Interview: Naseerullah Baber

Society Pakistan & World Affairs
1

This interview is a bit dated, but the man rarely gives such a comprehensive interview:

The Political Life of
Gen Babar

Personal Life

  1. Please tell us something about your early life before you joined the Army?

I was born in Peshawar in 1928. Our ancestors originated from Kandahar and had settled in the Peshawar Valley, particularly at Pirpai (my ancestral village) near Nowshera. There is a Babar Settlement at Zhob and there are small communities of Babar, at Quetta, Multan and D I Khan (Chaudwan). Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan also hails from the same tribe (Muzaffargarh). In the First World War 78 people went to the war as Indian Army men and four laid down their life. Pirpai is one of the very few villages which has an official plaque commemorating its First World War contribution. My father was basically a Recruiting Officer of the Indian Army but had been attached for sometime to the 6 Rajputana Rifles.

After initial study of two years at a Private Public School (Miss Birch), I joined the Presentation Convent School Peshawar from 1935 to 1939. From 1939 to 1941 I attended the Burn Hall School, then located at Baramula and Srinagar. (Please note that they shifted from Baramula to Abbottabad in 1947 since they did not desire to continue in India). From 1941 to 1946 I studied at the Prince of Wales’ Royal Indian Military College Dehra Dun from where I did my Senior Cambridge and also received one year’s pure Military Training. It was here in Dehra Dun that I was lucky to be the student of the well-known Mr Catchpole. Catchpole was a man of great devotion, conviction and dedication. He played a very formative role in our education at Dehra Dun. After Senior Cambridge from the RIMC Dehra Dun I appeared before the Services Selection Board at Meerut and was selected for the Indian Army in November 1947. We were airlifted to Lahore along with Muslim GCs (Gentleman Cadets) from the IMA as the First PMA and were privileged to be received by Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. I joined the PMA in January 1948.

  1. Please describe your parents and their influence on your perception/personality?

My father and grandfather were the two most honest and upright people that I saw in life. I was greatly inspired by both of these individuals and inherited their basic traits. In character building the role of mother was more significant.

  1. Please tell us about any incident in your early years that left a lasting impression on your personality ?

Two events left a particularly strong impression. One was the abject poverty and submissiveness of the Kashmiri Muslims, particularly the males owing to severe oppression by the Dogra rulers. However, the females were fairly aggressive in protecting their rights. The second significant incident was while proceeding to Meerut I saw a Muslim refugee train which had been attacked near Jagadhri in 1947. All my life thence I have not been able to reconcile with the feigned Indian democracy and been involved in four wars against India, viz; 1948 (Kashmir); 1965 Rann of Kutch, 1965 (Indo-Pak War), 1971 (Indo-Pak War). In three of these I found myself in Kashmir!

  1. How was your student life?

It was memorable. The missionaries at the convent in Peshawar and at Burn Hall Baramula/Srinagar were a dedicated lot. Education in those days was a very healthy combination of intellectual and physical activity. I got an early exposure to military training at RIMC where one year was completely dedicated to military training.

  1. Any teacher who played a decisive role in formation of your perceptions/convictions?

There were many teachers who I can mention. There was Father Shanks, Father Moran, Father Louis a Dutchman who later died at Malakwal, Father Mallet, at Burns Haiz, Mr Catchpole and Mr E I Connolly, a Battle of Britain fighter pilot, who had already received a DSO and DFC (Bar) at the RIMC.

  1. What was your opinion about Mr Bhutto as you saw him as a Minister the period 1958-66?

I had seen Mr Bhutto as a Minister in 1958-66 as an Army Major and felt that he had great talents. From 1972 onwards I saw him far more closely as IG FC.

  1. What do you have to say about the Balochistan problem of 1974-76?

This problem was created through the intrigues of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the then Interior Minister. Qayyum was an arch intriguer and wanted to strengthen his party in Balochistan. Thus the problem in Lasbela was started due to his machinations. Mengal was a patriot who was manoeuvred into a controversial role through Qayyum’s intrigues. I may add that the motivation of taking the army to Balochistan was positive. Given the task even the FC could have done the job as we earlier did in Kakar Khurasan. Mr Bhutto was a bit impatient since all members of his family had not crossed the 50 year age mark. He wanted to do away with the Sardari System and bring development in Balochistan. Regrettably, the Chief Secretary and the Corps Commander were brothers and this led to a much quicker employment of the Army.

  1. What about the Hyderabad tribunal and disengagement of the army from Balochistan?

It is on record that Mr Bhutto wanted to withdraw the Army from Balochistan in 1976. The then Army Chief Zia opposed this idea. In addition around the same time Mr Bhutto wanted to wind up the Hyderabad Tribunal. This was again opposed by Zia as Army Chief. Ironically Zia did exactly what Mr Bhutto wanted in 1977 rather than 1976. The two subjects were discussed in my presence in November 1976 at Dir. Zia had wanted to use these as excuses/pretexts for military take over. He was already in collusion with the opposition.

  1. You were selected as Governor NWFP in 1974-75. How did this occur ?

Mr Bhutto had already seen me as IG FC and was keen to have me in the province as a Governor since the province was a political trouble spot and he wanted to integrate the tribal areas and organise the nascent Afghan resistance, a task, commenced by me in October ’73 as IG FC.

  1. So how was this stint?

We did well. During this period there were a large number of bomb blasts in the NWFP with Ajmal Khattak and Azam Hoti sitting in Kabul indulging in anti-Pakistan speeches and activity. In order to convey a message to Sardar Daud that we could play the same game and to assess the training level of the resistance an operation was initiated in Panjsher Valley in August 1975. The operation was a total success. The Afghans suffered heavily in men and equipment and Daud sought peace and accepted the Durand Line. He initiated an agreement in mid-1976. However, the formal agreement was not signed in view of Zia’s take over.

  1. When did Pakistan enter the Afghan scenario as a party, which was assisting the anti-Daud insurgents in Afghanistan?

In October 1973 while I was serving as IG FC an Afghan named Habibur Rahman (Shaheed) came and contacted me about setting up a resistance movement in Afghanistan with active military assistance of Pakistan. I conveyed the same to Mr Bhutto, who accepted my proposal in view of the changed situation in Afghanistan and asked me to organise training of Afghans.

  1. What was the political and military aim of the Pakistani government of that time?

From 1947 till that date all Afghan governments had generally not been friendly towards Pakistan. They raised the bogey of Pakhtunistan but refrained from acting against us in 1965 and 1971 when at war with India because of the political environment after the Liaquat Bagh meeting. There were a large number of bomb blasts. Mr Z.A Bhutto was very clear even in 1973 after Daud’s coup. An analysis of the regional environment was undertaken, highlighting the break in the Afghan system of continuity; the impending generational change in the leadership in the USSR and China (Chou had died). The inability of continuity/stability in Iran with removal of Shah of Iran from the scene. Being the last of the party ideologues it looked likely that the USSR leadership may take the opportunity to move once more and invade Afghanistan, a step towards the fulfilment of Peter the Great’s will (1777). Thus we established the base of Afghan Mujahideen resistance in 1973.

  1. What type of assistance was provided to the Afghan resistance and which Pakistani agencies were involved?

We gave them basic infantry weapons, some specialised training in how to conduct guerrilla warfare under an SSG team until it was discontinued on 05 July 1977 by Gen Zia, who lacked the strategic vision.

  1. At what stage did the SSG enter the scene as the principal agency that trained the Afghan resistance?

They (a team) imparted training in the belief that they were training Frontier Corps personnel (all trainees were enlisted in the Frontier Corps before training)

  1. What was the ISI role in Afghanistan in the period 1974-77?

It was a top secret affair and the ISI had no role. The secret was shared between Mr Bhutto, myself, Aziz Ahmad and the then Army Chief Tikka Khan. This was for obvious reasons. The Foreign Office could with, nonchalance deny if the issue was raised at UN or any other forum.

  1. Who were the pioneers of the anti-Daud Afghan resistance?

These were Ustad Rabbani, Hikmatyar, Ahmad Shah Masood and a host of others who came to Pakistan after October 1973.

  1. You have been a committed member of the PPP? At what stage did you decide that you must join Mr Bhutto’s party?

I was impressed by Mr Bhutto’s progressive policies since 1972. On 27 July 1977 after Martial Law Mr Bhutto personally requested me to join the PPP. I did so out of conviction once Mr Bhutto was out of power.

