http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/story.jsp?story=332010
After the ragtag Taleban, looks like US has found another lightweight to knock over. Gotta hand it to the Americans they know how to handpick their opponents 
Looking through the report we see:
The "overview" is "Iraq could produce nuclear weapons on a fairly short notice if it was somehow able to acquire sufficient nuclear material from a foreign source but there is no evidence it has done so. " ...Iraq could divert in-country radioisotopes or obtain material from foreign sources for a radiological weapon. But how such a weapon could be delivered, and its effectiveness, remain open to question."
Since 1998, the report claims "Iraq possesses an industrial capability and knowledge base to produce agents quickly and in volume if desired. Aside from conventional military munitions, delivery of biological weapons by individuals or small groups acting as commandos or terrorists remains a plausible threat that is very difficult to defend against".
But, the report says "Iraqi biological munitions could spread terror and provoke a strong political response but are unlikely to cause mass casualties, unless Iraq has made substantial advances in delivery technology."
The report's "overview" says "Although Iraq's current chemical capabilities are reduced from their high point in 1990 before the Gulf War, it is probably able to mobilise a limited capability for use in battle against civilian targets."
The report concludes "Iraq's current chemical capability probably comprises hundreds of tonnes of agents ( presumably a mixture of mustard and nerve agent, most likely sarin and cyclosarin) and perhaps a few thousand munitions."
However, Iraq covertly negotiated with 500 companies from 40 countries in an attempt to get missile technology, says the report. It's "small number" of al-Hussain missiles with a 650km range can reach Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. However, the report has no evidence that Baghdad has ever intended to use them. The report concludes "Iraq probably has a small number of missiles. Some worst case scenario puts this number at several dozen missiles; a more likely figure is around a dozen.
But I get the idea, let us wait for the mushroom cloud to be sure of what he has or does not have. What this report points to is they have no idea what has been produced since 1998.
Here's the article from the link above. Just to get things in their proper context:
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Saddam weaker now than before Gulf War, says report
By Kim Sengupta
10 September 2002
The report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies is being promoted by the hawks in Washington and their supporters in Whitehall as providing "proof" that Saddam Hussein is just months away from launching a nuclear bomb.
That is the way is has been presented in some quarters of the media. But an examination of the report shows that, in fact, Iraq is far weaker in weapons of mass destruction and every other military field than it was in 1991 before the Gulf War. The realistic chances of acquiring, let alone delivering, a nuclear weapon without "substantial" outside help, is years away.
The report, edited by Dr Gary Samore, formerly of the US State Department, was presented yesterday in a dramatic and even alarmist style. "War, sanctions and inspections have reversed and retarded, but not eliminated Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long-range missile capacity, nor removed Baghdad's enduring interest in developing these capacities", said IISS director Dr John Chipman.
"Wait, and the threat will grow. Strike, and the threat may be used."
The report has been described as the most comprehensive yet into Iraq's acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry, and their possible means of delivery.
It was compiled in eight weeks, starting in June, based on reports of Unscom, the UN weapons inspectors who had not been in Iraq since 1998, consultations with "experts" on what may have happened since then, and newspaper cuttings.
These are the report's overviews and conclusions.
Nuclear/Radiological
Following the the tripling of oil prices after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the increase in oil revenues, Iraq embarked on an ambitious nuclear programme. On 7 July, Israeli warplanes destroyed al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre near Baghdad, setting back the programme considerably.
The Iraqi programme went underground and, by 1990, had reached a stage when it could produce two nuclear weapons a year, and â had it not been for the Gulf War â " Iraq could have accumulated a nuclear stockpile of a dozen or more weapons by the end of the decade."
However, "Gulf War strikes devastated Iraq's overt and covert nuclear facilities. All of the major facilities ... including all safeguarded research reactors and most laboratories, were damaged or destroyed."
During the years of weapons inspections, until 1998, Iraq sought to hide its nuclear programme by destroying some of the evidence. The "nuclear potential was not completely eliminated ... the scientific and technical expertise of Iraq's nuclear programme survived."
