Balochistan: an objective assessment
Dr Farrukh Saleem
One, Balochistan has a total area of 347,000 sq km, nearly 45 per cent of Pakistan’s landmass and a 750 km coastline stretching from Hub River to Gwadar Bay on the Pak-Iran border. The terrain is extremely rough and mountains dominate the terrain occupying 52 per cent of the land area.
Two, Balochistan has five per cent of Pakistan’s population nearly eight million residents. Baloch have learned to live with extremely harsh climatic conditions, water shortages, droughts, extreme temperatures and seasonal migrations.
Three, in 2000, twenty-two of the twenty-six districts of Balochistan were declared ‘drought affected’. Over the past year the situation has only worsened.
Four, Balochistan is endowed with mineral and natural resources – natural gas, oil, uranium and copper. The Sui gas reservoir meets 38 per cent of Pakistan’s gas need.
Five, the 12 Corps is headquartered in Quetta and comprises two divisions, 33rd and 41st. Additionally, the Frontier Corps (FC) is a paramilitary force with its units spread all over Balochistan. FC is officered by non-Baloch.
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Six, Balochistan has had four uprisings in the past 58 years – 1948, 1958-59, 1962-63 and 1973-77. Every subsequent uprising was more violent than the previous one but the Pak Army brought them all under control (in 2005, according to official data, there were 187 bomb blasts, 275 rocket attacks, eight attacks on gas pipelines, 36 attacks on electricity-transmission lines and 19 explosions on railway lines).
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Seven, Balochistan’s terrain is ideal for asymmetric warfare (defined as ‘warfare in which the two belligerents are mismatched in their military capabilities or their accustomed methods of engagements’). Baloch ‘insurgents’ have no front line, no single leader and operate in ‘small, mobile, flexible combat groups’ comprising 2 to 10 persons. Terrain is used as a force multiplier; ‘insurgents’ rely on a friendly indigenous population and employ guerrilla tactics based on ambush, sabotage, evasion and deception. Pak Army, on the other hand, is a disciplined conventional fighting force trained to execute battlefield tactics in order to subdue a well-defined enemy.
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Eight, Baloch ‘insurgents’ know very well that they cannot defeat the Pak Army. Their objective is a long, sustainable, low-intensity conflict that gradually increases Pak Army’s cost of maintaining its hold on Balochistan.
Nine, Pak Army – with 70,000 troops in Waziristan and six brigades deployed in Balochistan – is getting over stretched.
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Ten, insurgents have ready access to arms – at a cost – both within Balochistan, across the border in Afghanistan and through sea smuggling routes.
Eleven, Baloch ‘insurgents’ seem to have established a strong financial network – from London to Qatar, the UAE and then on to Balochistan – to fund the ‘insurgency’.
Twelve, London does not have any meaningful Baloch expatriate community but London, Qatar and the UAE are all home to large contingents of American intelligence agents. America’s immediate interest is not to destabilise Pakistan but the Pentagon has reclassified China as a ‘strategic adversary’ and China’s strategic presence in Gwadar is reason enough for a well-calibrated, low intensity boil in Balochistan.
Thirteen, the ‘insurgency’ is now in a phase whereby it is actively soliciting a state- backer.
Fourteen, if the ‘insurgency’ spreads the cost of containing it – in terms of manpower and capital – will skyrocket.
Fifteen, the cost of suppressing the insurgency – through extreme use of force – in terms of our international standing is going up by the day. Sixteen, the root cause of every insurgency is grievances.