  1. Why did Mr Bhutto select Zia as a COAS?

There were a number of reasons and these were discussed with me personally by Mr Bhutto, while in detention at Murree. One was the pretended humility of Zia, and this disarmed Mr Bhutto into the belief that he would pose no threat to the nascent democracy. Secondly, his performance when he invited Mr Bhutto to the centenary celebrations of 11 Cavalry at Kharian. He took pains to ascertain Mr Bhutto’s tailor in Karachi (Hamid Khan) and had a Blue Patrols as Colonel-in-Chief of Armoured Corps stitched. On entering the room, Mr Bhutto found a suitcase on his bed and on inquiry was told that it contained the Blue Patrol. The next day, Mr Bhutto was requested to climb a tank and engage a target. Quite obviously the target was hit. Then was his performance while on deputation in Jordan, where he killed a large number of Palestinians (Black September), Mr Bhutto was led to the belief that if he was so loyal to Jordan, he would be even more loyal to Pakistan. His prime performance came at Multan, where he invited Mr Bhutto as Colonel-in-Chief. After the function, when Mr Bhutto had barely returned to Mr Sadiq Qureshi’s house, when he was informed that General Zia requested to meet him. Mr Bhutto was surprised, having met him in the mess a little earlier. However, he called him into Mr Sadiq Qureshi’s study/library. Gen Zia on entrance went round the Almirah, looking for something and on inquiry he revealed that he was looking for a copy of the Holy Quran. On finding a copy he placed his hand on and addressing Mr Bhutto he said, “You are the saviour of Pakistan and we owe it to you to be totally loyal to you”. Then was the fact that there was little to pick and choose amongst the other aspirants. The only other suitable candidate was General Majeed Malik who was Mr Bhutto’s favourite as a sound professional. Unfortunately was involved in the International Hotel Scandal where he was caught with Mustafa Khar. He was sent as Ambassador to Libya. Finally, of course was the American angle. Zia’s obsequeous behaviour made Mr Bhutto think that he was a non-political man. Pakistani democracy was at an infant stage and could not afford an Army Chief with political ambitions. Then there was not much choice. Gen Sharif was considered politically unreliable since he had been very close to Ayub Khan. Jillani had no command experience and was the head of ISI. Akbar Khan had not performed well as a GOC 12 Division in Kashmir in 1971 war. Gen Aftab and AB Awan had no command potential and were not suitable.

  1.   It has been said that a large number of PPP tickets for 1977 elections were awarded to opportunists who were not sincere workers of PPP. Why did this happen?

It is good to be idealistic! However, in politics as in other fields of endeavour, the ground realities cannot be ignored. It is typical of us to select one aspect of an event and pass judgements rather than rationally analyse the problem in its entirety. Firstly, political parties, unlike dictatorship, perform under a manifesto or a programme rather than on whims as dictators generally do. Individuals, in consequence, are not of prime import as long as they subscribe to the basics/underlying philosophy of the manifesto. Judgement should only have been passed if the individuals had performed for a reasonable period and not abided by the party’s basic philosophy/manifesto.

  1. It has been asserted that Mr Bhutto was punished by some foreign powers/power for initiating Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Is this correct?

Within hours of the declaration of an election programme/date the PNA came into being and thus, through all means fair or foul thwarted the political process. As, in the ultimate, they were working at someone else’s behest and according to someone else’s agenda. It would be pertinent to recall Kissinger’s remarks at Lahore and the letters written to army officers by a senior leader of the PNA (who even today masquerades as a democrat). The entire movement was in keeping with a programme and, in consequence, a large amount of dollars changed hands at Jan’s, Peshawar Cantonment between a foreign representative and a senior leader of the PNA. Further more, in keeping with this/their programme some key leaders, of the PNA (detained at Sihala) thwarted efforts of reaching an agreement between the government and the PNA despite the fact that initial agreement to hold elections afresh was taken on May 12 1977 between the late Mufti Mahmood and Mr. Z.A Bhutto in a meeting at the PM’s house. Today, even Professor Ghafoor Ahmed, owing to belated pangs of conscience admits that the army moved in, despite an agreement having been clinched.

The bane of this country has been the repeated intervention of the army and thus frustrating political maturity and strengthening of political institutions. The four post-1988 interventions amply confirm this attitude/malaise of the Armed Forces.

It cannot be gainsaid that the military junta has failed in entirety in all interventions, and departed ignominously. The fate of the present element is yet to be seen but could be no different.

  1. It has been said that Zia coup was foreign insipred.

Yes, undoubtedly, the factors cited contributed to his selection as COAS. There was off course the American angle. They had picked Zia as suitable material at Fort Leavenworth, followed his career progress and possibly lobbied in his favour. They made it known to friends months in advance that he would be appointed COAS.

  1. How would Mr ZA Bhutto have behaved had he been in power when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan?

Mr Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan resistance in 1973. He had the foresight and vision to do it. As a matter of fact we created the organisational network which was used by Zia and the USA to oppose the Soviets. Zia had a short term vision and ignored the political angle of organising an Afghan government in exile with ulterior aims of gobbling US aid. Had Mr Bhutto been in chair he would not have deliberately neglected the political angle like Zia. Even Daud was convinced by Mr Bhutto in 1976 and said “Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the same boat. If it is the threat from the North (USSR) it is Afghanistan today and Pakistan tomorrow. If it is the threat from the South (India) it is Pakistan today and Afghanistan tomorrow”. You see after 1971 Indian strategists had placed Pakistan and Afghanistan in the same category as the next target. Mr Bhutto laid the foundation of the Afghan resistance for reasons discussed earlier. However, being a political animal, he also continued with a political alternative/solution. In November 1976, in consultation with the resistance leadership, two individuals, namely Wakil Azam Shinwari and Yunus Khugiani were selected to proceed to Rome and request King Zahir Shah to return as his father had done earlier, to lead a movement into Afghanistan. The caveat was that Zahir Shah could return as a constitutional monarch under the Constitution drafted by Mr Musa Shafiq, a former Prime Minister and the mentor/founder of the Hizb in Afghanistan. However, Zahir Shah indicated that he was willing to play his role but he would first visit Saadat (Egypt), then visit the Shah of Iran and finally arrive in Pakistan. Mr Bhutto was confident that King Zahir Shah could act as a rallying point and play his historical role. Events, however, took a different turn and martial law was imposed in Pakistan. The other aspect was the negotiations with Sardar Daud. Even Daud as earlier discussed had accepted the Durand Line in 1976 and wanted peace with Pakistan. Also the successful negotiations with Sardar Daud, to safeguard Pakistan’s, rightful interests are cases in point.

  1. Why was the PPP unable to mobilise the masses around the time Mr. Bhutto was sentenced to death till his execution?

It would be recalled that the PPP workers made great sacrifices and the resistance put up by Mr. Bhutto himself during his incarceration proved a beacon light. He endured all the excesses with great courage and dignity. The workers on their part went to jail in the thousands! Every element of society (pressmen, lawyers) were brutalised and lashed. A large number of workers resorted to self-immolation. However, it was the leadership that eventually deserted them. Jatoi and Khar colluded with the army, proceeded abroad and despite being mixed up with the Indian intelligence agency RAW, later Mr Khar was never tried by the military! Hafeez Pirzada also married afresh and abandoned his leader! The worst instance was of the talented cousin Mr Mumtaz Bhutto, who not only abandoned Mr. Bhutto but also colluded with Zia. Maulana Niazi, Mir Afzal Khan and a host of others initially endeavoured to take over the party. In February 1978, when the endeavour failed or was foiled and Begum Bhutto was designated co-chairperson, they disappeared from the scene. Their political nemesis is abundant proof of their disloyalty and the party (workers) never accepted them in their fold. The most poignant scene was at Garhi Khuda Bux, when on one of the anniversaries, they were beaten up by the workers and had to flee barefooted in the scorching heat! It is to the credit of the workers, that, despite 11 years of repression and intrigue (formation of IJI by the ISI), they yet succeeded in bringing the party into government in 1988. Contrast this with the events of October 1999 and subsequently, when the main leadership (Nawaz Sharif and family) of the so-called PML (Nawaz) absconded to Saudi Arabia and the workers left in the lurch.

  1. It is being said in Sindh and Balochistan that had Mr. Bhutto not been from Sindh he would not have been executed but exiled like Mr. Nawaz Sharif. What is your opinion?

There is no doubt in this assertion. Initially the attitude of the Lahore High Court and its Chief Justice (Maulvi Mushtaq) is no secret. Even at the Supreme Court, it was a divided verdict and the judges hailing from Punjab on the one side and those hailing from the smaller provinces (all dissenting) on the other. It was a replay of the Lahore High Court scenario. Moreover, no divided judgement has ever been affected but in this case Mr. Bhutto, hailing from a smaller province, was executed. The merit of the judgement is evident from the fact that it cannot be cited as a legal precedent. Foreign judicial/legal experts have termed it as judicial murder.

  1. How would you assess Zia’s Afghan policy?

It was based on sheer opportunism and personal interest. Initially, he lacked the vision and, therefore, suspended financing the movement. This resulted in break-up of movement from one to seven groups, each leader fending for himself. Secondly, when the Soviet invasion took place he did not form a government in exile, which could gain experience during the Jehad and be available when the Geneva talks took place. Also all the US/Saudi and other assistance would have been routed through institutional organisations (Ministries) rather than individuals and would have prevented heart burning and divisive tendencies. Finally, he opposed the Geneva talks and visualised only a military solution — the bane of all our subsequent military leadership — Hamid Gul, Beg etc. We were very deliberate. Every resistance is based on a political centre, a hierarchy, like the DeGaulle government in exile, the Algerian and Yugoslav Government in exile etc. Zia deliberately kept the Afghan Mujahideen divided into various groups in order to ensure that the bulk of the US aid could be embezzled. The future events thus led to the post-1988 civil war in Afghanistan.

  1. When Ms Bhutto came to power after winning the 1988 elections the Pakistani nation had very high expectations from her. However, she was unable to bring any revolutionary changes and remained a prisoner of circumtances. Why did this happen?

and

  1. What was the role of COAS and the President in the period 1988-90 in destabilising the PPP government?
    (We have combined the two questions since Gen. Babar decided to answer both the questions in a combined manner).