Since 1998, "Baghdad retains a strong interest in developing nuclear weapons but it seems unlikely Iraq has produced, or is close to producing, nuclear weapons from indigenously produced nuclear material."
The "overview" is "Iraq could produce nuclear weapons on a fairly short notice if it was somehow able to acquire sufficient nuclear material from a foreign source but there is no evidence it has done so. " ...Iraq could divert in-country radioisotopes or obtain material from foreign sources for a radiological weapon. But how such a weapon could be delivered, and its effectiveness, remain open to question."
Biological
At the time of the Gulf War, Iraq had filled munitions with biological weapons and deployed them. Individual commanders were given permission to use them if Baghdad was threatened or if there was the threat of a nuclear attack by the Allies. The coalition counties were not aware of this until 1995.
During the years of weapon inspection, Unscom found traces of biological weapons agents on the containers of destroyed al-Hussein missile warheads and R-400 bombs, but could not verify the numbers. There was no verification of Iraqi claims the programme was terminated in 1991.
Since 1998, the report claims "Iraq possesses an industrial capability and knowledge base to produce agents quickly and in volume if desired. Aside from conventional military munitions, delivery of biological weapons by individuals or small groups acting as commandos or terrorists remains a plausible threat that is very difficult to defend against".
But, the report says "Iraqi biological munitions could spread terror and provoke a strong political response but are unlikely to cause mass casualties, unless Iraq has made substantial advances in delivery technology."
Chemical
From 1982 to 1988, Iraq constructed industrial-scale chemical weapons facilities, and stockpiled raw material. "It produced effective (if primitive) chemical munitions in the form of aerial bombs, artillery shells and rockets."
During the Gulf War, Iraq "apparently mobilized its chemical forces, filling al-Hussein missile warheads, R-400 aerial bombs, and other munitions." During the years of inspection, " it is unlikely that Iraq produced substantial new quantities of agents or munitions between 1991 and 1998."
The report's "overview" says "Although Iraq's current chemical capabilities are reduced from their high point in 1990 before the Gulf War, it is probably able to mobilise a limited capability for use in battle against civilian targets."
The report concludes "Iraq's current chemical capability probably comprises hundreds of tonnes of agents ( presumably a mixture of mustard and nerve agent, most likely sarin and cyclosarin) and perhaps a few thousand munitions."
Ballistic missiles
Iraq's al-Hussain missile strike against a US military facility caused the greatest number of US casualties in one incident. The mobility of the launchers meant that no operational missiles were destroyed during the war. During the years of inspection "Unscom made considerable progress in verifying Iraqi declarations of its destruction campaign but questions still remained about a small amount of imported and indigenously produced missiles, warheads, missile propellant, and engine components."
However, Iraq covertly negotiated with 500 companies from 40 countries in an attempt to get missile technology, says the report. It's "small number" of al-Hussain missiles with a 650km range can reach Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. However, the report has no evidence that Baghdad has ever intended to use them. The report concludes "Iraq probably has a small number of missiles. Some worst case scenario puts this number at several dozen missiles; a more likely figure is around a dozen."
IISS has strong establishment links
COMING TWO days before 11 September, and in one of the most critical periods in the debate over a fresh Iraq war, the IISS report could not have been better timed to influence coming events and attract maximum publicity.
Starting in June, the IISS took eight weeks to compile the report, and, says the organisation, it was always due out at this juncture, whatever the state of play with military action.
The methodology appears to have been to rely to a very great extent on the UNScom weapons inspectors' reports, which were produced until 1998; take soundings from various experts and officials on what could have happened subsequently; and a copious perusal of newspaper cuttings.
The report, costing ÂŁ40 to non IISS members, is edited by Dr Gary Samore, an American who served in the State Department during the Clinton administration. Dr John Chipman, the Institute's director, who presented it yesterday, is a former Nato fellow.
The organisation insists it is independent and does not receive any general government funding, although it does get funding "for the organisation of meetings and for research from government departments". The Foreign Office contributed ÂŁ100,000 to the setting up of its new headquarters, Arundel House, in central London.
