Realism of India’s UN ambition
By Shaukat Umer
AN astute Cuban diplomat, with long experience of the United Nations, once described the decision making process in the Security Council by drawing an enigmatic mathmatical equation: 1+1+3+10=15. He deciphered the riddle as follows; on any major issue one must first get the support of the United States. Britain will automatically follow suit. France, Russia and China would come along after offering varying degrees of resistance. Thereafter the 10 non permanent members would be left with no option but to join the permanent five.
That was in 1993, when the successor state to the erstwhile Soviet Union was in shambles and American supremacy virtually unchallenged. The world has moved on from there but the fundamentals of my Cuban friend’s formula remain valid even today.
India’s initiative to secure the UN secretary-general’s post shows keen appreciation of how the Security Council functions. If its nominee Shashi Tharoor, an under- secretary general and Kofi Annan’s close confidante, had obtained even an implicit assurance of US support prior to announcing his candidature, the remaining numbers in the puzzle, with the possible exception of China, should be expected to fall in place. Britain and France have openly supported India’s claim for permanent membership of the Security Council and enjoy the closest of relations with that country. The two are also supportive of the Indo-US nuclear deal and are expected to lobby for it in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group once it is cleared by the American Congress.
Russia, despite India’s recent closeness with the United States, remains a strategic ally and the supplier of most of India’s weaponry. China’s attitude would be decisive provided it is prepared to cast a negative vote against the Indian nominee in the Security Council. Even if China abstains, Shashi Tharoor would not be thwarted, since a veto is necessary to disable a candidacy. Given the growing political and economic ties between India and China, it is this writer’s assessment that a Chinese veto, particularly if the other P-4 are in agreement, would be inconsistent with the content and the emerging trend of bilateral relations between the two countries. It would also be at variance with China’s traditional aversion to taking positions of strident opposition unless its vital national interests are seen to be in jeopardy.
This takes us back to the first number in the equation, the United States. Since there were already three Asian candidates in the field, namely the Deputy prime minister of Thailand, the foreign minister of South Korea and Dhanapalan an accomplished Sri Lankan diplomat, what prompted Tharoor to stake his own claim?
India was quick to lend him its wholehearted official support. Tharoor is a UN insider and a shrewed tactician. Why did he choose to enter an already crowded arena? Just to try his luck?
Or is his and India’s decision the outcome of prior consultations and some understandings with the P-5, more specifically the US. An accurate answer to this query would comprise the first test of our diplomacy in the opening moves of what promises to be an absorbing and intense diplomatic tussle.
One might be wondering that for such a major appointment, easily the most prestigious in the multilateral system, why has the constituency been limited to a mere five countries with a pronounced accent on just one. What about the General Assembly, where the entire UN membership of 191 countries is represented and which has been designated by the UN Charter as the final authority for appointing the secretary-general? The reader’s bewilderment would be dispelled by a short analysis of the manner in which the secretary general is appointed.
According to the Charter he is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council.
In practice, however, since the inception of the United Nations, the General Assembly has never overturned a candidate recommended by the Security Council. In recent decades, the Assembly has not even asked to take a vote on the Council’s nominee preferring to express its approval by acclamation. There is considerable logic behind this practice.
To take a vote, one or more countries would be required to formally ask for it. Since the Council recommends only one candidate, no country considers it worthwhile to challenge the Council’s nominee regardless of how distasteful that person might be.
Because such a challenge is most likely to be beaten, even an adversarially inclined delegation considers it in its interest to avoid causing offence and stay on the right side of the prospective secretary- general. So on the specific issue of selection of the secretary-general, the table needs to be slightly amended; 1+1+3+10=191.
There have been widespread calls to reform this process by making it transparent and giving the General Assembly a more meaningful role in the secretary-general’s selection. For instance, it has been suggested that all candidates should be obliged to present their vision before the general membership and respond to their concerns to enable an informed assessment of their competence and political inclinations.
It has also been proposed that, instead of recommending one individual, the Council should present a panel of three and let the General Assembly then elect the most suitable amongst them.
These are constructive ideas which would make the process democratic and participatory and render the secretary-general more widely accountable to the membership. Understandably these proposals are being resisted by the Permanent 5, since their implementation would deprive the big powers of a vital lever of authority. The forthcoming election would thus, in all likelihood, be decided in the Security Council, with the veto wielding five permanent members in the driving seat.
A brief look at the current non-permanent members of the Security Council would be instructive. These are Argentina, Republic of Congo, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia, Tanzania. None amongst them would go against an agreement amongst the Permanent Five. On the specific issue of India’s candidature several would be quite supportive, particularly Ghana (Tharoor’s long association with Kofi Annan, a Ghanian) Greece (India’s consistent support on Cyprus), Japan (India’s close ally on Security Council expansion) Slovakia(historical ties with Eastern European countries) and Tanzania (Nonaligned affiliation and economic assistance).I do not see the remaining five taking up the cudgels for any one of India’s three rivals. Much has been made of the Thai candidate enjoying the support of the entire Asean group. This would be of little help since none of the Asean countries are currently represented on the Security Council.
Hence the significance of 1+1+3+10 and the need for a correct answer to the question posed earlier in this analysis.
It has been argued that India does not qualify to occupy the secretary- general’s office since an unwritten tradition refrains a great economic or political power from seeking the office. This is not entirely correct.
The injunction applies essentially to the permanent members. Even if this postulate was extended to include great powers I would be disinclined to include India in that category. After all, did we not oppose India’s case for permanent membership precisely for this very reason? To now reject India’s bid for the top slot in the UN invoking its great power status would completely destroy the logic and credibility of our argument in regard to the membership issue.
How would the appointment of an Indian secretary-general impinge on our national interests? Quite adversely, one should imagine. In my long association with the United Nations and its affiliate agencies, I did not come across a single Indian UN employee who did not directly or indirectly advance his country’s interests particularly vis-a-vis Pakistan. Shashi Tharoor is no exception. There should be little doubt in our mind that he would use the powerful platform of the secretary-general’s office to subtly promote India’s agenda on Kashmir and the lopsided nature of the on-going peace process. A host of Indians would be appointed to senior positions to bring to bear their inherent bias against Pakistan.
Regardless of the current upgradation in our bilateral relations with India, in the context of multilateralism it is still a zero sum game, largely because of the Indian attitude. Its diplomats remain as negatively inclined towards Pakistan as ever.
One wonders whether India will ever be able to overcome the smallness of spirit which has been the cause of so much subcontinental misery.
Pakistan must develop a sensible strategy to counter the Indian candidature. It should not simply be seen to be reactive as currently appears but spring from an objective assessment of the situation in its global context. The length of this article obliges me to examine this aspect separately.
(To be concluded)
The writer is a former ambassador.