Re: Seventy dead in NW Pakistan violence: official
Interesting news article about operations in Waziristan in 1919…history never ceases to amaze me…
Operations in Waziristan (1919-20)
AUTHOR: General Staff Army HQ, India
PUBLISHER: Government Printing, Calcutta India
DATE OF PUBLICATION: 1921
The following excerpt has been taken from Pages: 58 — 61
“From the time of earliest dealings with the Wazirs and Mahsuds these tribes have presented a most difficult problem and one which still awaits a satisfactory solution. The political history of Waziristan especially in its earlier stages has always been closely interwoven with and to some extent overshadowed by, that of Afghanistan. Since the middle of the nineteenth century the British Government has from time to time been involved in military operations with the Waziristan tribes, but the first event of purely political importance with which we are concerned occurred in 1884, when the Amir of Afghanistan made an attempt to establish his supremacy over the Wazirs, and though it met with little or no support from the tribesmen, our policy with regard to Waziristan had not reached sufficiently advanced stage to enable us to dispose of the question finally. Four years later the Amir was informed that it was not our intention to occupy Wana.
“This somewhat vague intimation led him to suppose that the Afghans were free to go there, and they accordingly did so. Previous to this the Amir had on more than one occasion asserted that Waziristan belonged to him, but his claim was not definitely repudiated until 1892, when he was informed that, although he would not be called upon immediately to evacuate Wana, we did not admit his right to occupy it, and he was forbidden to advance further into Waziristan pending a settlement. At the same time he was reminded that we had always insisted on the independence of the Wazirs and upon our right to deal directly with them, that we should continue to do so and that he must not attempt to bring them under his authority.
“This pronouncement was naturally unpalatable to the Amir, who objected to our having any dealings with the Wazirs and claimed the whole of Waziristan in his dominions. It was of course, impossible to admit such a claim, which had no foundation in fact, for it would have allowed this large track of country in which we were becoming more and more interested, to pass entirely out of our control. The position of Waziristan was thus clearly defined to Amir as being one of complete independence, qualified by our right to hold direct relations with its inhabitants. About this time a proposal was made that we should hand over the suzerainty to the Amir, allow the tribesmen to pay him tribute, and at the same time exercise some sort of control over them, ourselves and bind the Amir to abstain from all actual interference with the tribes. Lord Lansdowne, however, disliked the idea of this arrangement which would have given both ourselves and the Amir concurrent rights in the same country, and it was rejected. Nor did the Government of India view with more approval a suggested solution of the question involving a partition of the Wazir tribes between ourselves and the Amir. This scheme, by which the whole of the Darwesh Khel would have been transferred to Afghanistan, was considered as presenting insuperable difficulties and was also dropped.
**“It had always been the policy of the British Government to abstain as far as possible from interference with the internal affairs of the independent tribes living beyond our Indian border, but the decision to exclude the Amir from Waziristan logically involved the protection of that region as well as of its inhabitants from unprovoked acts of aggression on his part. All that Government wanted, however, was that the Wazirs should look to us and to no one else. Obviously the advantage of gaining the confidence of the tribes was all important.
**
“In 1893, the negotiations of the previous year reached a final settlement and by the Durand Agreement, signed in Kabul in November, the Amir definitely renounced all claim to Waziristan (the Birmal tract excepted) and agreed to the request of the British Government that the boundary line between India and Afghanistan should be delimitated. A Commission was accordingly appointed in October of the following year to demarcate the Western boundary of Waziristan from Domandi, on the Gomal, northwards.
“It was considered that this was a suitable opportunity to accept the invitation of the Wazirs of Wana, given two years previously, to occupy their country, thereby preventing future aggression on the part of either the Afghan authorities or the Powindahs and securing the Gomal route against the depredation of the Mahsuds. To do this it was decided to establish a military post in Wana with outposts along the line of the Gomal Valley. No sooner was Wana occupied than Mahsud attack on the camp occurred and the third-Mahsud expedition of 1894-95 was the immediate result.
