Taliban no more terrorists?

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

Leave aside taleban for a minute another big problem facing the international troops in Afghanistan as they cant distinguish now as to who is friend or foe, they spent so much in raising ANF and now this is what its doing to them.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/world/asia/afghan-soldiers-step-up-killings-of-allied-forces.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all?src=tp

Afghanistan’s Soldiers Step Up Killings of Allied Forces

KABUL, Afghanistan —** American and other coalition forces here are being killed in increasing numbers by the very Afghan soldiers they fight alongside and train, in attacks motivated by deep-seated animosity between the supposedly allied forces, according to American and Afghan officers and a classified coalition report obtained by The New York Times.

****A decade into the war in Afghanistan, the report makes clear that these killings have become the most visible symptom of a far deeper ailment plaguing the war effort: the contempt each side holds for the other, never mind the Taliban. The ill will and mistrust run deep among civilians and militaries on both sides, raising questions about what future role the United States and its allies can expect to play in Afghanistan.
**
Underscoring the danger, four French service members were killed and a number were wounded on Friday when a gunman wearing an Afghan National Army uniform turned his weapon on them, according to an Afghan police official in Kapisa Province in eastern Afghanistan where the incident occurred and a Western official in Kabul, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the press.

The Afghan police official, Asdullah Hamidi, said the shooting happened in Tagab District, an area that is viewed as dangerous and dominated by insurgent forces.

The gunman is in custody, a NATO official said.

**The violence, and the failure by coalition commanders to address it, casts a harsh spotlight on the shortcomings of American efforts to build a functional Afghan Army, a pillar of the Obama administration’s strategy for extricating the United States from the war in Afghanistan, said the officers and experts who helped shape the strategy.
**
The problems risk leaving the United States and its allies dependent on an Afghan force that is permeated by anti-Western sentiment and incapable of combating the Taliban and other militants when NATO’s combat mission ends in 2014, they said.

One instance of the general level of antipathy in the war exploded into uncomfortable view last week when video emerged of American Marines urinating on dead Taliban fighters. **Although American commanders quickly took action and condemned the act, chat-room and Facebook posts by Marines and their supporters were full of praise for the desecration.
**
**But the most troubling fallout has been the mounting number of Westerners killed by their Afghan allies, events that have been routinely dismissed by American and NATO officials as isolated episodes that are the work of disturbed individual soldiers or Taliban infiltrators, and not indicative of a larger pattern. The unusually blunt report, which was prepared for a subordinate American command in eastern Afghanistan, takes a decidedly different view.****“Lethal altercations are clearly not rare or isolated; they reflect a rapidly growing systemic homicide threat (a magnitude of which may be unprecedented between ‘allies’ in modern military history),” it said.
**
Official NATO pronouncements to the contrary “seem disingenuous, if not profoundly intellectually dishonest,” said the report, and it played down the role of Taliban infiltrators in the killings.

The coalition refused to comment on the classified report. But “incidents in the recent past where Afghan soldiers have wounded or killed I.S.A.F. members are isolated cases and are not occurring on a routine basis,” said Lt. Col. Jimmie E. Cummings Jr. of the Army, a spokesman for the American-led International Security Assistance Force. “We train and are partnered with Afghan personnel every day and we are not seeing any issues or concerns with our relationships.

**”****The numbers appear to tell a different story. Although NATO does not release a complete tally of its forces’ deaths at the hands of Afghan soldiers and the police, the classified report and coalition news releases indicate that Afghan forces have attacked American and allied service members nearly three dozen times since 2007.
**
Two members of the French Foreign Legion and one American soldier were killed in separate episodes in the past month, according to statements by NATO. The classified report found that between May 2007 and May 2011, when it was completed, at least 58 Western service members were killed in 26 separate attacks by Afghan soldiers and the police nationwide. Most of those attacks have occurred since October 2009. This toll represented 6 percent of all hostile coalition deaths during that period, the report said.

“The sense of hatred is growing rapidly,” said an Afghan Army colonel. He described his troops as “thieves, liars and drug addicts,” but also said that the Americans were “rude, arrogant bullies who use foul language.”

Senior commanders largely manage to keep their feelings in check, said the officer, who asked not to be named so he could speak openly. But the officer said, “I am afraid it will turn into a major problem in the near future in the lower ranks of both armies.”

There have been successes, especially among the elite Afghan commandos and coalition Special Operations forces, most of whom have undergone in-depth cultural training and speak at least some Dari and Pashto, the two main languages spoken in Afghanistan. But, as highlighted by the classified report, familiarity in most cases appears to have mainly bred contempt — and that, in turn, has undercut the benefits of pairing up the forces.

The problem has also featured in classified reports tracking progress in the war effort, most of which are far more negative than the public declarations of progress, said an American officer, who asked not to be identified because he was discussing secret information.

“If you get two 18-year-olds from two different cultures and put them in New York, you get a gang fight,” said Anthony H. Cordesman, a defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington who has advised the American military on its Afghan strategy.

“What you have here are two very different cultures with different values,” he said in a telephone interview. “They treat each other with contempt.”

