This deal will not deliver

**This deal will not deliver **](The News International: Latest News Breaking, World, Entertainment, Royal News)

*Reality check

                     By Shafqat Mahmood*             
        
        The writer is a former member of parliament and a freelance columnist   based in Lahore 

The first reaction to a deal between Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf is a mixture of disbelief and outrage and it cuts across various fault lines. There are those who hate Musharraf and cannot believe that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter would throw a lifeline to a sinking military dictator. She is supposed to represents pro democracy/anti military forces, they say plaintively. Why is she sabotaging all those people who struggled valiantly since March for judicial independence, democracy and the rule of law?

Then, there is the other side: people who hate politicians and believe that Musharraf is the best thing that happened to this country. Not only do they eulogise his eight years in office, they believe that he is the only person who has the potential to take this nation forward and introduce something they grandly describe as haqooq ul ibad. For them too this is a betrayal. How could Musharraf agree to share power with people who are known looters and plunderers they ask?

Sitting astride these opinions are people who have no great love for either Benazir Bhutto or Musharraf. For them there is only one serious contradiction in this country and that is between ‘liberal’ ideals and extremism. I have put liberal in inverted commas because there is no consensus on what liberalism stands for. For many it is nothing more than a culture of modernity akin to western social and cultural practices. Seen in this context it becomes a lifestyle issue and the extremists are perceived as enemies because they threaten it.

It is interesting that for this liberal faction other liberal ideals of due process and rule of law take a back seat when it comes to fighting extremism. They covertly and in some cases some openly advocate tough military measures to suppress it even if it involves widespread killing. Their worldview seems closer to George Bush and Dick Cheney than John Stuart Mill but what of it. This is liberalism of the twenty-first century.

This category of liberals also believes that military strength married with popular support is the only mix that can rid this country of extremism. Thus, Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf getting together is a good thing for them. They are not particularly concerned that this could mean a set back for democracy or that in this partnership the military will always have an upper hand. They only want the PPP to provide a broader fig leaf to cover dictatorship’s naked power as it is directed against extremists.

The two protagonists actually cutting the deal couldn’t care less for any of these opinions. Musharraf has only one interest. He wants a smooth and as far as possible a credible transition to another five years in power. Once this end is achieved, he will be ready to tackle whatever troubles this cohabitation brings. The name of the game for him is not a stable future arrangement although it would be desirable if it comes about on his terms. What he really wants is to get through the election hurdle and have some legitimacy while doing it. This he hopes the PPP will provide.

For Benazir Bhutto, this deal is not just a lessening of pressure as far as cases are concerned or a re-entry into the corridors of power although both issues are important. She genuinely believes that if the party is dealt out of the power game for another five years, it will disintegrate. The example of her party men ditching her after 2002 elections is sobering reminder to her of how cruel the game of politics can be.

She also believes that coming into power is always through an arrangement and not through popular will. She forced herself into power in 1988 but only after the Americans helped and she agreed to General Beg’s terms. She was kept out in 1990 even though her voting percentage was more or less the same. She came into power in 1993 only after army acquiesced to it and was forced out in 1996 when the army refused to support her. She therefore thinks that only an arrangement or a deal will get her back into power.

An important part of this equation is the attitude of the Americans. They have no great respect for Benazir Bhutto as is evidenced by the fact that in the last eleven years, since she was ousted from power, hardly any American official of consequence met her. But, now they are willing to give her another chance because they have a great steak in the future of General Musharraf.

The Americans believe that despite all his troubles Musharraf is still their best bet in Pakistan. The difference in their thinking compared to the past is that they now believe he needs to be strengthened by adding a doze of popular support to his dictatorship. It is in this context that Benazir Bhutto and the PPP have again become relevant. I wouldn’t be surprised if Benazir gets a better reception in Washington this time than she has had in the recent past.