The institute's income, according to the IISS website, comes from "a range of international bodies and foundations", individual and corporate membership, and its publications. There is little doubt that the IISS, set up in 1958 at the height of the Cold War, has strong establishment links. When it moved to Arundel House from Covent Garden, Lady Thatcher and Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, the Nato secretary general, were on the guest list.
The institute spent ÂŁ8m refitting Arundel House, the former townhouse of the dukes of Norfolk, of which ÂŁ1m was given by Conrad Black's Hollinger Group, which owns Telegraph newspapers. Further donations came from the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry (ÂŁ350,000) and the Japanese government (ÂŁ130,000).
IISS officials point out it has been critical of Western governments. A report on the US role in the Middle East and several other crisis points stated that Washington's leadership was often found wanting. "It is often late into crisis management and oscillates unpredictably between unilateral and multilateral approaches to international problems."
Re: Saddam weaker now than before the Gulf war
China and Russia have not recently conspired to incinerate thousands of Americans to my knowledge. Why Taleban? Why Iraq? Why not Chad or Jordan?
More crowd pleasing nonsense.
It was compiled in eight weeks, starting in June, based on reports of Unscom, the UN weapons inspectors who had not been in Iraq since 1998, consultations with "experts" on what may have happened since then, and newspaper cuttings.
This makes things sound like they know what is going on for sure! Why don't they just say we don't have any idea so we are guessing to the tune of who ever will write us a checks wishes..
Why Iraq is a good question. Seeing as there is no evidence of THEM conspiring to incinerate thousands of Americans so far at least.
[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by Judge^MentuLL: *
Why Iraq is a good question. Seeing as there is no evidence of THEM conspiring to incinerate thousands of Americans so far at least.
[/QUOTE]
You may just be right there. But IF the evidence becomes clear and the U.S. begins a campaign to oust Sadaam, will Iraq have been handpicked as a tomato can to use a boxing phrase or because it poses a legit threat?
Russia posed a legit threat but pretty wisely US didn't send the miltary machine there. It wouldn't have made much sense would it?
Hereâs another perspective froma different journalist. The French President raises some important points.
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http://argument.independent.co.uk/regular_columnists/donald_macintyre/story.jsp?story=331937
The crucial question remains: is the Iraqi President mad as well as bad?
Even if Saddam had nuclear weapons, does that mean he would use them, exposing Iraq to second-strike retaliation?
By Donald Macintyre
10 September 2002
If anyone can make a coherent case for war in Iraq, itâs probably Tony Blair. Nobody doubts his powers of persuasion, least of all the man himself. He combines the lawyerâs ability to marshal his arguments clearly with an actorâs to make them resound. He is going to need them if he is to secure the backing of his country, his party and â perhaps the key to both those â help to persuade his fellow members of the UN Security Council to support the strategy he and George Bush agreed at Camp David last weekend.
No doubt yesterdayâs International Institute for Strategic Studies report will help somewhat. No, there is no evidence that Iraq has yet acquired the foreign material it would need to produce a nuclear weapon at short notice; but the chemical and biological capabilities available to a man who has already shown he is willing to use them remain deeply frightening. Nobody can read this with equanimity. The reportâs conclusion that âwait and the threat will grow; strike and the threat may be usedâ is no doubt as bleakly realistic as itâs possible to be.
But it wonât, of course, be enough. Any more than will the official dossier on Saddamâs capabilities now expected within the fortnight. Indeed those in Whitehall familiar with its contents are already a little worried that it will seem a little anti-climactic after all the importance that has been attached to it. Itâs a commonplace that Mr Blair has to âmake the caseâ for possible war against Iraq , starting today at the TUC. But to do that requires more than a factual assessment, however important, of the weaponry Saddam has and is trying to get in flagrant breach of UN resolutions. It also requires a sober, global cost-benefit analysis of the consequences of war in Iraq.