The United States soldier was killed this month when an Afghan soldier opened fire on Americans playing volleyball at a base in the southern province of Zabul. The assailant was quickly gunned down. The deadliest single incident came last April when an Afghan Air Force colonel, Ahmed Gul, killed eight unsuspecting American officers and a contractor with shots to the head inside their headquarters.

He then killed himself after writing “God in your name” and “God is one” in blood on the walls of the base, according to an Air Force investigation of the incident released this week.

In a 436-page report, the Air Force investigators said the initial coalition explanation for the attack — stress brought on by financial problems — was only a small part of Colonel Gul’s motivation. His primary motive was hatred of the United States, and he planned the attack to kill as many Americans as possible, the investigators said.

There have been no reported instances of Americans’ killing Afghan soldiers, although a rogue group of United States soldiers killed three Afghan civilians for sport in 2010. Yet there is ample evidence of American disregard for Afghans. After the urination video circulated, a number of those who had served in Afghanistan took to Facebook and other Web sites to cheer on their compatriots, describing Afghans of all stripes in harsh terms.

Many messages were posted on public forums, others in private message strings. One private exchange was provided to The Times by a participant in the conversation; the names of those posting matched those on record as having served in the Marine Corps. In that conversation, a former Marine said he thought the video was “pretty awesome.” Another said he hoped it would happen more often.

The 70-page classified coalition report, titled “A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility,” goes far beyond anecdotes. It was conducted by a behavioral scientist who surveyed 613 Afghan soldiers and police officers, 215 American soldiers and 30 Afghan interpreters who worked for the Americans.

While the report focused on three areas of eastern Afghanistan, many of the Afghan soldiers interviewed had served elsewhere in Afghanistan and the author believed that they constituted a sample representative of the entire country.

**“There are pervasive feelings of animosity and distrust A.N.S.F. personnel have towards U.S. forces,” the report said, using military’s abbreviation for Afghan security forces. The list of Afghan complaints against the Americans ran the gamut from the killing of civilians to urinating in public and cursing.

“U.S. soldiers don’t listen, they are too arrogant,” said one of the Afghan soldiers surveyed, according to the report. “They get upset due to their casualties, so they take it out on civilians during their searches,” said another.
**
**The Americans were equally as scathing. “U.S. soldiers’ perceptions of A.N.A. members were extremely negative across categories,” the report found, using the initials for the Afghan National Army. Those categories included “trustworthiness on patrol,” “honesty and integrity,” and “drug abuse.” The Americans also voiced suspicions about the Afghans being in league with the Taliban, a problem well documented among the Afghan police.
**
“They are stoned all the time; some even while on patrol with us,” one soldier was quoted as saying. Another said, “They are pretty much gutless in combat; we do most of the fighting.”

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

4 French troops shot dead today...

Source BBC

It does not come as a surprise to me. Taliban are the way in the eyes benefactor!
I was never swayed by the war on terror nonsense!

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

http://www.dawn.com/2012/01/27/peace-talks-and-pakistan.html](The News International: Latest News Breaking, World, Entertainment, Royal News)Peace talks and Pakistan

**SOME years ago, a small passenger aircraft in the US crashed because its pilot and engineer started concentrating on neutralising the trimmer that had not settled, although it was not dangerous.

**
Both crew members failed to watch the fuel gauge, and the crash occurred due to lack of fuel, not the malfunctioning trimmer.

**Today, Pakistan is in a similar situation. The state machinery and its top civil-military leaders are so engrossed in the day-to-day happenings in the Supreme Court and the Mansoor Ijaz episode that developments in Afghanistan are being ignored. They are not receiving the attention they deserve.

**
**For instance, the Afghan Taliban made a very important pronouncement on Jan 16, when they officially declared victory in the Afghan conflict. Obviously, they are now making the announcements that will lead to the end of hostilities: if the war has ended in victory, it is no longer necessary to continue fighting.
**

**This declaration, though very meaningful, has not received due attention. Only 10 days earlier, on Jan 3, the Taliban officially expressed interest in negotiations with Washington. This was a considerable shift from their normally stated position that there could be no talks until foreign troops left Afghanistan.

**
This stance, too, is no longer fixed as they announced their willingness to open a political office in Qatar (although no date for an actual opening has been fixed yet). The Taliban have said that the objective for opening the office was to reach an “understanding with other nations”.

**Afghan ethnic minority leaders have simultaneously begun to make statements that they support a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. By all accounts, it is apparent that the Afghan peace process is under way but Pakistan — for reasons explained — is not focusing on the ramifications of what is happening.

**
What was the need for the Taliban to announce victory? One of the strongest reasons for the group to do so is that it is shifting and transforming itself from being a non-state to a state actor. In 1996, the Taliban fought and came to power in the civil war after the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Now, however, the situation is different and they realise that they will need to supplement military options by starting a political process that will allow them to share power.

In the earlier period of the civil war, there was no government in Afghanistan. This time around, there is one. However weak it may be, it is a legal entity. There is also a visible flexibility on the US side, which is no longer insisting that the Taliban accept the existing constitution as a pre-condition.

