Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

Yes lay the blame on Pakistan (the scapegoat) now! But in effect they seem to have lost the war to win over the hearts and minds due to their arrogance.

Afghans turn on occupiers

Shock, incomprehension, fury. Americans are feeling these raw emotions as news keeps coming in of more attacks by Afghan government soldiers and officials on US and NATO troops. Six US troops were killed last week as a result of protests across Afghanistan following the burning of the Holy Quran by incredibly dim-witted American soldiers.

**“Aren’t they supposed to be our allies? We are over there to save them! What outrageous ingratitude,” ask angry, confused Americans.

Angry Britons asked the same questions in 1857 when “sepoys,” individual mercenary soldiers of Britain’s Imperial Indian Army, then entire units rebelled and began attacking British military garrisons and their families. British history calls it the “Indian Mutiny.” Indians call it the “Great Rebellion” marking India’s first striving for freedom from the British Raj and the Indian vassal princes who so dutifully served it.
**
Britons were outraged by the “perfidy” and “treachery” of their Indian sepoys who were assumed to be totally loyal because they were fighting for the king’s shilling. Victorian Britain reeled from accounts of frightful massacres of Britons at places like Lucknow, Cawnpore, Delhi, and Calcutta’s infamous “black hole.”

As Karl Marx observed watching the ghastly events in India, western democracies cease practicing what they preach in their colonies. British forces in India, backed by loyal native units, mercilessly crushed the Indian rebels. Rebel ringleaders were tied to the mouths of cannon and blown to bits, or hanged en masse.

Today’s Afghanistan recalls Imperial India. Forces of the US-installed Kabul government, numbering about 310,000 men, are composed of Tajiks and Uzbeks from the north, some Shia Hazaras, and a hodgepodge of rogue Pashtun and mercenary groups. Ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks served the Soviets when they occupied Afghanistan as well as the puppet Afghan Communist Party. Today, as then, Tajiks and Uzbeks form the core of government armed forces and secret police. They are the blood enemies of the majority Pashtun, who fill the ranks of Taleban and its allies in Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan.

But half the Afghan armed forces and police serve only to support their families.** The Afghan economy under NATO’s rule is now so bad that even in Kabul, thousands are starving or dying from intense cold. Half of Afghans are unemployed and must seek work from the US-financed government.
**
**But loyal they are not. While covering the 1980’s jihad against Soviet occupation, I saw everywhere that soldiers and officials supposedly loyal to the Communist Najibullah regime in Kabul kept in constant touch with the anti-Soviet mujahidin and reported all Soviet and government troops movements well in advance. The same thing occurs today in Afghanistan. Taleban know about most NATO troops operations before they leave their fortified bases. Among Afghans, the strongest bonds of loyalty are family, clan and tribal connections. They cut across all politics and ideology.
**
Afghans are a proud, prickly people who, as I often saw, take offense all too easily. Pashtuns are infamous for never forgetting an offense, real or imagines, and biding their time to strike back. This is precisely what has been happening in Afghanistan, where arrogant, culturally ignorant US and NATO ‘advisors’ – who are really modern versions of the British Raj’s “white officers leading native troops”- offend and outrage the combustible Afghans. Those who believe 20-year old American soldiers from the Hillbilly Ozarks can win the hearts and minds of Pashtun tribesmen are fools.
**
Proud Pashtun Afghans can take just so much from unloved, often detested foreign “infidels” advisors before exploding and exacting revenge.
This also happened during the Soviet era. But some Soviet officers at least had more refined cultural sensibilities in dealing with Afghan. US-Afghan relations are not going to flowers when American troops call the Afghans “sand niggers” and “towel heads.” Many US GI’s hail from the deep south. **

Many Afghans have just had enough of their foreign occupiers. The Americans have lost their Afghan War. As the Imperial British used to say: you can only rent Afghans for so long. One day they will turn and cut your throat.
Eric Margolis is a veteran US journalist

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

Karzai’s team clash over relations with US - Features - Al Jazeera English

Kabul, Afghanistan - The increasing influence of a conservative circle within President Hamid Karzai’s palace has impeded progress in signing a crucial strategic agreement with the US to chart the relationship beyond 2014, officials and analysts have said.

