The Pakistan risk
Paul Rogers
Between a reproachful Washington, a rivalrous India, and a restive Afghan border, might Pervez Musharraf play the Chinese-Russian card?
North Waziristan theatre
The fighting in North Waziristan has for the moment receded, but what happens there in the next few weeks could shape military outcomes in the region, and even political outcomes in Pakistan, in the months to come. North Waziristan and its neighbouring areas directly straddle the routes between Pakistan and Afghanistan. These include the corridors through which Taliban and other paramilitaries are developing the logistical supply-lines for the anticipated spring offensive against both the Afghan government and its western (United States and Nato) military allies.
2006 is expected to be the first year since their withdrawal from Kabul in November 2001 when Taliban units take the offensive on a large scale. In order to maximise their effect, they need safe access to and from Pakistan. Musharraf is therefore under considerable pressure from Washington to sustain military activity on the Pakistani side of the border; yet the more he does this, the more he is likely to provoke local antagonism to his regime.
Much will now hinge on whether Musharraf decides to continue the military operation in the border regions. The domestic political risk is severe; so too is the potential benefit in terms of the kudos he may earn in Washington. If, however, the Bush administration does not respond to Musharraf’s efforts, he may respond by scaling down operations in North Waziristan, thus enabling a more forceful Taliban spring campaign in Afghanistan.
It may seem unlikely that Musharraf would thus jeopardise even the vague hope of support from his principal ally. But his regime may well consider that it has another card to play – its relations with China and Russia.
Beijing has long had a cordial and useful relationship with Islamabad. The positive nature of Musharraf’s visit there on 19-23 February 2006 is reflected in the joint statement released at its conclusion. Russia, too, has no problem with improving its relations with Pakistan, despite its closer historic ties with India.
Both Russia and China, conscious of their overall strategic weaknesses in relation to the world’s sole superpower, would regard improved relations with Islamabad as valuable. Such an outcome, though, is dependent on the Pervez Musharraf regime surviving the next few months. That in turn may depend on what happens in North Waziristan and neighbouring regions as the Taliban’s spring offensive gathers pace.
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