OPERATIONS IN
THE SHAHUR AND KHAISARA VALLEY BETWEEN 12TH JUNE AND 17TH AUGUST 1917
“A large number of Mahsuds who had collected on the Shrawanni Pass with the intention of opposing a second raid into the Khaisara, now seeing signs of withdrawal began to advance. A piquet of the 54th Sikhs and a covering party of the 1/4th Gurkhas therefore remained in position west of the camp until the transport had passed through the tangi, when the 30th Mountain Battery shelled the pass effectively, information regarding the result of their fire being given them from the piquet by signal. Two other piquets on the north and one of the south of the camp also remained in their positions till the tangi was reported clear of transport.
“The retirement down the tangi was necessarily slow and it was not till 9-30 A.M. that the rearguard could begin to move. During the withdrawal of the piquets a party of snipers worked their way round the right (north) flank of the first gun position near camp to within 300 yards of the guns but the escort of the 54th Sikhs saved the section from the casualties which it was in danger of suffering by a rapid advance, before which the enemy retired. Almost immediately after this, the last piquet was withdrawn, and the rearguard and guns retired through the tangi. The enemy at once descended from the hills and occupied our camping ground. There they were heavily shelled by the centre section of the 30th Mountain Battery, while both the centre and left sections engaged targets of the enemy appearing on the heights north and south of the tangi. The intention of the Mahsuds had evidently been to envelope our rearguard, but the positions on either side of the tangi had been occupied by our piquets which was withdrawn under cover of the guns. The retirement was completed without a casualty, though one sepoy had been wounded in the attack on the village and camp was reached about 3 P.M. Towns and villages which had been left standing owing to the hurried advance were now destroyed and the work of devastation in this area completed.
**“During the operations of the striking force the B. E. 2C aeroplanes based at Tank proved to be of the greatest assistance. Owing to the high temperature prevailing co-operation, which was requested sparingly, usually took the form of a preliminary reconnaissance carried out ahead of the column by one or two machines, which summoned others from Tank when it was observed that the force was being opposed.
“Apart from co-operating with the column in this manner independent raids were carried out almost daily on parts of the country not being visited by the force. On the 22nd bombs were dropped with considerable effect in the Kaniguram valley and in a particularly successful raid on the 26th a number of direct hits were obtained on houses in Makin and Marobi, the latter being the home of Mulla Fazl Din.
**
“The political reports now available showed that the Mahsuds were in a more reasonable state of mind, the defeat that they had suffered at Nanu, the destruction of villages and the raids of the aeroplanes on regional formerly considered safe from our attack, had disheartened them, nor could they any longer hope for help from Kabul. A letter from the Amir to the Viceroy dated June 23rd showed, indeed, that he was endeavouring to check the spread of disorder.
“On his return Ispana Raghza on the 25th the Chief Political Officer received messages to the effect that some of the principal maliks were anxious to treat for peace and also that a representative Jirga at Kaniguram had written asking for a specification of the terms to be imposed by Government. The Jirga appealed too for a suspension of the hostilities for five days in order that the Jirga might consider them. The terms of the Government of India which were sent them were briefly as follows:
“(a) The settlement of Major Dodd’s murder case by tribal custom as against the Abdur Rahman Khel.
(b) All rifles captured from the military and militia since March 1st were to be returned.
(c) The prisoners now with the Mahsuds were to be released.
(d) The outlaws from British territory were to be surrendered or expelled.
(e) A guarantee for future good behavior was to be given.
“The military and political requirements now seemed to be identical; the operations had so far been successful, the troops required a much needed rest, and an opportunity had occurred for giving the Mahsuds that chance of coming to an agreement which it was our declared policy to offer them. Accordingly on the 26th June offensive operations including aerial raids were suspended pending the results of the Mahsuds deliberations, the days of grace to end on the 1st July. The force remained halted at Ispana Raghza unmolested by the enemy except for sniping of a water party on the 20th resulting in two British privates being wounded.