Their outspoken anti-US views have frustrated Karzai’s diplomats negotiating with US officials, often resulting in messy clashes.

On March 8, a day before Afghanistan and the United States signed an agreement to gradually transfer control of prisons to the Afghan government, Jawid Ludin, the deputy foreign minister, and Karim Khurram, Karzai’s chief of staff, were summoned to brief Karzai ahead of a video conference with US President Barack Obama. Also in the room were General John Allen, the US commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Ryan Crocker, the US ambassador to Kabul.

Just minutes before the call between the two leaders, Karzai left the room for a break, according to three separate sources inside the palace. In the following few minutes, in a confrontation that reportedly verged on physical violence, Khurram and Ludin accused each other of spying - one for Pakistan, the other for the United States. They were split up by the NATO commander and the US ambassador.

**Accusations

**It all began with a complaint from General Allen, the palace sources said. The US embassy and NATO declined to comment for this article.

General Allen reportedly stated that the prisons would be gradually handed over, one of Karzai’s pre-conditions to signing a long-term strategic agreement on wider issues. But the Afghan government’s media wing must tone down its anti-US rhetoric, Allen insisted.

The Government Media and Information Center(GMIC) falls directly under the authority of Khurram, Karzai’s chief of staff.

Ludin, one of Karzai’s chief negotiators, turned to Khurram and reiterated the General’s point - that such comments hindered negotiations with the US.

Khuram, according to the palace sources, said GMIC was only defending Afghanistan’s interests - which Ludin took as an insult.

What Khurram insinuated, an official close to Ludin said, was that the foreign ministry was betraying Afghanistan in negotiations with the US.

Ludin said he would take it upon himself to stop GMIC from making such statements, to which Khurram reportedly responded: “Not even your father can do that.”

“You are a spy for the Americans, you do whatever they tell you,” Khurram told Ludin at the meeting, according to one official.

Ludin, in return, accused Khurram of spying for Pakistan. At that point, General Allen and Ambassador Crocker are said to have stepped in to prevent a physical confrontation.

Ludin declined to comment for this article. Khurram, after hearing about the premise in person, promised an interview, but then refused to answer his phone.

“Diplomacy was set aside,” one senior government official told Al Jazeera about the meeting. “They turned to the Afghan way of arguing.”

When Karzai returned to the room, the video-conference went ahead. The prison deal, gradually transferring control to the Afghan government over six months, was signed before the cameras of the world’s media the next day, as planned. But the reported confrontation underlines how divided President Karzai’s inner court is, with regard to the nature of the long-term relationship with the United States.

**Divided palace

**
“It has been one and half years that the palace has been fractured into two groups,” said analyst Abdul Waheed Wafa, the director of the Afghanistan Center at Kabul University.

“On the one side, you have people who say: ‘We have not achieved what we want, but we need to stick with the internationals because the alternative is chaos.’ Then the other elements - they are against night raids, and against a long-term US and international presence.”

The strategic agreement is supposed to provide Afghanistan - a poor country that requires foreign donations for roughly 90 per cent of its annual budget - some assurance to continue its new beginning after decades of war. More importantly, the support of the US would bolster Afghan standing in a volatile region, where the country’s neighbours have long been accused of interfering in its internal affairs. For the US, a longer presence in Afghanistan would ensure that it could operate against “threats to US national security”, by being able to go after the sanctuaries of those who it believes would use violence against US interests.

But the increasing influence of the conservative chief of staff, and his clashes with what he sees as pro-US elements within Karzai’s circle and beyond, has hindered progress to such a point that, in recent weeks, the US announced “it is more important to get the right agreement than to get an agreement”. Some interpreted that as the US expressing a decreasing interest in the commitment.

Wafa said the announcement was a bluff that put pressure on the Afghan negotiators, who then compromised, tabling certain preconditions for separate discussions.

“The change of tone in the US was partly to pressure Afghans,” said Wafa. “But some Afghans believe it is true - that these people [US officials] are fully frustrated, the US public opinion is against the war, even some senators who were staunch supporters of the war are now saying it is hopeless. That those who wanted an exit got an excuse - that look, the Afghans don’t want us, they don’t want to sign a long term commitment.”

