Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

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Narratives on the TTP**
*
Asad Munir
](Asad Munir:Writer - The News International: Latest News Breaking, World, Entertainment, Royal News)Saturday, July 06, 2013*

**
The writer is a retired Brigadier and former Head of MI and ISI of FATA & KPK region.**

Nawaz Sharif wants to talk to the Taliban. Imran Khan has, for many years, considered negotiations to be the only option to get rid of terrorism and is convinced that Waliur Rehman was a pro-Pakistan militant, who was only droned because the US wants to sabotage the process of negotiations with the TTP.

Two APCs, attended by all political parties, also preferred the option of negotiations over the use of force. So the majority of Pakistanis want to negotiate with the terrorists. In a democratic state we must honour the opinion of the majority and go for the option of dialogue.

An offer of talks was initiated by the TTP through a Punjabi Taliban leader** Asmatullah Muawiya in late 2012,** laying down three conditions, “The government should make independent foreign policy, withdraw from the Afghan war, and form and implement a new Islamic constitution in the country”. The offer was later endorsed by the TTP, naming three politicians – Nawaz Sharif, Fazlur Rehman and Munawar Hasan – to act as guarantors for the implementation of any agreement that was finalised through the negotiations.

This offer was withdrawn once Waliur Rehman was killed in a drone strike. Since the TTP is so sure that the nation is in favour of talks, it has conditionally renewed the offer “if the group sees that the elected government is able to take a stand against the country’s intelligence agencies, only then will the option of talks be considered”.

Before opting for talks, the Taliabanisation of Pakistan needs to be understood in its correct perspective. This process did not start with the US war on terror, as believed by the majority of Pakistanis.

In 1994 the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi** (TNSM) **initiated an armed movement for enforcement of shariah in the Malakand Division. The group took control of some districts through the use of force. It took the troops of Frontier Corps more than a month to dislodge the TNSM from the areas it had captured. Nizam-e-Adl was introduced and established in **Malakand in 1995 – later revised in 1998.
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However, the issue was not completely resolved and TNSM activists continued with their protests till 2001. Leaders of the TNSM enforced Taliban’s rule in Swat and Bajaur, led by Fazlullah – son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad – and Faqir Mohammad respectively. In 1996 the Afghan Taliban captured Kabul. Inspired by their achievements, a Taliban force was raised in the** Orakzai Agency in 1997**. In 1998 a Taliban force emerged in** Mirali, North Waziristan.**

A few tribals from South Waziristan had joined the Afghan Taliban and taken part in battles against the Northern Alliance. **By the year 2000 Talibanisation had spread to Fata and some districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. **Once Afghanistan was invaded, the Pakistani Taliban were already active in some parts of Fata. They provided the required support system to the foreign militants who fled Afghanistan and took refuge in Pakistan.

The army was inducted into Waziristan in 2001/2002 with two objectives – to develop infrastructure in the inaccessible areas of Waziristan and to conduct targeted operations against foreign militants who had entered Waziristan in large numbers in **March 2002.
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The narrative that there was no terrorism before 2004 and it started because the** army entered Fata** is not based on facts. The army entered Fata because there were a large number of** Al-Qaeda terrorists** in Waziristan. These militants had plans to create a state with Fata and some border districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa included in it.

The other popular narrative believed by Pakistanis is that the issue of terrorism cannot be addressed by the use of force as we have failed to eliminate terrorism in the last eleven years. The fact is that in 2008-2009 there were eighteen administrative units, districts, tribal agencies and frontier regions that were either completely or partially under the influence of the TTP. Now they have their bases only in North Waziristan. They have been dislodged from all other areas through the use of force; they refuse to surrender through negotiations.

Very few people know that negotiations with the tribals were initiated in** 2002,** before the start of any operations – and the process of dialogue continued all through these eleven years. Numerous peace deals were inked, but none produced the desired results.
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All such deals were used by the Taliban to their advantage; they regrouped, increased their strength, trained their fighters, explored avenues of funding and extended their influence from two tribal agencies to the whole of Fata and Malakand Division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.**

Negotiations are likely to be a complicated process, which will require many issues to be addressed as well as a framework accepted by both parties. Since the offer has been made by Hakeemullah Mehsud, talks will be held with his group. There are many other groups of the TTP like those of** Fazlullah of Malakand, Faqir Mohammad** of Bajaur, and **Khalid Umer **of the Mohmand Agency. Some of these militants are presently based in Kunar and the Nuristan province of Afghanistan.

Are they still part of Hakeemullah Mehsud’s TTP? Will they accept any agreement reached between the state and the TTP led by Hakeemullah Mehsud? In all probability they will not.

