The Kosovo Syndrome

[spoon]

A long read, but very good. A note on reading this: It is not about Yugoslavia, or Iraq, or anywhere in particular. It is about the possible repercussions of doing things wrong. This came from the US DoD: http://www.dtra.mil/about/organization/iran_iraq.pdf [PDF!]

That sense of unease among small and medium powers solidified into a deeper sense of threat in March 1999 when the United States and its NATO allies once again employed their vast military-technical superiority, this time to resolve an internal dispute between the Serbian government and the ethnic Albanian majority in the province of Kosovo. Whatever else they thought of Slobodon Milosevic and his policies of ethnic cleansing, growing numbers of those less-than-major powers looked with alarm at what they saw as the increasing willingness of the United States to use its military supremacy to impose its liberal-democratic vision and values on the rest of the world. The conclusion that many of those states drew was that, if they were to avoid Serbia?s fate, they would have to develop the capability to deter the United States from intervening in their future internal ethnic, religious, political, or regional disputes.

The rise of this ?Kosovo Syndrome? has changed the context within which analysts and policymakers must think about future deterrence and threat reduction strategies for the United States and its Western European allies. The days of straightforward, bilateral superpower deterrence designed to prevent the outbreak of World War III in Central Europe, or across the 38th parallel in Korea, are over. In its place has emerged a new nuclear paradigm in which small and medium powers will try ? perhaps with nuclear weapons ? to deter the United States from projecting its overwhelming military power into their internal or regional conflicts. And the Kosovo Syndrome is not limited to the so-called ?rogue? states ? Indian analysts have cited the need to prevent the United States and NATO from intervening to resolve the festering Kashmir crisis as an important factor in justifying that state?s decision to flaunt emerging international nonproliferation norms and become an overt nuclear power in 1998. These small and medium powers increasingly believe that since ?once the US has committed its power against you, the game is lost? they must do everything they can in the earliest stages of a crisis to ensure that the US does not commit its force against them. In this new paradigm, nuclear weapons are no longer the threat of last resort; they are the opening gambit.

Iraq and Iran share many of the basic characteristics of the small and medium powers that are currently seeking nuclear weapons, at least in part in an effort to counter the Kosovo Syndrome. They are both aspiring regional hegemons who resent the continued US military presence that they believe prevents them from achieving their rightful status. Both also have ongoing or unresolved differences with neighboring states, dangerous internal instabilities, or both. Both have been strategically isolated since the end of the Cold War as the option of playing one superpower off against the other disappeared. Both have regimes, national principles or values, and national strategies that put them at odds with emerging (and from their view, US- engineered) international norms. And both are firmly convinced that the United States is determined to force changes in their internal structures to bring them more into line with its own values and strategic objectives ? changes that they both believe would undermine their identity, cohesion, and perhaps their national survival. As a result, any crisis involving either or both of these states is likely to escalate to include the United States, whether or not it did anything to foment the crisis. And if Iraq or Iran acquires nuclear weapons, an attempt to use those weapons to force the US out of the region or preempt intervention is likely to be among their opening moves.

It was only later that the less-than-major powers began to worry that the US might use its supremacy not just to punish aggression but to impose a sort of imperialism of vision and values. The event that served finally to solidify this sense of unease into a new strategic outlook was the US/NATO air campaign in Kosovo. It was at this point that the context in which US nuclear strategy must operate shifted significantly and permanently from one in which the US used its nuclear arsenal to deter major aggression against itself or its allies, to one in which smaller powers would seek to acquire nuclear arsenals to deter the US from imposing its will and values on their internal or bilateral affairs. The greatest intellectual stumbling block to rethinking US deterrence strategies has been the inability of Cold War deterrence theory to cope with the new strategic reality: that in a proliferation world, the US is no longer the defender in the most dangerous nuclear scenarios, it is (at least in the early stages of crises) the challenger. Deterrence strategies in this context must be supple enough to function at (and between) three distinct levels:

1. continuing to deter international aggression,
2. countering nuclear deterrents designed to prevent US intervention in internal or bilateral disputes, and
3. deterring the use of nuclear weapons in resolving regional crises.
   This paradigm shift is embodied in what might be called the ?Kosovo Syndrome? that increasingly informs the strategic thinking of small and medium powers, whether or not they have or are seeking nuclear weapons. The fate of Serbia drove home to these states their degree of vulnerability to the will of a United States determined to expand its values throughout the rest of the world. States that felt threatened by US conventional supremacy ? including states that are not and never have been either ?rogues? or on particularly hostile terms with the US ? increasingly concluded that they must be able to deter the US or defend themselves on their own if they became the target of a similar US ?humanitarian intervention.? Columnist M. D. Nalapat of the Times of India used the Kosovo analogy to rationalize India?s entry into the nuclear club in 1998 in spite of its long record of anti-nuclearism:

“Kosovo has shown the need for Indian power, and the need for diplomacy that can bring the three giants of Asia together, not to begin a world war but to stop the NATO planners from igniting one with their racist arrogance.”

For these small and medium powers, whatever they think of the relative merits of the Serbian regime and its policies in Kosovo, the lessons of the Kosovo intervention are clear, and disturbing:
? Serbia had not committed, or even threatened, international aggression (as Iraq unambiguously did in 1990).
? The United States employed its vast qualitative and quantitative military superiority disproportionately against a much smaller and weaker opponent, apparently without serious qualms about ?collateral damage.?
? Serbia?s conventional military capabilities were helpless against the American military onslaught, while the standoff US / NATO forces were impervious to Serbian counter-attack.
? The United States and its NATO allies were acting not in defense of internal stability but in order to impose a solution consistent with their values in an entirely internal ethnic / political dispute in Serbia.
? The US and its partners were indifferent to the will of the Serbian people, their physical well-being, or Serbia?s national survival.
? Once the US has committed its forces against you, the game is lost no matter how ?legitimate? your strategic objectives. So the only hope of prevailing lies in deterring the US from committing its forces.

The Indian decision to become a declared nuclear power indicates that the Kosovo Syndrome could become a major motivating factor for nuclear proliferation ? both among the states seeking nuclear weapons and the ones (like China and North Korea) who are willing to export relevant technologies. It could also result in the emergence of strategic alignments among states who want to neutralize, or at least ?contain,? US conventional supremacy. In this study, however, the issue is the degree to which the Kosovo Syndrome makes the United States the likely target of nuclear deterrence in crises far below the level of global ?strategic decisiveness? that was the focus of Cold War deterrence theory.

If small and medium powers who see their strategic objectives as at odds with the United States? global agenda also believe that ?once the US has committed its force against you, the game is lost,? then they will increasingly focus on how they can ensure that the US does not commit its forces. In this paradigm; nuclear weapons are no longer the endgame, they are the opening gambit. And the challenge for US strategy is to find a way to deescalate from nuclear crisis in order to project US power ? whether military or diplomatic ? in pursuit of a non-nuclear resolution.

[spoon]

An article reporting on recent comments by the director of DIA about how the world is evolving to this challenge:

The Trouble With Dominance
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58343-2003Feb24.html

[Nadia_H]

:k: Some good stuff. Looks interesting; i just read the first two paragraphs. i am going to read it in more detail and post my reply in a few hours.