I am interested in what people know of this. Are there any lessons to be learned from the actions at Suez in 1956 that can be applied to this current crisis? I am not looking for military or economic similarities, nor conspiracy plots. What I am interested in are the social and political similarities, if any.
I will wait for others to respond on this one before I go off.
Well, OK, I'll go... I only have a few minutes so this isn't going to be complete. Also, this is being done with the benefit of hindsight.
Here are some of my points on Suez; conclusions/similarities can be drawn from these:
1) Two of the main motivating factors were emotion and an exaggerated sense that removing Nasser would strengthen their national and economic security.
2) The length of time involved before a well rounded argument for action evolved led to increased opposition.
3) Disregard for the opinions of the public and other nations and a unilateral push by France and Britain led to the failure of the mission and long-lasting diplomatic repercussions.
4) Use of the United Nations' expected mediocracy as legitimization for unilateral action.
5) International Law was on the side of Nasser - regardless of circumstance and history.
6) There existed a more dangerous threat at the time (Hungarian Revolt, among others), but conditions did not allow for action on this other front. This made a display of power necessary in other areas so that its message may be transmitted to this more difficult situation.
Many more points.. I've gotta run...
interesting analysis
I think there was an article in The Economist (Baghot?) that compared Blair's present predicament to Eden in 1956, and the Suez crisis. I'll see if I can get a link an online version?
Wow! I just read Blast from the past (it’s a collection of analyses by major historians) as recommended by Nadia. That thing had almost every point I’ve ever tried beating into people in it! I got caught up with other things but will come back to respond to this early tomorrow. Meanwhile, go ahead and turn this thread into an argument over relevant history. This may get long winded but history didn’t happen in a paragraph..
Before I go I’d like to point out this: The first point many of these historians make is that history never repeats itself and thus there can be no true parallels between any two conflicts. This is true in a literal sense, but the true value of history is in the lessons learned - not the ability to simply say something is like something else or as a legitimizing tool.
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i think that’s true, Spoon.
i am glad you enjoyed reading “Blast from the past”. Sorry, i didn’t mean to suggest that i was asking you to read the entire shebang:D i was specifically referring to Avi Shlaim’s contribution but you have quite a bit of patience to read it all; if one has the time and the patience, then perhaps it might be useful to read them all because at times it reads like a genuine ‘debate’ between historians.
i am going to take some of your points, bit by bit, and attempt to comprehend how/whether it relates:
Two of the main motivating factors were emotion and an exaggerated sense that removing Nasser would strengthen their national and economic security.
With regards to Iraq, if it is a relatively short invasion, then economic security might be achieved. If it drags out, then that MIGHT depress consumer confidence? The parallels between Suez 1956/Iraq 2003 with “national security”, are obvious.
It will remain to be seen whether genuine “security” manifests itself or whether al Qaeda is able to utilize a future opportunity to play off more hatred against the “west”. Factors critical here are the duration of the invasion, the civilian casualties in Iraq (and their media dissemination), the form and type of the new Iraqi government (is it truly representative), and the governments involved (or not involved) in future reconstruction and ‘nation-building’ projects. Any of these factors, not played out by the US govt. appropriately, can spell a stroke of luck for al Qaeda and lead to less inter/national security.
Disregard for the opinions of the public and other nations and a unilateral push by France and Britain led to the failure of the mission and long-lasting diplomatic repercussions.
Perhaps, this is quite a striking lesson to learn from. Interestingly enough, was it not the US back in 1956 that was - atleast from all external appearances - attempting to uphold international law (against the UK and France)?
Use of the United Nations’ expected mediocracy as legitimization for unilateral action. …] International Law was on the side of Nasser - regardless of circumstance and history.
i think these two are slightly related.
i think quite a bit is riding upon whether or not Blair&Bush are able to succeed in getting that second Resolution passed through the Council. If it is widely perceived that they both forsake a route that was leading to substantial cooperation and disarmament on the Iraqi side (as Blix’s report of yesterday seemed to imply, or at any rate that is my personal interpretation of it), then - history may not forgive these countries’ governments for casting aside a multilateralist route that may have avoided a protracted, unilateralist-driven conflict.
There existed a more dangerous threat at the time (Hungarian Revolt, among others), but conditions did not allow for action on this other front. This made a display of power necessary in other areas so that its message may be transmitted to this more difficult situation.