A programme/manifesto, however revolutionary requires time and freedom of action, more so, when it comes in the wake of 11 years of Martial Law with all its incumbent distortions. In democratic norms/practice, it also requires a comfortable majority in the parliament as each measure has to receive the assent of the Parliament, i.e, the Assembly and the Senate. This was appropriately denied through formation of IJI. Simultaneously, the government has to operate in a free environment rather than limited by the President (who had assumed abnormal powers in 1985) and, in consequence, interpreted the constitution and rules of business according to his whims. This was true in the case of Judges appointment and in Admiral Sirohey’s, retirement. The then Army Chief General Aslam Beg had the ambition to usurp power during the period 1988-90 but lacked the courage! Initially, the IJI was formed, then it was ensured that Punjab not only went to the opposition (Nawaz Sharif) but remained in perpetual confrontation with the Centre. When they felt endangered by the stability of the government, an effort was then made to remove her through a vote of no confidence, engineered by Mr. Nawaz Sharif, General Aslam Beg and, undoubtedly, with the blessings of the President GIK! Mr. Nawaz Sharif took the parliamentarians to Changa Manga and later Murree (beginning the biggest bane of Pakistan politics… “Horse Trading”) and, of course dished out considerable financial (plots in Lahore etc) and other benefits. Yet, it did not succeed. Gen Aslam Beg weaned away the MQM members from the coalition. A meeting having been held at Yunus Habib’s. (Mehran Bank fame) residence at Karachi. The agencies also felt endangered with the removal of General Hamid Gul (more famous for the fiasco at Jalabad — despite advice to the contrary) and the establishment of Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Committee, tasked to bring the intelligence agencies under a constitutional umbrella. The President had his own distorted interpretation of law with regards to the retirement of Admiral Sirohey (it would be recalled that the case was initiated by the Ministry of Defence, after due scrutiny of rules and precedent) and duly processed by Law Ministry). Next, the immaturish attempt of the Law Minister/Advisor to do down the senior, experienced and competent Attorney General. The episode of “Midnight Jackals” to wean away PPP’s MNAs. Two of the principal characters are today behind bars for corruption! Finally of course, Gen Beg felt threatened (after removal of Hamid Gul and the possible ouster of Admiral Sirohey). Need for brevity precludes fuller details, for these petty intrigues can only be covered in many volumes! As further proof of Beg’s ambitions (fortunately curtailed by lack of courage) which stand thwarted (his directing Mr. Yunas Habib at COAS house) to pay Rs. 50 million to Mr. Javed Hashmi at the peak of “Operation Desert Storm” (Nawaz Sharif government) lends further credence to his ambitions.

However, when all these measures failed the President, in total collusion with the COAS and the opposition, used 58(2) (b) and removed the government. The supine superior judiciary placed the seal of confirmation, on an act, blatantly, unlawful.

It is to the credit of Ms Bhutto that despite all these intrigues/endeavours she succeeded in enforcing her programme: rationalising the sugar industry, spelling out sugar cane areas, benchmark for credit based on crushing capacity, the establishment of Board of Investment; providing job opportunity to the youth and overall improvement in the national economy, both, industrial and agricultural. The growth rate GDP and the stability of the Dollar are evident proof of her success. Her achievements must also be viewed in the context of the time frame, barely 2 years as against 5 years as ruled in the constitution, more so, when the first intrigue at destabilisation took place within 30 minutes of her oath-taking (i.e a Russian aircraft hijacked and heading towards Pakistan, her cool and composed response thwarted the attempt —details some other time)

  1. What is your opinion about limiting or totally finishing the ISI’s political role?

In its classic role i.e. Intelligence, it has rendered yeoman service. However, it should neither have a political role nor dabble in politics. The bane in Pakistani politics since 1977, has been the active dabbling of the ISI in politics. Zia initiated this role for personal reasons and, since he was wearing many a hat simultaneously, institutions became intermixed. An additional factor was the Afghan Jehad, when at times, their assessment/action was at total variance with that of the government in office. An endeavour like the one reflected in the ACM Zulfiqar Committee Report and the proceedings pending in the Supreme Court should be the vehicle to bring about this change. It is claimed with great naivette that the ISI is under the direct control of the Chief Executive! If this was so, then how did the ISI pick up Asif Zardari, the Chief Executive’s spouse, from the Governor House Lahore in 1996? These are merely fictions and the reality is that it clobbered together the IJI in 1988, a claim personally made by the then DG ISI (Gen Hamid Gul); in 1990 the ISI distributed funds amongst politicans of their choice (Gen Asad Durrani; Affidavit in the Supreme Court). Initially, they brought together the MQM in 1985-86 and when it became a threat, Gen Javed Nasser raised the Haqiqi. All their measures have militated against the continuance/maturity of political institutions/governments. The take over in 1996, was engineered by the ISI and not the 111 brigade as, is, the general practice. The confession on organizing the IJI in 1988; the distribution of funds by the ISI in 1990; the rigging of the 1997 elections are apt proof of their continued dabbling in politics. It is hoped that the Supreme Court, when it finds the courage/moral fibre to proceed with the ISI Fund & Mehran Bank case may bring sanity to the entire system and apportion rightful responsibility to each institution. It is strange that the logic used in 1993 and 1996 was that they had responded to the president/supreme commander (National) rather than the Chief Executive and in 1998 they abandoned the Supreme Commander Sardar Farooq Leghari and supported Nawaz Sharif, the Chief Executive.

In brief/short, martial laws have been more in the nature of “economic necessity” rather than any national commitment, the Armed Forces feeling left out of the rat race for financial benefits!

  1. It has been said that the 1988, 1990, 1997 Elections were rigged. In 1988 the system was relatively imperfect. However, it was made more perfect in 1990 and perfected totally in 1997. What is your opinion?

Undoubtedly, all elections since 1988 have been rigged to enable certain desired results. In 1988, the IJI was placed in opposition so as to limit the majority of the PPP. In 1990 the ISI not only disbursed funds to their favoured candidates but made analysis of the electoral rolls so as to ascertain those voters who generally did not cast their vote. These votes were then cast in favour of their favourite candidates. In 1993 there was a little respite as both the President and the PM were simultaneously given the marching orders. In 1997, the modus operandi was further streamlined and made effective. The candidates were issued different electoral rolls, one set to the favoured candidates with two to three additional pages. These pages contained the newly enrolled voters, this implied an additional 20-25 thousand votes (around 200 voters and with around 140 polling stations). These additional pages were not available to the opposing candidate. These additional votes, since they could not be challenged, were cast between Iftari and Tarawih. Thus emerged the heavy mandate and the desired results! These additional pages were detected at a few stations, but went overlooked, as being an error on the part of the Election Commission/staff. It would be of interest to note that in each of these elections the first results were from remote areas like Maiwand (Dera Bugti) etc where no communications existed. Manipulation was also carried out at the Aiwan-e-Sadar where a “Control Centre” was established each time and the service of Justice S.A Nusrat and/or Gen Mujeeb and Rafaqat were utilised.

  1. The PPP was a progressive party. How did its leaders allegedly get involved in capitalist activities? Further why did the PPP abandon its progressive outlook after 1988?

Every government and political party works within an environment. The political philosopy is designed/cut according to the obtainings/public desires. When Mr. Bhutto assumed office there was despondency (aftermath of surrender at Dacca and failure of the Armed Forces in West Pakistan) and exploitation of the common man. Also, the threat from India persisted. He took necessary measures to overcome these: introduced populist politics, gave the right of Trade Unionism; nationalised industry, to break the steel grip of the industrialists over the labour; gave the right of obtaining passports and after opening avenues of job opportunity, oil as a weapon, ensured that large number of individuals went abroad to seek employment and benefit. Organised the Islamic Summit at Lahore. By giving observer status to PLO, enabled its entrance into the portals of UN; opted out of South Asian Sub-Continent and went back to the State’s Islamic roots. At home he succeeded in obtaining consensus on the 1973 Constitution, a document that still remains sacrosanct and inviolable, despite efforts by Dictators/ML authorities, including the present Junta. His high water mark, of course, was the launching of the nuclear programme, in response to the Indian blast at Pokhran. A singular measure (Balance of Terror) that has kept the Indians at bay. When Ms. Bhutto came into government, it was in the wake of the 1985 party less elections, which were designed to and did destroy the political party fabric. The issuance of Rs. 5 million as development fund by late Mr Mahbub-ul-Haq (in fact a political bribe) not only formalised corruption in the body politics, but also reduced the MNA to the position of local councillor (drains, street paving etc came within the ambit of the MNA and legislation became secondary). Also, this introduced malpractices within the election system and, in consequence, implied heavy expenditure — i.e, 3 million to Rs. 5 million. These measures as all other measures undermined party conformity and the parliamentarians, on the pretext of covering the heavy election expenditures, began to seek undue favours. Loyalty was at a price!

