Very well balanced article arguing the need for the military junta to make way for genuine representatives of people and true democracy in the country.
VIEW: The second coup **
](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\11\25\story_25-11-2007_pg3_2)
—Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi**
Even if we buy the official American argument that there are no attractive alternatives to Musharraf, what is the guarantee that a narrowly based political status-quo in Islamabad would continue to ensure stability and effectively tackle extremism and terrorism?
General Pervez Musharraf’s second coup on November 3, officially described as the State of Emergency, has channelled attention to Pakistan’s relations with the United States for understandable reasons. The US is viewed, in Pakistan, as one of the two sources of strength for the beleaguered Musharraf government.
The other source of strength is the Pakistan military.
Though the support of the latter is shaped mainly by its professional and corporate interests, its connections with the US in the security field, especially in the context of global war on terrorism, influence the Pakistan military’s policy choices.
General Musharraf won the goodwill of the Bush administration after his government turned its back on the Taliban government in Afghanistan and joined the US led war against terrorism in September 2001. Despite what the US administration described as the lapses and deficiencies in Pakistan’s policy on tackling extremism and terrorism, it valued Pakistan’s cooperation and rewarded it with economic assistance and military aid and sales.
Musharraf cashes in on America’s lack of better alternatives for accessing Afghanistan. Initially, the US used three Pakistani airfields for supply, logistics and emergency support to its troops in Afghanistan. Later, it used two airfields. In addition to intelligence sharing and military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the US uses Pakistani territory or air space to send ammunition, fuel and other supplies to Afghanistan. According to one American source, approximately 75 per cent of US supplies to Afghanistan pass through Pakistani territory or air-space. The US, of course, compensates the Pakistan government for these facilities and services.
President Bush often described Musharraf as a “friend of the US” and “a man of courage and vision.” American policy of friendship with Musharraf (which some describe as appeasement) continued after Musharraf assumed all power by setting aside the constitution. Though the US administration distanced itself from Musharraf’s domestic policy decision since November 3, the support was unrelenting, at least in the first two weeks. Condoleezza Rice said on November 12 that the general should be given time to “make good on his promises to return his country to democratic rule.”
US policy makers are unable or unwilling to recognise that Musharraf assumed dictatorial powers by suspending the constitution only to serve his own power agenda. The emergency is being used against the media, political leaders, lawyers and other societal groups who are protesting the suspension of the constitution, removal of judges and restrictions on the media. The emergency has nothing to do with Islamic militancy in Swat and Tribal areas. It aims only at securing Musharraf’s hold on power.
The US administration continues to express faith in Musharraf for putting the democratic process on the rails. And it continues to advise the moderate and liberal political and societal forces to work with Musharraf despite the fact that this section of the populace is the main victim of the emergency.
US Under Secretary of State John Negroponte’s visit to Islamabad has been a major disappointment for Pakistan’s political and societal circles and his statement reviewing the visit is totally out of line with the ground political realities in Pakistan.
The gist of Negroponte’s statement was that even though the US would like for Musharraf to withdraw the emergency and other restrictions on civil and political rights, it would continue working with him because he “has been and continues to be a strong voice against extremism. We value our partnership with the government of Pakistan under the leadership of President Musharraf.” He also urged the “political moderates” to seek reconciliation with Musharraf.
The US efforts to improve the representative character of the Musharraf government by bringing Benazir Bhutto on board have now collapsed in view of what has happened in Pakistan since November 3. Any opposition leader that agrees to be co-opted by Musharraf will be faced with a revolt in the party. However, the US administration is still hanging on to the outdated framework of bringing together moderate political forces under the leadership of Musharraf.
The policy makers in Washington are favourably inclined towards a solution of the current Pakistani crisis that ensures the centrality of Musharraf to the political arrangements. They think that no credible alternative to Musharraf is available and the political forces lack the capacity to guarantee Pakistan’s internal stability.
However, they want Musharraf to soften the handling of the political situation so that they can deflect the domestic pressure from the Congress and American media for a meaningful change in the policy towards Pakistan. Even if we buy the official American argument that there are no attractive alternatives to Musharraf, what is the guarantee that a narrowly based political status-quo in Islamabad would continue to ensure stability and effectively tackle extremism and terrorism?
It is erroneous to link counter terrorism, security of nuclear weapons and internal stability with Musharraf’s hold over power. The military as an institution attaches importance to counter terrorism and security of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, with or without military rule in the country.
Musharraf wants political accommodation on his terms which includes his acceptance as the president for the next five years and legitimisation of his action since November 3 by the reconstituted Supreme Court. He is using the election commission to force a tight election schedule to ensure the electoral triumph of his supporters. He needs a pliant parliament for securing the endorsement of his election and to give a legal cover to his actions after the suspension of the constitution, including the removal of the judges of the superior courts. This is the minimum he needs to hold on to his office.
**His determined approach to secure his rule reflected in his statement on November 18, arguing that that “the country was more important than the constitution and democracy and that he was doing the important job of saving the country.” In another statement he linked the security of nuclear weapons with his continuation in office. **
These considerations will shape his decision on the lifting of emergency, surrendering of the office of army chief, and reconciliation with the opposition.
American hope for political accommodation in Pakistan is misplaced. Given Musharraf’s high-speed strategy to secure himself in power, the opposition parties are left with the option of either seeking some auxiliary space in his game plan or challenging him in the streets.
**Pakistan is not Myanmar; the generals can’t rule indefinitely by relying exclusively on the administrative and coercive apparatus of the state. **
It is also not Iran that the alternative to Musharraf be a hard line Islamic clergy.
Unlike most Middle Eastern states and Africa’s Islamic countries, Pakistan has had a tradition (however weak) as well as some infra-structure that supports constitutionalism, the rule of law and representative governance. It has significant potential to become a democratic state. Long years of military authoritarian rule have not eroded societal commitment to democracy and fair and free elections.
**The real fight in Pakistan is not between moderates and Islamic hardliners but between the supporters of participatory governance and authoritarianism. **It is ironic that the US is seen in Pakistan as supportive of authoritarianism; it is undermining the political forces that could have been the mainstay of its counter-terrorism policy.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst