The battle for prime ministership

They give our rulers dollars, but have a peek at their involvement in our internal affairs!

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/22/the-battle-for-prime-ministership.html

The battle for prime ministership By Hasan Zaidi | From the Newspaper

KARACHI: A week before the 2008 elections, former PPP Co-Chairperson Asif Zardari was asking General Pervez Musharraf’s National Security Adviser Tariq Aziz for “advice” on “who should be prime minister if the PPP were asked to form the government.” These and other fresh insights are provided from previously unpublished US diplomatic cables about what the American ambassador once termed the “increasingly ugly” tussle within the ruling party for the prime ministerial slot immediately before and after the 2008 elections.

The query from Zardari for Aziz is documented in a cable dated Feb 16, 2008 from then US Ambassador Anne Patterson who was told by Aziz a day earlier that he had met with Zardari twice in the past four days. At that time the former NSA, along with ISI Director Gen Nadeem Taj were trying to dissuade Zardari from seeking the PM slot for himself and to support PPP Senior Vice President Makhdoom Amin Fahim.

According to an earlier cable dated Feb 7, 2008, Aziz had told Patterson on February 6 that Musharraf had “responded with a firm rejection” of the trial balloon floated to Aziz in Dubai by Rehman Malik about Zardari as PM. “Aziz said it would reflect badly on Musharraf to have cut a deal to bring Benazir Bhutto back and then end up with Zardari as Prime Minister,” wrote Patterson. “They could support Zardari as being behind-the-scenes party leader; in fact, Aziz said they preferred this scenario as it was easier to cut deals with Zardari than it would have been with Benazir.”

Aziz and Taj were obviously successful in convincing Zardari not to attempt becoming PM himself. However, as Zardari dithered on naming the PPP’s candidate for premier, the contenders for the slot multiplied. The US embassy dutifully sent back to Washington their assessments and profiles of the possible candidates, including at one point PML-N’s Javed Hashmi and ANP’s Asfandyar Wali, whose names Zardari floated in a one-on-one meeting with Patterson on Feb 20 (detailed in a cable of the same date) in a seeming attempt to prevent (what he termed) “government forces” from splitting the PPP.

The Americans were particularly well-placed to provide running commentary on the leadership tussle, since Patterson pointed out that “all of [her] PPP contacts are lining up behind various contenders and seeking our support for their choices.”

Of the serious initial contenders from within the PPP — Fahim, Yousuf Raza Gilani, Shah Mahmood Qureshi and Aftab Shaban Mirani (Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar’s name was added later to the short-list) — Patterson noted in the Feb 7 cable that “Frankly, none of these PM contenders strike us as being the strong leader that Pakistan needs.”

Fahim was considered “likeable but weak” and “unprepared for being prime minister” in the American assessment, Gilani had “a history of corruption charges”, Qureshi was “very ambitious”, “self-promoting” and “too independent for Zardari’s taste”, Mirani “at age 70″ was “pliant”, and Mukhtar was “a dependable crony.”

Despite Musharraf’s aides pushing Fahim’s name — or perhaps because of it — Zardari seemed most disinclined to approve him as the party’s nominee even as he allowed the speculation to continue. In private conversations, he was in fact downright scathing. In the one-on-one meeting with Patterson, according to the cable, “Zardari noted ‘Fahim has never done a day’s work in his life’ and that ‘he had been in Dubai five times since Benazir’s death for rest and recreation.’ Benazir was fond of him and he was loyal, Zardari recounted, but Fahim was incompetent.”

After Zardari finally told Fahim that he was no longer a contender on March 6, Fahim sought a one-on-one meeting with Patterson himself, ostensibly to “inform” her of the news. In the meeting on March 7, reported in a cable sent the same day, “Fahim indicated he considered Zardari a bit of an upstart and an outsider” and told the Ambassador “that he would resign from the party and go off ‘on my own.’”

In a meeting with Patterson on March 10 (detailed in a cable dated the same day), Zardari laughed off the prospect of Fahim splitting the party. “Zardari said Fahim would only take two deputies with him if he split from the party,” she recounted of the meeting. “Now, Zardari said, he did not trust Fahim.” Zardari also “noted Aitzaz Ahsan was campaigning for President now” and “said he would not welcome Aitzaz back into the PPP fold.”

Zardari also intimated to Patterson that “he needed someone from the Punjab as PM, since that populous province was the backbone of the party’s future.” However, Zardari noted, “he had floated Ahmed Mukhtar’s name as a possible candidate…but Mukhtar had not done well in the subsequent glare of international publicity.” This left only the rival spiritual leaders from Multan as the possible choices.

Even though the political brawling between the PPP contenders continued for almost another two weeks, Zardari had already told Patterson on March 10 that Gilani was his choice.

Cables referenced: WikiLeaks # 139894, 140318, 143716

Related cables (profiles): Makhdoom Amin Fahim: 141548; Yousuf Raza Gilani: 144160; Shah Mahmood Qureshi: 143433; Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar: 143716

All cables are available on Dawn.com.

Re: The battle for prime ministership

:cb:

No comments (at the risk of hurting some people’s feelings)

Re: The battle for prime ministership

So an American sends a cable, an American source publishes the cable at the time best suitable for the country and it becomes something so important to us?

I know our politicians are all sold out, we don't need any confirmation from any source for that matter.

But perhaps it is the right time for Pakistanis to realize that WikiLeaks is nothing but a new tool of CIA in the propaganda war that will strictly follow the American interests.

So why to read these at all? Just ignore them as you would ignore anything published in some Jihadi News medium.

