September 6th, 1965 & the PAF
By: Arshad Hussain
September 6th, 1965 will be live in our national history, a day to remember for valiant men & women, who sacrificed their day for our present and future days. When the PAF rose to meet the challenge of Indian military aggression by launching full scale air war in accordance with Air War Plan of June 29, 1965 by registering its name in the annals of air warfare against numerically superior Indian Air Force.
As the Indian Army started its advance against Lahore at about 1.00 am after mid night of 5/6 September, 1965 from the borders of Amritsar and its adjoining areas, presuming its vanguard armor and mechanized infantry units will easily over run the thinly deployed ground defense units of the Pak Army and Sutlej Rangers at Wagah, Burki and other border posts through multi roads network.
Some of the Pak Army units had just deployed at its battle positions, while others were on the roads heading to wards borders. When the Indian Army units at about 2/3 am launched its grand invasion of West Pakistan, The main advance began on three axes with the major thrust along with the GT Road aimed capturing the city of Lahore and where the Indian Army Chief General J. N. Chaudhry and his staff generals will celebrate victory at Lahore Gymkhana club in the evening.
The Indian military offensive seemed designed not merely to relieve pressure exerted by the advancing Pak army on Akhnur & Jammu axis, but to defeat the Pakistan armed forces by capturing major cities Lahore and Sialkot in the initial stage then shifting its advance for other areas.
Although long before the Indian ground offensive against West Pakistan was launched in the mid night of 5/6 September, the PAF s’ Air Commodore Aziz Ahmed head of the Indian Desk in Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had sent a red signal to all concerned that prior to the outbreak of war with India on 30th August, 1965:-
“An Indian attack outside Kashmir was imminent and listing detailed Indian Army movement from peace locations to its battle positions particularly mentioning Indian armoured division had been deployed in Jallunder since July 1965, where it could launch out in one of several battle points against West Pakistan.”
None at the government of Pakistan and Pak army high command level particularly C-in-C General Musa Khan and Chief of the General Staff Major General Sher Bahader took it seriously, except Air Marshal Nur Khan went away seriously convinced of the impending war with India. He therefore on 1st September, 1965 ordered the PAF to the highest state of alert.
This was the most significant strategic move made by the C-in-C of the PAF, whose merit would be determine through air victory against numerically superior Indian Air Force during Indo-Pak War with in first three crucial days of air war. A bold snap decision by the Air Marshal Nur Khan!
While the PAF increased its combat posture from day to day, the country s’ political leadership and the hierarchy of the Army, incredibly, continued to languish in the shade of the Foreign Office s’ assurance concerning escalation. A wishful school of thought was promoted by the Foreign Office prior launching of the operation Gibraltar that “it will be localize military venture with in limits and boundaries of occupied Kashmir and the Indian Army will not be able to counter it effectively there”. Therefore, No contingency plan in case of violent counter attack by the Indian Army against Pakistan was ever visualized during the planning phase of operation Gibraltar as a result of its ultimate reaction from enemy.
The Pakistani Leadership and Army had miscalculated the ultimate outcome of the operation Gibraltar. The political Indian Leadership was not prepared to treat the military venture in Kashmir as an issue isolated from Indo-Pak relationship in the wider sphere.
Meanwhile, Indian political leadership in the response to Pak Army s’ operation Gibraltar and Grand Salam in Jammu Kashmir areas, finally decided on September 1st , to put into motion her long standing plan of attacking West Pakistan at Lahore, Sialkot and Kasur with the ground invasion timed to materialize in the early hours of September 6th, 1965.
The Pakistan s’ High Commissioner in New Delhi, India Mian Arshad Hussain got the top secret details of the ground attack plan of the Indian Army against Lahore including exact H Hours of September 6th,1965 acting imaginatively communicated the entire details to the Foreign Office, Islamabad, Pakistan through Turkey s’ embassy in New Delhi, India. It was timely war warning alarm but again, No contingency action was taken by the Government of Pakistan.
On the night of 5th September there was a dinner hosted by the International Aid Agency in Lahore. The guests included GOC 10th Division Major General Sarfaraz Khan and some American aid officers from the border. The Americans crossed the border at Wagah between 8.00pm -9.00pm night of 5th September. They camed in three civilian jeeps driven by Indians. The driver of one jeep made some excuse for going across the border to Indian side. The other two drivers jumped in. Under the circumstances it would reasonable to assume that drivers were on reconnaissance mission to check the deployment of Pakistani troops.
On the night of 5th/6th September HQ 10 Division checked with Military Operations Directorate before ordering move of troops. The duty officer in MO Directorate was Lt.Col. Happy Aslam. He said,” The Foreign Ministry will not give clearance. The GOC can, of course, use his own discretion.” The marching columns of the Pak Army arrived in battle locations from 03.30am-04.30am. 23 Field Artillery Regiment occupied its gun positions by 03.30am.
The first breaking news of the Indian army major assault against Lahore was also communicated to the PAF s’ Operational Headquarters, Rawalpindi from Lahore Airbase Commander Wing Commander Ayaz A Khan at about 4.00 am, which was received from a mobile observer wing deployed at Wagah to monitor the enemy air force s’ activities. This was the specialized PAF unit which witnessed first Indian Army s’ tank units advance on the GT Road and attacking rangers s’ posts during the mid night. Air Vice Marshal M Akhtar was detailed at night duty in Operational Air Headquarters, Rawalpindi sensing the ultimate war scenario with India, immediately informed President Ayub Khan as well calling to Air Marshal Nur Khan and the Army Chief General Musa Khan about Indian Army attacks against Lahore through hot lines.
Since, the PAF was a highly trained, highly disciplined, and motivated professional air force since decade led by inspiring and dedicated professional leadership ever ready to take on the enemy air force during peace and war. That s’ why , the ever vigilant PAF geared into air war operations immediately after the Indian army started its major offensive against West Pakistan like a well oiled razor sharp air war machine. Every one in the Air Force, from high command level to the airmen level, was up on his toes and contributed his max towards the fulfillment of the PAF role in the air war beyond the call of the duty.