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Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
The pn lacks clarity in planning and tends to go for equipment mainly because it is being offered without considering the strategic significance of the acquisition or its long-term impact on the growth of the service
HE RECENT STATEMENT BY NAVAL Chief, Admiral Shahid Karimullah, pointing to the need to revise the country’s maritime policies is a cry in the dark. He is of course right in trying to draw the attention of military planners to the geopolitical and structural changes in the region. But his cry is unlikely to make much difference due to Army’s predominant control of military-strategic planning. The generals, with their land-oriented approach, have never understood maritime issues nor would they appreciate the significance of a strong naval defense. This is a predicament the Pakistan Navy has always encountered through the fifty years of the country’s existence. Pakistan has had a navy but it has still to find a role for it, primarily because of the absence of a comprehensive military strategy and a joint services planning culture.
Within the existing military security culture of the country the conflict in Kashmir is of prime importance for policymakers. This entails, according to the generals, strengthening the ground forces. They have never appreciated the fact that with a strong naval force the adversary could easily outmaneuver the Pakistan Army. For the time being, the Indian Navy might not be in a position to do so due to its strategic and operational planning inefficiencies, but the fact remains that the more New Delhi concentrates on strengthening its navy, the tougher it would get even for the Pakistan Army.
Reminiscing from 1971, Pakistan would have been in a better position to defend itself had it not let loose its army on East Pakistan’s population and invested in a stronger naval defense that was the only way of keeping the two wings better connected.
In his statement, the naval chief tried to draw the generals’ attention towards developments such as the potential significance of the Gwadar port. While the new port would end Pakistan’s predicament of the constant fear of the single-port and naval base at Karachi being blockaded by India, this development also entails certain serious future challenges for which Islamabad has to plan now. For sure, the Gwadar port’s development, especially with assistance from China and the access this would provide to Beijing’s sea traffic, has drawn New Delhi’s attention. In a recent statement, the Indian naval chief alluded to the foothold the Gawadar port would give to the Chinese. Such development, in his view, would add to the existing problem for India of Chinese influence in Burma. Hence, he stressed the need to add to India’s aircraft carrier fleet.
The intention is to buy a larger Admiral Gorshkov class carrier from Moscow. Such technological acquisitions would fall in line with current Indian plans to extend its naval outreach in the Indian Ocean. Within the past couple of years, the Indian Navy (IN) has conducted exercises in the South China Sea, and joint exercises with a number of navies, including US, Russian and French navies. Important naval powers do recognise a role for the IN, especially since it is the only navy with some significant size and is clearly making efforts to develop a blue-water capability. Such capability would help counter the Chinese naval strength. Thus, foreign navies see IN’s growth as investment in the future.
The Indian naval chief might have been trying to convince his leadership to attend to the Indian Navy’s needs; a service that does not enjoy the same significance in India as the other two services, but the fact remains that the entry of China into this part of the Indian Ocean (Arabian Sea) would result in greater pressure on Indian planners. Of course, this should be no reason for Pakistan to abandon its cooperation with Beijing, but it does need to review the emerging threats that would require a more proactive approach towards national and military-strategic planning for the future.
Such planning would demand clarity in thinking and systematic planning at both the strategic and operational levels, especially when it comes to capital investment by the government. For instance, Islamabad will have to think carefully about its overall maritime policy and attend to the issues of solving the problem of an undefined maritime boundary. Unfortunately, the issue of maritime boundary is linked with the Sir Creek dispute that, in turn, has always been held hostage to the Kashmir issue. The other essential matter is to invest in maritime and naval technology. Presently, Pakistan’s merchant navy’s state is as poor as that of its navy
However, this second option reminds one of the problems the government has traditionally had with naval acquisitions. The Pakistan Navy is reputed for mismanaging its procurement and wasting money, particularly in kickbacks. One would not really blame the military establishment for such views because the PN was given sufficient space for modernization during the entire 1990s when it was the only service that signed three deals, which was more than what the other two services had asked for during that period.
Part of the problem is that the PN lacks clarity in planning and tends to go for equipment mainly because it is being offered without considering the strategic significance of the acquisition or its long-term impact on the growth of the service. For instance, the British Type-21 frigates were procured despite the fact that planners at the Naval Headquarters (NHQ) were divided on the decision. The core incentive behind that acquisition was the kickbacks and the apprehension that this was the only opportunity to obtain some equipment.
Sadly enough, the PN is about to make a similar mistake through the acquisition of the F-22P frigate from China which has been allowed by Islamabad under a transfer-of-technology arrangement. Notwithstanding the observation that the deal has not been debated by parliament, one wonders if the PN has carefully thought about what would these ships add to its overall capacity. It is worth noting that the deal, which would cost Pakistan about US $ 600 million, is problematic due to the technology under consideration. As reported in reputable international publications, the Thai Navy, on which the ships were thrust, had to dock its F-22s on arrival to improve on poor shipbuilding standards and enhance the vessels’ damage control capability. Reports indicate that technological problems were also pointed out by several PN sources that were ignored by the top management for fear that any delays from the Pakistani side would result in cancellation of the government’s approval.
Since the negotiations for this ship have been going on for more than ten years, there are also rumors of kickbacks that might explain the reasons for the PN not considering other sources offering better technology at comparable prices. Reportedly, the initial cost of acquisition would not include the cost of de-gaussing, missiles, helicopters, ammunition and tactical software that would be provided through a separate contract. A similar practice was also followed in the Agosta deal where certain critical parts were bought through a separate contract.
Equally problematic is the TOT deal that would, in fact, increase the cost without any meaningful dividends for the service. Like the French minehunters and submarines, two of the three ships would be constructed at the Karachi Shipyards and Engineering Works (KSEW). The idea is to develop a capability that could be used later to construct frigates for sale. Such a concept ignores three facts. First, by the time the PN would be finished with the construction of its fourth ship around 2014/15, the technology would be too old for it to attract any buyer. Second, given Pakistan’s past experience with TOT potential buyers would be discouraged from procuring ships from Pakistan that has limited technological capacity to make such ships. Third, myriad management problems at KSEW would prevent the venture from being cost-effective. The mismanagement of the organization is of the nature and its financial liabilities of the scale that it would require about Rs 700 million to make it functional.
Clearly, the cost factor is not a priority with military managers that believe in strengthening military security at all costs. However, this is the time for the political and military leadership to carefully review alternatives and devise a strategy. Making a service happy by getting ‘toys for the boys’ is an approach Pakistan can ill-afford at this juncture. Perhaps, it would be feasible to bring the issue before parliament for discussion.