Re: Slap of Obama
I still remember that Indira Gandhi did not want to stop the war even after break up of East Pakistan. Her target was to destroy remaining West Pakistan as the whole nation was so much shocked, demoralized and confused, particularly Pakistan army, no one at that time knew what to do.
‘This woman suckered us’, said Nixon of Indira Gandhi](http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/this-woman-suckered-us-said-nixon-of-indira-gandhi/article1-514267.aspx)
Nixon’s frustration at not being able to make Mrs Gandhi back off from war reflected in his telephone conversation with Kissinger on Dec 6. Almost fumbling for words without breaking into expletives at the turn of the situation in the subcontinent at a time when Yahya Khan’s propping up was imperative for American foreign policy interests, Nixon wondered if he was “too easy on that goddamn woman when she was here”.
Even as Kissinger tried to pacify a fuming president by saying he was only following advice to be “gracious” to a visiting dignitary, Nixon agreed at one point with Kissinger that he should have probably “brutalised” her and followed up by threatening: “But let me tell you she is going to pay. She is going to pay.”
Nixon even asked Kissinger whether the Chinese would make threatening moves towards India. But the Chinese, much to the chagrin of the Americans did not agree to “intimidate the Indians”, as the author points out, because the Chinese thought that "independence for East Pakistan was a foregone conclusion.
“It (China) was prepared to endorse UN proposal for a standstill ceasefire and forgo a demand for mutual troop withdrawal,” the book states.
When even the Soviets refused to put presssure on New Delh for a ceasefire, Nixon ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean in a threatening gesture. The Fleet, consisting of an aircraft carrier and four destroyers, was to move towards Karachi with the publicly stated aim that they would stand by for “possible evacuation” of Americans although the intention was to browbeat India in case the government in New Delh did not agree to an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal.
India did finally agree to a ceasefire, but that was only on Dec 17 after Indian forces marched into Dhaka (then Dacca). There was a ceasefire also in the west with India assuring that it had no desire to seize the territory of West Pakistan, an assurance it delivered to Wasington via Moscow.
Records declassified a few years ago show that a dramatic turnaround came on 6 December when a CIA operative leaked out India’s “war objectives” to the agency. Then Prime Minister Gandhi had actually informed her top ministers in a meeting that, apart from liberating Bangladesh, India intended to take over a strategically important part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and go for total annihilation of Pakistan’s armed forces so that Pakistan “never attempts to challenge India in the future”.
When he came to know of the CIA report, a furious Nixon blurted out that “this woman (Indira Gandhi) suckered us”, for he was under the impression that in their last interaction at Washington, Mrs Gandhi had promised him that India wouldn’t attack East Pakistan―not to speak of targeting West Pakistan and PoK.
The CIA went on to assess that fulfillment of India’s “war objectives” might lead to “the emergence of centrifugal forces which could shatter West Pakistan into as many as three or four separate countries”.
As a direct result of the operative’s information, the Nixon administration went on an overdrive to save West Pakistan from a massive Indian assault.
Records very clearly demonstrate that Nixon then threatened the USSR with a “major confrontation”, should the Soviets fail to stop the Indians from penetrating West Pakistan. Kissinger secretly met China’s Permanent Representative at the UN to apprise him of the CIA operative’s report and rub it in that India’s plan for Pakistan with Soviet backing could turn out to be a “dress rehearsal” of what they might do to China.
All this led to the USSR’s first Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov visiting New Delhi and telling India “to confine their objectives to East Pakistan” and “not to try and take any part of West Pakistan, including Azad Kashmir”, as “Moscow was concerned about the possibility of a great power confrontation over the subcontinent”. Kuznetsov also extracted a guarantee from Prime Minister Gandhi that India would not attack West Pakistan. This decision was promptly conveyed to Nixon.
On 16 December 1971 when Nixon was told that India had declared a ceasefire, he exulted: “We have made it…it’s the Russians working for us.” Secretary of State Henry Kissinger congratulated him for saving West Pakistan―India’s primary target, as per the operative’s report to the CIA.