Despite these handicaps, the government continued to work unabatedly on a egalitarian programme. There are four major factors that confront society; One:- “Unemployment”, Two: “Inflation”, Three:- “The Security of Person and Property”, Fourth:- “Women Empowerment”. It can be said with due pride, that the government, based on merit and within the parameters of provincial quota, provided around 40,000 jobs, particularly to the educated youth. Secondly, it contained inflation within reasonable limits and there was no widespread dissatisfaction. Thirdly, the law and order and, in consequence, the security of person and property ensured. Fourthly, women empowerment. Women constitute 52% of our population — yet, they are not only debarred from the mainstream national endeavour, but also in most cases present a picture of abject exploitation. They are used for labour (a manual task) and at the receiving end of severe abuse. Resultantly; a “Women Development Division” was created; the First Women Bank, to provide job opportunity was established. Women Police Stations were opened; a lady was admitted into the PSP in officer rank and permitted to undergo training at the Police Academy, alongside with the male selectees. For the first time a lady was inducted into the PIA as a pilot — today, she is operating as captain of a Boeing aircraft. It was endeavoured to appoint a lady (Ms Shireen Mazari) as Vice Chancellor of the Quaid-e-Azam University — to be stopped only by the obduracy of Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Chancellor. A massive socio-economic development programme was launched to provide electricity, gas, potable water, schools and colleges and other facilities to the neglected element of society. The ANF was created so as to eliminate the menace of Narcotics.

  1. How would you define your Taliban policy?

The Taliban movement was purely indigenous and a direct reaction to the intra group fighting of the erstwhile Jehadi Groups i.e. between Hikmatyar and Rabbani; Ahmed Shah Masoud, Dostam, Sayyaf and others. The Afghan people had had enough of the infighting and desired peace so as to launch/undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. It also stemmed from a failure on the part of the Western Nations — after having achieved their objective (the destruction of Soviet Union) they abandoned the Afghans to their own devices. It would have been fair to launch a Marshall Plan or some such developmental activity. Regrettably, they failed to so so. The Pakistan Government (PPP) had no favourites and the only desire that motivated all activity was the unity, and integrity of Afghanistan and the well being of the Afghan people. In furtherance of this policy a tour (with permission from the Central Afghan Government — Rabbani) of S.W Afghanistan was undertaken. The purpose: Firstly, to prove to the world that peaceful conditions existed in the region; Secondly, the Central Asian Republics had attained political independence but not economic independence (integrated economy for 70 years); Thirdly, to utilise the energy sources available in the Central Asian republics by the entire region, including S.E Asia; Fourthly, to develop communication, and resultantly, trade between Central Asian Republics (markets) and India (industry) — Pakistan would act as a conduit and a single train/truck could take anyone/anything from Ukraine to Singapore uninterruptedly. Fifthly, and most importantly, enable the development of Gwadar port and thus reducing pressure on Karachi port (eliminating the persistent law and order problem).

During the tour these issues were raised with the leaders, and possibly, fell on good ears. Subsequently, within the space of a week a large number of Diplomats (mostly Western) were taken to Herat and Kandahar so as to familiarise them with the situation, and the need to assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan and ameliorate the economic difficulties of the Afghan people.

In view of the total absence of medicines and other essential goods a convoy with relief goods for Kandahar, Lashkargah, Shindand and Herat (organised through contribution from philanthrophists) arranged and despatched. The convoy was, regrettably, stopped at Kandahar by the Indo-Iranian Lobby. Then Iranians were justified as the opening of this route would have spelt the death-knell to their own ambitions considering the Central Asian Republics as their backyard. Moreover, the Iranian route linking Ashkabad, Mashad, Tehran, Bunder Abbas was 3200 KMs, whereas the contemplated route was 1600 KM, with 800 KM, from Karachi to Chaman already developed. The Indians, however, were atypically foolish and could not see/identify their strategic economic interests! The Taliban (former Jehadis) sensing their economic interests being endangered, came to the rescue and released the convoy. The convoy then proceeded to its destination. However, the Taliban phenomena had commenced and then there was no stopping until they finally entered Kabul in September 1996.

Consequent upon their entrance into Kabul in September 1996, negotiations were commenced/set apace between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in October 1996. The negotiations, after a few shuttles, were successful and a draft agreement compiled — reflecting a numbers of issues. Article 5 stipulated the future political system — the establishment of a commission: composed of representative from all the provinces of Afghanistan, based on the population of each province; the representatives, provided/nominated by the respective province could be local or from amongst those settled abroad. The meetings (on Dostam’s request and agreed to by Taliban) would be in Kabul. The plan quite obviously was federal and one that would enable suitable representation to all ethnic, cultural and religious groups. Regrettably, Para 5 (at the time of the signing) was erased by Dr. Holls, the then UN representative on Afghanistan, and this caused a furore by the Northern Alliance and the agreement was stalled. Subsequently, Dostam made a number of requests seeking finalisation of the accord — the final one being on 3 November 1996. The same evening i.e. 3 November 1996, a meeting was summoned at the Aiwan-e-Saddar with the President, PM, the COAS, the DGISI and the Foreign Secretary in attendance. It was decided/ruled that I should proceed to Mazar-e-Sharif and have the agreement finalised on 5 November 1996. On the night 4/5 November, for reasons known to him, the President, acting under article 58 (2) (b), dismissed our government. The Afghans were, regrettably, once again left to their own devices and the power struggle continues unabated.

A similar trade agreement/protocol was drawn up and signed between Kazakhstan. Kirghizia, China and Pakistan so as to enable movement of goods in the region via the Khunjrab Pass.

The Indians on their part have, regrettably, been not only short sighted but foolish and by siding with Iran (a natural antagonist — conflict of interest in Gulf and Indian Ocean) have lost the opportunity of a millennium to benefit from cheap/economic supply of power on the one hand and export of goods to Central Asia on the other. Nations, like individuals, at times act most foolishly and against their long term interests

  1. What is your opinion about the Taliban Government and their future relations with Pakistan?

The Taliban movement was purely an indigenous movement in response to the local environment / conditions. It must be added with all emphasis that in view of the cornerstone of our Afghan policy, unity and integrity of Afghanistan and the well-being of the Afghan people, this was not the ultimate. This is amply borne out by setting a pace negotiations between the Taliban and northern alliance in October 1996, after the Taliban’s entry into Kabul in September 1996. The negotiations were aimed at establishment of a broad based government and a possible federal structure so as to apportion due rights to all ethnic and religious groups. These measures would lead to peace and stability in Afghanistan and enable its reconstruction and rehabilitation. The Afghans (all groups) are not only friendly to Pakistan but consider it their second home —- which, in turn has demolished the Pakhtunistan bogey. It is my firm belief / faith that in the event of a future misadventure by India, it would find not only Afghan people, but also at least 100,000 fully trained and armed Afghans on our side. The sub continental balance of power has imperceptibly but effectively changed.

  1. It has been said that the Zia regime acted as a mid-wife to the MQM and Sipah-i-Sahaba in order to reduce the PPP influence in Sindh and Punjab and the ISI master minded the creation of MQM. How far is this correct? Further what was the degree of Indian involvement with MQM in Sindh?

One (MQM) was deliberate, while the Second (Sipah-e-Sahaba) was the outcome of flawed government policies. The MQM was indeed, not only organised by the Zia Regime (Intelligence Agencies) but also nurtured so as to weaken the hold of political parties like PPP and Jamaat-e-Islami. The partyless elections helped the MQM in this agenda.

Progressively, they not only fell into inimical hands (India) but also became a problem for the domestic government and in consequence, Javed Nasir proudly proclaims that he (ISI) nurtured the Haqiqi. But a genie once released from the bottle is uncontrollable and the Army (Intelligence Agencies) in their naivette failed to realise/understand these subtleties/niceties. The Sipah-e-Sahaba was the result of undue emphasis on religion. All dictators, lacking a manifesto/programme fall back on religion. This increases the tempo of the struggle between modernists (political forces) and fanatics (religious groups) and imperceptibly undermine the body fabric of national polity/direction. Simultaneously, these groups to further their programme, wittingly or unwittingly, become proxies of other fissiparous forces. The MQM, progressively fell into the hands of the Indians and Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Arabs. The TNFJ and other linked groups covered Iranian interests.

The MQM was undoubtedly, a boom for the Indians as at a very minimal/negligible expense (finance) brought the country’s economic and industrial hub (Karachi-Hyderabad) to a grinding halt. With a handful of militants, they could hold the entire city (120 million) hostage. After the demise of Zia-ul-Haq, they found a new mentor in General Aslam Beg. There was no doubt that the MQM became Indian sponsored, recruitment being done by Javed Langra from the Bihari Camps at Tongi (Bangladesh)! Being unscrupulous, they also took advantage of divided nature of families. They had established a number of training camps (Lucknow, Rajasthan and others) where they trained these elements and infiltrated them into Pakistan. The Indians not only financed the operations (weapons/livelihood) in Pakistan but also financed the grandoise life style of Altaf Hussain in the UK — such life style not being possible through charitable donations (skins on Eid)! The individuals to ensure an appropriate life style collected “Bhattas” from Industrialists and the rich — apart ofcourse, from donations in kind (pulao etc) from marriage halls!

