Re: Lal masjid/ISI drama: 5 Chinese kidnapped
and here’s another good read from today’s dawn:
Threat of Talibanisation](http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/29/op.htm#1)
By Javid Husain
THE National Security Council in its meeting held on June 4 was reportedly briefed on the menace of creeping Talibanisation which, according to the high-level presentation made on the occasion, could pose a serious threat to national security.
It was pointed out that the foreign occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the war on terror, long-festering disputes in the Muslim world and a growing feeling among the Muslims that they were under attack from the West had contributed to growing militancy in the region.
While referring to the growing extremism and militancy in Fata and the adjoining settled districts, the presentation called for immediate action to eliminate this phenomenon before it was too late. The briefing coming from a military regime was full of irony, contradictions and half-truths. It has become fashionable in Pakistan to lay the blame for Talibanisation at the doorsteps of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation. This is only partially true. Pakistan, aided by the United States, many Muslim countries and other members of the international community, did extend valuable assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen in their struggle to liberate their homeland.
Both the Afghan jihad and the assistance provided to it were justified as a historical necessity to stop the Soviet advance into the heartland of the Muslim world. This had started with the occupation of Central Asia by the Czarist Russia in the 19th century.
While the Afghan jihad was crowned with success with the Soviet withdrawing in 1989, Pakistan had to face the repercussions of its support to it in the form of extremism, militancy and the easy availability of guns. The end of the Afghan jihad also coincided with the start of the freedom movement in Indian-occupied Kashmir.
For well-known reasons, the trend towards growing extremism and militancy in Pakistan was maintained as the freedom struggle in Indian-held Kashmir, which was essentially indigenous in character, gathered momentum.
As if this were not enough, Pakistan was also dragged into the civil war in Afghanistan, which ensued after the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992 and led to the emergence of the Taliban in 1994. The support that the Taliban received from official and non-official quarters in Pakistan in their fight against the regime of Burhanuddin Rabbani and the forces of Ahmad Shah Masood had far-reaching implications for Pakistan’s internal peace and harmony.
There is little doubt that this support, more than anything else, promoted extremism and militancy in the country, brutalised Pakistani society through encouraging the kalashnikov culture, and sowed the seeds of creeping Talibanisation which threatens Pakistan now.
The policy of support to the Taliban was championed in Pakistan by a powerful section of the establishment both on the military and civilian sides (including most of the leadership of the foreign ministry at that time), who lacked the vision or the foresight to anticipate its adverse repercussions on Pakistan’s internal situation.
However, considering that the operational aspects of Pakistan’s Kashmir and Afghanistan policies have remained firmly in the hands of the military establishment since the days of General Ziaul Haq, it would have to shoulder most of the blame for this ill-considered support for the Taliban. Predictably, this policy of support was continued by the government of General Musharraf till the American ultimatum forced a U-turn soon after the events of 9/11.
The problem of creeping Talibanisation, thus, can be directly traced to Pakistan’s policy of support to the Taliban pursued from 1995 to 2001 with scant regard to its dangerous repercussions for Pakistan at the international, regional and national levels. It is, therefore, ironical now to listen to sermons from General Musharraf and his supporters on the dangers of Talibanisation for Pakistan’s security and on the benefits of moderation and enlightenment for our country.
The risks involved in our pro-Taliban policy for Pakistan’s internal situation could have been minimised if we had a stable and vibrant democratic set-up, capable of filtering out negative repercussions through vigorous political debate and free and fair elections thus allowing the moderate tendencies of the people of Pakistan to prevail. Instead, during most of the 1990s Pakistan was saddled with unstable civilian governments and, after October 12, 1999, by a military dictatorship.
The civilian governments lacked the political strength to control these negative repercussions because of their inherent instability and also because of the autonomous character of the military establishment which effectively controlled Pakistan’s Afghanistan and Kashmir policies.
