After the war both India and Pakistan claimed ‘victory’. It is open to interpretation what is meant by the word ‘victory’, and it
may be true to some extent that they were both ‘victors’ because both have in their occupation land which did not belong to
them. The only loser in this war game were the Kashmiri people who were the main suffering party; and who despite huge
sacrifices were still divided and oppressed.
Mrs Indira Gandhi was once asked by a foreign journalist that Pakistan claims to have won the 1965 war, and India makes a
similar claim; what was her opinion on this. With a smile she said we did not send any one to liberate the area which is under
illegal occupation of Pakistan. It was Pakistan which sent the "intruders" in order to get Kashmir from India. Our purpose, at
that time, was not to get any more area which is occupied by Pakistan, we simply wanted to drive out the "saboteurs" out of
Kashmir. Kashmir is still with us and the "intruders" were successfully pushed out of Kashmir. I want you to be judge and
decide who is the ‘victor’.
- Operation Gibraltar rejected by the Army Chief
Brigadier (R) Farooq who was an officer in the force which was sent to 'liberate Kashmir' claims in his book, 'Operation
Gibraltar', that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan was one of the brains behind this. 5 According to him,
Bhutto set up a ' Liberation Cell ', which included people like:
Mr Aziz Ahmed
Mr Nazir Ahmed
Mr Ayub Buksh Awan
Mr NA Farooqi
Mr Ahmed
Mr Altaf Goher
(although the later did not attend any of the meetings)
General Musa, Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army at that time, confirms the existence of this 'Cell', which was set up in
August of 1964. 6 The majority of the members of this 'Cell' were from the 'Qadiani sect'. This 'Cell' had the support of some
senior army officers, including Major General Akhtar Malik, who was also known to be a 'Qadiani'.
When this ambitious plan was first sent to the GHQ, General Musa opposed it and wrote the following points to the President
Ayub Khan:
A. Guerrilla war in Kashmir can only be successful if the people of Kashmir take part in it, and in my opinion we need more
time to prepare people for this.
B. During the guerrilla war if India realized that it is losing the war in Kashmir, she will attack Pakistan.
C. As long as Pakistan is not in a position to defeat India militarily, we should not venture such operation in Kashmir.
D. In order to defeat India we need more army, better arms and better training.
(General Musa asked for money to set up two more army divisions to face the challenge. General Ayub in principle agreed with
this idea, but the Finance Minister Mr Shoaib persuaded him against this by saying that the Pakistan economy cannot afford it.
And this idea was dropped. It is ironic that no such army was raised before the start of the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ or during its
operations, but after the war, in the same month, two divisions were set up).
It is amazing to note that Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who retired from his position on 23 July 1965 was not consulted on this
important issue. It was quite obvious that with an ‘ Operation ‘ of that nature there would be some serious response from India,
which could lead to a full scale war, and for that the assistance of the air force was must. The planners, for what ever reason,
assumed that like 1947 India would limit the war to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan had pay heavily for this wrong,
rather foolish assumption.
Despite this opposition from the senior army men, including the Commander in Chief, the go ahead was given to this
'Operation'. In Brigadier (R) Farooq's view, Mr Bhutto played the leading role in persuading Ayub Khan. According to him,
Bhutto must have said to Ayub Khan that:
You missed an opportunity of liberating Kashmir in 1963, while India was engaged in a war with China.
You are just as great and important as Mao- se -Tang of China, General Charles De Gaul of France, and Marshall Tito of
Yugoslavia. You have made Pakistan a strong and viable country. Pakistan needs you, and his (Bhutto’s) wish is that Ayub
Khan remains president for life. This can only be done if some how Kashmir is liberated and joined with Pakistan. If this can
happen then it will establish him in the history as a great leader and conqueror, and there will be no parallel to his greatness.
Furthermore Bhutto is what he (Ayub Khan) has made him, and it is his desire to serve him as the Foreign Secretary to pay
his due.
Another writer, Arshad Ahmed, in an article on the 1965 war said:
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wanted to deprive Ayub Khan of his power, and this was not possible until the strength, ego and pride of the
army was not smashed. This view was supported by Marxist leader Tariq Ali, who was close to the Peoples Party which
Bhutto formed after disagreements with the Ayub Khan Government, said in an interview in America that, he had asked Bhutto
about the 1965 war, and Bhutto told him: Until these generals are not defeated it is not possible to get in power in Pakistan. 9
According to the writer this view is also supported by prominent people like Major General Rao Farman Ali, Lt. General Atiq
Ul Reman, Major General Ahesan Ul Haq, Col. Ghafar and Altaf Goher.
Brigadier Arshad who was the Director Military Intelligence also opposed this 'Operation', but later agreed to go along with the
tide, perhaps he had realized the trend and did not want to oppose this and jeopardies his promotion prospects. He later retired
as a Lt. General. According to Brigadier (R) Farooq General Musa was a simple man. He gave his opinion about the
'Operation' and then did not make it a matter of pride and remained quiet. if he and General Sher Bahdar who also opposed the
idea, had resigned then there would have been no 'Operation Gibraltar'
A top level meeting was held at the Headquarters of the 12 th Division in May 1965. Once again, General Musa opposed the
plan, and to this President Ayub Khan: 'Musa I have been assured by the Foreign Office that India would not be involved in a
full scale war'. When both General Musa and General Sher Bahadar said that if we are to start a guerrilla war at that level, it is
very likely that India would react and attack Pakistan. President Ayub Khan reacted by saying: 'We will have to take heart
sometime'
Apart from the assurance to which President Ayub Khan made reference that India would not attack Pakistan, Pakistani
planners of this ‘Operation’ were led to believe that India is not in a position to launch attack against Pakistan until 1966 or
1967. It was emphasized that we do not waste any more time, and start our action as soon as possible.
During this time the plan was discussed with Col. Syed Ghafar Mehdi, the Commander of the Special Services Group, whose
officers were also to take part in this Operation. After reading it he said:
'The whole concept of this Operation is wrong, and the planning is wrong too. The planners have not used their common sense
and intelligence. This is a product of a bankrupt mind, and it is possible that this may prove to be "Bay of Pigs" for Pakistan.' 14
- Objectives of the Operation
We have looked at the planners and the leaders of the ‘Operation’, now let us examine at its objectives. According to Brigadier
(R) Farooq it was assumed that as the result of this guerrilla war the Kashmir problem would be settled within weeks; if this did
not happen, at least, it would force the United Nations to intervene and have a cease fire.
India had started calling Kashmir as its 'integral part', this was contrary to the UN resolutions and India's pledges regarding
Kashmir. The aim of the ‘Operation’ was:
- To expose the Indian claim on Kashmir by the guerrilla war - present it as the Kashmiri peoples
[This message has been edited by rvikz (edited February 15, 2001).]