Additionally, some religious groups in their zeal to recruit individuals for the Jehad in Kashmir, unwittingly, recruited individuals (Fahim Commando) from amongst the rank and file of MQM, and sent them for training to Afghanistan. No record being maintained these individuals joined the militancy in Karachi. The most damaging aspect was the rule/misrule of the late Jam Sadiq. He provided employment to these individuals in the thousands in the Police, the KMC, the KWSB, the Steel Mills etc. Thus ensuring their economic well being. Similarly, he issued thousands of Arms Licences to these individuals. At one point the US was also enamoured (considering them oppressed) of them and were liberal in the issuance of visas etc. However, after “Khaji Ground” operation in 1995, they not only limited the visas but shifted the visa section to Islamabad, realising that a terrorist in Pakistan was a “would be” terrorist in US.

I must in all honesty, reiterate that 99.9% of the Urdu speaking element (Mohajir being a misnomer after 50 years) did not support them and were, themselves hostage to militancy. After all the creation of Pakistan had been their need and their forefathers had rendered yeoman secrifices in its attainment. Further more, it was their fore-

fathers who with sweat and blood converted an unknown locality (Mai Kulachee) into the great metropolis that it is today.

  1. How did the MQM part ways with PPP in 1989. Was it due to the pressure of the then COAS and the ISI?

Initially, there were difficulties (of principle) in their joining the coalition. The MQM desired that all their terrorists be granted amnesty and cases against them be dropped. The Federal Government could not, for obvious reasons, accept these demands. However, the MQM realising the prinicipled stand of the government, withdrew their demand and joined the Coalition.

However, in 1989 when the “No Confidence” move came up, General Aslam Beg, prevailed upon the MQM to withdraw their support. A meeting was held at the house of Mr. Yunus Habib (Mehran Bank fame) and the MQM withdrew. Simultaneously, an effort was made by the Army and Mr. Mustafa Jatoi to wean away the Sindhi members of the N.A . At the time of their arrival at Islamabad Mr. Jatoi and late General Asif Nawaz (in uniform) were present to whisk them away. The plan, however, was largely foiled by my picking up the individuals from the aircraft at the tarmac. Rana Chander Singh and a couple of others fell prey and were taken to Punjab House in Rawalpindi. The Pir of Ranipur was evacuated from Rawalpindi and moved to an annexe of the PM House so as to thwart his kidnapping by the Punjab Police. The story of Cheema running across the aisle in the national assembly shouting “save me, save me” seeking the speakers protection is well known to warrant repetition! There are numerous other tales, the classic being the movement of parliamentarians to Changa Manga and later Murree. General Aslam Beg and the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan were totally hand in glove as they did not take notice or react to these non-constitutional endeavours.

  1. What about human rights violations on part of Police/Rangers and extrajudicial killings in the 1995 disturbances in Karachi?

It was purely a slander campaign against the People’s Government, designed to influence the public and the superior judiciary when the case came up in the form of a writ petition.

The Supreme Court, too, contrary to all recognised practices, accepted newspaper cutting as evidence — the same court, however, declined to accept similar proof when M. Rafiq Tarar, the sitting President, carried brief cases stashed with money to Quetta and Peshawar so as to influence the judges against their own Chief Justice! Nature has its own method of retribution! The public responded positively and ignoring the slander cast 35,000 votes in my favour in the 97 elections. The constituency, too, was the heart land of the MQM and it was largely the MQM vote. Additionally, it is standard practice that a judicial inquiry is conducted in each case where suspicions as to foul play appears and, in consequence, in Karachi, too, this practice was duly followed. The greatest of all proofs is the fact that no complaint as to excesses was lodged in the years following 1995, more so, when an Opposition Government was in office and the MQM was, atypically, part of the coalition. However, in 1992 the Nawaz Government had to induct the Army to suppress terrorism.

  1. What are your impressions about the 1995 disturbances in Karachi?

In 1992, the Nawaz Government inducted the Army into IS Duties, though the Army is not designed to handle terrorism. In November 1994, responding to a major demand of the MQM leadership, the people’s government withdrew the Army, in the hope that this measure would bring normalcy. However, not only did peace not return but in fact terrorist activity increased.

The problem, being essentially a political/socio-economic one, and the militancy only a manifestation rather than the malaise, the People’s Government decided on a three pronged policy. Firstly, restore peace, the essential/precursor of any other activity; Secondly, conduct negotiations with the MQM, an endeavour designed to bring MQM into the political mainstream; Finally, the launching of a massive socio-economic development programme to remove the economic/social anomalies. I was assigned the Law and Order aspect and to co-ordinate the effort of all the elements. At the outset, I would like to pay a tribute to the Intelligence Bureau (IB), who rendered yeoman service and enabled targeted action. They succeeded where the ISI and MI had totally failed. Tribute must also be paid to the Police, who despite heavy casualties (109 martyrs in period Jan-Jun 1995), responded with great courage and fortitude. The Rangers, too played a classic role and responded to all calls of assistance with great alacrity and there was total co-operation between the elements on the ground. It would be appropriate to single out the leadership, Mr. Masood Sharif for his vision and organization of intelligence efforts; Mr. Shoaib Suddle for his sedate temperament and outstanding integrity, thus acting as a beacon light to his subordinates. A mention of Mr. Saeed Khan the IG Police would also be appropriate as he not only co-ordinated all the police effort, but also ensured availability of strength from the moffusil. Finally, the unflapable Gen Akram, who responded in a cool and collected manner to all demands placed on his force, the Rangers. It is a tribute to the impartiality and even-handedness of all ranks that not a single case alleging excesses has been filed over the years, infact there has not even been a muted complaint. The MQM parliamentarians Mr. Aftab Sheikh and Mrs Nasreen Jalil, in particular and the others in general that they did not create problems in the senate.

On arrival at Karachi on 1 July 1995, the press made inquiries as to the period it would take to quell the terrorism? My answer was Dec 95. However, thanks to the outstanding performance of the IB, the Police and the Rangers, the problem was, to all intent and purpose, over by Sept ’95. The remainder was merely mopping up and consolidation. Regrettably, the political aspect did not proceed apace and achieved very little. The socio-economic aspect was a great success and the massive funds earmarked and projects undertaken have found fruition in the succeeding years, viz the Liaquat Fly-Over being completed in April 2001. It is a compliment to the wisdom and sagacity of the then PM, Ms. Benazir Bhutto.

The story must, however, end on a sad note! Gen. Akram, Masood Sharif and Mr. Shoaib Suddle and Mr. Saeed Khan were, in recognition of their singular service awarded the Hilal-e-Shujaat. Gen Akram being from the army, has been able to retain his award. The notification with regards to the others was, contrary to all rules, cancelled by the unscrupulous President… Sardar. Farooq Leghari. However, since these awards are in the nature of gallantry awards, they are not subject to cancellation and cudgels will have to be taken up in this behalf at an appropriate time! The whole espisode savours of rank ingratitude.

  1. How would you compare the Rangers in IS Duties with FSF?

Events have come a full circle! What Mr. Bhutto could, with his vision, conceive in the 70s came about in the 90s

(two decades later)!!! It would be recalled that in 1972/73 there was a Police strike in the Punjab and the NWFP. In the NWFP and Balochistan with the availability of two federal forces, the Frontier Constabulary and the Frontier Corps, it did not pose a problem. However, in the Punjab it did pose a problem, more so when the Army refused to come to the assistance of the provincial government, although legally, even a district officer (DC) can summon the Army. This led to the raising of the FSF. No FSF unit was assigned to the NWFP as the FC and Frontier Corps already existed. Furthermore, when during the PNA agitation, the Police requested for Ranger support (Army being the last resort), they were informed that they could provide only 20 men, Mr. Fazal-e-Haq, the then IG, was totally amazed and commented that he could raise, a larger force from his village! The FSF, because of the disrepute of its commander, Masud Mahmood was disbanded immediately after imposition of Martial Law in July ’77. It may be of interest to add that the ammunition with which Mr. Ahmed Raza Kasuri’s, father was allegedly killed by the FSF, was never issued to FSF, the Supreme Court was dishonest enough not to summon Colonel Wazir, the then Commandant Ammunition Depot Havelian to testify and thus belie the prosecution case.

Since the 1980, Punjab Constabulary and Rangers have been raised in the Punjab and Sindh, apart, of course, from a horde of Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Corps, personnel. The Rangers, in Sindh, in view of this contingency, been divided into two elements: one, the operational element on the border (with HQ’s at Hyderabad); and the second dedicated purely for IS Duties at Karachi. History has more than vindicated Mr. Bhutto’s vision and measure.

  1. What is your opinion about Murtaza Bhutto’s gunning down in a police encounter. Was it a conspiracy to destabilise the PPP Government or was it an impromptu incident?

The case is subjudice and cannot be commented upon with honesty. Some day the true facts will emerge, linked with the fact as to who, despite his resistance/reservation, encouraged him to return to Pakistan so as to create problems for Ms. Bhutto, the then PM. However, it can be said with confidence that his life could have been saved if he had been moved to Jinnah Postgraduate or the Aga Khan Hospital which were designed to meet such emergencies. He was rushed to the Mideast Hospital (proximity), where neither staff (being a holiday) nor appropriate equipment were available — so much so that even the telephone key was not available.