While all these deals and arrangements are being worked out what of the people? Do they matter at all? The situation on the ground is that Musharraf is an intensely hated figure. The extremists are of course his deadly enemies but his troubles do not end there. The entire liberal intelligentsia including lawyers, professionals, civil society activists, and the media only have a negative opinion of him. So do religiously inclined people of all persuasion. He is in the unique position where neither the left nor the right, neither the conservatives nor the liberals, except a miniscule faction, are standing with him.

Among the political forces he now has the overt support of the MQM and elements in the PML-Q. I say elements because most of the others would ditch him the moment he weakens. He also has the covert support of Benazir Bhutto and perhaps Maulana Fazalur Rehman but not of their party’s rank and file. The PPP is going through a severe crisis with a majority of its second and third line leaders and workers deeply unhappy with what their leader is up to. The same can be said of the JUI-F. Fazalur Rehman may covertly support Musharraf but does his party?

Meanwhile those opposed to Musharraf are finding a resonance among the people. Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif, Imran Khan, and even Qazi Hussain Ahmed are rising in stature because they refuse to accept Musharraf’s dictatorial rule. The office bearers of the bar associations are also making headlines with their anti Musharraf stand. So, does a deal between Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf brokered by the Americans and supported by a small faction of liberal intelligentsia mean anything to the people?

The only positive that I see in this deal is that Musharraf may be beguiled into allowing a free and fair election. If this happens, I am convinced that he and his supporters in the Q league and if the PPP joins them, will get an electoral thrashing they will remember for a long time.


This deal is such a turn off for some heavy weights within PPP itself. Razza Rabbani says he’ll resign if PPP goes through with it. Aitezaz might part ways too. Same goes for Farhatullah Babar. (then again, they might not) It’s really puzzling why BB wants to do a deal with a sinking boat…WHY :confused:

beats me every time.

Re: This deal will not deliver

why deal at the expense of longtime stalwarts of ppp. simple, she wants to make inroads for her son/daughter once she gets to become pm. remember thats what her father did during his reign. remove the children from the picture, and bb might as well renounce her pakistani citizenship and reside abroad forever. hence she will deal with the devil itself if it means getting the family to hold onto power. mind you i'm not calling mushy the devil here :D

Re: This deal will not deliver

achi achi baatain likhi hain babar sahb nay.

**
Fiction of democracy**
Legal eye

                     By Babar Sattar

Just when General Musharraf really began to struggle due to waning public support and patience for his military rule, Benazir Bhutto decides single-handedly to transform the political capital of Pakistan Peoples Party into questionable legitimacy for the general. This deal on the one hand epitomises the politics of pragmatism and expediency that continues to bedevil this country and on the other highlights our culture of idol-worship that reduces party democracy to autocracy and disables ordinary people from making any meaningful distinction between military dictatorship and civilian rule.

What is it that actually transpired in Abu Dhabi between the general and Benazir Bhutto? Are they not being contemptuous to the people of Pakistan in assuming that we don’t have a right to know what arrangements are being agreed upon to distribute the exercise of public power in our country? How is it that two individuals – one heading the military and other leading a mainstream political party – along with a handful cronies can secretly huddle-up in a foreign land and assume that they can determine the fate of 160 million Pakistanis? Why is it so easy for our ruling elites to even sell their souls to the devil and claim that it was done in the larger national interest without being mocked by the people?

It is questionable whether the procedural aspect of this deal is more disdainful to the concept of democracy or its substance more harmful to the future of representative politics in Pakistan. A deal between the general and PPP falls foul of the two basic fault-lines that will determine the future of democracy in Pakistan: the balance between civil-military relations in the polity and the moderate-extremist divide in the society. Military’s encroachment over state authority has neutered the growth and performance of vital state institutions, discredited the essential role of politics in an alive society and nourished a morally bankrupt pragmatism in the country that enables individuals to prefer expediency over principle and get away with it.

The military with its monopoly over brute force is primarily responsible for derailing democracy in Pakistan. But it couldn’t have accomplished such a feat without our homespun brand of politicians who are always eager to play second fiddle to military rulers at the cost of principles, integrity and democracy. Such a system suits the ruling political elites for continuous democracy supports competition and accountability, which in turn would curtail the life span of discredited politicians that this nation has had to endure for decades. How, for example, would Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain ever become the prime minister of Pakistan if we were a thriving democracy? Would Shaukat Aziz have a chance of landing from New York into the top ministerial slot?