Re: The battle for prime ministership

interesting read this too…

http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/22/easy-access-hard-decisions.html

Easy access, hard decisions By Cyril Almeida | From the Newspaper

KARACHI: Trawling through the Pakistan Papers re-confirms much of what has been established since the first cache of US diplomatic cables was published last November.

The US is neither omnipotent nor omniscient — it often reacts to events in Pakistan rather than dictating outcomes. But the US is a very influential player in Pakistan.

**If there is a theme as such in the 4,000-plus cables read by Dawn, it is the unparalleled access Americans enjoy in Pakistan.
**
Hardly surprising, though it is something else to see it in black and white, over and over again, in cable after cable.

**The political class is seen perennially knocking on the doors of American officials to share information and vie for support.

And American officials appear to have open-door access at the highest echelons of political and military power in the country.**

**Take a secret cable sent by Bryan Hunt, the former Principal Officer at the US consulate in Lahore, in late January 2009. At the time, the country had been rocked by the PPP’s attempt to form a government in Punjab and everyone everywhere was racing to figure out how the plot would unfold.

But not the Americans. From Moonis Elahi to Khwaja Saad Rafique to Humayun Akhtar Khan, Punjab’s politicians were falling over themselves to explain the inside story to Hunt.

“PML leader Humayun Akhtar Khan recently told Principal Officer that the party was under significant pressure from ‘the establishment’ — the local euphemism for the military and intelligence services — not to become embroiled in the PPP/PML-N conflict at this stage. ‘The establishment’ preferred that the party remained neutral and in opposition for the time being as ‘additional alternatives might emerge,’” Hunt, then the go-to guy for Americans on all things Punjab, recorded in his cable.**

But Punjab’s famously mercenary politics wasn’t limited to the usual suspects of turncoats and freelancers. Hunt goes on to state, “While all the politicians were quick to claim that they rejected the overture [from the establishment], each took pains to point out that similar approaches were doubtless made to others who might be more amenable to the suggestion. Some even admitted that they might be tempted to support such an idea in the future if the current government proved unable to deliver.”

Even religious parties and figures were liable to open up to American officials in a way that most Pakistani interlocutors would envy.

**Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s overture to the Americans is well-known by now. But the extent of information sharing and cooperation becomes clearer in a secret cable originating from the Islamabad embassy in July 2006:

“Senior officials from the Islamist Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) report increasing concern over the influence and activities of Pakistani Taliban sympathisers in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata), border areas of Balochistan, and certain districts in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)…. Officials contend that Pakistani Taliban sympathisers have been angered by JUI-F’s failure to stem military and law enforcement actions against them and by its willingness to cooperate politically with the GOP.”**

And then, the penny drops: **“[Senior JUI-F officials] sought USG support in pressing the GOP to cooperate more fully with JUI-F and Deobandi clerics in seeking a negotiated end to the current stalemate in the Waziristans as a first step towards countering this trend.”
**
Elsewhere, in a July 2009 secret cable, Hunt records meeting a “well-placed Deobandi religious leader” in which details were shared about the “extremist group Sipah-i-Sahaba (SSP) … increasing its activities in the central Punjab city of Faisalabad … in collaboration with elements of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) and a splinter group from the banned terrorist groups Jaish-i-Mohammad.”

But it’s not just the politicians who are seen earnestly sharing private assessments with the US. In October 2008, a secret cable titled ‘Kayani exercises influence with new military appointments’ notes:** “Kayani told CJCS Mullen in September that he would use the Army’s normal promotion and rotation schedule to increase his control over military operations, particularly those of ISI. Kayani identified Pasha and Khan as his best two major generals, and he has now placed them in two critical posts.”**

Access, though, does not translate into knowing or understanding everything, and certainly not controlling events.

Particularly in the fight against militancy, American officials are often seen struggling to shape outcomes and even establish the facts.

A secret April 2008 cable originating from Islamabad on a prisoner swap being contemplated by Pakistan is illustrative of American constraints: “Ambassador told [Rehman Malik, then the adviser on interior to the prime minister] the USG strongly objected to the plans of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to exchange some of the Al Qaeda and Taliban-associated operatives for captured soldiers and for Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan. Malik replied that there was something ‘fishy’ about the abduction of the Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan.”

The cable does not clarify what Rehman Malik’s suspicions were, but perhaps that only underlines the difficulty of establishing the facts in the murky world of militancy.

And if the facts are hard enough to establish, sometimes the decisions are even tougher.

A secret January 2009 cable by then US Ambassador Anne Patterson entitled ‘The way forward for Pakistan’s F-16 program’ carries this assessment: “The bottom line is that Pakistan cannot afford the $2bn required to complete the F-16 program.

“At the same time, nothing is more important to good military-military (and overall US-Pakistani) relations than avoiding a blow-up over the F-16 case.”

Unrivalled access but murky facts and difficult trade-offs — the Pakistan Papers tableau confirms what many already suspect: Pakistan is a hard country.

Re: The battle for prime ministership

I second that!

The cable is doing what??? it is coming out with custom made setting, 1st about Kiyani taking some stand we get a cable about him, Shahbaz announcing rejection to aid we got cable about him, Now zardari led govt. getting into strategic relationship with China ( and possibly with Russia) and we get cable against him... what next!!!

Re: The battle for prime ministership

^ yes agreed, but the past and present of these leaders should be infront of the public...and the cables are just showing us what we already dreaded...now at least the character of our politicians is infront of the whole world, if they had not provided any weak points to the Americans there shouldnt have been any problem...

the Americans have their weak points and now they will use them as per their requirement...

the point is why should our politicians and military discuss Pakistan's internal matters with any foreign envoy?