What about Mangal Bagh and other groups operating in the Khyber Agency? What will be the fate of Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants presently operating from North Waziristan? Will they surrender and agree to be handed over to their countries of origin or decide to live as peaceful refugees in Pakistan? What about the LeJ and other groups operating in Waziristan?

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Hafiz Gul Bahadur** and **Mullah Nazir’s **groups are presently not conducting terrorist activities inside Pakistan – will they disband their forces once the US leaves Afghanistan? In all probability they will not; they will either join the Afghan Taliban in their battle for the capture of Kabul. If that does not happen they will keep their forces, control Waziristan and try to expand their influence to other parts of Fata, like the TTP did .

The PML-N should go ahead with the negotiations ‘option’, but in all probability it may not achieve the desired results, and may not bring peace and end terrorism in this unfortunate country.

The TTP is likely to make unconstitutional and unreasonable demands. But the only advantage of such talks, in my opinion, is that it may help in building a national consensus that the use of force is the only language terrorists like the TTP understand.
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Email: [EMAIL=“[email protected]”][email protected]
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http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-188128-Narratives-on-the-TTP

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

For PMLN lovers.

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

2 mulaon main TTP haram :omg:

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

The Terror Syndicate

Babar SattarSaturday, July 06, 2013

http://images.thenews.com.pk/06-07-2013/Opinion/7-6-2013_188125_l_akb.jpg

PML-N stalwarts declared immediately after the election that the ruling party’s top three priorities would be the economy, the economy and the economy. One hopes that two things are clear to thinking minds within the party in this first month: that the economy cannot really blossom if the country is suffering a reign of terror, and that perpetuation of terror and crime is what the TTP and its syndicated subgroups do for a living; they will not reconsider their ideology and politics or undermine their financial interests and source of power because the new governments in the centre and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa refuse to denounce them outright.

The government has decided to convene an All-Parties Conference on terror. It will be a complete waste of time if the agenda is limited to innocuously condemning terror, endorsing talks with terrorists and passing other banal resolutions declaring respect for the sovereignty of other states while asking them to reciprocate. Let this be a two-part APC. The first part should be focused on helping the politicos fully understand the nature of the cancer eating Pakistan up. Once they know how things really are, then ask them to deliberate the best way to curb terror and build public opinion behind the agreed anti-terror framework.

Let the army, the intelligence agencies and civilian law-enforcement agencies give in-camera briefings to the politicos and explain to them the horizontal, non-hierarchical functioning of the TTP and how it has granted franchise to subgroups engaging in crime and violence or entered into joint ventures with the LeJs and LeTs where it is more suitable. If they still support talking to the TTP as the best way to liquidate our terror network, ask them to consider what will become of the crime and terror subgroups that have presently been subsumed by the larger TTP brand but are functionally autonomous and not under the TTP’s control.

Today’s Pakistan is like the nightmare where danger is approaching you fast but your body turns numb and refuses to respond. Our misfortune is being stuck with a national leadership – political, military and religious included – that either doesn’t understand the sense of urgency that must attach to rooting out terror or lacks the resolve and courage to take up such a daunting challenge. But in the event that we were to wake up from this nightmare and find our leaders willing to take responsibility for the future of our state and society, here are a few things they might wish to consider.

As Austin explained, a sovereign is one who doesn’t habitually obey the command of another within a given territory, while others habitually obey his command within such territory. Now if Pakistan is a sovereign state it cannot tolerate the existence of sanctuaries where the TTP or other non-state actors don’t habitually obey its command and have established their own writ. Once those living within such sanctuary recognise that the command of the TTP, backed by threat of sanction, is more potent than that of the state of Pakistan, it is the end of Pakistan’s claim to sovereignty in relation to such territory.

The concept of territorial sovereignty is not just theoretical. It is a functional necessity. First of all, there can be no such thing as shared sovereignty, unless those sharing power respect the legitimacy of the source distributing it. So for example, in a federation, the federal and provincial governments share power. But such power flows from the constitution, the legitimacy of which is recognised by both. In the TTP’s case it is* monopoly *over use of force within its sanctuary that forms the basis of its authority. As its ability to inflict violence on the state of Pakistan increases, so will its claim to additional territory.

Second, unless Pakistan carves a tribal agency as TTP-land and treats it like an autonomous state, the flow of men, material and money back and forth will continue. Pakistan will remain at the mercy of the TTP and its crime syndicate, which will retain its ability to attack the Pakistani state and its citizens at will. Let us understand that if we agree to talk to the TTP and the talks succeed, what will change is not the ability of the TTP to attack us, but only our presumption about its will to do so.

