Seems interesting. Always nice to read that some Pakistanis do want to go and do some serious research work on our history.
The British Papers:
Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1958-1969
Compiled by Roedad Khan
Published by Oxford University Press, Karachi
Price: Rs 995
By Dr Tariq Rahman
In recent years, scholars have compiled declassified official records both in England and America. Some of these records have to do with politics and history of Pakistan. The earlier books that comprise Pakistan-related documents, declassified earlier, include Roedad Khan’s The American Papers (1999) and F S Aijazuddin’s The White House and Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents 1969-1974. Both these books provide us with an insight enabling us to understand Pakistan’s murky political history and, especially, the way the others see us.
The book under review comprises documents pertaining to Ayub Khan’s era falling between 1958-1969. The documents include despatches, letters, telegrams and reports sent by British diplomats from Pakistan to Britain. The primary significance of these documents is that they help understand readers how democracy was sabotaged in Pakistan.
The first letter in the book written on August 23,1958 dates back to the time when President Iskander Mirza was about to put an end to democratically formed government. Elections were due and Mirza was feeling that his power would be curtailed afterwards. He told then British High Commissioner in Pakistan Alexander Symon that “if the election returns showed that a post-electoral government was likely to be dominated by undesirable elements, he would himself intervene”. Symon remarks that ‘undesirability’ was left undefined by Iskander Mirza.
The British diplomats were quite sympathetic to Mirza despite being extremely cautious in expressing their opinion. As early as on September 23 of the same year, it was clear to them that what Mirza had in mind was ‘a personal coup with Army support’. Symon also conveyed this to Macmillan, the then British prime minister. But contrary to what one would expect from a society embedded in a democratic political culture, the British did not seem to mind the prospect of this subversion of democracy.
Anyway the coup took place on October 7, 1958 and was immediately reported by the British High Commissioner to his high-ups in London. He reported that President Mirza had planned his move in secrecy. He also reported that Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan’s Armed Forces General Ayub Khan had also told Mirza to act failing which the general would act himself. This shows that even in those distant times the army chief felt he could intervene in political affairs. The British wanted to maintain good relations with Pakistan but were not concerned as to who should rule the country. When Ayub Khan toppled Mirza on October 28, 1958 this too was duly reported and accepted as fait accompli.
The telegrams about Iskander Mirza’s arrest and departure first to Quetta and then to London have a dramatic significance. Three generals – General Azam, General Burki and General Sheikh – were sent to persuade Mirza to abdicate. Their meeting with Mirza and other details have been mentioned in other sources as well. A brief mention may also be made of the fact that Mirza was paid his military pension to the tune of Rs 2,000 a month while he was staying in London.
Despatches dated November 3, 1958 mention General Yahya Khan, the then chief of the general staff, as the ‘most able and ambitious’ of those nearest to Ayub. The diplomats writing these despatches must have been very competent because their judgments proved to be so accurate. In a letter, written as far back as November 1958, one of generals commented that Ayub would not go for drastic land reforms because the most senior officers came ‘from land-owning families’. This, as we have seen, is what happened.
The British despatches continued to describe Ayub Khan’s 11 years of rule with great accuracy. A despatch of April 22, 1964 said Pakistan was turning into an oriental princedom. In then British High Commissioner Morrice James’s words: “The gilded pomp of the recent Pakistan day investiture which I watched not long ago in Rawalpindi had little about it that could be called republican”. These despatches also predicted that Pakistan will drift towards Muslim, not Western, political patterns.
A separate report on East Pakistan said Ayub regime since it was ‘essentially a Punjab-Pathan autocracy seasoned with migrants from UP’, could never be popular in the Eastern wing.
The 1965 war received much coverage in the papers. This source confirmed, like all earlier sources, that Bhutto was the ‘hawk’ and Ayub the ‘dove’ in the war. Indeed, as British diplomats noted, Ayub seemed to be surprised that India had reacted to Pakistan’s armed excursions into Kashmir by an open attack. It appears that the thinking in Pakistan in 1965, as in 1999 during the Kargil crisis, was that India would not escalate the Kashmir war.
Pakistani conspiracy-theorists believe that Western powers are anti-Pakistan. The facts are otherwise. One American ambassador, for instance, wrote to his government that the destruction of Pakistan’s military capability was not in American interests. If this happens, it will create a vacuum which the Chinese might fill, he wrote. There are several British documents showing concerns about the survival of Pakistan. So, while it is true that these countries like all others are moved by their self-interest in the first place, it is also true that they have not had any special anti-Pakistan bias.
The 1965 war had many adverse effects. One was the further alienation of East Pakistan which the diplomats have reported in detail. The other one was a newfound resentment against Pakistan in the Indian army. According to a report, whereas the older Indian officers talked affectionately about their Pakistani counterparts, the younger ones had no such nostalgic memories. The 1965 war had convinced them that Pakistan could not be trusted.
The despatches of 1968 report anti-Ayub disturbances all over Pakistan. Then Yahya Khan’s martial law is also reported. While nobody can be certain whether Yahya actually forced Ayub out, the reports suggest that Yahya had decided not to support the Ayub regime. Even more meaningfully, it is mentioned that the political situation was actually improving when Ayub resigned.
The last report, written on June 13,1969, says that Yahya may keep the military in power for a long time but if he does so, there may be an ‘explosion’ in East Pakistan. As we know, Yahya took the risk of going for elections but did not implement the results of that election. This led to the ‘explosion’ the diplomats had predicted.
On the whole, one feels that Pakistani leaders during the period covered by the book did not believe in democracy at all as they were all non-elected, non-political figures. They had no faith in democratic processes nor did they desire to create a democratic culture in the country. Moreover, western powers, which do have institutionalised democratic institutions, looked only after their self-interest which meant doing business with whoever happened to be in power. They took no principled stand in favour of democracy despite all the rhetoric to the contrary. This, of course, is what one would expect in a world so cynically obsessed with the pursuit of its selfish self-interest.
What one cannot help praising is the competence, good sense and intelligence of the diplomats who sent the despatches recorded in the book. And, of course, one would be unjust if one does not praise the compiler of these papers who has taken the pains to put them in one volume. The only suggestion I have to offer is that such compilations should also carry a summary of all documents. Dr Zawwar Zaidi in his Jinnah Papers does provide such a summary and it is immensely helpful. Apart from that I wish there were more people doing such important but arduous tasks of compiling important documents without which serious scholarship cannot go on.