Some very interesting revelations in the documents found at Osama Bin Laden’s compound.
- Shahbaz Sharif trying to conduct his own negotiation in parallel with Pakistan federal government
- Proof that TTP in Waziristan and Swat are/were fighting the war against Pakistan on behalf of Al Qaeda. Many Pakistan believe they are CIA/RAW agents.
- Pakistan trying to protect some Jihadi assets such as Haqqani and Harkat. Bottom line is that nobody controls any other group completely. Even Al Qaeda have to make an effort to keep Taliban in control.
- Close alignment of Al Qaeda, Afghan Taliban, TTP, Haqqanis
- Hamid Gul, supposedly retired, is actively involved in negotiations
*As a result of these discussions, al Qaeda was willing to broker a deal in which the jihadists’ would ease off the Pakistanis so long as the military and intelligence services stopped fighting al Qaeda and its allies.
“Our decision was this: We are prepared to leave you be. Our battle is primarily against the Americans. You became part of the battle when you sided with the Americans,” Rahman wrote, explaining al Qaeda’s position towards the Pakistani government. “If you were to leave us and our affairs alone, we would leave you alone. If not, we are men, and you will be surprised by what you see; God is with us.”
Al Qaeda’s negotiating tactic was simple. Either the Pakistanis leave them alone, or they would suffer more terrorist attacks. Rahman’s letter reveals how bin Laden’s men sought to convey their message. They relied on Siraj Haqqani, the senior leader of the Haqqani Network, which has long been supported by the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment.
Rahman summarized al Qaeda’s plan thusly: “We let slip (through Siraj Haqqani, with the help of the brothers in Mas’ud and others; through their communications) information indicating that al Qaeda and Tahreek-i-Taliban [the Pakistani Taliban] have big, earth shaking operations in Pakistan, but that their leaders had halted those operations in an attempt to calm things down and relieve the American pressure.”
“But if Pakistan does any harm to the Mujahidin in Waziristan, the operations will go forward, including enormous operations ready in the heart of the country,” Rahman explained. This is the message al Qaeda “leaked out through several outlets.”
In response, “they, the intelligence people…started reaching out to” al Qaeda through Pakistani jihadist groups they “approve of.”
One of Pakistani intelligence’s emissaries was Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the longtime leader of Harakat ul Mujahedin (HUM). Khalil is a well-known bin Laden ally, as he signed the al Qaeda chieftain’s infamous fatwa calling for jihad against the “Crusaders and Zionists” in 1998. Pakistani intelligence used Khalil’s HUM to send al Qaeda a letter.
“We received a messenger from them bringing us a letter from the Intelligence leaders including Shuja’ Shah, and others,” Rahman wrote, according the US government’s translation. “They said they wanted to talk to us, to al Qaeda. We gave them the same message, nothing more.”
Rahman noted: “This time the surprise was that they brought Hamid Gul into the session, and Fazlur Rehman Khalil attended with them as an advisor!” Gul headed the ISI in the late 1980s. During that time and after, he cultivated and the maintained deep ties to Pakistan’s jihadists.
Rahman summarized for bin Laden what the Pakistani intelligence liaisons had to say at the meeting. “Be patient with us for a little bit,” Rahman quoted them as saying, indicating that the Pakistanis had requested a cooling off period of up to two months. The Pakistani representatives continued: “We are trying to convince the Americans, we are putting pressure on them to negotiate with al Qaeda and we are trying to convince them that negotiating with the Taliban separate from al Qaeda is pointless. So please wait a little.”
If “we can convince the Americans,” the Pakistanis said, then we “have no objection to negotiating with you and sitting with you,” meaning al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda’s representatives agreed to pass the message onto to their leaders.
Rahman informed Hakeemullah Mehsud and Qari Husayn of the Pakistani Taliban that Shah Baz Sharif had “sent them a message indicating they [the government] wanted to negotiate with them, and they were ready to reestablish normal relations as long as they do no conduct operations in Punjab.” Rahman clarified that the proposed deal was restricted to the “governmental jurisdiction” of Punjab and didn’t include other areas such as Islamabad.
“The government said they were ready to pay any price…and so on,” Rahman wrote. “They told us the negotiations were under way.” Rahman then made it clear that the Pakistani Taliban was to keep al Qaeda’s leadership in the loop at all times. “We stressed that they [Pakistani Taliban] needed to consult us on everything, and they promised they would.”
Rahman’s summary of Shah Baz Sharif’s position is entirely consistent with Sharif’s public rhetoric at the time. On Mar. 15, 2010, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn published an article discussing Sharif’s desire for the Pakistani Taliban to halt its attacks in the Punjab. Sharif blamed the escalation of violence in Pakistan on Pervez Musharraf, the former president. Sharif stated that the Taliban and his political party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), were both opposed Musharraf.
Sharif was therefore “surprised that this common stance has failed to stop the Taliban from carrying out terror attacks in Punjab.” Sharif harshly criticized American policy, portraying Musharraf as a puppet for outside powers.
“Gen Musharraf planned a bloodbath of innocent Muslims at the behest of others only to prolong his rule, but we in the PML-N opposed his policies and rejected dictation from abroad and if the Taliban are also fighting for the same cause then they should not carry out acts of terror in Punjab (where the PML-N is ruling),” Dawn
[quoted Sharif]
(http://www.dawn.com/news/857697/cm-shahbaz-wants-taliban-to-spare-punjab) as saying