A few of those are touched on in President Jacques Chiracâs long interview in yesterdayâs New York Times. The interview affords some encouragement to the pro-war party. Spectacularly liberated from the very electoral factors which are currently constraining the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, Mr Chirac clearly wants to be seen as a friend of the US who is not ruling out military action against Iraq. His proposal for a two-stage United Nations process â one to set a deadline for Saddamâs admission of weapons inspectors, another to decide what to do if he refuses â is a movement, perhaps decisive, in the Blair-Bush direction.
But there are caveats. The French President still purports to see Blair-Bush as located on one side of a divide in the international community, with Germany and France on the other. He is publicly brutal in his rejection of Vice-President Dick Cheneyâs dismissive remarks about the pointlessness of UN inspections. More significantly, he challenges the âextraordinarily dangerousâ doctrine of pre-emptive, rather than retaliatory, action. What would happen if China decided to take such action against Taiwan, he asks. Or India against Pakistan? And he is unconvinced by the case for âregime changeâ at the very least without establishing a clear and present danger to the wider world. Avowedly less interventionist than Tony Blair, he adds: âIf we start saying âwe canât acceptâ, soon half the countries of the world will be fighting the other half.â
This doesnât mean that in time President Chirac and, given his powerful personal attachment to his relationship with the US, even President Putin might not come round â at least to the point of abstention rather than a veto â to the delivery of a clear military ultimatum to Saddam, provided, that is, that it is directly linked to Baghdadâs refusal to allow workable UN inspections. If they donât, and Tony Blair were to be presented with the deeply unpalatable choice of backing unilateral action by the US, against the declared opposition of figures ranging from James Baker to Henry Kissinger, then it would be much more difficult for the British Prime Minister to contain opposition, and not only in his party. But if they do, producing an explicit UN Security Council resolution backing military action, much, though not all, of the domestic opposition, not least in Britain, is likely to be dissipated. The resolution passed yesterday by the TUC in Blackpool, for example, explicitly condemned not all military action but all military action not endorsed by the UN Security Council.
But what the continuing Chirac reservations underline are the wider questions that need to be answered in âmaking the caseâ. Has the old doctrine of deterrence simply been superseded? Even if Saddam had, or were on the point of acquiring nuclear weapons, does that mean he would use them, exposing Iraq to the second-strike nuclear retaliation that would devastate his country? Is he, in other words, mad as well as bad? Of course, there is a strong argument that a nuclear threat from Saddam would not conform to the old Cold War certainties of mutually assured destruction. But it will need to be made in some detail.
Then there is the question of how Iraq relates to â and perhaps even distracts from â the âwar against terrorâ when no firm evidence exists of a link between Saddam and the terrible events of a year ago tomorrow. And what is the democratic outcome President Bush insists he wants for a post-Saddam Iraq?
But looming far over all this is the wider consequences for the region. This isnât only a matter of the outcry from the Muslim world at a perceived and wilful double standard which leaves Israel, also in breach of key UN Security Council resolutions, still enjoying the support of the US, though thatâs part of it. Itâs also a matter of what the consequences for the region would be given that Israel has indicated that it will not, as it did, during the last Gulf War, remain on the sidelines of the conflagration. All this needs to be answered, and will certainly be asked if Parliament is reconvened as it surely should be, perhaps at the time when the British government publishes its famous dossier.
This isnât, at the risk of repetition, to say that these questions canât necessarily be answered by Mr Blair. At the beginning of August it looked quite probable that the unilateralists would prevail in Washington and that the US administration might well simply brush aside any further attempt, however short-lived, to insert the weapons inspectors into Iraq. Mr Blair can claim a decent part of the credit for last weekendâs decisive, if fragile, attempt to internationalise the strategy on Iraq. He has also pressed â by all accounts including last weekend â for some revival of a peace process in the Middle East, though with much less evidence so far of any will by the US to engage seriously in making the prospects for that any less bleak than they have now become. Mr Blairâs moral determination that the threat from Saddam must be dealt with is said to be as fixed as it was long in the gestation â since well before 11 September 2001. But there are still many questions. And in a mature democracy the public and its elected representatives are entitled to some answers before they commit British troops to war.