Kargil; Separating Myth from the Reality

First let see how you are getting confused with the use of word ‘begging’ what Talbott wrote to compare it with what I wrote. I wrote that Nawaz did not beg Clinton to save face of Pakistani forces at kargil. You wrote:

Did you compare correctly? Did Talbott write that Nawaz begged USA to save Pakistan (as you think)? Let see in what context Talbott used the word begging. Here is what he wrote, according to reference you yourself gave.
http://drafzalmirza.blogspot.com/2006/02/b...ging-india.html

Anyone can see from above that Nawaz was not begging Clinton to save Pakistani forces, but Nawaz was begging (rather requesting) Clinton to bring plan brokering solution of Kashmir, so that fighting between Pakistan and India can be stopped.

It is also obvious from above statement that India was gaining nothing back at Kargil, that is why Clinton replied to Nawaz request that … He would consider it (brokering Kashmir issue) only if Pakistan first unilaterally withdrew. If India was inflicting defeat and forcing Pakistani forces to retreat than Clinton could not have asked Pakistan to unilaterally withdraw (withdraw is not retreat).

Obviously, Nawaz did not agree to it and that is why he went (uninvited) to USA so that he can explain his point of view to Clinton regarding unilateral withdrawal (Pakistan withdraw and India do nothing in response). Nawaz wanted conditional withdrawal followed by Kashmir talk where America plays role of broker, but Clinton did not wanted that, and in the end Clinton forced Nawaz to agree with unconditional withdrawal.

It is also clear from your reference that there was huge American pressure (and there are references that Pakistan had pressure of many other countries too), that to withdraw from Kargil Unilaterally and pressure from Pakistan army not to withdraw. Thus, even though Nawaz was prepared to give in (accept unilateral withdrawal) because of American pressure (and pressure from other countries), he was distraught and terrified of the (expected) reaction by Musharraf and Pakistan army if he did gave in to American pressure.

From your reference (if you read the whole reference) it is obvious that Clinton and Talbott both knew Nawaz as intelligently deficient and gutless person, who was prepared to sell-off Pakistani interest at kargil. They knew that other Pakistanis would never agree even if Nawaz is pressurised to agree, that is why they made sure that Nawaz talk alone with Clinton and Talbott (as Clinton’s aide). Shamshad and Sartaj were intentionally told to stay out of talk because according to Talbott, they could make talk unproductive (in other words, could influence Nawaz during talk, not to agree unconditional withdrawal, what Talbott and Clinton wanted). Without them to guide, Nawaz agreed for unconditional withdrawal. Even when Nawaz agreed, Shamshad tried to change the agreement, but Talbott told Shamshad that to keep out of the agreement, as his gutless boss Nawaz has already agreed unconditional withdrawal.