Benazir Bhutto’s deal has lent support to the argument of the military’s apologists that armed forces only intervene in politics due to the invitation or acquiescence of politicians. The military has entrenched itself as the most powerful institution in Pakistan and so long as the civil-military imbalance subsists, it will remain tempting for political parties to engage with the military and use it to appropriate political power. But then so long as the politicians continue to succumb to such temptation for personal political gain, the domineering position of the military will be reinforced and the vicious cycle will go on. The Bhutto-Musharraf deal will thus vindicate the critics of democracy who don’t see representative governance thriving in Pakistan so long as its fortunes depend on self-seeking politicians whose concept of national interest never gets larger than themselves.

The deal will also exacerbate the moderate-extremist divide in Pakistan. The naivete of the idea that all centre-left parties can be clubbed together under American encouragement to defeat the growing tide of extremism in the country is glaring. First of all, General Musharraf has presided over the proliferation of extremism in Pakistan and is the author of a failed strategy to check militancy. Having mainstream centre-left parties support his failed strategy will not turn it into a success, but only discredit the liberal political parties as well. Benazir Bhutto or any other civilian prime minister will have no control over Pakistan’s internal and external security policy for at least so long as the general is in the picture. We don’t need a continuation of the general’s policies that have landed us into the mess we are in. We need to rethink our direction as a nation and devise a new strategy to steer us on, and for that we need new people and energy.

Second, part of what comes across as extremism is actually a violent (though completely unjustifiable) form of anti-Musharrafism. A change of facade will thus cause part of this spiral of violence to subside. And in order to defeat the more entrenched (and dangerous in the long-term) ideology of extremism that continues to brainwash recruits and incite violence in the name of religion, we need a multi-pronged approach contrived by a legitimately elected government. Third, it is a bad idea to draw lines in sand between so-called moderates and extremists at such a polarising time in the country’s history. The role of religion in the state and the society needs to be discussed, but at a time when the resulting consensus is well considered and not the knee-jerk reaction to perceived injustices against Muslims around the world. It is not in the interest of moderation or moderates to make religion the centre of political discourse in Pakistan at the moment and force people to pick sides.

The procedural aspect of this deal highlights the shallow veneer of democracy in Pakistan. What is the difference between a military dictator and an elected prime minister if both act in an equally autocratic manner and feel no need to engage in a consultative process while making decisions that lies at the heart of representative democracy? What is it that lesser PPP leaders and workers get from this deal after braving ten years of hostility from the state and ruling government? The promise of being prime minister for a third time, having accounts unfrozen, cases withdrawn and being allowed to return to Pakistan are all personal gains for Benazir Bhutto. Why is it that Benazir Bhutto could leave top party leadership in a lurch in London for a rendezvous with the general without igniting a storm of indignation? How will second-tier PPP leaders eat their words against the general and face people after being compromised? Can political parties be engines of democratic change if they continue to be run as personal fiefs by their feudal lords?

Compromises are a necessary part of politics, but only such compromises that are made with regard to policies. Policies can be tweaked to find middle ground and accommodate divergent viewpoints. But principles can either be upheld or betrayed, for a compromised principle is no principle at all. Benazir Bhutto had claimed military rule to be Pakistan’s main affliction, and the general has categorised corrupt and opportunistic leaders like Benazir Bhutto to be the scourge this country must watch out for. Their bear hug is one big compromise of principles only explicable in terms of personal interest of both. The logic of expediency is a false one as just proven by the chief justice and the lawyers’ movement. Principled positions resonate with the people when pursued with the courage of conviction. It is time we stop being apologists for our lesser political evils and raise the bar of expectation for everyone who ventures to opt for public office.

  • The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. He is a Rhodes Scholar and has an LL.M from Harvard Law School.*