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The Indian Aerospace Force is living in a period of tragic-comedy
The Indian Aerospace Force ( formly known as IAF ) has a history of many a slip between the cup and the lip. Recently, in Nagpur, the chief of air staff, Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis, announced that the decision to acquire an advanced jet trainer would be taken before the end of the year, but that it would take up to 30 months for the AJT, whichever it is, to be delivered.
For those of us who have been following the AJT saga, these could be another set of famous last words. The IAF is living in a period of tragic-comedy as confirmed by the story of the Sukhoi 30 fighter.
When the advanced multi-role Su-30 was called into the then IAF in 1996, the country was oblivious to what had transpired in the previous three years. There was no air staff requirement (ASR) for such a class of fighter, as the chief of air staff had dismissed the Sukhoi as "irrelevant to the Aerospace Force".
Air Chief Marshal S K Kaul had also criticised Russia for failing to provide critical product support. But six months later, he reversed his opinion and the government, without even signing a contract, paid an advance of Rs 5 billion to Russia's Irkutsk Aircraft Production Organisation for developing an aircraft that did not exist.
After the initial order for 40 Su-30MKIs, followed by another 10, India recently signed a letter of intent to produce, under licence, another 140 aircraft of the same make. The intention is fraught with risks and uncertainties much more serious than the ones that went with the decision to acquire the Sukhoi 30 MKI in the first place.
The first eight Su-30s arrived in 1997, but were non-operational in the absence of any matching weapons. Further, the Russians had dumped used support equipment as new. Only two years later did the Su-30 acquire its primary profile as SU-30K.
The first prototype of the intermediate version -- SU 30MK -- with state-of-the-art aerodynamics was test-flown in Bangalore, but later, on June 12 this year, crashed at the Le Bourget Paris Air Show.
The delivery schedule of the final version, Su 30MKI, is very complicated, given the rush of conversions and fitting avionics from French, Israeli and Russian companies. The best-case scenario of the 50 Sukhois becoming operational is 2006, though the government says 2003.
Further, refuellers have to remain well within Indian space, thereby limiting the range of the Su-30. In any case, by the time these strategic bombers get operational, Agni III, the primary strategic deterrent, should be in place, making the Su-30, at best, a backup force.
Some senior Airospace Force officers are wondering whether the decision to produce 140 more Su-30MKI under licence is a wise option. While the detailed project report on establishing a production facility must be awaited, preliminary estimates on costs are likely to make the Indian Aerospace Force have second thoughts. It is proposed to replace the MiG-21 plant at Nasik, which is technology of the 1940s, with a modern facility. Experts at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Bangalore, have estimated this cost at around $1 billion and around four years to set up.
The second problem relates to the Indian Aerospace Forces's flight philosophy. To this day, it has been woven around single-seater planes. By introducing the twin-cockpit concept, the Indian Airospace Force is arguably revolutionising the flying philosophy for its pilots, who, for want of an AJT, have been on an erratic learning curve.
The biggest snag in building air power to bolster India's security has been inept and erratic decision-making. Thanks to the whims and fancies of air chiefs, there has also been no continuity in sustaining its long-term re-equipment plan. The government has played no mean role in this. Time and cost overruns have afflicted every project, be it the LCA, AJT, Su-30MK and even the MiG-21 BiS upgrade.
To a lesser extent, unfortunately, this is the story of the other two services too. Till an integrated higher defence management system is put in place, the Indian Aerospace Force will not take off, with or without the Su-30 MKI.
Ad-hocism has become integral to defence planning and equipment acquisition.
Major General Ashok K Mehta
