The India-Pakistan conflict is a mix of ironies and sad truths. While the Indian and Pakistani governments are preoccupied with the race towards acclaiming the international status of ‘nuclear power’, one wonders, of what use would this ‘power’ be to either of the countries in their economic, civil defense, and developmental fronts? How could the nuclear strength be considered a ‘power’ at the expense of economically and academically weak citizens of the nation? This paradox could perhaps be partially found in the American-Russian Cold War as well. However, there are significant differences!
FIRST: More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, both the United States and Russia maintain vast nuclear arsenals. During the cold war, the United States had 550 ICBMs – long-range missiles that could reach Moscow in a half an hour. A single U.S. nuclear submarine carried up to 192 warheads and could kill or maim about a third of Russia’s population, some 50 million people. The United States had 18 of these submarines. All told, the explosive power of America’s nuclear warheads was 100,000 times greater than the single Hiroshima bomb.
India and Pakistan seem to have moved a step further in terms of their ‘time-efficiency’. Interestingly, unlike the U.S.-Russia 30 minutes alert, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear-armed missiles and strike aircraft are on a hair-trigger, with only 3-minute alert! It implies that Pakistani and Indian citizens would not even have enough time to protect themselves in the case of radioactive fallout!
A single false alarm could lead to a nuclear exchange that would kill two million men, women, and children immediately and gravely injure 100 million. Indian and Pakistani nuclear reactors are prime targets in any war. Pakistan and India both have missile launchers aligned at the border, with missiles that can reach about 3,000 miles! This is enough to target all major cities in South Asia and most of West Asia.
SECOND: It’s been observed that as the time passed on during and after the Cold War up until today, the nuclear race has been taking several ugly and aggressive turns, as more and more nuclear powers try to outdo each other. For over a decade after the Second World War, the United States’ territory was not vulnerable to massive damage by Soviet nuclear forces. There was consequently no balance of power during that period. As the Soviets developed their nuclear and missile capabilities, they regained the balance of power. A new world order based on a balance of terror superseded the existing order based on unilateral terror. Meanwhile Britain and France also acquired the nuclear capability.
When the number of players increased, the rules had to be changed. Amongst the innumerable twists and turns of the Cold War, three major strategic concepts were developed: massive retaliation, mutually assured destruction, and flexible response. These concepts were interspersed with, and supported by, other concepts like first-strike capability, second-strike capability, limited nuclear war, and pre-emptive strike.
Therefore, while the idea of ‘mutually assured’ and ‘indiscriminate mass’ destruction were in the development process during the time of Cold War, now they have certainly become an underlying assumption for India and Pakistan forces. Now, instead of the armed combatants fighting each other, the idea of indiscriminately killing hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians and destroying the whole infrastructure of a nation seems to have become an accepted norm. But are the masses of India and Pakistan ready for such potential massive catastrophe? Are they even aware of the magnitude of ongoing destruction that would be caused by a ‘little slip’ on either side?
THIRD: If these two South Asian governments are ever-ready to spend millions of dollars of their GDP on nuclear technology to enhance their strike efficiently, what have they done about the defense and survival of their citizens? Are the masses educated and informed about the steps to take to survive the radioactive fallout? Not to our surprise, unlike the American and Russian citizens, the ordinary Pakistanis and Indians are still groping in the dark.
It is known that both during and following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, millions of Americans built fallout shelters and obtained survival information. Similarly, almost all Russians have compulsory instruction to teach them about the effects of nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons, and what they can do to improve their chances of surviving. Comprehensive preparations have been made for the crisis evacuation of urban Russians to rural areas, where they and rural Russians would make high-protection- factor expedient fallout shelters. Blast shelters to protect millions have been built in the cities and near factories where essential workers would continue production during a crisis. Wheat reserves and other foods for war survivors have been stored outside target areas. About 100,000 civil defense troops are maintained for control, rescue, and post-attack recovery duties. Does Pakistan have any of these blast shelters and other self-defense mechanisms in place, or even have plans to implement some in the near future?
FOURTH: Before the two countries could even think about engaging in any form of biological warfare, the following issue also requires a thought: Whether the presence of nuclear technology should undermine the role of conventional ground, air, and naval defense forces? i.e. would it be prudent to maintain conventional forces at their present strength?
The argument for downsizing the forces suggests, that it will make our nuclear deterrence more credible. On the contrary, the fact is that any reduction in conventional forces would weaken the deterrence. No wonder, America and Russia kept increasing the size of their conventional forces during and after the Cold War. Deterrence is successful only if it is able to prevent the enemy from aggression. If we cut down our conventional forces, we will cut our options down to only one.
If Pakistan were to downsize its forces, say, by half, the balance of power in the region would be tremendously tilted in favor of India. Moreover, how will Pakistan deal with the Kashmir conflict if it plans to reduce its ground forces and rely solely on its nuclear power, while India continues to pump in tens of thousands of its troops into the disputed area of Kashmir to maintain its oppressive regime? Pakistan’s aim should be to deter war, not merely nuclear war.
It is imperative for Pakistani citizens and politicians to discuss, question, and address such crucial issues, with greatest emphasis on the need to educate the masses about the steps to take and skills to learn to survive the nuclear war.