  1. Why did Ms Bhutto get into confrontation with the Judiciary in her second tenure?

To enable a full perspective, it would be appropriate to comment on his (Sajjad Shah) appointment. An appointment that was out of turn as he was not the senior most sitting judge. Ms. Bhutto, the then PM, normally consulted her cabinet colleagues when making such sensitive appointments. When she consulted Iqbal Haider and myself, we advised that she should strictly abide by the seniority and thus each individual would remain for a year or so and retire. No individual would be able to entrench himself. However, the Shahs (Syeds) of Sindh, a formidable group, prevailed upon her to appoint Mr. Sajjad Ali Shah. Thus the die was cast, and once safely placed in his saddle he launched on a venture of “Judicial Activism”. The CJ began to conjure visions of glory and political ambition! The role of the Judiciary, as listed in the constitution, is the ‘interpretation’ of law and dispensing justice. They have no business to indulge in politics. Sajjad Ali Shah’s, indulgence in “Judicial Activism” is proven by the fact that he was involved in a similar confrontation with the PML government of Nawaz Sharif. Judicial activism and the tacit collusion/support of Sardar Farooq Leghari, the then President, was the common factor in both cases. It is inconceivable that the same CJ gets involved in confrontation with two successive elected Prime Ministers (the prime source of constitutional authority).

However, he met his Waterloo when the supine President, lacking in moral fibre, abandoned him at the critical moment.

  1. Some critics assert that since her marriage the major political decisions have been made by Mr. Asif Zardari. How far is this allegation correct?

This is a baseless allegation. Ms. Bhutto possessed not only a brilliant intellect but was also deeply steeped in political acumen. All decisions (specially important ones) were either discussed at the Cabinet/ECC or in private with Ministers like the case cited above or the appointment of COAS/promotion of officers to Lieutenant General rank and Zardari figured in none of these discussions/decisions. Since they could not attack her directly so they used Zardari as a stick to beat her with. Undoubtedly, there must have been instances but these generally related to bad choice of friends or unscrupulous MNAs. I may also add that if the army builds a ‘Polo Ground’ at Kharian at state expense (although one already exists) no questions are asked but if a piece of land of the PM’s house is used for similar purpose it becomes scandalous. Also, no questions are asked when the succeeding PM converts/uses the same ground for cricket! People then rightfully/legitimately ask as to the difference in similar cases by a Sindhi and a Punjabi.

  1. Why did Farooq Leghari partways with the PPP? Was it due to ideological reasons or because of personal reasons i.e. was it a matter of principle or a case of clash of egos?

Sardar Farooq Leghari had become over ambitious and corrupt. In his stint as Finance Minister with the caretaker government he had obtained 30 million from Yunus Habib (Mehran Gate fame) although only 15 million were indicated in his bank account against a supposed sale of land to the frontmen (servants) of Mr. Yunus Habib. The deal was shady because the physical possession of the land was never taken. Resultantly, when the cabinet was being formed he was involved with Ms. Bhutto in a prolonged discussion/confrontation as he desired (having tasted blood) to become the Finance Minister rather than accept the Foreign Minister’s slot that was being offered to him. After a long discussion in which I was also a participant he was made to accept the job of Foreign Minister.

Ms. Bhutto like her father, has been trusting of their colleagues and suffered in consequence. Despite the discussion above, she was magnanimous enough to nominate and have him elected as President. As President too, she not only accorded him due respect, consulted him on all major issues but also encouraged him to preside over/address all functions that she was unable to attend. These assignments went to his head and he began to conjure visions of personal grandeur. He then insisted on and had General Jehangir Karamat appointed as COAS. The two then began to collude, the common ground being the ISI case in the Supreme Court (against funding of select individuals in the 1990 elections). He feared that he would also be exposed (30 million from Yunus Habib). Furthermore, because of his earlier political association he also began colluding with the Jamaat-e-Islami, a party that only opposes and launches movements against elected political governments.

He was fully a party to the Jamaat march on Islamabad. Regrettably, this also failed as they did not expect the army to respond to the call of the PPP government and against the Jamaat-e-Islami. Thus, he resorted to article 58(2) (b) and dismissed the elected government and that too of the party that had brought him to the pinnacle of power. The Supreme Court (where he already had a ready partner in the CJ) atypically supported the removal of government and dismissal of the assemblies. However, the NWFP Government under Aftab Khan Sherpao was initially left intact. A Caretaker Government was formed under another “turncoat” (Mr. Meraj Khalid, incidentally, who had also received Two Lakhs from the ISI in 1990). The long term plan was to remove the Caretaker Government and form a fresh Interim Government for two to three years under himself and with Aftab Sherpao, a collaborator, as Prime Minister. Gen Jehangir Karamat, lacking the moral fibre, got cold feet and declined to support any further ventures and, in consequence, fresh elections were held. Elections that were once again massively and scientifically rigged, and led to the ‘heavy mandate’ of Nawaz Sharif. Nature’s retribution was swift in coming, and Nawaz Sharif, borrowing a leaf from Machiavelli successively removed the CJ, Farooq Leghari, and finally, Gen Jehangir Karamat, the COAS. Bearing a guilty conscience all went like docile lambs.

  1. Why did you contest the 1997 elections from Karachi?

My natural constituency was NA IV, my home district and from where I had been returned in 1993. I filed my papers for NA IV. However, in view of the adverse propaganda that excesses had been perpetrated during 1995, restoration of law and order and that this fact had also been cited as one of the reasons for removal of the government under 58(2) (b), it was encumbent that I should contest elections from Karachi. I was so ordered by Ms. Bhutto, whose cabinet member I had been and I unhesitatingly complied——- though well aware that it would be an exercise in futility as Farooq Leghari would ensure that I lost. This was even more essential as, in its atypical manner, the Supreme Court had authenticated the measure of dismissal—based on newspaper cuttings as the only evidence placed on record. The constituency that I contested from was the heartland of Urdu speaking community and it is to their credit that, despite numerous interferences

(including the additional pages) by the agencies they cast 35,000 votes in my favour. Whereas, I took out numerous rallies as it was an elongated constituency and addressed numerous public meetings. The eventual winner Ejaz Shafi could not even appear in the area——- though, because of the massive availability of funds, he had opened numerous offices providing high cost facilities. It would also be appropriate that Mr Imran Khan, masquerading as a national leader could not visit the area and his publicity limited to screening of “World Cup” matches. Needless to state he forfeited his security. It would be proved if proof was needed of our impartiality in the restoring of law and order. And, in a manner, was a slap in the face of Sardar Farooq Leghari, his coterie and the members of the bench, who had, without appropriate evidence applied the seal of authentication/validity on the proceedings.

  1. How do you compare the Pakistan Army of 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 2001 with each other in terms of military spirit/virtue, quality of leadership at higher and lower level?

A rather sicklist question! The Army of 1947, was nascent and ill- equipped. The bulk of the army being of mixed class groups, the units had to be re-organised on arrival in Pakistan. India, playing its atypical Chanakian role, did not release the entire share of equipment and, where it did, it was of little use: all boots of size 8; disparate weapons and ammunition etc. The major failing being that all the Ordnance factories were located in India. Therefore, it had to start virtually at scratch. While these Herculean problems were not enough, the problem of Kashmir was thrust on us. In addition of course was the security to be provided to convoys of refugees after the engineered Radcliffe and Badge Awards. Despite all these handicaps, the Army was highly motivated and displayed no inferiority. It is to the credit of the political and the military leadership that it not only met but overcame all these challenges. The officers had served in Burma, Middle East and other areas as part of the Indian Army and had some experience. The public too was highly motivated and it was, thanks to the Lashkars, that we did manage to retain the area of Azad Kashmir. Being short of officers the former INA officer/JCOs, etc. were inducted and they played havoc with Indian regulars. Brigadier Sadiq Satti laid the foundation of AK Army and being short of officers — quite naturally Subedars etc commanded battalions, SMs, (Hony Captains) commanded Brigades. The senior officers, but for rare instances, like Gen Akbar Khan and Sher Khan, displayed lack of courage/military sense. The political leadership also erred (after the sad demise of Quaid-e- Azam) and agreed to a ceasefire (Jan 49) when the army was poised to attack Beri Pattan (area of Akhnoor) and with Banihall Pass (route) not available due to snow, the Indian Army deployed in the valley would have been cut off. This led to a natural reaction, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy. In the interim Gen Sher Khan and Gen Iftikhar died in an air crash on their way to the UN. It led to the appointment of Gen Ayub Khan as C-in-C. The nation and Army remained spirited and motivated. This was reflected in the historic “Liaquat fist” which aptly symbolised the national will.

The next water shed came in 1954, when we joined the CENTO and SEATO and, in consequence, received military equipment from the US as well as training facilities at their military schools. Though we lost neighbours like USSR (Russia) and China (went into NAM) against whom the pacts were to act as bulwark, the army’s quality of training and standard of equipment improved drastically. However, in 1958 came the Martial Law and brought in its wake, corruption and desire for properties etc. — the allotment of urban properties and agricultural lands — the army was never to come out of this quagmire.