As an indication of this change, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said some days ago that discussions regarding the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar were taking place and that the release of Taliban prisoners held in Guantanamo was also under consideration.

These are clear signs that positive steps have taken place to start the Afghan peace process. It is likely that some milestone agreements can be expected before the next Nato conference in Chicago in May. It is hoped that by then Pakistan opts to assist in the peace process.

Sagacity and cold calculation warrant that once peace returns to Afghanistan, Pakistan’s centrality — that was crucial for the western alliance — will no longer have the same value. This would call for serious debate on the terms and conditions for its re-engagement as an important regional player.

The window of opportunity is closing fast and our present thinking and concerns will be less valid in, say, six months’ time.

**Perhaps the time has come for Pakistan to renegotiate its position with its erstwhile partners and to build some solid IOUs to use for solving many or some of its problems.

**
**Pakistan also needs to focus on the terms and conditions on which it would like to reduce the level of military operations that it began in support of Nato in Fata and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

**
**However, as time passes, two of the country’s largest worries will be to control and retire the phenomenon of the Punjabi Taliban that is predicted to continue challenging the state and threaten regional security as well as cause difficulties with India. Pakistan must counter this situation and instead concentrate on building links.

**
**But, to bring about a positive change, we will have to take robust counterterrorism measures coupled with the de-radicalisation of militants and de-weaponisation. Reconciliation with different groups may now be unavoidable; in a sense, Pakistan today appears to be facing more difficult challenges than perhaps Afghanistan is.
**

We should begin the task of national self-preservation in right earnest immediately, since the regional security situation is changing very rapidly. Meanwhile, Pakistan must begin to provide whatever assistance it can to help bring the Afghan conflict to an end. The opening provided by the Qatar peace process is a major opportunity to finally conclude the decade of death and destruction that began after 9/11.

Our tragedy today is that Pakistan has a split national consensus — not only is civil society split among various political parties but the civil-military framework that is so essential to stability is also not functioning smoothly.

**For Pakistan’s efforts to succeed, the country must find the space to generate economic growth for an increasing population that is facing massive unemployment, inflation and a decaying infrastructure.

**
**The situation would have been much worse if Pakistan had not had a strong agricultural base and the benefit of the flow of remittances from expatriates working abroad. Pakistan badly requires nation-building.

**
The writer is chairman of the Regional Institute of Policy Research in Peshawar.

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

Like someone asked them… :slight_smile:

tu kaun tay main khwamkhwa

http://www.geo.tv/GeoDetail.aspx?ID=32991
Pakistan tacitly approves US-Taliban talks: report

WASHINGTON: Taliban negotiators have begun meeting with US officials in Qatar, where they are discussing preliminary trust-building measures aimed at ending the war in Afghanistan, The New York Times reported Sunday.

Citing several former Taliban officials, the newspaper said these measures included a possible prisoner transfer.

The Afghan government is expecting a delegation from the Qatar government to visit Kabul to explain its role in the talks, said High Peace Council secretary Aminundin Muzaffari.

The former officials said that four to eight Taliban representatives had traveled to Qatar from Pakistan to set up a political office for the exiled Afghan insurgent group, the report said.

The comments suggested that the Taliban, who have not publicly said they would engage in peace talks to end the war in Afghanistan, were gearing up for preliminary discussions, the paper said.

US officials would not deny that meetings had taken place, and the discussions seemed to have at least the tacit approval of Pakistan, which has thwarted previous efforts by the Taliban to engage in talks, The Times noted. (AFP)** **

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

long but interesting article. i’ll be posting it in three partshttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/magazine/afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all?src=tp

The Hard Way Out of Afghanistan

For years, in the village of Juz Ghoray, at the remote fringes of the Musa Qala District in northern Helmand Province, the Taliban enjoyed free rein, collecting taxes from local poppy farmers and staging attacks on any foreign patrol that moved within shooting range of an abrupt desert prominence called Ugly Hill. After a Marine unit found nine I.E.D.’s hidden beneath Ugly Hill’s scarred and caverned faces last year, coalition forces seldom ventured near it. Until one night this October, when members of Echo Company, from the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines — known since Vietnam as the Magnificent *******s — quietly sneaked into Juz Ghoray and posted signs on people’s doors and windows.

Their idea was to co-opt the infamous Taliban practice of intimidating government sympathizers with night letters threatening execution. The Marines’ signs were bordered with the nation’s colors, and in Pashto and Dari they announced: “The Afghan National Security Forces are coming.” Two weeks later, about 60 members of Echo Company, along with 30 Afghan National Army soldiers, traveled on foot through the night and took Ugly Hill without a shot. At dawn, as villagers emerged from their homes, they found laborers stacking bastions to fortify a new Afghan police post. And something else, which many residents of Juz Ghoray had never seen before: an Afghan flag raised on a wooden pole.

For the government, the new post represents a palpable extension of its reach, a triumph however modest. But not one without some cost. Before the Afghans could claim Ugly Hill, two marines had to sweep it for mines. Joshua Lee, a 26-year-old sergeant from Arkansas, located the first I.E.D. using a metal detector. As he set to work on the device, Lee identified a second bomb, and while readjusting he stepped on a third. The blast shattered his right leg, cocking it sideways below the knee and leaving mangled pieces of foot hanging loosely from flesh and bone.

