Babar Sattar
The swirling debate over the eligibility of General Musharaf for being ‘reelected’ president is confusing because both sides cite constitutional provisions to support their arguments. The general’s latest legal eagle, Attorney General Malik Qayyum, argues with a straight face that there is no legal barrier hampering our army chief’s reaffirmation as president under Pakistan’s fundamental law. Other more independent constitutional experts like Justices Wajeehud-in and Nasir Aslam Zahid have vociferously maintained that the general is constitutionally debarred from being a presidential candidate. Is our constitution really this vague that we cannot even develop a consensus over whether or not the army chief can simultaneously be the president of the country?![]()
It is actually not bizarre for reasonable lawyers and judges to disagree about legal rights in hard cases? On the contrary it is extraordinary when there is a complete consensus of legal opinion on an issue, like was witnessed during the judicial crisis in favour of the Chief Justice. There were a handful of lawyers (the present Attorney General included) who argued in support of the general’s position, but not for a moment was the legal fraternity persuaded by the merit of their arguments. Is the issue of a uniformed president much different then? Does the Constitution, even in its existing garbled form, allow the same person to run for president while being the army chief? Is it a hard case where reasonable legal minds would draw different conclusions? Further, what responsibility do able lawyers like Sharifuddin Pirzada and Malik Qayyum shoulder in helping to interpret the Constitution?
There are a few articles of the Constitution that need to be understood to follow the reelection debate. Article 41 outlines the timing of the presidential election and sub-clause (2) requires that the president be “qualified to be elected as member of the National Assembly”. Article 41(7) is the grandfather clause in our Constitution that has been used to reaffirm the position of dictators as constitutional presidents when the constitution stands revived after a coup. This clause was originally introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq to guarantee him self a five year presidential term. It was amended in 2002 on General Musharaf’s behest through the 17th Amendment to reaffirm the general’s position as president for five years after he chose to relinquish his position as Chief Executive.
The amended Article 41(7) also states that Article 63(1)(d) – that disqualifies a candidate from being elected member of the parliament if “he holds an office of profit in the services of Pakistan other than an office declared by law not to disqualify its holder” – shall become operative on December 31, 2004. This language was a product of the deal between the general and the MMA, wherein he promised to shed his uniform by the end of 2004 in lieu of MMA support for the 17th Amendment. The president then had a change of heart and decided not to quit the army chief position. To provide legal cover to his vault-face the parliament passed the President to Hold Another Office Act, 2004, that came into force on December 31, 2004, and stated that holding the office of army chief shall not disqualify the president under Article 63(1)(d) read together with 41(7).
There are at least two other articles of the Constitution that are relevant to this debate. The first is Article 43(1), which states that “the President shall not hold any office of profit in the service of Pakistan or occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the rendering of services.” It must be noted here that Article 63(1)(d) endows the parliament with some discretion in determining which office of profit does not disqualify its holder for purposes of eligibility as a candidate for Parliament. However, Article 43(1) unequivocally states that holding an office of profit or position that endows the president with a right to remuneration is simply prohibited.
Neither can the parliament exempt the president from requirements of Article 43 nor can he exempt himself by not receiving two salaries, for the operative word is the ‘right to remuneration’ and not whether he actually exercises such money. The last provision of the Constitution that needs mention in this debate is the oft-quoted Article 244. This requires each member of the armed forces to swear a solemn oath that he/she shall not “engage in any political activities whatsoever”. In view of this provision it is hard to claim that the Constitution is confused about the political role of members of the armed forces. If a military man can simply not engage in political activities, do we even need to look at the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution for the president or members of parliament who occupy political offices after running political campaigns to seek public mandate?
Before getting immersed in the merits of the re-election debate, an initial puzzle of why the term of the president is expiring prior to that of the National Assembly (creating this unsavoury situation where one Parliament might be in a position to impose a president on its successor) must be solved. The general’s five-year term under the 17th Amendment started to run from the date he picked to relinquish the office of the Chief Executive after appointing himself president through a referendum, as opposed to the date on which he was reaffirmed as president by the electoral college under the Constitution. The general kept such flexibility in the language of the constitutional amendment to bolster his bargaining ability at that time and not commit to a fixed date.
**Such molestation of the constitutional process has created a lacuna upsetting the scheme of the Constitution wherein the presidential election is supposed to follow the general elections and not precede them. Notwithstanding the legality or lack thereof of this plan, its consequences are disturbing. One, re-election of the general by the present assemblies turns the concept of parliamentary sovereignty on its head by defeating the underlying principle that no parliament can bind a successor parliament. Unlike a prime minister, a president once elected cannot be replaced if he loses a vote of confidence in the parliament. He can only be impeached by a two-thirds parliamentary majority if he is guilty of gross misconduct or of violating the Constitution.
Equally disturbing is the fact that should the general be re-elected by the present assemblies and successive assemblies continue to complete their constitutional terms, the sequence of parliamentary and presidential elections will be skewed for all times to come. Thus lame-duck parliaments will get to elect the president of the country right before such time when the Constitution requires them to seek fresh mandate from the people. The credentials of such presidency will remain suspect, not to mention the likely rift between the parliament that will be representative of people and the public mood in the present and a president who will represent an electorate that existed five years back.
**(To be concluded next Saturday)
The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. He is a Rhodes Scholar and has an LL.M from Harvard Law School. Email: [EMAIL=“[email protected]”][email protected]
Comment
The constitution of Pakistan has been molested more tham Mukhtaran Mai. Its time that constitution be provided political asylem overseas.