Very interesting observation, Spoon :k: :k: The manifest differences between the dangerous threats dating back to 1956, and the dangerous threats the US (and UK) are facing in 2003, are IMHO quite significant. The US is unable to pinpoint from precisely which direction al Qaeda is based due to its extremely amorphous nature - viewed from their perspective, it’s not like in the good 'ol days when at least there was a tangible foe one could deal with; today, that opponent is spread out over several diverse countries.
With regards to the Hungarian Revolt, i wonder whether we also have to appreciate how an invasion against Iraq, led by the US and UK, plays straight into the hands of bin Laden. Are the American and British govts. so blind to the reality that, with an invasion against Iraq (particularly one that lacks UNSC cover), 90% of the khutbas or sermons in the majority of mosques in countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, even as far away as Canada, will be critically discussing their actions? The display of power for others’ sake may have been necessary back in 1956, but the brutal display of power in 2003 in Iraq will, IMHO, stoke up further bitter resentment and hatred, laying seeds for further acts of terrorism - precisely what bin Laden must be currently dreaming of.
Iraq ‘could create UK financial crisis’ as Blair faces his Suez
If Bush is facing his Vietnam (or worse) then the bare faced liar in 10 Downing street is facing his Suez.
**Iraq ‘could create UK financial crisis’ **
The Liberal Democrats claimed today that the Iraq war would cost the British taxpayer £6bn - double the amount initially set aside for the conflict by the chancellor, Gordon Brown. In a stormy PMQs, dominated by the recent violent events in Falluja, the Lib Dems economic spokesman, Dr Vincent Cable, said the growing costs would create a “growing hole” in the chancellor’s budget, and the cost of plugging it could see the prime minister face the same fate as Anthony Eden. But Mr Blair rejected the cost analysis, saying merely that he “did not recognise the figure”. Mr Blair added that he “deeply regretted” any civilian deaths in Falluja, insisting “but it is necessary that order is restored and the Americans are trying to do that”.
Mr Cable said: "The latest estimate of the eventual cost to the UK tax payer of the war and occupation of Iraq is £6-£7bn. “Now that more troops are being considered, does he have any plans to plug the growing hole in the chancellor’s budget or will he risk, like Sir Anthony Eden after Suez, creating a financial crisis?” Mr Blair also, under questioning, unequivocally backed the US military action currently taking place in Falluja, where 600-800 civilians have previously been killed by US attacks. The Lib Dem leader, Charles Kennedy, pressed the prime minister to use his influence on the US to not just rely on an overwhelming use of force to deal with violence in Iraq.
But Mr Blair told MPs: “It is perfectly right and proper that they take action against those insurgents.” Mr Blair said: “If American soldiers are being fired on, American soldiers are going to have to fire back.” Later the SNP leader in the Commons, Alex Salmond - who opposed the war - criticized Mr Blair for appearing to deny that US soldiers were inflicting civilian casualties. He said: "At one stage during question time, the prime minister denied that American soldiers are killing Iraqis - when the reality is that thousands of innocent civilians are dead because of the US/UK war and occupation. “The killing and chaos goes on in Iraq - and Tony Blair can’t tell MPs and the people anything important about what is happening because he isn’t in charge.”
Cool, I was wondering when the Brits would bring back the Suez parallels. Still valid if you ask me :k:
Just bumbing this to the top...
So how many of the 6 points I listed above need to be changed? I can still think of some to add.
So now the British generals are now privately discussing “strategic failure” in the Iraq war.
http://www.electronictelegraph.co.uk
*The Telegraph has learned that a contingency plan - called the “evacuation con plan” - has been drawn up by staff officers in Basra and agreed by the Chief of Joint Operations at the Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood. After a month of worsening problems, the mood within the Ministry of Defence has switched from how do “we achieve strategic success” to “how do we avoid strategic failure”.
One senior official described this as: “The collapse of the coalition and the inability to achieve the strategic objective of a safe, democratic Iraq”. He said that the British mission had been a success, but could not be guaranteed to remain so because of the deteriorating situation elsewhere in Iraq. "It is a case of we all win or all fail. We are not at the point of strategic failure yet but there has been a mood change. Strategic failure is now an option that is being considered."*