In the morning, while searching a compound at the base of Ugly Hill, the marines discovered three more fully assembled I.E.D.’s, containing 100 pounds of explosives. When technicians set charges around the bombs, detonating them in place, a six-foot crater was left where one of the compound’s buildings had stood. The following evening Echo Company continued south, making camp on a plateau of hard-packed gravel; as the desert night grew frigid, a small convoy arrived to resupply the men with food and water. Turning to climb the steep escarpment, the lead vehicle hit yet another bomb. Its mine-roller — an extended axle of weighted wheels that tests the ground ahead — absorbed the brunt of the blast. Walking nearby, a young platoon sergeant, Jacob Maxwell, was knocked off his feet as rocks and wreckage from the obliterated roller struck his legs and back.

This was Maxwell’s fifth deployment. During a single tour in Iraq in 2006, he survived four I.E.D. explosions. When the dust settled, he was sitting beside the road, cut and bruised, but otherwise unscathed. The corpsman who treated him judged his luck to border on the freakish. Nonetheless, after the attack, Maxwell assured me he’d be leading his platoon on its coming operations. Those will take the company even deeper into Taliban country, to farther-flung villages than Juz Ghoray, among Afghans who, more than 10 years after the government’s creation, still lack any meaningful contact with it.

“The Marines are going out into the hinterlands,” Maj. Frank Diorio, the battalion’s executive officer, told me. “They’re not tied to any posts. It’ll be ongoing until we leave. It’s just going to be continuous operations.”The Marines didn’t arrive in force in Helmand until 2009. Previously, the British controlled the region. Undermanned, ill equipped and far too thinly spread, they were unable to contain the Taliban revival already proliferating through Helmand by 2006. Only as recently as 2010 did coalition forces, bolstered by Obama’s troop surge, try to cauterize what Gen. Stanley McChrystal called the “bleeding ulcer” of Marja — a town just outside the provincial capital where the Taliban presided unmolested over a lucrative opium industry.

Today the Taliban in Marja have been killed or vanquished to sparsely populated desert regions, and Afghan security forces have assumed most policing responsibilities in the town. Successful as it is, the taking of Marja was accomplished with an immense commitment of men and resources that could not realistically be brought to bear elsewhere in the province. An analogy often invoked across Afghanistan is that of the water-filled bag: squeeze the bottom, the top distends. Accordingly, subdued in Marja and other towns nearer the capital, the fight in Helmand has shifted upriver. There, in places like Kajaki and Sangin and Musa Qala, after 10 years and 821 coalition deaths and thousands of wounded, the insurgency perseveres.

Year after year, month after month, Helmand has ranked as the deadliest, most violent province in Afghanistan. Nowhere else comes close. Growing anxiety over the Pakistani border regions, however, means that America’s withdrawal from the country will most likely happen more rapidly in Helmand than in the eastern provinces. During the coming year, the number of marines there will shrink by the thousands; as early as this summer, many Marine positions will be shuttered or handed over to the Afghan Army and the police. No one expects the insurgency to be defeated by then. The issue has long ceased to be how we can decisively expunge the Taliban — we can’t. Instead, the question is: How can we forestall its full-fledged resurgence upon our departure? Toward the end of this year’s fighting season, just before the winter rains, I spent seven weeks with marines across much of Helmand, and everywhere the answer was basically the same. First, leave behind a proficient national security force. And second, win them as much breathing room as time allows.

The Marines’ push into Juz Ghoray was part of this plan. Adhering to a provincewide blueprint for withdrawal, Echo Company had recently closed two of its patrol bases, which in turn permitted longer-range operations, previously impossible, like the taking of Ugly Hill. “Essentially, we’re trying to consolidate American forces and turn over positions to the Afghans in order to facilitate deeper operations,” Lt. Nikolaos de Maria, the platoon’s commander, told me shortly after the I.E.D. attacks that injured Lee and Maxwell. “So the center will be the Afghan Police. The next wave, around that center, will be the Afghan Army. And then for us, we’re trying to operate a lot deeper. So that would be a third concentric ring. We would be on the outside, ready for a harder fight.”

Later that afternoon, a local man claimed that insurgents had buried three I.E.D.’s in the dry riverbed crossed by the marines on their way to Juz Ghoray. After they found and detonated one of the bombs, several marines stayed to watch the area during the night. In the morning they were attacked by machine guns and artillery clattering from unseen positions to the east. Hearing the exchange back at Ugly Hill, de Maria rallied the rest of his platoon and the Afghan Army soldiers. As they donned their flak jackets and shouldered their radios and loaded their carbines, the men were charged by the usual electricity — but there was something else too: relief at the promise of actually confronting whoever had been trying so hard to blow them up. “We’re bringing the hammer,” de Maria said over the radio.

