Pakistan was “created in a hurry” says Husain Haqqani and Pakistan-US relations a ‘marriage of convenience’, and is “most dangerous state in the world” says Robert Oakley in Washington Post
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_27-7-2005_pg7_38
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: Robert Oakley, a former US ambassador to Pakistan, told a gathering here on Tuesday that the United States and Pakistan have always seen their relationship as a ‘marriage of convenience.’
He said except for the Cold War years of CENTO and SEATO, Pakistan and the US were never really allies.** Asked if the US now sees Pakistan as an ally, he replied in the negative. He also called Pakistan the “most dangerous state in the world.” He was of the view that the US does not view Pakistan as a “fundamental ally.” **He also said that it was not the ISI so much as the civilian leadership, in particular Gen Naseerullah Babar during Benazir Bhutto’s time in office, that had built up the Taliban. Gen Babar’s support for the Taliban was situated in the Pushtun factor.
Oakley, who as US ambassador in Pakistan was often called “Viceroy” because of what some saw as his “imperial manner,” was speaking at the release ceremony of Husain Haqqani’s book on Pakistan at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Steve Coll of the Washington Post also spoke, describing ‘Pakistan: between mosque and military’ as a “timely” and “very important book”. He said Pakistan would continue to remain central to US security policy for the next five years. He said what needs to be examined is the extent to which the personal religious convictions of the Pakistan army corps commanders – whom he called the “guardian council – affect statecraft and state policies. He was of the view that personal convictions had a greater role to play in Pakistani statecraft today than in the past.
He pointed out that there were three-pronged, interlocking insurgencies that were active today in Pakistan’s tribal belt. The Pakistan Army was controlling these insurgencies with one hand and enabling a religiously motivated alliance to keep power in two provinces with the other. He was of the opinion that groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish Muhammad were army proxies, whose role had now been limited because of the dialogue with India. But outfits like the Lashkar could be getting out of Pakistan and staging their operations elsewhere, something that would create new pressures on Pakistan.
The author, Husain Haqqani, told the gathering that the people of Pakistan have continued to nurture democratic aspirations despite repeated interventions by the army and extended periods of army rule. No military leader in Pakistan has been able to gain legitimacy. The overwhelming majority of Pakistanis is made up of moderate Muslims, but there also is an ever-present current of militant Islam among them. Pakistan is a national security state and yet it suffers form a sense
of insecurity.
**
He felt that Pakistan was “created in a hurry” and the founder of Pakistan had not been able to explain what kind of a state it would be. It was decided by the rulers early on that not a sense of nationhood but the common faith of Islam would be the cement that would bind the state together, a formula that had not worked. He declared that even if Pakistan is able to obtain Kashmir “on a platter”, its sense of insecurity would remain.
**
He said Pakistan from day one had offered itself as a “rentier” state, given its unique geography and location. It had been decided by the ruling elite that the United States should “pick up the bill”. He called the Pakistan military and the Islamists members of an old alliance. Today, he warned, a point has been reached where the local and the global jihadis have coalesced. The US, he stressed, must not abandon Pakistan but it should at the same time make it clear that military rule has to make way for a democratic polity. Washington should also engage with the country’s civilian political leaders.
**
As for Pakistan, it should not compete with India, not play the Great Game, not seek a client state in Kabul and understand that it cannot go on living as a “rentier state.”
**
Good one.