Three issues have been of contention in the negotiating process: US control over Afghan detainees, night raids, and permanent military bases. The two sides agreed to remove the issues of prison transfer and night raids from the strategic agreement, allowing them to be discussed separately.

The prison transfer was signed on March 9, while the memorandum over night raids is being finalised this week, according to an official at the national security council. But the contentious issue of military bases still looms large.

The argument on March 8 was not just a spur of the moment event. Those views were repeated in subsequent interviews.

“Khurram clearly has an agenda - and he wants to disturb any progress in the relations with the US,” an official close to Ludin insisted days after the incident. The other side was no different.

“Absolutely, there are circles that see their sustenance in the West’s benefits, and they don’t think about the nation,” said Ghulam Gilani Zwak, the director of Kabul’s Afghan Research and Consulting Center. "They insist on not negotiating and bargaining, and their actions are slave-like.

“But there are others who have the interest of the nation in mind, who don’t want the repeat of what Dr Abdullah Abdullah and Younus Qanooni signed with the US in December 2001, bringing our independence under question.”

Zwak was referring to an alleged agreement signed between the US government and representatives of the northern alliance, then an anti-Taliban group holed up in the north, which helped the US topple the Taliban. But the “status of force” agreement that stands now, giving US military personnel immunity from criminal prosection by Afghan law, wasactually signed with Karzai’s transitional government in 2003, a US congress report says.

The foreign ministry’s dysfunction is much spoken about in Afghanistan. Zalmai Rasul, an aging foreign minister, has been called a passive operator without much foreign policy experience. Ludin, a former spokesman and chief of staff to Karzai, shoulders most of the responsibility in the foreign ministry, where many appointments are allegedly based on kinship.

“Our foreign policy weakness is that we haven’t had a stable foreign policy, a clear vision. It’s all been reactionary, ad-hoc,” said Wafa.

Ahmad Shuja, a Washington-based Afghan analyst, believes the palace repeatedly steps on the toes of the diplomats, making it difficult for them to do their job.

“Karzai’s statement, his dynamism, eclipses the efforts of the foreign ministry to set policy. It is diplomacy ‘Afghanistan style’ - not policy in the conventional sense.”

And Khurram’s tight grip over the president in the past year has made the job much more difficult for diplomats like Ludin, said analysts.

**Frustrations

**
A controversial former minister of culture, Khurram took over the post of Karzai’s chief of staff in early 2011 - a position that has held increasingly more power in the country, particularly under Khurram’s predecessor, Omar Dawoodzai.

During his stint as culture minister, Khurram was known as a strict censor of television programmes.

Shuja believes Khurram’s seemingly anti-US views stem from two sources.

“His political ideology is shaped by his alignment with Hizb e Islami, and that seems to figure in his calculations,” he said. Led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hizb e Islami began as a political party that fought the Soviets. It played a major role in Afghanistan’s bloody civil war in the 1990s, and now is considered the third (and weakest) faction of the anti-US insurgency.

“But also, let’s not forget that they have been trying to reach out to the insurgency. Delaying the signing of a strategic pact will help them in appeasing the Taliban,” added Shuja.

In purging the GMIC, which is largely funded by the US embassy, the new chief of staff announced his intention to control the government’s message. Frustrated with Khurram’s control, the US embassy cancelled funding for a brief period and withdrew its advisers from the media group.

Khurram also issued a warning to the president’s press staff, ordering them not to allow US advisers in press conferences, one palace official tols Al Jazeera.

The US embassy declined to comment for this story. But a US official based in Kabul confirmed the frustrations with the palace.

“For the embassy, it is hard to get any access inside the palace since the chief of staff changed,” the official said.

Khurram has at least three private newspapers, a television channel and a radio station under his control, directly or indirectly, one official - who formerly worked for him - said.

“The message is not just an anti-American one, but also divisive internally,” said Khurram’s former colleague. “His brand of conservative Pashtunism strengthens the notion that all Pashtuns are unilateralist and conservative by nature.”

“The president’s non-Pashtun allies have been increasingly isolated. The damage that Khurram has inflicted on President Karzai’s image in one year - his enemies could not have done the same.”