Cpl. Brandon Sisson led the platoon down the hill and through the deserted village. Thin and scrappy, with a penchant for brawling, Sisson should have been a sergeant, but in Iraq his promotion stalled after he broke another marine’s jaw so badly he needed to be evacuated to a hospital in Germany. Now, at 23, with a wife and a child and another on the way, Sisson claimed to have mellowed with age. When we emerged into farmland, more shots rang out and the marines found cover where they could. As we lay flat on our stomachs in the wet mire of a tilled poppy field, Sisson shook his head. “I liked Iraq a lot better,” he said. “You could actually see them.”

Just then two Afghan soldiers strutted by holding their weapons like folded umbrellas. They seemed entirely unconcerned by the fact that people were shooting at us. I recognized one of them. In lieu of a rifle, he humped a rucksack full of rocket-propelled grenades. The marines loved him for this and had nicknamed him R.P.G. Others were less popular: because they were lazy, because they complained, because they smelled, because they stole, because way too often they were way too stoned — the list of grievances ran long. In the end, though, what mattered most was that one item never made the list: cowardice. They delighted in fighting.

If you had to name the principal difference between Afghan soldiers and United States marines, it might best be summarized as “discipline.” Marines are existentially defined by it; Afghans have little concept of it. The previous day, I accompanied a patrol through Juz Ghoray with an Afghan Army squad that insisted on searching the first compound we came to. Sgt. Adam Sweet, the marine overseeing the patrol, was surprised. It was early, we had a long way to go and nothing about the place appeared especially suspicious. “This one?” he asked the Afghan squad leader.

“Yes, this one,” the Afghan said. “We must search this one now.”

Sweet had become a marine by accident. After being arrested for driving while stoned, he dropped out of college during his first semester, was evicted from his apartment and soon found himself back in Nebraska, living with his mom. There he met a girl who invited him to go with her back to Fort Collins, Colo., where she attended school. Sweet went. Six months later the girl pledged a sorority and announced she was moving in with her new sisters. “I didn’t know what to do,” Sweet told me. “So I ended up getting drunk one night and told myself that I should join the Air Force. I showed up in the morning to join the Air Force, and they were closed. So I walked next door to the Marine recruiting office and signed the paperwork.” A year and a half later, Sweet was carrying a machine gun through the streets of Fallujah.

In Juz Ghoray, he shrugged and followed the Afghan soldiers into the compound. No one was home. As Sweet scrupulously searched room after room — opening ornate chests, shaking out heavy blankets, rifling through piles of hay, sniffing plastic fuel jugs — I noticed one of the Afghans hurry across the courtyard with a large propane tank. Then another ran by carrying a metal cooking pot. Finally came a third, making a basket of his shirt that bulged with fresh eggs. A few minutes later, Sweet and I found the whole squad huddled in the livestock pen. A shaggy-haired soldier sporting a Che-style beret grinned at us a little sheepishly. “Breakfast?” he said.

Now, as bullets clapped toward us in the muddy poppy field, R.P.G. gave a thumbs up. “Taliban good!” he said.

Corporal Sisson returned the gesture. “Hopefully, Taliban dead.”

We pushed past a cornfield toward another village farther east. Whole families were running away. Sisson noticed, on a distant ridge, the silhouette of a lone figure and the glint of something metal catch the sun.

“We got a spotter,” he told de Maria.

Bullets kicked the dirt near several of the marines, and the platoon pressed through the village to a wide, white-rocked creek on its other side. This was as far as they were authorized to go. From the edge of an eroding embankment that dropped precipitously, the marines watched a train of people fleeing toward the eastern hills. The figure on the ridge vanished, and soon two men on motorcycles appeared among the villagers.

“They’re screening themselves with the women and kids,” Sisson said. As the marines struggled to find a clear line of sight on the men with motorcycles, someone peeled away from the exodus and began walking toward us. It was a young boy, maybe 9 or 10, and he trailed a voluminous black scarf held high above his head. The cloth flapped in the hot wind.

Sisson spat. “They’re doing this on purpose.”

The boy walked all the way to the creek, where he seemed to waver, regarding the marines and the Afghan soldiers shouting at him to stop, turn around, get out of the way. Then he kept coming. He crossed the stream; he scaled the embankment; he passed right through the ranks of frantically yelling soldiers. All the while he held up his scarf as if it were a flag. The men on motorcycles came and went: now picking people up, now dropping others off — tauntingly, or so it felt. Soon the sun began to dim. It made of the men vague shapes receding deeper into a country where they knew the marines could not follow. When I looked around for the boy, he was gone, too.

to be continued…

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

Its a very long article therefore I have decided against posting it all, but I'd like to discuss a few points mentioned in the article

[QUOTE]
All of the police officers on the Shrine were Tajiks or Uzbeks from northern Afghanistan who said they enlisted and came to the Pashtun south because they believed in their country and its government; they were nationalists. Their commander was a gaunt middle-aged Uzbek named Ghulam Jalani. Over several meals of rice and lamb in the cramped hut where his men quarter, Jalani expressed deep admiration for the Marines. He also fears for the day they go home. “I am not an educated man,” Jalani told me one night. “In fact, I am illiterate. But I tell you: if the Marines leave here, the Taliban will come back.”