Pakistan is a big country. And in this age of terror and non-state actors, the distinction between hard and soft targets has ceased to exist. You may be able to protect the GHQ, air bases or VIPs with added layers of security, but how will you protect every school, every state building, every commercial complex, every residential compound, every policeman, judge, prosecutor, every bus and every camping site? So long as there remain non-state actors on our soil, whether motivated by an ideology of bigotry and hate or employed as mercenaries by foreign enemies, the problem of terror will remain alive with its bite.

So here is the bad news. If talks with the TTP happen and succeed, they will result into nothing more than a temporary tenuous truce. The terror syndicate functioning under the TTP umbrella is no hierarchical disciplined organisation that will liquidate itself if Hakimullah Mehsud calls it a day and Ehsanullah Ehsan announces such retirement from his undisclosed location. The underlying radical ideology and political economy of terror is such that if the present faces are won over by the state, their more hard-line cousins and joint-venture partners will render them irrelevant and march on.*

The terror syndicate is getting stronger and more resourceful with every passing day. Forget the foreign funding for a moment. The two main sources of funding of the terror network are kidnapping and extortion. According to one unempirical estimate, on average there are around one thousand kidnapped citizens held for ransom in North Waziristan at any given time. The story of extortion is even more alarming. All kinds of extortion rackets – some franchised by the TTP and others just making hay while they can – are collecting money from anyone who has the ability to pay.

The state as we know is unable to protect the life and property of citizens. Now if you could pay off the TTP in return for a promise not to be harmed, wouldn’t that be a rational choice for a businessman within the TTP’s firing range (which now unfortunately extends across most of Pakistan)? And then the TTP provides citizen services as well. If you have a house or land that is under someone’s occupation, you can either engage with the crackling justice system, grease your way through and wait for years as ‘due process’ lingers on, or you can outsource the task to the TTP or its local franchise and get instant results.

In a functional state people pay taxes in return for protection of their fundamental rights and liberties and pay fees for provision of services.
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Is it not ironic that prosperous businessmen of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan are forced to pay jizya to the TTP to be left in peace? And is it not frightening that some are willingly reaching out to these merchants of terror for adjudication and resolution of private disputes?
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When the diktat of the TTP becomes more effective than the writ of the state and when the terror syndicate appears more resourceful than institutions of the state, can there be a conclusion other than that the state is falling apart?

As the APC meets to discuss our terror problem, let Chatham House rules apply. Let the security establishment share the scope and magnitude of the problem with our representatives and let the anonymity of those engaging in such debate be guaranteed. For if the ability of our policymakers to formulate a rational policy on such a crucial issue is sabotaged due to personal safety concerns, we’re already past the tipping point.

Email: [EMAIL=“[email protected]”][email protected]

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

Desert Bird bhai… I have a few of requests for you…

  1. Please read forum posting guidelines, available here http://www.paklinks.com/gs/pakistan-affairs/586049-updated-policies-please-read.html …:

"…Posting links and articles

All articles posted must include a working URL link and the person posting these should also include their own comments and state what they wish to be discussed, especially in posts that start a new thread. …"

  1. When you post a long article, could you please copy-paste relevant portion only? Those interested can read the whole thing from the link.

  2. Please link the thread title with the post.

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

I have already said that I am not an official spokesperson of PML-N , m fully oppose krta hu PML-N ki policy ko over this isse ... btw Saad Rafique and Khwaja Asif also dont want to talk with Talibans anymore

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

Fair enough, I was just completing the thread title.

At the end of the day its PMLN who'd talk to the taleban or otherwise. If they dont want to talk they should come up with a counter terrorism policy soon as I see Punjab coming into the terrorist radar soon.

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

URL link last m hota h new thread/post k … comment title m h tha k PTI wale jo smjhte h k only negotiations is the way out … unke lye yh article h from the man who served as Head of MI and ISI of the KPK and FATA region … so uski info. aur analysis buht wazan rkhta h

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

I agree the information and analysis is nice and carries a lot of weight. Only that this is a discussion forum and not an information dissemination service.

I just requested to be more open about what you want to discuss, otherwise, your effort might go useless.

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

Punjab kb ni tha radar m ..... ISI safehouse Model Town K Block attack , FIA Building attack , Moon Market attack , Naval Academy , Manawa Police Academy , CIA building , Sarfraz Naeemi etc etc

yh tau unka zor toota h thora drones aur army operations se tau wo risk ni lete lamba route le kr Punjab ane ka and prefer to blow them up in KPK /FATA

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

desert, following up on kaka’s post, kindly read thru ‘policies thread’ and edit your first post accordingly with YOUR opinion. Otherwise, I will have no other option but to lock the thread :slight_smile:

Thanks for understanding.

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

bomb blast in Lahore http://www.paklinks.com/gs/pakistan-affairs/615387-bomb-blast-at-old-anarkali-lahore.html

Re: Narratives on the TTP : For PTI Lovers

:fraudia: :omg: