Re: Osama bin Ladin documents released
It was only when al-Qaida lost its sanctuary following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 that a trend of regional jihadi groups pledging allegiance to al-Qaida or acting in its name emerged.
Paradoxically, this may have been due to the fame that the 9/11 attacks generated in the jihadi world and at the same time al-Qaida’s inability to be in control of its organization after it lost its sanctuary. More precisely, it was in 2003 that the brand1ng of al-Qaida took off when Saudi militants adopted the name “al-Qa`ida on the ArabianPeninsula” (QAP).23
In 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad group pledged allegiance to al-Qaida, and Usama bin Ladin publicly acknowledged the group as “al-Qaida in Mesopotamia,” or al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). Al-Zarqawi’s group was the only regional group that Bin Ladin formally admitted into al-Qaida; others were later announced publicly by Ayman al-Zawahiri.
It is clear from the letters that the TTP was not following the AQ leadership and they were considering themselves the leaders of Islamic world.
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**TTP
**
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is believed to be one of al-Qaida’s primary partners in that region. Although the TTP has not pledged allegiance to al-Qaida, it is reported that al-Qa`ida fighters active in the Waziristan region have had operational ties to factions of the TTP and have conducted joint operations in Afghanistan.159
Al-Qa`ida leaders active in the Waziristan region have also operated in the same social orbit as former TTP leader Baitullah Mahsud (and, after his death, current leader Hakimullah Mahsud) and worked together to address disputes. 160
Letters authored by Bin Ladin did not discuss at length his views of the TTP, but the few scattered references in which he mentioned the group are far from flattering.161
The documents make it clear that Bin Ladin was not informed of the TTP’s planned bombing of Times Square in New York City, a failed attack on U.S. soil attempted by Faisal Shahzad in May 2010. Bin Ladin was following Shahzad’s trial in the news and was disappointed by his performance, which he thought distorted the image of jihadis:
You have perhaps followed the media trial of brother Faisal Shahzad, may God release him, during which the brother was asked to explain his attack [against the United States] in view of having taken an oath [not to harm it] when he was awarded his American citizenship. He responded that he lied [when he took the oath]. It does not escape you [Shaykh `Atiyya] that [Shahzad’s lie] amounts to betrayal (ghadr) and does not fall under permissible lying to [evade] the enemy [during times of war]…please request from our Pakistani Taliban brothers to
redress this matter…also draw their attention to the fact that brother Faisal Shahzad appeared in a photograph alongside Commander Mahsud. I would like to verify whether Mahsud knew that when a person acquires an American citizenship, this involves taking an oath, swearing not to harm America. If he is unaware of this matter, he should be informed of it. Unless this matter is addressed, its negative consequences are known to you. [We must therefore act swiftly] to remove the suspicion that jihadis violate their oath and engage in
ghadr.162
This is not the only instance that Bin Ladin worried about jihadis violating their oaths. The letter addressed to Abu Basir in which he is asked to focus on operations inside the United States (instead of Yemen) alerted him to focus on Yemenis “who hold either visas or U.S. citizenships to carry out operations inside America as long as they did not take an oath not to harm America.”163
Underlying Bin Ladin’s thinking is a distinction between a visa (ishara), acquired citizenship — which involves taking an oath (ahd) —
and citizenship by birth — which does not entail taking an oath. From an Islamic law perspective, it is not lawful to violate one’s oath (naqd al-ahd or naqd al-mithaq). Accordingly, Bin Ladin wanted to promote the image that jihadis are disciplined and conform to Islamic Law. Faisal Shahzad’s boasting that he lied during his oath not to harm the United States, therefore, is antithetical to the image of jihadis that Bin Ladin wanted the world to see.164
It is not just the lapses in the public statements of TTP that worried Bin Ladin. The group’s indiscriminate attacks against Muslims are also a subject of concern that he raised with `Atiyya. In particular, he drew his attention to an operation the TTP carried out against one of the tribes on the basis that the tribe was against the Taliban. “Even if this were to be proven, it does not justify the operation in view of the non-combatants who died, for that would contradict the [Islamic] legal basis of our politics,” Bin Ladin wrote. “I therefore urge you to continue advising TTP [to reform their ways].”165
This TTP attack was not an isolated incident; their indiscriminate attacks, including targeting Muslims in mosques, is the subject of a long list of serious concerns that Adam Gadahn enumerated in his letter.166
It was left to Atiyya and Abu Yahya al-Libi to write a letter addressed to the “respected brother” Hakimullah Mahsud, the leader of the TTP. Its content hardly reflected any respect for Mahsud. The authors did not mince words, explicitly stating their dissatisfaction with the TTP’s “ideology, methods and behavior.” These, they stated, are marred with “clear legal errors and dangerous lapses,” and unless the group changes its ways, its errors would be a “cause of great corruption of the jihadi movement in Pakistan.” News had reachedAtiyya and al-Libi that Mahsud had declared himself to be “the singular leader to whom everyone must pledge allegiance and declaring anyone
who rebels against him (kharij `alyhi) or is not in his Tehrik to be a rebel (baghi).”167
In classical Islamic political parlance, dissenters (khawarij) and rebels (bughat) who renounce the authority of the legitimate imam are subject to jihad and liable to be killed. Thus, Mahsud’s announcement amounted to declaring himself to be the great imam with political authority over all Muslims, so `Atiyya and al-Libi found it necessary to point out to him that there is a difference “between the [minor] position of leader of jihad and that of great imam,” a distinction with which Mahsud should familiarize himself.168
It also seems that Mahsud or members of his group had referred to al-Qaida as “guests.” In response,Atiyya and al-Libi explained to Mahsud that “we in al-Qaida (Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad) are an international Islamic-jihadi organization, we are not bound by country or race. In Afghanistan, we pledged allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful Mullah Muhammad `Umar, [we recognize him to be] a mujahid and the commander of the faithful of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. From his side, it is permitted for us to be involved in general jihadi work…we would like to make clear to you that this description [of ‘guests’] lacks a legal basis, and that Muslims are brothers
in religion.”169
The letter concluded with an unambiguous threat: “unless we see from you serious and immediate practical and clear steps towards reforming [your ways] and dissociating yourself from these vile mistakes [that violate Islamic Law], we shall be forced to take public and firm legal steps from our side.”170
Atiyya’s and al-Libi’s letter was not the first warning issued to the TTP by the leadership of al-Qaida. In light of its rebuking tone, an examination of some of `Atiyya’s and Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid’s statements a year prior to the drafting of the letter makes it clear that their
condemnation of the indiscriminate targeting of Muslims in mosques and marketplaces was an implicit criticism of the TTP.171
It is either that the TTP was too slow to understand that these public statements were implicitly criticizing their actions or simply pretended that they did not understand.
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