The situation worsened after the military takeover of October 1999 as the two mainstream moderate political forces were sidelined by General Musharraf’s government. The resultant vacuum was filled by extremist religious forces. Little wonder that we see in the country extremism on the ascendancy and creeping Talibanisation.
The briefing in the National Security Council, therefore, told only half the story when it attributed growing Talibanisation in Pakistan to the foreign occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the war on terror, long-festering disputes in the Muslim world and a growing feeling among the Muslims that they were under attack from the West.
While these factors are undoubtedly relevant to the phenomenon of growing Talibanisation, it is necessary to underscore that the present military regime under the guise of democracy is equally to blame for the deplorable internal situation in which Pakistan currently finds itself.
A military regime, which lacks grass-root political support and relies on patronage and coercion for its survival, is ill suited for overcoming the problem of growing extremism and militancy which, in the ultimate analysis, is a political problem.
Unfortunately, according to the report carried by the press, the NSC briefing treated Talibanisation primarily as a purely law and order problem even though the law and order machinery can, at best, provide temporary relief in dealing with such problems.
Instead, we need to adopt a comprehensive strategy if we are serious about overcoming the problem of creeping Talibanisation or growing extremism and militancy in different parts of Pakistan. The strategy must cover the political, administrative, security, educational, economic and foreign policy dimensions of the problem.
Perhaps the most important element in this anti-Talibanisation strategy should be the restoration of a democratic framework in the country in place of the current political dispensation dominated by the military.
This democratic framework must encompass the restoration of the constitution as it was on October 12, 1999, free and fair elections under the supervision of an independent and powerful election commission and the return of the armed forces to the barracks to concentrate on their professional duties in accordance with their oath and the relevant constitutional provisions. It must also encompass an independent judiciary, the rule of law, an independent press and the adherence of political parties to the rules of the game in which the majority is allowed to rule the country for a specified period and presents itself for accountability by the people in elections thereafter.
In addition, General Musharraf must take off his uniform, allow political leaders in exile to take part in the forthcoming general elections and present himself for election as the president by the new assemblies after general elections, if he is interested in being elected to that position.
This, however, would require the highly desirable process of political reconciliation in the country rather than a policy of confrontation which General Musharraf has pursued so far vis-à-vis the opposition, especially the two mainstream political parties and their leaders in exile.
Of course, the political steps enumerated above must be supplemented by other measures in the administrative, security, educational and economic spheres to root out the problem of Talibanisation in the country. The thrust of these measures should be to encourage moderation and enlightenment through a conducive administrative, legal and security environment and a programme of educational reform while remaining faithful to our core religious and cultural values.
These reforms must be supported by economic measures to enhance public welfare in contrast with the current military government’s past policy of neglecting issues of concern to the common man. This resulted in increasing inequalities of income and wealth in the country and the growing misery of the average Pakistani.
Finally, there is no doubt that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, Washington’s hegemonic policies in the Middle East, its support to Israel’s policy of occupation and persecution in the Palestinian territories and the disturbed conditions in Afghanistan have fanned the fires of extremism and militancy in the Muslim world including Pakistan. The briefing in the NSC recognised this problem but apparently failed to recommend any remedial measures. The situation calls for a reconsideration of our foreign policy to bring it in line with long-term national interests on the basis of a well thought-out grand strategy. The limited space of this column does not allow the elaboration of the essential elements of such a grand strategy.
However, we must tell Washington in no uncertain terms that while we will continue to be a partner in the war on terror, the US has a corresponding obligation to eschew its own extremism and bias against the Muslims in dealing with issues of concern to them.
Further, since the fighting in Afghanistan has a direct fallout in Pakistan, especially in its tribal areas, in the form of increased militancy, we should also call for the restoration of peace and harmony through a process of national reconciliation and an agreed power-sharing formula among the various political forces in Afghanistan, leading to the withdrawal foreign forces from there as soon as possible.
It should be obvious by now that the coalition forces, that are seen as occupation forces by many in Afghanistan, have themselves become the problem rather than the solution as regards insecurity in that country.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Email: [email protected]