[/QUOTE]

Since most of the people in Afghan security forces are from ethnicities other than pashtun, even in areas of their dominance that could be one reason why some of them get pushed towards taleban.

[QUOTE]
Three months ago, the boy and two other brothers had triggered an I.E.D. while playing in an alley near their house. The blast killed one boy and badly maimed the two survivors, who were taken to Camp Leatherneck for surgery. On their way to see them, racing along the Helmand River, Kareem’s parents crashed their car and died.

[/QUOTE]

[QUOTE]

“Who do you blame?” Perry wanted to know.“The Taliban,” Kareem answered automatically. “I hate them. Look at what they did to us.”As the marines left the compound, they found the third brother, who was maybe 13, waiting outside in a wheelchair. Both of his legs were amputated above the knees. He glared at us with naked loathing. He cursed us in English as we passed.Back at the base, I asked Perry why he thought the third brother’s attitude toward the marines had been so different from Kareem’s. The lieutenant held up his hands. Maybe they weren’t who they said they were. Maybe Kareem’s whole story was a fabrication and they’d been involved in placing an I.E.D. that accidentally detonated. This felt plausible, if disturbing. But then Perry offered another explanation, which seemed to suggest a paradox inherent to any counterinsurgency: “They feel like if we weren’t here, bombs wouldn’t be in the ground.”
[/QUOTE]

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

*To be sure, the United States will try to keep some kind of presence in Afghanistan long after 2014. Big bases might remain; trainers and advisers might come and go; special operations forces might continue to carry out targeted “kill-capture” raids. But conventional forces are coming home. And when that happens, the weird end will almost certainly pass unheralded by any declaration of victory or admission of defeat. Because the war in Afghanistan, almost certainly, will not be over. It will go on without us. Nobody knows how it will evolve. It’s easy to be pessimistic — but pessimism, too, assumes some insight into a future that has seemed recently to become more, not less, opaque.
*

“People ask me all the time, ‘Can the Afghan National Security Forces hold what we’ve got and maintain security?’ ” General Toolan told me. “I say, absolutely: they’re better-trained, better-equipped and better-liked than the insurgency. They can do it. However, what is important is their will. Their will is a function of their leadership. And their leadership is oftentimes susceptible to corruption.” This perhaps would be the greatest tragedy of all: if the gains earned in Helmand by the coalition since 2006 were lost because of a lack of will. For what would the British and Americans have sacrificed so much? To what end would we be able to say 821 of them gave their lives?

Before I left Sangin, I attended a memorial service for two marines who were killed a week earlier by an I.E.D. The centerpiece of any memorial for a marine is the formal construction of his battle cross. The rifle stuck bayonet down, the helmet set atop the butt stock, the dog tags draped on the pistol grip, the boots placed on the ground. The end result is a movingly personlike assemblage of the dead man’s essential gear. What holds it all together is the rifle. Clearly, the rifle is meant to symbolize a kind of linchpin — the singularly vital thing. Yet somehow, it is the boots, their laces neatly looped and tied, that are most affecting. It is the boots, not the rifle, that most evoke an absence. It is the boots that young marines reach out to touch when they kneel before it all.

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2012/02/8904030

Truth, lies and Afghanistan
How military leaders have let us down
**BY LT. COL. DANIEL L. DAVIS
**
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. **Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.
**
**What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.
**
Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.

**Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.
**
My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs — among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas.

As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. **Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village elders.
**
**I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.
**
**I saw little to no evidence the local governments were able to provide for the basic needs of the people. Some of the Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government.
**
**From time to time, I observed Afghan Security forces collude with the insurgency.
**
**FROM BAD TO ABYSMAL
**
**Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or wrote in official reports, I can’t talk about; the information remains classified. But I can say that such reports — mine and others’ — serve to illuminate the gulf between conditions on the ground and official statements of progress.
**
**And I can relate a few representative experiences, of the kind that I observed all over the country.
**
**In January 2011, I made my first trip into the mountains of Kunar province near the Pakistan border to visit the troops of 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry. On a patrol to the northernmost U.S. position in eastern Afghanistan, we arrived at an Afghan National Police (ANP) station that had reported being attacked by the Taliban 2½ hours earlier.
**
Through the interpreter, I asked the police captain where the attack had originated, and he pointed to the side of a nearby mountain.
**“What are your normal procedures in situations like these?” I asked. “Do you form up a squad and go after them? Do you periodically send out harassing patrols? What do you do?”
**
**As the interpreter conveyed my questions, the captain’s head wheeled around, looking first at the interpreter and turning to me with an incredulous expression. Then he laughed.
**
**“No! We don’t go after them,” he said. “That would be dangerous!”
**
**According to the cavalry troopers, the Afghan policemen rarely leave the cover of the checkpoints. In that part of the province, the Taliban literally run free.
**
In June, I was in the Zharay district of Kandahar province, returning to a base from a dismounted patrol. Gunshots were audible as the Taliban attacked a U.S. checkpoint about one mile away.

