Yes, exactly.
Here it is described in more detail.
Consider these facts:
In 43 days of war, a mere 330 weapons (244 laser–guided bombs and 86 Tomahawk cruise missiles) were delivered on Baghdad targets (a mere three percent of the total of all smart weapons expended) (see tables 1 and 2).3
Ordnance impacting in Baghdad totaled 287 tons (not even one–tenth of one percent of the total in the air war).4 Contrast this with Linebacker II, during which aircraft dropped 15,000 tons on Hanoi in 11 days, 50 times the bomb tonnage on Baghdad.
There were 18 days and nights when there were no Baghdad strikes at all. In eight additional days and nights, five or fewer weapons fell. There were only 14 nights when more than two individual targets were attacked within the city.
Three of Baghdad’s 42 targets—Iraqi air force headquarters, Muthenna airfield, and Ba’ath party headquarters—absorbed 20 percent of the effort.5
The most intense “leadership” attack in Baghdad occurred on the last day of the war, when 21 bombs were delivered against the empty Ba’ath party headquarters.
Only once, on 7 February, was a suspected presidential target hit with more than two bombs during an attack
The author, William Arkin is a well known military critic. He visited Baghdad for 6 weeks, and investigated the bombing. His theory is that the US was TOO precise, and that the Iraqi leadership knew this read on from the same report:
Home in Their Beds
When Peter Arnett interviewed Saddam Hussein on 27 January, it was in a modest residential house in northwest Baghdad, far from the downtown presidential compound.56 As Soviet envoy Yevgeny M. Primakov began his shuttle diplomacy, he also met the Iraqi leader in normal private homes, not in government facilities.57
Before the war, the Iraqi leadership debated where Saddam and the inner circle should operate from. The office of the president and Saddam’s personal guard, well known for their impenetrable security screen, had multiple buildings and residences to choose from. Though the presidential grounds, a five–square–mile enclave in the elbow of a twist in the Tigris River, contained numerous obvious targets—including underground command centers58—it also contained dozens of VIP residences and innocuous “safe houses.” And there were scores of additional government and Ba’ath party offices and homes dotted elsewhere throughout the city.
Just before the UN deadline, the Iraqi government informed the foreign diplomatic corps that it would move all functions out of the capital,59 and civil defense exercises were held to practice civilian evacuation. When the bombing started, many people flooded from the capital to stay with relatives and friends in the countryside and avoid what they perceived to be the impending cataclysm in the center.
But the inner circle soon realized that much of its formal contingency planning didn’t need to be implemented. Both the Soviet and French governments, officials claim, assured them that the coalition would not destroy the capital, not pursue its capture, nor attempt the occupation of Iraq. Bombing did not contradict this assurance.
Iraqi officials state without exception that after the first few days, they recognized what types of targets were going to be hit and how circumscribed the damage would be. Though Iraqi public bluster is that Saddam was in Kuwait with the troops when the bombing started, sources close to the president state that he was actually in Baghdad, in a residence specifically chosen for its innocence. After the first few days, however, he moved back to his compound. A national–level “tactical” command center set up in Babylon near Hillah, less than 45 minutes south of the capital by car, was only occasionally used.
Though Warden opines that through C3 attacks, Saddam was “reduced” to running the war with a command system “not much more sophisticated than that used by Wellington and Blücher at Waterloo in 1815,”60 this is mirror imaging of American electronic dependence. US intelligence was well aware that Saddam made use of face–to–face meetings and special couriers to deliver “official” messages to subordinates. During the Iran–Iraq war, he would visit the front unannounced, or summon leaders to Baghdad (this was only a few hours’ drive or a 30–minute helicopter ride) in order to assert his personal control and intimidation.61 Numerous military actions (e.g., authorization of Scud missile firings, escape of aircraft to Iran, the Khafji incursion) required Baghdad’s approval, but bombing of leadership targets and disruption of communications did not seem to have much effect. Instructions normally would have been written and transmitted via courier, Iraqi officials say. And most targets hit were not occupied anyhow.
When asked to describe the impact of Baghdad bombing on either government decision–making or military capability, knowledgeable officials state that given their assumption of a short war (at least a short air war), they could think of only minor effect, particularly given emergency generators used to handle the most important needs. In terms of work habits or daily lives, officials could not give any examples of adverse impact other than the expected “inconveniences” of war.
Though the psychological impact of strategic bombing is one of its cardinal qualities, and attacks of specific targets were meant to convey discreet messages,62 Iraqi officials gloat that the precision was soothing rather than disconcerting. In a city the size of metropolitan New York with a population of over four million, scattered and occasional strikes seemed to validate their decision not to give in to the coalition. In early February, people evidently agreed, for they started returning to the capital, and normal basic commerce resumed.
Pinpoint bombing of leadership might have been meant to “send a message” to the Iraqi people, but most Baghdadis knew little of what went on within Saddam’s complex. Ironically, then, there were few visible signs that Saddam or the Ba’ath were in fact seriously threatened.63 The limited bombing effort was its own messenger. “If you are asking about the effect in Baghdad, clearly more intense bombing would have made a greater impression on the people,” a Foreign Ministry official said in 1993.