In 1962, came the Sino-Indian war and the army, by and large, felt that taking advantage of India’s abject straits (roundly beaten by the Chinese) and the improved equipment’s availability, we should have taken advantage and occupied/recovered the remaining areas of J & K (Occupied Kashmir). To the contrary, Gen Ayub, by then President, offered a “No War Pact”. His support within the army began to wane. By 1965, the opinion in the army at all levels was that a time of “do or die” has arrived vis-a-vis India. The Indians having taken the debacle of 1962, to heart had begun a massive equipping and re-organization of the army. The first opportunity to come in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch Operation in early 1965. The Indians in keeping with their tradition, decided to occupy the Rann — believing that it contained large oil reserves. The operations of 51 Brigade were about even. However, 6 Brigade under the dynamic command of Brigadier (later Maj Gen) Eftikhar not only decimated them but also put them to total rout. The threat of F- 104’s overhead, kept the IAF at bay.

This operation was followed by “Operation Gibraltar” and “Grand Slam”. While “Operation Gibraltar” failing to take ground realities into account failed, “Grand Slam” having been brilliantly planned strategically failed because of the army high command’s indecision procrastination vacillation and irresolution! Similarly, the operation in the south (Khem Karan) area was brilliant in conception but failed due to faulty timings and lack of co-ordination. The army then merely responded to situations rather than abiding with the original plan. The PAF executed their plans brilliantly and destroyed a large component either on the ground or in air battles.

In the army the young officers fought with courage and dedication and established a world record at the OR/officer ratio of martyrdom — they had surpassed even the Israelis. However, the political (President Ayub) and the army high command (Gen Musa) etc. cost us the war and it ended in stalemate (though keeping the disparities in mind, we had achieved a marginal advantage). The 1966 Tashkent Agreement took a heavy toll of the political leadership and FM Ayub was ousted by a new adventurer/usurper Gen Yahya in 1969. In 1969, the Agartala Conspiracy took place and Mujeeb, who, by now, was totally in the Indian camp, was arrested to be tried. The trial could not take place because of the misplaced obduracy (thanks to inadequacy of information) of politicians who were to participate in the round table conference summoned by President. The chicken hearted President gave in and Mujeeb was released — despite advise by the Law Minister (Manzoor Qadir) that he (Mujib) should be tried, guilt established and then granted clemency (remission of punishment). The die was now cast.

In 1970, using his “Six Points” as his manifesto he launched on the secessionist plan. The Cyclone in Dec 70 and the cool response to it in the sense that Yahya visited only once and that, too, while returning from China and the fact that relief/aid was received from all over the world, less West Pakistan. The Press (local Bengalis) and international played havoc by spewing poison. The election (which normally should have been postponed) that followed cast the ultimate dagger in breast of nationalism.

The Bengali psyche, influenced for years, now totally changed and resulted in the most unfair elections. No opposition party could hold a party meeting/rally, nor could they establish polling stations etc. Resultantly, only two indiviuals (Non-Awami League) were elected. India, too, sensing an opportunity of a millennium added fuel to the fire — not only through the media but also by the way of training the Mukti Bahini. The higher rank of officers (Maj Gen Farman etc.) had sensed that E Pakistan had become a millstone and to be got rid of through an honourable method. The final nail in the coffin was the intemperate behaviour of Yahya Khan, in a bout of drunkenness, with the Russian President at Tehran, during the Pahlavi celebrations. If 1965, was the Zenith, then 1971, was the Nadir. The Army was effectively in control of both, civil and military and, in consequence, must accept full blame for the fiasco and ignominy. The first mistake was the withdrawal of Gen Tikka, who had restored normalcy and afforded an opportunity for negotiations. The military junta, however, was in no mood for a political solution to a manifest political issue. Next, was the despatch of Gen AAK Niazi as commander, Eastern Command. The general officer lacked moral, mental and physical capacity for the task. He changed the eloborate plan made in 1968 and resorted to his pet “strong point” defence, in a totally hostile environment. This was to progressively spell disaster. In West Pakistan, too, the top leadership continued their unabashedly colourful life, made no plans for the impending conflict and went to the extent of not even informing the senior commanders with regards to the fast approaching calamity. The formations, the vast bulk of them, were informed only 24 hours in advance and thus belied the strategic concept of “the defence of E Pakistan lies in West Pakistan”. The strike force north and south remained uncommitted —- one spent the war in entraining and detraining. The effort in the South - Rahimyar Khan, proved a disaster, without air cover. Although, it was largely due to PAF insistence that the “D Day” was fixed, yet, it was the PAF that did not/could not respond. In the South, Jacobabad had not been activated and, in consequence, air support impossible. The only credible operation took place in Chamb, where considerable area was captured. However, here too, a major thrust was made impossible by the non-availability of 17 Division, because of the dilemma raised by the Commander 1 Corps, Gen Irshad. It was due to the courage, leadership and leading from the front effort of late General Eftikhar Khan that made possible the success. Air Commodore Saeed Ullah, visited the HQs on D-Day and, on behalf of the PAF, made tall promises none of which were to materialise when battle was joined. In view of the “masterly inactivity” in Strike Force North, the middle rank Brigadier and the Junior Officers mutinied and took over the command.

In E Pakistan, because of imcompetent leadership, except at Company and Platoon level the war ended in ignominy, defeat and surrender. If the defeat was not enough, the surrender was even more ignominious - putting to shame the entire course of history of the Muslims in India. The main cause was the pathetic leadership — who once, operations started not only lost their nerve but also abandoned their command.

In 1972, they found a Chief Executive (President later PM) who rendered yeoman service: the release of 90,000 PWs (out of which 34,000 were civilians/non combatants) and return of considerable territory in Indian hands. He re-created (re-raised) the formations that had dissolved in

E Pakistan. He directed a commission of inquiry — the Hamood-ur-Rehman commission. The Commission, included General Altaf Qadir, a brilliant intellect and an officer who had a bent for detail. The commission not only identified the failures in command but also the shortcomings — structural, organisational and training. In consequence, the National Defence College the Joint Staff Committee were established etc. Mr. Bhutto, made an effort to make the local industry cater for the service requirement, as in all conflicts — 65 & 71, restrictions were imposed by the US and West to the resupply of weapons and spares. Thus he established: the Kamra Aeronautical Complex; the Heavy Mechanical Complex. The Tank Rebuild Factory and, above all, launched the nuclear programme. It is this “balance of terror” that has enabled 30 years of respite.

The publication of the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission was not taken in hand because of the implicit pleadings of the army. The COAS felt that the army had already fallen into disrepute because of the abject surrender in 1971 and, if the report was published, the public would lynch the army personnel. Being a nationalist he acquiesced and the endorsement remains on the file. In gratitude, the army sent him to the gallows.

In 2001, it can be said that while the Junior Officer remains as motivated as ever and prepared for the supreme sacrifice —- Siachen and, particularly, Kargil are classic cases. A glance at the roll of honour clearly reveals that their sacrifices are at the same level as 65, if not higher. The same cannot, however, be said for the senior ranks. It is the senior ranks, though better trained than ever lack the mental stability — the withdrawal at Kargil. Undoubtedly, they found a convenient peg at placing the blame on the political government — but then, the withdrawal must have been with their connivance. Thus another historical opportunity had been frittered away! It recalls to mind, my opposition, when consulted to the appointment of Gen Jehangir Karamat as COAS. In 1989/90 an incident (depicted in Alpha, Bravo, Charlie) took place in Siachen, when to meet a possible threat of Indian occupation of a strategic height, personnel of 45 AK were cargo slung lifted with helicopters and landed on a strategic height. Within 24 hrs, at a request of the then COAS, Gen Beg, a meeting was summoned at the Aiwan-e-Sadr. As the Army High Command had begun to get cold feet. Being Security Advisor to the PM, I attended the meeting. The meeting began with: a briefing by the then DGISI (Gen Hamid Gul — Jalalabad fame) a story of counsels of fear; then a briefing by Gen Jehangir Karamat, the then DGMO, spelling a picture of doom and recommending withdrawal. Gen Beg, of course, concurred with the renditions. The reasons — artillery fire and lack of logistic support. Being a gunner and aviator I spelt out the situation (space precludes detail) and the PM directed holding on for another 24/48 hours. The Indians withdrew.

Another major reason for the failure in command is the fact that most of the senior officers have either not seen war or either had barely joined the army in 1965. The promotions today, as against the past, are largely based as performance at the war course, NDC etc, rather than war experience and this has even led, to the fudging of course reports at the MS branch.

Finally, the single largest factor that has militated against high quality of performance has been: First, second- ment of good officers to the civil services — largely, again on political contacts, Secondly, the continual interventions —- imposition of Martial Law, and, in consequence, employment on ML duties. In the 70’s misuse of staff car was considered an offence — today, they are used at will — apart, of course, from the fact that most General Officers retain 7-8 cars. The allotment of plots and agricultural land has been another bane, resulting in fudging of qualification points in the W & R Directorate. Corruption continues unabated. Recent purchase of defective meters by WAPDA from Lithuania is a classic case.

It will take a Herculean effort to rectify the situation — although the Junior Officer and the rank and file retain their erstwhile quality. The senior officer will have to learn that “death comes but once”, at the destined time and even the Pharoahs could not take their worldly wealth with them. The ultimate is six yards of coffin cloth, space for the grave and a heap of earth for the mound.

