Flt. Lt. Athar Hussain, Flt. Lt. Sohail Gul, Flt. Lt. Badar Islam, Flt. Lt. Aftab Khan and Flt. Lt. Azhar Hussain led the two-ship formations. Number two positions were flown by Flt. Lt. Shahid Khan, Flt. Lt. Tahir Hamid, Flt. Lt. Khalid Mehmood and Flt. Lt. Shahid Sikander. During the year 1986-87, the Squadron shot down five Soviet/Afghan aircraft.
For the officers and families of No. 9 and later No. 14 Squadron, life was not normal during this period. There were long hours of anxiety, tension, odd flying times, fatigue and silent commitment towards national cause. They were involved in an actual shooting war on the borders where the situation could, within moments, develop into full-fledged combat. Only the aircrew of No. 14 Squadron could understand the stress and strain endured by their brethren-in-arm, the pilots of No. 9 Squadron, since the start of the western CAPs. The Base Commanders of Sargodha and Minhas, during those fateful years displayed exemplary leadership qualities by sharing this strain, monitoring operations and providing professional guidance.
[This message has been edited by outlaw (edited July 19, 2002).]