As I entered the unit’s command post, the commander and his staff were watching a live video feed of the battle. Two ANP vehicles were blocking the main road leading to the site of the attack. The fire was coming from behind a haystack. We watched as two Afghan men emerged, mounted a motorcycle and began moving toward the Afghan policemen in their vehicles.

The U.S. commander turned around and told the Afghan radio operator to make sure the policemen halted the men. The radio operator shouted into the radio repeatedly, but got no answer.

**On the screen, we watched as the two men slowly motored past the ANP vehicles. The policemen neither got out to stop the two men nor answered the radio — until the motorcycle was out of sight.
**
**To a man, the U.S. officers in that unit told me they had nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area — and that was before the above incident occurred.
**
In August, I went on a dismounted patrol with troops in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Several troops from the unit had recently been killed in action, one of whom was a very popular and experienced soldier. One of the unit’s senior officers rhetorically asked me, “How do I look these men in the eye and ask them to go out day after day on these missions? What’s harder: How do I look [my soldier’s] wife in the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died for something meaningful? How do I do that?”

One of the senior enlisted leaders added, “Guys are saying, ‘I hope I live so I can at least get home to R&R leave before I get it,’ or ‘I hope I only lose a foot.’

Sometimes they even say which limb it might be: ‘Maybe it’ll only be my left foot.’ They don’t have a lot of confidence that the leadership two levels up really understands what they’re living here, what the situation really is.”

On Sept. 11, the 10th anniversary of the infamous attack on the U.S., I visited another unit in Kunar province, this one near the town of Asmar. I talked with the local official who served as the cultural adviser to the U.S. commander. Here’s how the conversation went:

Davis: “Here you have many units of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?”
**Adviser: “No. They are definitely not capable. Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them.
**
**“Also, when a Taliban member is arrested, he is soon released with no action taken against him. So when the Taliban returns [when the Americans leave after 2014], so too go the jobs, especially for everyone like me who has worked with the coalition.
**
“Recently, I got a cellphone call from a Talib who had captured a friend of mine. While I could hear, he began to beat him, telling me I’d better quit working for the Americans. I could hear my friend crying out in pain. [The Talib] said the next time they would kidnap my sons and do the same to them. Because of the direct threats, I’ve had to take my children out of school just to keep them safe.

“And last night, right on that mountain there [he pointed to a ridge overlooking the U.S. base, about 700 meters distant], a member of the ANP was murdered. The Taliban came and called him out, kidnapped him in front of his parents, and took him away and murdered him. He was a member of the ANP from another province and had come back to visit his parents. He was only 27 years old. The people are not safe anywhere.”

**That murder took place within view of the U.S. base, a post nominally responsible for the security of an area of hundreds of square kilometers. Imagine how insecure the population is beyond visual range. And yet that conversation was representative of what I saw in many regions of Afghanistan.
**
In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal. If the events I have described — and many, many more I could mention — had been in the first year of war, or even the third or fourth, one might be willing to believe that Afghanistan was just a hard fight, and we should stick it out. Yet these incidents all happened in the 10th year of war.

As the numbers depicting casualties and enemy violence indicate the absence of progress, so too did my observations of the tactical situation all over Afghanistan.

**CREDIBILITY GAP
**
**I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground.
**
**A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were “sharply divergent from IMF, [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.”
**
The following month, Anthony Cordesman, on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote that ISAF and the U.S. leadership failed to report accurately on the reality of the situation in Afghanistan.

**“Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” Cordesman wrote. “They also, however, were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the ri
**
How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by U.S. senior leaders in Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan. But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on.

I first encountered senior-level equivocation during a 1997 division-level “experiment” that turned out to be far more setpiece than experiment. Over dinner at Fort Hood, Texas, Training and Doctrine Command leaders told me that the Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) had shown that a “digital division” with fewer troops and more gear could be far more effective than current divisions. The next day, our congressional staff delegation observed the demonstration firsthand, and it didn’t take long to realize there was little substance to the claims. Virtually no legitimate experimentation was actually conducted. All parameters were carefully scripted. All events had a preordained sequence and outcome. The AWE was simply an expensive show, couched in the language of scientific experimentation and presented in glowing press releases and public statements, intended to persuade Congress to fund the Army’s preference. Citing the AWE’s “results,” Army leaders proceeded to eliminate one maneuver company per combat battalion. But the loss of fighting systems was never offset by a commensurate rise in killing capability.

A decade later, in the summer of 2007, I was assigned to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) organization at Fort Bliss, Texas. It didn’t take long to discover that the same thing the Army had done with a single division at Fort Hood in 1997 was now being done on a significantly larger scale with FCS. Year after year, the congressionally mandated reports from the Government Accountability Office revealed significant problems and warned that the system was in danger of failing. Each year, the Army’s senior leaders told members of Congress at hearings that GAO didn’t really understand the full picture and that to the contrary, the program was on schedule, on budget, and headed for success. Ultimately, of course, the program was canceled, with little but spinoffs to show for $18 billion spent.

If Americans were able to compare the public statements many of our leaders have made with classified data, this credibility gulf would be immediately observable. Naturally, I am not authorized to divulge classified material to the public. But I am legally able to share it with members of Congress. I have accordingly provided a much fuller accounting in a classified report to several members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, senators and House members.
A nonclassified version is available at www.afghanreport.com. [Editor’s note: At press time, Army public affairs had not yet ruled on whether Davis could post this longer version.]