Reporting by Qais Azimy in Kabul, Afghanistan and Mujib Mashal in Doha, Qatar.
Follow them on Twitter: @qaisAje](https://twitter.com/#!/QaisAje%20), and @MujMash](https://twitter.com/#!/MujMash)

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?.

Are there still any doubts left, History does repeats itself... !!

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

The war in Afghanistan is not a war to conquer Afghanistan or the Afghan people. It is a war against terrorism, and people who indulge in terror activities. We have not lost in Afghanistan; in fact, we have curtailed terrorism in the region, and terrorists have been on the run. Today, Afghanistan is progressing in all aspects of life. Just take education for an example. Following is a snapshot of what USAID has done in this field as of June 2011:

  • More than seven million students are now enrolled in primary and secondary schools (37 percent are female).
  • University enrollment has grown to 62,000.
  • Printed more than 97.1 million textbooks for grades one through 12.
  • Supported 43,800 students annually in remote community-based schools.
  • Trained more than 53,000 teachers in 11 provinces.
  • Built or refurbished more than 680 schools.
  • Benefitted at least 1,700 professors and 10,000 students through computer literacy and English proficiency programs.

Afghans are progressing in other fields as well. The Afghan National Security Force is another success story. They are training hard, and have taken over security duties from ISAF in many areas. Soon they will be in charge of all security in Afghanistan. We understand that some recent issues have been a source of concern, but remember these are acts of a few individuals. We have the system in place to deal with these individuals. We cannot overlook all the good that is done in Afghanistan because of these few “black sheep.” Our mission in Afghanistan is coming to its natural end. We have captured or killed most of the Al-Qaeda leadership who have been a source of worldwide terror. Our victory is the defeat of terrorism.

Maj David Nevers
DET-United States Central Command
www.centcom.mil/ur

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

theres never a "winner" in a war. In fact - if anyone has won, its the afghan people for enduring americas "noble cause"

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

Were they ever on the winning side? Nope, I don't think so. They lost the war in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. And what happened in the end ? They run away with their tail between their legs, claiming victory. How sad..

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

The war will have been lost if the Taliban regain power, the country is thrown back into civil war, and the instability becomes a haven for a new generation of terrorists.

The term “War on TERROR” itself is flawed. Terrorism is a strategy, its a means. Should we also start a war on guerilla war, kidnapp, or perhaps a war on ransom! I mean the entire thing is so completely inane, only a politician could have come up with it.

At the end of the day, how can you win a war which you haven’t even defined?

And if you kill a few criminals/terrorists today, will you then return to kill their sons, and their sons ad infinitum?

I cant help but feel that while you are of killing terrorists, you are only producing new ones. Arent you feeding the very ideology you seek to quell?

Literacy is great and I wish the Afghans well, but it will all have been for nothing if the Taliban simply rush back in once Nato leaves. The Afghan Army leaves much to be desired. And if independent reports are anything to go by, the loyalty of these soldiers is sketchy at best.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

Today - Afghan forces killed 3 terrorist.

NATO: 3 foreign troops killed by Afghan forces - Yahoo! News

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

This year a very large proportion of killings of NATO forces have been carried out by ANA people.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

BBC News - Afghan arrests after authorities foil ‘suicide attack’

The Afghan authorities have arrested 18 people in Kabul after foiling plans for an apparent mass suicide attack, intelligence officials say.

They told the BBC that 11 suicide jackets had been seized inside the ministry of defence.

The officials say the attacks would have caused significant loss of life.** Some of those arrested are reported to Afghan National Army soldiers.**

Six soldiers were arrested at the time - initial reports suggested they were armed and prepared to attack.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

Im no friend of the Taliban by any stretch of the imagination, but at some point we all have to come to the realization that this war is failing, and the inevitable will eventually happen.

All we can hope for is that the Taliban will have learned something from their last stint and allow for a modicum of human dignity, and Afghans in general will cooperate with each other instead of bombing each other.

History repeats itself.

Is all this positive spin from the good people at CENTCOM so different from the fall of Dhaka, or the dying days of Vietnam? Havent we all heard this before...

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

no.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

So to fight lets say 5,000 terrorists you invade country, you destroy it, you killed how many civilians? you terrorised how many million civilians? you destroyed two country's economies, you lost credibility around the world, you caused loss of trillions to national exchequers/tax-payers in US, you fooled your own nation.... the list goes on, you can continue to live in denial.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

The biggest problem in the NATO (read American) strategy in Afghanistan is that most of the people in ANA are Tajiks and Uzbeks, with very few pashtuns. If the Americans leave Afghanistan in the present situation there will be a certain civil war which could divide Afghanistan into a pashtun South and Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara North. Any such division of Afghanistan on ethicity will spell problem from Pakistan too, as we could see a revival of the pashtunistan movement there. The best bet is to talk to the Afghan taleban and try to bring them in the mainstream (recent events during the past few weeks will haunt the efforts of any reconciliation) but there are not that many options left.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

If America cannot win then it has lost.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

of course they lost long time ago....

the US military so paranoid and have no clue they now left with walking into villages shooting at sleeping children!

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

Quite a few people see Afghanistan through distorted eyes here. I do not think the Americans have lost, if they had lost the whole country would be up in arms. That clearly is not the case. Most resistance is actually quite close to the porous borders areas near Pakistan. I doubt even half of the Pashtuns would support the Taliban even though they did have some good policies. The Taliban have no right to rule Afghanistan and we have no idea how popular they are even. They are not the representatives of Pashtuns in Afghanistan. The Taliban are a foreign backed organisation and only powerful because they have arms and will power.

I dont think Afghanistan will split on ethnic lines as all the ethnic groups there have a strong sense of national identity. The Uzbek and Tajik consider themselves Afghan and none I have ever met have shown support for independence or joining their ancestral countries.

I do not wish to see the NATO troops leave Afghanistan now as it would become a civil war again. I am glad the Taliban were removed as their distorted views on Islam were almost accepted as the truth at one point. Nato/USA/UK etc are not bothered about the common Afghans and never installed fair people in the first place. However, at least they broke the control the Taliban had. Anyway life was not much better under the Taliban anyhow.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

An end to illusion - FT.com

By Anatol Lieven
Among other flaws, it was the ignorance of local realities that led to the failure of the western project in Afghanistan

The western project in Afghanistan is now well and truly over. The US has no political plan for the country after its ground troops withdraw in 2014. Its move to create an enormous Afghan army to fight the Taliban, if it succeeds at all, can succeed only in bringing about military rule. For every dollar in international aid that enters the country, another flows out through corruption, money-laundering and capital flight. Over the past 10 years, only the most tenuous gains in western-style judicial reform and women’s rights have been achieved, even when backed by large western military forces.

**Not surprisingly, then, the Obama administration has finally acknowledged the need for direct talks with the Taliban. Unfortunately, powerful forces in Washington are working for different goals: to use these talks to split the Taliban and make a settlement unnecessary; and to retain US bases and special forces in Afghanistan so as to defend the Kabul regime – whatever it turns out to be – and continue attacks on al-Qaeda and Taliban targets in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Associated with these goals is hostility to and fear of Pakistan, leading to a view that this country should be “contained” – both as a sponsor of extremism, and because it is in imminent danger of becoming a failed state and a safe haven for terrorism.This approach to Pakistan is mistaken on three key points. First, if the US were to aim at a genuine compromise with the Taliban, then Pakistan would be an ally, not an enemy. Second, while Pakistan has certainly sheltered the Afghan Taliban, as senior US and British officials acknowledge, it continues to give vital help against terrorism directed at the US and Europe. And third, although the situation in Pakistan is certainly grave, it is in little danger of collapse in the near future – unless, through some mixture of attack and “containment”, the US itself brings this about.
**
Among those writers who have done most to promote the idea of Pakistan as a failing state is Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, who justly won fame with his excellent Taliban (2000) after 9/11. Descent Into Chaos, a 2008 account of the western failures in central Asia, was also a solid and detailed record of events, even if it lacked deeper analysis of Afghan and Pakistani political culture and society.

His latest book, Pakistan on the Brink, is unfortunately something of a disappointment. It is well worth reading for its sensible arguments against the containment of Pakistan by the US and in favour of a peace settlement with the Taliban; and for its descriptions of Rashid’s meetings with Afghan president Hamid Karzai and with senior western officials. However, it also shows signs of haste in its writing. It is more like a set of articles, aimed at different audiences, than a coherent work. Signs of carelessness are also evident in the prose. If you encounter sand in Rashid, you can be sure that someone’s head will be buried in it. Elephants are to be found in rooms rather than in zoos or jungles.The book’s relative incoherence also seems to reflect Rashid’s attempt to adjust some of his ideas to suit new circumstances and US policies, while sticking to others. Thus he has belatedly come round to backing peace negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and argues that they have “mellowed considerably since the 1990s”, including in their attitudes to women (though the evidence for this is in fact pretty ambiguous). He also now sees a clear gulf between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which he previously regarded as the closest of allies. This support for compromise within Afghanistan, however, sits uneasily alongside his continuing demand that Pakistan destroy without compromise Afghan and Pakistani militants on its own soil. Similarly, while Rashid criticises US policies as ill-thought-out, he demands that Pakistan give them its full support.

Most damagingly, Rashid at no point sets out his own concrete ideas of what a peace settlement in Afghanistan might be. As a significant participant in the US public debate on Afghan policy, this is a serious failure on his part.** A compromise with the Taliban will be deeply painful and highly unpopular with many sections of US society; but as the western position in Afghanistan crumbles almost by the week, experts on the region now have an obligation to advance concrete, useful plans, not pious generalities. Without discussing the details of a settlement, it is impossible to discuss what may or may not be practical, and what Pakistan and other regional states can or cannot reasonably be asked to support.
**
On Pakistan, Rashid’s belief that the country is “on the brink” stems in part from what can only be called a disappointed belief in miracles – all too common among the Pakistani liberal elites to which he belongs. It seems that he genuinely hoped for great reforms from the elected government of the Pakistan People’s party and President Asif Ali Zardari – though what gave him that hope in view of their previous record in office and the class interests they represent, God alone knows. When miraculous change failed to arrive, he swung to utter condemnation of that government’s failings. Yet in fact, by Pakistani standards (rather than idealised western ones) the Zardari administration has some limited but real achievements to its credit. It has brought about modest improvements in revenue collection; and passed, through democratic compromise, very difficult reforms rebalancing revenues between Pakistan’s provinces and devolving powers from the central government to the provinces. Pakistani democracy too, with all its faults, does give the chance for public frustration to vent itself without revolution – something that makes Pakistan very different from the Middle Eastern autocracies overthrown in the “Arab Spring”.

Above all, however, Rashid fails to understand the deeper sources of political, social and indeed religious resilience in Pakistani society because he is completely in thrall to western political stereotypes and western ideas of “normality” – a word he uses several times. **The ignorance with which the west entered Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban is pardonable given the complexity of that country. What is much less forgivable is that western institutions and officials remain so ignorant after more than a decade of western presence. They have betrayed a lack of curiosity amounting to narcissism when it comes to learning about Afghan society and culture – with disastrous results for western strategy. The same has been true of much western analysis of Pakistan.
**
This intellectual and political failure is reflected in the fact that Noah Coburn’s book *Bazaar Politics *is not only one of the most interesting and important of recent works on Afghanistan, it is also the only new piece of specific anthropological research on Afghanistan written in the past decade. And it is above all works of anthropology and history that western policy makers need when trying to operate in profoundly different social and cultural environments.

Much of western political science is hopelessly wedded to general theories based on schematic versions of western societies and institutions, and is remarkably impervious to even the strongest evidence of local experience. Western journalists on the ground rarely have the time or the background to challenge these paradigms.There is an interesting comparison to be made here with the western anthropology of the colonial period. Since Edward Said’s famous book Orientalism (1978), it has been fashionable to denounce these works because they shared the assumptions of empire and often aimed explicitly to serve its cause. This is quite true, but at least intelligent colonial administrators understood that knowledge is power and worked hard, often with genuine intellectual curiosity, to acquire that knowledge. Most of their latter-day descendants, by contrast, entered Afghanistan with little more than a faith in Blairite nostrums about “people everywhere wanting freedom”, and leave it with little more than embittered clichés about “tribalism” and “fanaticism”.

Most anthropological studies of Afghanistan have focused on the Pashtuns. Coburn, by contrast, looks at the Tajik town of Istalif, north of Kabul. This might seem a narrow field, but Coburn both paints a wonderfully vivid picture of the place and draws lessons from it that are of immense value for an understanding of societies where the state is only one among a multitude of constantly negotiating sources of power. His chapter on the “politics of stagnation” is a profound study of how the means that people in Istalif use to avoid conflict among themselves work at the same time to prevent economic development. Above all, by spending long periods listening to ordinary people, Coburn provides evidence that is worth a thousand official and semi-official briefing papers – as well as being a lot more fun to read.

Concerning the future, Coburn is pessimistic but not despairing. He brings out the tenuous nature of the peace that the west thinks it has established in places such as Istalif, where violence can be summoned up if powerful actors find it useful. On the other hand, he writes: **“If political and economic incentives shift and insurgents cease seeing disruption of the system as their most effective strategy, violence could end as quickly as it began.
**
**Coburn can usefully be read in conjunction with Astri Suhrke’s book When More is Less, a brilliant and merciless dissection of the strategies of the western officials and aid workers who appear in Coburn’s Istalif almost as visiting space aliens; and as described by Suhrke, Afghans have good reason to treat them with wariness. Suhrke, a Norwegian political scientist, looks at the megalomaniac illusions of the western project in Afghanistan, and the way in which as western policies stumbled, the dominant response – Vietnam-style – was not to abandon them but to reinforce them. In particular, the attempt to appeal to sceptical western electorates through the language both of building Afghan democracy and existential Afghan threats trapped the US and Nato in a “rhetoric trap” of their own making.
**
**It is especially important to pay attention to one belief attacked by Suhrke, because it may come back to haunt us in future operations. This is the view that the western project in Afghanistan was doomed not by its own inherent flaws and lack of correspondence to Afghan realities, but because the west did not pour even greater resources into Afghanistan after 2001 – a view held by Rashid among others.
**
Suhrke brings out the sometimes almost Soviet gap between western official rhetoric and reality. Thus in recent years the US has turned to a strategy of creating locally raised auxiliary police in southern Afghanistan to fight the Taliban, describing this as “empowering local communities”. In fact, this points directly towards a resurrection of the local warlord militias that ruled in the years after the fall of the Communist regime in 1992. Already their members have been accused by Human Rights Watch and other bodies of murder, rape and kidnapping. Lest we forget, it was precisely in order to get rid of such forces that the Taliban came together.

.Anatol Lieven is professor of war studies at King’s College London. His book ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’ has just been published in an updated paperback edition

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

^Good read! Afghanistan still the same Quamire it was when the soviets were here.

And while I have repected Rashid in the past, im starting to see him as someone who simply mongers to Western stereotypes by hyperinflating the issues…

This part in the article caught my attention. These things are genuine accomplishments. They may well make the basis for a stronger Pakistan tommorow… Something to reflect on for Pakistanis.

…Zardari administration has some limited but real achievements to its credit. It has brought about modest improvements in revenue collection; and passed, through democratic compromise, very difficult reforms rebalancing revenues between Pakistan’s provinces and devolving powers from the central government to the provinces. Pakistani democracy too, with all its faults, does give the chance for public frustration to vent itself without revolution – something that makes Pakistan very different from the Middle Eastern autocracies overthrown in the “Arab Spring”.

Re: Have Americans lost in Afghanistan?

Without pakistan military and slavish government the United states would have been finished many years ago on the afghan battleground, this author has no sense of reality what more does he want from pakistan they have spent $70 billion on someone elses war, lost 35,000 lives in process what else does this buffoon want?

as for democracy its is a funny word with no meaning pakistan has had democracy and what has it done for past 50 years… the silence is deafening

compare it to a nation like china which doesn’t fall for cheap foolish western slogans which worth nothing and doesn’t put food into belly of the poor people it has progressed to a much more advanced and greater level than pakistan.