  1. What do you have to say about the so-called accountability drive launched by the present military regime?

Accountability is a farce. This was well proved once Nawaz Sharif was pardoned. Another test case is that of Qidwai a highly corrupt man who is Pakistan’s Ambassador in Kenya and goes around bragging everywhere that it was he who persuaded Mr Nawaz Sharif into appointing Musharraf the Army Chief! Furthermore, important segments like Armed Forces officers, judges and ulema have been excluded, They are no angels!

After the release and exile of Nawaz Sharif and family, it has lost the moral angle — the most important aspect of any accountability. It sounded romantic and sublime when announced on 12 Oct 99 but has been progressively reduced to the ridiculous. Today, it is too selective to warrant any approbation, as important element of society have been excluded to wit; the Armed Forces (particularly the generals and their progeny); the religious leaders-the JI has still to respond and clear its position vis-a-vis the 5 million received from ISI in 1990; finally, and most importantly, the superior judiciary. The continued sitting on the bench by Malik Qayum and Rashid Aziz have brought the entire judiciary into disrepute. Add to it the beneficiaries of the alleged brief cases carried by the Hon’ble President. Apparently the system has lost total sense of direction. In an atypical manner it has come down to the traditional level of “patwaris”, tehsildars etc. Rather than the Chairman Pakistan Steel Mill, who from the position of security officer and despite an FIR-1/97, has moved upwards the reason, being a course mate of the Chief Executive, it makes a sad reading when one sees people, who contracted the floating coffins (Frigates type 21); the mine sweepers; the alleged tank deal and—. The tales of numerous plots and agricultural holdings do not require repetition. If the Service Chiefs receive a plot and dispose of for Rs. 20 million, it is honourable, as also, if a DGISI, obtains a Bengali plot (allotment banned by the Mohtasib — through an application filed by me in 1990, so that residential accommodation can be built for government servants) it is justified and honourable. However, if a similar allocation is made to a politician, it constitutes a crime.

The Armed Forces (Senior Officers) have formalised their corruption by taking over and alloting prized land in the cantonments (despite the fact that all land is, basically, provincial and given to the army for specific purposes and legitimately where the specific purpose is over, it should lapse to the respective province) which is a sacred trust. Similarly, prized governmental agricultural land is similarly allotted without any qualms of conscience. The Armed Forces, as a preliminary, need to do some keen soul searching and dispense with the differing standards —(what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.”!)

  1. What is your advice to the present military regime?

The Armed Forces, should abandon their political ambitions and at the first opportunity hold free, fair and impartial elections (unlike the rigged elections — by their own confession of “88, 90 and 97”) and get out. This would bring them respect and sobriety to the society.

  1. What political and economic solution do you propose in the present conditions?

A return to democracy. The junta has totally failed in achieving any of its agenda points. They were sweet music on 12th October 1999 but are a nightmare today. They should, without delay, hold fair and transparent elections (unlike the rigged election of 88, 90 and 97) and hand over governance to the political elements. It is only political governments, supported by the will of the people that can take correct and appropriate political and economic decisions. Since political parties work under the umbrella of manifesto/programme their measures are in keeping with the aspirations of the people.

  1. What is the future of politics in Pakistan?

The future of politics in Pakistan is bright, provided the army refrains from continual interventions. The interventions have, generally, created more problems than resolved them. The limited Martial Law of 1954, based on the anti-Qadiani Movement set the pace. The 1958 Martial Law, because of the One Unit, a brainchild of the Field Marshal, set in motion the ultimate secession of E Pakistan. It gave rise to the economic disparities in society (22 families) and the two wings of the country — leading to the Six Points and, ultimately, secession. By curtailing political activity, they deny communication with the people and thus set in motion patterns that are in conflict with the aspirations of the people. The Yahya intervention needs no comment. The Zia decade, in the absence of manifesto/programme led to undue emphasis on religion and fanaticism. It ended up with leaving a heroin and Klashinkov culture — the nightmare of the nation since. Although two wrongs do not make a right — however, it will be seen that there have been worst instances of corruption — Estrada in Phillipines; Bill Clinton’s immorality (Monica Lewinsky) and reprieves — on final day of office); the German Chancellor Helmit Kohl; a host of Japanese PMs and ministers — who merely resign; the most glaring being “Bofors” and “Tehelka” are clear instances where the incidents — however, grave, have not led to military intervention but political activity/governance permitted to proceed __ as, in the ultimate, it is the people who are the best arbiter and decide the issue at elections.

Although no angels themselves, the Armed Forces intervene with alacrity and political maturity is delayed by another decade or so.

The Indians have attained maturity and, in consequence, world recognition because of the emphasis on more and more politics and continual election process. We are the Pariah and they are the darlings of the West. Pakistan was created through a political process — based on the political vision of Iqbal and the political will of the Quaid-e-Azam. It received stability through a political process and vision of the Quaid-e-Awam, the 1973 Constitution and changing the pattern of politics to populism. Distortions, if any have come during periods of military interventions — including the debacle and ignominous surrender of 1971.

Therfore, if Pakistan has to survive, which, Inshallah, it will, there is no doubt that politics has to be permitted to mature and result in good governance as, political parties, have the will and strength of public opinion with them.

  1. Do you plan to write your memoirs or some book on Pakistan?

No. No one likes the truth and, if written with a conscience it would raise considerable controversy. The present article, too, has been written with a clear conscience and am prepared, if questioned, to substantiate the issues raised. Moreover, there has been a spate of writing in the recent past and do not feel that people would welcome any more scribbling.

  1. How serious is the supposed religious militant threat in Pakistan?

The religious parties have nor ever had a constructive role in the politics of Pakistan. The bulk of them (JUI and JI) were not only opposed to the creation of Pakistan but did not hesitate to call it Kafiristan. Similarly, they called the Quaid-e-Azam as Kafir-e-Azam. It was these parties that brought about the first Martial Law in 1954 (anti-Qadiani riots). However, when their key leadership summoned before the Munir Commission, they could not render a unanimous definition of Islam or Muslim.

The role of Al-Shams and Al-Badr in the secession/sepration of East Pakistan is too well-known and recent to warrant detail. Similarly, they were in the forefront of the PNA Movement and proudly became the “B” team of Martial Law, until ousted as their services were no longer required. History would indicate that it is these elements that have played a fissiparous role (division of the community into 72 sects — at last count). It is these forces that have prevented the creation of Pakistani nationalism. They have always clamoured about the Umma rather than Pakistan. It is because of these efforts that we stand totally isolated. The JI joined the US bandwagon, in 1979, when on the invasion of Afghanistan, American dollars began to roll in. Today, they are opposed to the Taliban because their darling, the Hizb, has been ousted from authority. It is no secret that it was the Hizb leadership that was responsible for the in-fighting and instability in Afghanistan.

It would also be noted, historically, that these elements have always opposed political governments and been responsible for instability in Pakistan, being fully aware that they cannot enter the corridors of power through a political process — elections, they attempt to find ways and means through the backdoor. It is the wisdom of the common Pakistani, that they do not trust these parties for governance. It is no secret that they are responsible for sectarian troubles and playing as proxies for different powers. Finally, they all clamour for Jehad (despite a Fatwa by Maulana Maudoodi to the contrary) but at the expense of other people’s children. (in most cases their own children are comfortably settled in the US. It is this rank hyprocrisy that militates against their playing a political role) the recently concluded Deoband Conference at Taru Jabba exposed their true colours vis-a-vis Jehad and the repression in Indian-held Kashmir.

  1. A CIA report predicts fragmentation of Pakistan. What is your opinion? What are your thoughts about the future of Pakistan ?

Pakistan is here to stay. Despite all failings and setbacks, on the whole great progress has been made. The human mind is never satisfied. In 1947 Pakistan had hardly any industry. Since 1947 great progress has been made. Initially, Pakistan suffered great setbacks like the early death of Mr Jinnah, the aircraft crash in which Gen Iftikhar and Sher Khan died, the assassination of the first Prime Minister and selection of Ayub Khan a non-professional soldier with poor/nominal war record and a pathetic performance in the Punjab Boundary Force. While the first Constituent Assembly had delayed Constitution making and elections Ayub actively conspired with the bureaucrats to destabilise democracy. All these factors greatly retarded progress. But for Pakistan there would have been no Pakistani Presidents, PMs, Ministers, Governors or Generals etc. It has been a blessing. Look at the abject poverty and third rate citizenship of Muslims in India. If there was no opportunity the ilk of Beg, Jamal, Moin or Musharraf would not have come to Pakistan. We are generally an ungrateful people. In retrospect we are much better off in 2001 than in 1947. There is great hope. I have not lost faith in Pakistan’s future. I dismiss the assertion that Pakistan is a failed State!

Globe

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Re: Interview: Naseerullah Baber

The interview is oudated. Anyhow, the brat has given a glimpse of what he is. His forefathers were the stooges of British and he of the new masters. In fact, the whole family has subservience as the profession.

The thief also stole antiques from Afghan Musuim. I have heard Afghan government is thinking of activating international agencies to recover those from him. His crimes against Urdu-speakers of Karachi is another proof of his devlishness.

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Re: Interview: Naseerullah Baber

Very long interview. But thanks for posting it.

If it were not for him crushing MQM uprising, Karachi would have left Pak long ago.

He saved us from all these rampaging terrorists. Tough,tough man.

which celebrity do different members remind you of