**TELL THE TRUTH
**
When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.

Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start. AFJ

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

a news article regarding Afghanistan from 1941, seems not much has changed…

page 11, go thru the page you will find it on the left side of the page…

The article is talking of Faqir of IPI’s and how their guerillas have haunted the brits for 100 years, these poor guys have been fighting against invasions through out their history.

I have reproduced one paragraph from the article “Khyber pass may be scene of new wars”:

The opening paragraph of the article is:

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NB04Df05.html

AN ASIA TIMES ONLINE EXCLUSIVE
Taliban eat into Afghanistan’s core

As the United States steps up efforts to engage the Taliban and al-Qaeda :smiley: in a peace process for Afghanistan, elements of the Taliban have initiated their own plan focusing on regaining the power they lost in 2001 following the US-led invasion.

Another great victory Nam & NoKo style… :slight_smile:

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

^ Did you read the article that I posted above (post 109)? Thats from an American Lt colonel published in Armed Forces journal.

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

I did yesterday at NYT web site...

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

The US does not care about afghnaistan folks.
en ka yehan par hidden agenda ha. WoT is just an excuse. moon mein ram ram bukhal mein churee!!!

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

Oh please, check with everyone in BBC, CNN, FOX, they have a government, they have elections, they have security forces in Afghanistan. Besides, America promised Pakistan that this time US will not leave mess without cleaning it up.

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

They will leave the region in a much bigger mess than before, last time it was only Afghanistan this time along Pakistan has also been fragmented.

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

[RIGHT]کچھ تجزيہ نگار “دہشتگردی” جيسے اہم ايشو کو نظر انداز کر تے ہوۓ يہ الزام تراشی کررہے ہیں کہ امريکہ کے اس خطے ميں کچھ اور مقاصد ہیں۔ ليکن خقيقت ميں اسا ہوتا تو امريکہ 9/11 سے پہلے جا چکا ہوتا۔ اصل ميں گیارہ ستمبر کے بعد امريکہ اور نيٹو فوج افعانستان سے القائدہ کو ختم کرنے کے ليے گئ تھی جنہوں نے افغانستان کو پوری دنیا کے خلاف دہشت گردی کا اڈا بنا رکھا تھا۔
امريکی حکام چاہتے ہيں کہ جلد از جلد فوجيوں کو افعانستان سے واپس بلايا جاۓ خود امريکی صدر اوبامہ نے ايک سے زائد موقعوں پر اس حقیقت کو واضح کيا ہے ليکن آپ کچھ زمينی حقائق نظرانداز کر رہے ہيں۔ اس وقت امريکی افواج افغانستان ميں منتخب افغان حکومت کے ايما پر موجود ہيں اور افغان افواج کی فوجی تربيت کے ذريعے اس بات کو يقينی بنا رہی ہيں کہ خطے سے امريکی افواج کے انخلا کے بعد سيکيورٹی کے حوالے سے پيدا ہونے والے خلا کو پر کيا جا سکے۔ حکومت پاکستان سميت بہت سے ماہرين اور تجزيہ نگاروں نے اس خدشے کا اظہار کيا ہے کہ اگر امريکی افواج کو فوری طور پر واپس بلا ليا گيا تو پر تشدد کاروائيوں پر قابو پانا ممکن نہيں رہے گا اور خطے ميں امن کا قيام محض ايک خواب بن کر رہ جاۓ گا ۔ ہمارا مقصد القائدہ کو شکست دينا، افغانستان کو مستحکم کرنا اور اس بات کو يقينی بنانا ہے کو اس ملک ميں القائدہ دوبارہ اپنے قدم نہ جماۓ۔ اس مقصد کے حصول کے بعد امريکہ افغانستان کو چوڑ دے گا۔

ذوالفقار – ڈيجيٹل آؤٹ ريچ ٹيم – يو ايس اسٹيٹ ڈيپارٹمينٹ

[EMAIL=“[email protected]”][email protected]

www.state.gov

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

Before 2001, terrorism (as per the Americans) was confined in Afghanistan, now it has spread into Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Sudan! So is that a victory for you guys?

as far as running out of Afghanistan is concerned what else is left now? this is the 10 year report card…

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2012/02/8904030

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NB04Df05.html

The strategic location of Afghanistan is infront of us, located at the junction of South, Central Asia, Russia, China and Middle East. Big discoveries of oil, gas, copper and gold! So why shouldnt Americans want a slice now, after all they were willing to do the same with taleban before 2001 (Unocal). Most of the gas pipelines from Central Asia to the rest of Asia will pass through Afghanistan as well. Afghanistan is tempting, and Americans have committed the same strategic blunder that the Brits and Russians have already committed during the past 200 years or so.

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

Read US statements from summer of 2001 and you will know what US was planning on invading Afghanistan already.
[/RIGHT]

Re: Taliban no more terrorists?

^ Yeh tum kiss ko bata rahay ho ? :hehe: